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INTRODUCTION 
I. The problemo--The problem of the dissertation, briefly _stat-
ed, is whether, in the light of Immanuel Kant•·s thought, there 
is any justifiable religious certainty (particularly of Godle 
existence), and if so, to what degreeo This involves the sub-
ordina~but crucial problem: can logical certainty and psycho-
logical certainty be correlated, i.e. is an empirical theology 
possible? An answer is sought in Kant's treatment of the prob-
lem of God, for it suggests three types of religious certainty, 
namely: 1) theoretical, 2) moral, and 3) experiential~ These 
require for their consideration a passage from dogmatic-ration-
alism to empiricism via Kant's attempted mediation of these ex-
tremes in critical rationalism, and lead to a retracing of steps 
to what is considered a true mean (rational-empirical certainty--
the correlation of the logical and psychological aspects), in 
the Hegelian conviction that the rational is the whole, and that 
a rationalism which does not consider the whole of experience by 
the whole reason of a whole personality (intellect, sensibility, 
will) is not a true rationalism, and that an empiricism "1hich 
does not include faith and reason as parts of experience is not 
a true empiricism. That is, basic to the discussion are the 
contrasts between part and whole reason, part and whole faith, 
and part and whole experience·. The first three of the methods 
of arriving at religious oer.tainty have been unjustly subjected 
to the limitations of either one or more of the fragments of 
~-------=---~----..:...-------:.,..--... ...:......---·- - .... 
2 
reason, faith, and experience. For inst~nce, it will be sholm 
that Kant's pure reason of the first Critique, even when supple-
mented by the practical reason of the second and third Critiques, 
was not whole reason. 
II. Definitions.--"!teligious certaintyn is psychological con-
viction of the existence of divine realities, particularly of 
God. This certainty may be merely psychological, or it may be 
grounded in logical considerationo When it is desirable to 
distinguisn bet't.geen the .logical and the psychologioal aspects 
of certainty, 11 logical certainty" will be used for the former, 
and "certitude" for the latter. For although The Catholio En-
cyclopedia views "certitude" as both a state of mind and a 
·quality of a proposition," it points out that Cardinal Newman, 
for instance, reserved llcertitude" for the former, and employed 
11 oertainty 11 for the latter .• l And Webster, although character-
izing 11 certainty11 · as either subjective or objective, makes this 
distinotion: 
Certitude is almostexclusively subjective, and 
suggests especially the assurance of the one who 
believes; as 'My arg~ment is ••• that certitude was 
a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of a 
proposition' .2 · . . 
The word 11God11 will be used throughout this dissertation 
in the same· sense in "ftthioh Kant used the word, i.e. in the gen-
eral theistic sense-- 11 ein We sen "'rae alles ·weiss, vermag und was 
gut 1st will.,n3 
. . 
1. Vol. III, 1908, speoial 
ed., 539. . 
2. W"ebster 1 New Internat. Diot.~ 2nd. ed. 
3. Kant in Buchenau, KOP, I, 50; 
see KrV, B 725, B 728; .· expla-
nation of abbreviations used 
will be found in Bibliography 
at end. 
"'\ 
3 
III. Literature.--No other consideration of the four types of 
religious certainty treated in this dissertation has been found, 
either in general or as implied in the works of Kant. The clos-
est approach is found in Pathways to Certainty, by William A. 
Brown. Viewing the loss of certainty in contemporary religion 
as a real loss, and making the distinction between the certainty 
attained by science and the certainty of common life,,.which sig-
nificantly involves personal factors, such as 11 persons to be 
loved and promises to be trusted, 11 Dr. Brown· makes certainty of 
God something more than weighing of arguments; it is a convic-
tion of the whole personalityt to be worked for and won by each 
one for himself.l As ·a subjective experience having an object-
ive reference, and not to be viewed as an end in itself, it is 
like happiness~ Certainty is the consciousness that 0 there.is 
something that lasts ••• that gives continuity to my experience 
and unity to my thought. 0 2 It is approached by four paths--
authority, reasoning, intuition, and experiment. 
Mention should also be made of The Quest for Religious 
Oertainty, 1?Y Harold A. Bosley. He outlined his task thus: 11 To 
inquire ••• into the meaning of certainty, the various types of 
certainty, and the conditions and extent to which it is possible 
for us to achieve certainty. 11 3 He defines it as, "man1 s con.-! 
sciousness of a reliable relationship, stated in terms of belief, 
between himself and the world. n4 Holding with Brown that cer-
tainty is broader than any one type, Bosley places the types in 
1. Brown, PC, 11, 3-5, 42, 22. 
2. Brown, PC, 2~25. 
3. Bosley, QRC, 32. 
4. Bosley, QRC, 32. 
4 
pairs; J.) psychological and J.ogicaJ.r 2) certainty of method and 
certainty of concJ.usion. He favors t:b,e first of each pair, hoJ.d-
ing that certainty characterizes attitudes rather than beliefs. 
IV. Method.--The me.thod foJ.lowed. in this dissertation is as fol-
lo'f~S! Chapter I, by revealing the inadequacy of the· traditional 
theistic 11 proofs" and of all theoretical arguments for God 1,s ex-
istence, will be a denial. of theoretical certainty in religious 
matters; Chapter II, by accomplishing the same with reference to 
the moral. argument of Kant, will constitute a denial of moral. or 
practical. certainty as assurance in the highest degree concern-
ing religious realities;. Chapter III, after weighing the claims 
and counter-claims for probability on general. grounds, will. move 
on to consider the claim of experiential. certainty due to the 
direct experience of God in personal relationship; Chapter IV, 
seeking to remedy the defeats of the methods of arriving at re-
ligious certainty implied in the preceding certainty-claims, 
will. be an effort to join true rationalism and true empiricism, 
and to correlate logical certainty and certitude in a degree of 
certainty that wil.J. justify the formation of a rational-empiri-
cal theology. 
Kant 1 s treatment of the problem of God, as found in his 
published works, is the basis for the oonsiderat:t6n of the 
questions involved. 
CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL CERTAINTY 
I$ The theoretical certainty ot the rationalism of Kant's day 
1. Definitions 
The relevant definitions of rationalism given in Web-
ster's New International Dictionary (2nd ed., 2066), are: 
"Philosophical; a. The theory that reason is a source of know-
ledge in 1 tself, superior to· and independent of sense percep-
tions--opposed to sensationalism. b. The theory that philo-
sophic knowledge may be arrived at by deduction from a priori 
concepts or necessary ideas--opposed to empiricism. 
Theological: a. Explanation according to reason of what ap-
pears supernatural. b. Reliance on reason as the basis for 
establishment of religious truth." 
.Thus, lltheoretical certainty" would be conviction de-
pending upon logical necess~ty, .. or reasoning separated from 
' 
revelation, faith, will, feeling; and all other aspects of 
religious experience. Its nature l'7ill beeome clearer in the 
light of the other certainty-claims to be considered. 
2. Characteristics of this rationalism 
The c4aracteristics of rationalism as Kant knew it (the 
true type, as illustrated by the Hegelian concept with its re-
gard for the concrete and the empirical, to come up later) are: 
1) naeificatian of reason 11 1 and. 2) narrow view of reason. 
1. Case, HCD, 158. 
6 
By the former is evidently meant an excessive reliance upon rea-
son or an undue stress on the intellectual, at the expense of the 
non-intellectual, elements of life. Rationalism began liTi th the 
early Greek philosophers.. Later, Plato stressed reason at the 
expense of sense-experience; the soul remembers rather than cre-
ates its ideas out of experience •.. For him, "the real world is 
the ·world of ideas, apprehended only by reason. 11 1 'fhis opposi-
tion between sense and reason wa~ rejected by Aristotle, who 
modified Platonic rationalism by the introduction of empirical 
elements. Rationet-lism was made to harmonize with faith and rev-
elation by·Thomas Aquinas~· But in.the fifteenth century, ration-
alism 11 took the form of a great and increasing reliance upon 
1 the light of reason' 11 :with the result that by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, it "became no uncommon thing for philosophers 
and radically-minded theologians altogether to disregard faith 
and revelation. 11 2 "During the enlightenment, abstract reason 
9rowded out revelation and vital religion until the revivals of 
J. Wesley and J .. Edwards .. 11 3 In the meantime, speculative apolo-
getics had finally assumed fixed and definite form in Christian 
Wolff, with whose tforks . Kant was familiar~ 4 
3. Classes of this rationalism 
Kant divided philosophers into three groups: dogmatists 
(represented by Descartes, Leibniz and Wolff), skeptics (repre-
sented by Hume), and critical philosophers (represented by 
1. Knudson, PP, 127. 
2. Baillie, IR, 73; see 
also DeBurgh, Art. (1926), 419. 
3~ Brightman in Ferm (ea.), 
ER, 637. 
4. See Wolff, VG, for his 
theistic arguments. 
himself). Each group was rationalistic in some sense. 
a. Dogmatism 
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The dogmatic rationalists, the deists and their oppo-
nents alike appealed to reason; the first group in their theis-
tic arguments believed that it is possible by 1! priori means 
to determine the ultimate nature of God, of the soul and_of the 
universe. But the significant fact, the one that brought on 
the skeptical reaction, was the limited view taken of reason--
"the passage from proposition to proposition by the ordinary 
processes of d.eduction and induction. nl Kant• s primary purpose 
seemed to be to attack this system with its false pretensions 
in metaphysics, in order to save metaphysics, science and reli-
gion from skepticism and indtfferenoe. For already metaphysics, 
11 die K~nigin aller Wissensohaften,nwas the object of "Veracht-
ung. tt2 
b. Skepticism 
But skepticism was the inevitable outcome of this the-
istic and deistic rationalism. As Kant put it, the anarchy 
following the despotism of dogmatism made possible the inroads 
of skeptioism.3 Hugh R. Mackintosh views this rationalism in 
three stages: first, the belief that the orthodox creed can be, 
and ought to, be, _defended-by reaso~; second, there was a gap 
' . 
between what men privately believed and what they publicly pro-
fessed; and third, that reason (mere understanding and common 
sense) was put on-the throne of judgment to try every Christian 
1 ... Sorley, MVI&, 462. 
2. Kant, KrV, A ii., 
3 o Kant, KrV, A 3 ~ 
doctrine. Thus, great and reasonable doctrines we~e hastily 
pushed aside. 11 The movem.ent had this curious feature that 
though professing to prove everything by reason," it did not 
inquire into the nature of reason .. l Reason was supposed to 
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be in normal working order; the possible effects of sin upon 
it, did not seem to occur to the rationalists. For this type 
of rationalism, reason seems to stand for 11 the residuum left 
in man's higher mental life when we have purged out everything 
derived from Christianity. 11 2 
Hume was a rationalist in the theological sense of the 
definition given,3 and an epistemological skeptic, asserting 
that sensations arise in the soul 11 from unkno~m causes, 11 as 
we cannot be sure that there are external objects resembling 
our perceptions.4 
c. Critical rationalism 
Critical rationalism was Kant's answer to the skeptical 
rationalism of Hume. According to Shirley Jackson Case, Hume 
~ 
was the clearest voice of the newly awakening empiricism, al-
though Locke had made sense perception the basis of all knm·r-
ledge .. 5 But Hume 1 s good ~1as mixed with evil~ he lrfreed the 
individual from the rigid authority of reason but made him the 
helpless victim of his hopes and fears, pleasures and pains, 
jqys and sorrows. 11 6 Seeing the plight of philosophy and re-
ligion (and possibly also of science), Kant undertook the task 
1. Mackintosh, TM!, 16. 
2. Mackintosh, TMT, 17. 
3. Vide supra, 5. 
4. Hume, THN, I, 
316-317; see 505. 
,5. Case, HOD, 159 .. 
6. Case, HOD, 159. 
of making secure the well-grounded claims of reason by limit-
ing its activity, taking up a position midway between dogmat-
ic rationalism and Hume•s positivistic empiricism.l 
II. Kant•s treatment of the traditional theistic arguments 
1. His purpose: three facts to be kept in mind 
9 
To understand Kant's severe criticism of the tradition-
al theistic arguments, three facts about Kant must be kept in 
mind. 
a. A member of a Christian community.--Kant was a mem-
ber of a Ohri.stian community. He was brought up in a Piestio 
home and general environmen~. Naturally, then, he was a be-
liever in God. There is no evidence that he departed from this 
childhood belief. This is borne out by his writings of both 
the pre-critical and critical periodso For in the former pe-
riod, he wrote Der einzig m~gliche Beweisgrund zu einer.Demon-
stration des Daseins Gottes, a modified ontological argument, 
and in the latter period, Was heisst: sich 1m Denken orientiren? 
In this latter work, Kant grants the possibility of the exist-
ence of super-sensible entities: 11 denn Gegenst&nde der Sinne 
fiillen doch nicht das ganze Feld aller M~glichkeit aus. 11 2 He 
contends that when speculative reason has left the field of 
the objects of sense-perception, it has left its proper sphere.3 
But he further contends that what can not be demonstrated by 
the speculative reason, can be held as a reasonRble belief. 
1. See opening of 
Einteilung, KrV, 
A 1-2. 
2. Kant in Hartenstein, KSW, IV, 
343; hereafter all KSW refer-
ences will be found in this vca. 
3 • Kant , KSW, IV, 342. 
10 
This is due to self-orientation: 11 Sehe ich nun die Sonne am 
Himmel and weiss, dass .·as nun die Mi ttagszei t 1st, so 'tl7eiss 
ioh Stiden, Westen, Norden und Osten zu finden .. 111 ~hie is ao-
. companied by a feeling of the difference between the left hand 
and the right hand: 11 Und. selbst der Astronom, wenn er bless 
auf das, was er Acht gibe, w&rde sioh unvermeidlich desorient-
1ren.u2 What may be regarded as a reasonable belief on sub-
jective grounds, 't'l7ithout sufficient objective evidence, Kant 
calls an hypothesis. (of the theoretical reason)' and a postu-
late (of the practical reason).3 The failure of the tradi-
tional arguments to demonstrate the existence of God did not 
deter Kant from believing in God for, "wo will Jemand duroh 
reine Speculation der Vernunft die Einsicht hernehmen: dass 
es kein h&chstes Wesen ••• geben. n4 This "t•rill suffice to show 
that Kant believed in God; evidence 'tltill be given later that 
he saw the necessity of belief in 11 e~n Begriff l'1elcher die 
ganze menschliche Erkenntniss schlieest und kr&net. 11 .5 · 
b. A man of his age .. --Then, Kant t<J'as a man of his age, 
an age of deism. Lord Herbert, kno1rm as the founder of deism, 
.believed that a Supernatural God exists, and that He should be 
t-rorshipped. Not all the deists of .the age ending in Kant re-
J'ected the testimony of revelation on the nature of God; Des-
cartes, Locke and Leibniz, for instance, accepted in general 
the teaching of their respective churches, but holding in com-
mon "~i th St .. Thomas 11 that reason apart from revelation could 
1. Kant, KS\'f, IV, 340. 
z. Kant, KSW, IV, 341. 
3. Kant, KS~'l', IV, ·348. 
4. Kant, KrV, B 669. 
5. Kant) KrV, B 669, 
B 72?. 
assure us by process of argument, independent of any specifi-
cally religious experience, of the existence of God .. nl It is 
doubtful 1orhether Kant any morta than Hume ever emancipated him-
self from deistic influence,2 at least, not until late in life. 
c. A foe to fa.l·se pretensions in knowledge.--Then it 
must be remembered that Kant 1o1as a foe to false pretensions in 
knowledge.3 His purpose was to attack dogmatic rationalism 
rather than to question the existence of God. He never actu-
• 
ally denied the existence of the real·or the noumenon (and 
thus of God viewed as the Noumenon); in fact, noumena are re.:. 
quired as bases for phenomena, and although, in Kant's view, 
in the teehnical language of the first Critioue, noumena are 
unknown and unknowable, they must be thought and thought tru-
ly. His work was to show how inadequate mere speculative rea-
soning is: 
Ich werde dartun: dass die Vernunft, auf dem 
einen Wege (dem empirischen) so wenig ale auf dem 
anderen {dem transcendentalen)tt etwa.s a.usrichte, 
und das sie vergeblioh ihre Flugel auspanne, um 
tlber die Sinnem1elt durch diem blosse Macht der 
Speculation hinaus zu kommen.'"j' 
2. Ontological argument 
a.. Statement of the argument by Descartes.--Reduced to 
a simple statement, the ontological argument of Descartes af-
firms that the possession by man of' the idea. of the perfect 
or infinite implies the existence of a perfect being.5 That 
is, 11That &od exists is an analytical judgment. It is involved 
l. Webb, XPR, 12-13. 
2. P~ngle-Pattison, 
~G~ 47. 
3. Vide supra, 7. 
4. Kant, KrV, B 619 .. 
5. Descartes, MPP, 11. 
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in.the definition of God, and hence is a necessary truth of 
reason .. ul 
1) His rational method and principle 
Realizing that he might have many false notions, Des-
cartes decided to discard all his beliefs, and to take a fresh 
start. So he doubts everything, even his own existence, as 
he might be deceived in this~ But the fact that he is deceived, 
that he doubts, is of itself evidence to him that he exists. 
His start in epistemolmgy is, then, 11 I think, therefore I am .. 11 2 
The combination of 11 I think 11 (broadly, 11 ! am conscious") and 
11 Therefore, I am 11 exhibits his method of recalling discarded 
notions 't<Thich he thinks 't..rorthy of holding--intuition and deduc-
tion. The fact of which Descartes is most certain at the start, 
is t.hat he exists.. This he terms intuitive knowledge. If there 
are external objects (a question at this stage), they will not 
be known directlyt 11 0ur i,n'quiries should be directed .... to what 
we can clearly ••• behold and 11ith certainty deduc~. 11 3 Now, de-
fining "clear" as that which is intuitively present to the mind, 
and 11 distinet 11 as that which is entirely clear in itself, Des-
cartes announees his positive rational principle: "Everything 
must be true which is as clear and distinct.as self-conscious-
ness. n4 This self-evident, first principle, Descartes applies 
to the idea of God, and to this theistic argument. 
lq Knudson, PP, 260; see Kant in 
Hartenstein, KSW (KAW), VIII,S65. 
2. Descartes, MPP, 33; all referenees 
in this section are to Descartes's 
works, unless otherwise stated. 
3 •• PWD, 14, 15, 28. 
4 Windelba.nd.J. HP, 
392; see M.t'P, 
151. 
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2) His approach to the argument 
Descartes begins ,.rith a contrast bet"t-reen "finite" and 
11 1nfini te . 11 Before he threw overboard all his opinions, he 
had had an idea of God. Now he reflects that qualities that 
he had assigned to physical objects--substance, duration 8.nd 
numbe~-might have arisen in his own mind. But this, he de-
cides, could not be true of the idea of God, for the idea of 
an infinite being could not have originated with him, a finite 
being. Thus, although granting that the mere idea of God is 
no proof of His ex~stence,l Desoart~s has introduced the con-
cepts of necessary existence and perfect being, concluding 
that the existence of God is a valid inference, as necessary 
existence is inherent in the concept of God, but not in finite 
things or imaginary concepts.2 
3) His reinforcement of the argument 
In this contrast between 11 finite 11 and 11 infinite11 , Des-
cartes has reinforced his ontological argument by the cosmo-
logical, which goes from effect (here, ide~ of an infinite 
being) to cause (here, infinite being). Obviously under the 
influence of the medieval principle that the greater the be-
ing the greater the.reality, Descartes writes: 11 I clearly 
perceiv~ that there is more reality in the infinite substance 
than in the finite.u3 He concludes that he -possessed the no-
tion of the infinite before that of the finite, i.e. before 
himself.. He is more· sure of God's existence than of his o't-m. 4 
1. l.n'P, 78-79. 
2. MPP, 136-137. 
3. MPP, 54 .. 
4. MPP, 61. 
14 
And the idea of God is so clear and distinct, and man's ·con-
stant dependence on a higher power is so obvious, that Des-
cartes is led to declare that 11it is impossible that the hu-
man mind can know anything_ with more clearness and certitude. 11 1 
The greater the objective perfection in our idea of a thing, 
11 the greater also must be the perfection of its oause .. 11 2 For 
instance, in a machine great skill is displayed. We have a 
right to ask hO't..r the constructor came by the idea, for 11 all 
the ingenuity which is contained in the idea objectively only, 
••• must exist at least in its first ahd chief cause. n3 Even 
so, 't'l7e have a right, declares Descartes, to inquire 't'lrhere we 
got the idea .of God .. 4 It is significant that Descartes in all 
this has substituted another given for the human self, and has 
taken a fresh start. God becomes the Given, 11 the true God, in 
t-rhom are contained all the treasures of science and wisdom," 
·the basis of operations in the acquisition of all other know-
ledgeo5 This opens a path to the external l10rld.6 
b. Kant 1 s .treatment of the argument 
l) His pre-critical position on it.--Kant' s pre-
critical. position on th.e ontological argument as stated by 
Descartes is indicated in his Prinoipiorum primorum Cogni-
tionis metaphysicaeNova Dilucidatio (1755, and referred to 
as No.va Diluoidatio) • He is in sympathy with the argument, 
and his method is somewhat rationalistic. 
1. MPP, 63. 
2. MPP, 138. 
3. 1-iPP, 138:...139. 
The distinction 
4. MPP, 138-139. 
5 .. MPP, 63-64. 
o. MPP, 66. 
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between necessary and contingent being is made; God is the 
Inbegriff or Schema of the reality of all possible notions,l 
although, following O~sius, Kant sees that the principle of 
non-oontradiotion is not sufficient in dealing with matters 
of fact, and that absolute reality cannot be deduced from ab-
solute nece.ssity. vlhen Kant wrote his Inaugural Dissertation, 
still somewhat under the spell of the Leibnizian-Wolffian dog-
matic rationalism, he held that a certain form of the ontolog-
ical argument is valid, in fact, the ohly val-1;d one, deducing 
the proof "from the inherent quality of absolute neoessity~"2 
But in Der einzig'm&gliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demon-
stration des Daseins Gottes (1763 ~ .,.and referred to commonly 
as the Beweisgrund), Kant notes 'the qualitative differences 
between realities, ioe. he has detected the difference between 
logical and real relations. But unable to conceive of the 
' 
non-existence of God, he argues for an-absolutely necessary 
being, although not going as far as Descartes, that is, from 
possibility to actuality. Such passages as the following are 
found: 11 Schlechterdings nothttO·endig 1st, dessen Gegentheil an 
sich unm8glich ist.li' 11 Es existirt ein.schlechterdings noth-
wendiges Wesen. 83 This being Kant describes as one, simple, 
eternal, a spirit containing the highest reality.4 F. E. 
England clarifies Kant's thought in the Beweisgrund: 
Existence is no predicate; there is no more 
in actual things than in possibilities. We can-
not pass from a concept to the affirmation of 
1. See England, KCG 67-68. 
2. Eckoff ,, Art. (1894), 38. 
3. Kant, BDGt 21, 23. 
40 Kant, BDG, 25-32. 
existence. But he ma-intains 1-te ean and must 
pass from the inner possibility of things in 
general to an absolute positing, the affirma-. 
tion of the existence of that which makes pos-
sibility itself possible .1 · . 
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Evidently Kant was slow in coming to his critical posi-
tion. James Ward considers this last work as tho~oughly ra-. 
tionalistic in the Wolffian sense~2 But this appears to be 
an exaggeration. 
2) The natural cou~se of reasening.--Preliminary to 
the discussion of the theistic arguments in the first Critique, 
Kant describes the natural course of reasoning in these argu-
ments. He describes the Ideal (a word standing for euoh ideas 
as God, freedom and immortality), as a regulative principle of 
human reason, with no objective reality.3 Reason feels the 
saeed of presupposing a conception of unconditioned.being as a 
ground of conditioned beings, in order to prevent the thought 
of infinite regress of causes. For, "Wenn etwas ••• existirt, 
so muss auoh eingerllumt tfterden, daes irgend etwas nothwendig-
e~feise existire. Denn das Zuflllige existirt nur unter der 
Bedingung eines andereri, ala seiner Ursache .. nL~ It is only 
natural for reason to put existence intb this concept.5 
3) Examination of the conoept of .absolutely neces-
sary being.--In Kant 1 s examination of the concept 
of abso:tutely necessary being, he declares that lf this being 
exists, then it is outside the phenomenal order; if that order 
1. England, KOG, 53-54; 
see 51 and Kant, BD~, 
I, 396. 
2. Ward, SK, 13-14. 
3. See Kant~KrV, B 596-599; 
Watson, ~KE, 290-291. 
4 .. Kant, KrV, B 612. 5· Kant, KrV, B 613-615. 
were a totality of conditions, it would mean infinite regress 
of ·causes.l He again grants that the recognition of any one 
. - . . 
thing. as contingent implies something which exists necessari-
ly.2 But it is a 11 blosse Idee,'' although Kant would grant 
that the idea refers to a Supreme Being (not nature) "t-11 th a 
res.triction3: 
Nun ist zwar ein Namenerkl~rung von diesem 
Begriffe ganz leicht, dass as nl!mlich so et-
was sei, dessen Nichtsein unm8glich ist; aber· 
man wird hiedurch um nichts klii~er, in .Anseh-
ung der Bedingungen, die es.unmoglich machen, 
das Nichtsein eines Dinges ale schlechterdings 
undenklich anzusehen ••• Denn· alle Bedingungen, 
die der Verstand jederzeit bedarf, um etwas 
ale nothwendig anzusehen, vermittelst des Worts; 
Unbedingt, ~1eg1:1erfen, macht mir noch lange 
nicht verstlindlich, ob ich alsdann durch einen 
Begriff eines UnbedirigtnothwendigRn noch etwas 
oder vielleicht gar nichts denke. · 
Such a v.erbal defirii tion, declares Kant, does not tell 
lvhy it is impossible to think of the non-existence of this 
' , 
being. The examples produced are of judgments, not things, 
as the judgment that if there is a triangle, it must h::1ve 
three angles, a conditional necessity. Kant grants that the 
idea of perfect and necessary existence carries 't'lith it the 
~··of existence, but notes that this was not the conclusion 
that Descartes drew from hie illustration. It is true, as 
Descartes said, that the idea of the triangle entails the 
equality of its three angles to two right angles. But mak-
ing the comparison, Descartes said that the idea of an all-
perfect beirig carries· with it existence. That is, Descartes 
1. Kant, KrV, B 612. 
2., See Kant, KrV, B 
612, 618. 
3. See Kant, KrV, B 
614 620, 640. 
4. Kant, KrV, B 621. 
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. . 
confused logical and ontological necessity. 
l'lhatever involves no contradiction cannot be regarded 
as 11 the sole principle of all truth"l: 
. Einen Triangel setzeri ·und doch die drei Winkeln 
dessenben aufheben 1st ,-widersprechend, aber den . 
Triangel sammt seineh drei W'inkeln aurheben, 1st 
kein v1iderspruch. Gott is allm!chtig; . das. ein noth-
wendiges Urtheil.,., .,Gott 1st nicht, so 1st "treder 
die Allmacht; noch irgend ein anderes seiner Pr&di-
cate gegeben denn sie sind all zusa.mmt .dem Subject 
aufgeh,open und es ze~gtsich. indiesem Gedanken 
nicht der. mindeste ~'fiderspruch .. 2 ·· ·. . . 
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If the subject is admitted ·to_ exist, _the predicate must · 
. be granted, but both .subject and predicate can be .denied 'trith..:.. 
. out contradiction. Kant nol'r ?ffers a criterion for the impos-
sibility of the conception of unconditioned_ being: 11 0hne den 
Widerspruch~~}:la.be ich duroh blosse Begriff~ ·a priori kein ·Mark-
mal de;U;m8glichke1t. n3' There was no inne'r contradiction in 
Descartes's illustration, although, as 't.Ye have seen Descartes 
misapplied it. And a triangle can pe drawn on paper, but there 
is no 'external contrac1iction in thinking that there'ia no ob...o 
jective triangle corresponding to the representation. Kant is. 
following Hume here, for holding that it is impossible to dem-. 
onstrate the existence of anything by~ priori arguments, Hume 
said that 't.Yhat .is conceived as .existent can be conceived as 
· · non-e·xisterit. 4 · 
4) The or11;icism of ens rea.lissimum 
To the argument. that there is one exception to the 
above line of reasoning, i.~ .. that .there is contradiction in 
1. England, KCG, 142~ 
2; Kant, KrV, B 622~ 
3 • Kant , KrV, B 623; BDG, 13 • 
4 •. See vTatson, IRE, I, 2.53. 
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annihilating both subject and predicate in the case of the 
~ realissimum, as: 11 Nun ist unter aller RealitMI.t auch das 
Dasein mit begriffen; also liegt das Dasein in dem Begriffe 
von einem M8glichen, 11 1 Kant answers that it is absurd, "wenn 
ihr in den Begriff eines Dinges, welches ihr lediglich seiner 
MBglichkei t nach denken ."t10lltet, ~ 0 .. schon den Begriff seiner 
Existenz hinein brachtet. 11 Z It is a mere idea, whose objec-
tive existence is yet to be established o 11 Sein is offenbar 
II kein reales Pradicat, d.i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was 
zu dem Begriffe etwaa Dinges hinzu~ommen k&nne. 11 3 Then to 
say, 11 God is omnipotent, 11 ·is not to say that God is, for. this 
verb in the quotation is merely a l'tord of relation bet""t<reen ·~ 
subject and predicate. And the content of the real is no more. 
than that of the possible: 11 Hundert wirkliche Thaler enthalten 
nicht das Mindest7 e mehr, ala hundert mbgliche. 114 An existen-
tial judgment is not the same as an attributive judgment.5 
The idea of a necessary being is possible (as 't.Yi th the hundred 
dollars), but a possible idea is not the same as the idea of 
a possible being. That is, Kant has distinguished analytic 
and synthetic judgments. The ontological argument is analyt-
ic in nature, as ~priori, adding nothing to the conception 
of God. Thus, Kant teaches that existence is not derived by 
analysis of a concept, but by synthetic judgments based on ex-
perience. 
Perhaps no better summary of the reasons for Kant's 
1. Kant, KrV, B 624. 
2. Kant, KrV, B 625. 
3. Kant, KrV, B 627. 
4. Kant, KrV, B 627. 
5. See Dunham, RP, 248. 
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rejection of the ontological argument can be given than that 
of Go T. Whitney, namely, 1) that mere absence of contradic-
tion proves no more than the logical possibility of a concept; 
2) it is impossible to derive existence by analysis of a con-
cept, as nall existential judgments are synthetical ... ,The ex-
istence of a thing can not be determined without experience. 11 1 
But Whitney should have qualified 11 experiencen by prefixing 
"sense, 11 for that is Kant's qualific.ation. 
c. Consideration of Kant's reasoning 
1) Narrow ·in its disregard of 1 the Anselmic formula: 
summary and criticism of Anselm's argument 
In the consideration of Kant's reasoning upon the onto-
logical argument, a summary and criticism of Anselm's argument 
will·be necessary in order to show that Kant's reasoning was 
narro'tf as disregarding the Anselmic formula. The two names 
usually associated with the ontological argument are Anselm 
and Descartes,. But Kant declares that it was Descartes's 
putting of the case that he treated 9 2 Perhaps a better 
descriptiV-e word for the Cartesian form of the argument is 
11 incomplete 11 rather than "spurious" or even 11 imperfect • 11 3 
Anselm's argument 
ing on Psalms 14:1, "The 
is no God,' 11 Anselm wrote: 
d in the Proslogium~ Comment-
th said in his heart, 'there 
But at any rate, thi very fool when he hears 
of this being ••• a being than which nothing great-
er can be conceived--un erstands what he hears, 
1. Whitney, IKP, 204-205. 
2. See Kant, KrV, B 6309 
3~ See England, KOG, 53; 
Frank, PRT, 51; Taylor 
Art.(l929), 268,. ' 
and what he understands is in his understanding, 
although he does not understand it to exist.I 
To illustrate this, Anselm mentions the painter who 
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has the idea of his painting in his mind before it is objec-
tified. Afterward, the painter 0both has it in hie understand-
ing, and he understands that it exists. 11 2 Assuming that the 
fool has the,idea or God, Anseltn proceeds: 
And assuredly that, than which nothing greater 
can be conceiv~d cannot exist in the understanding 
.alone. For suppose that it exists in the unde~ 
standing alone:. then it can b» conceived to exist 
in reality, which is greatero~ · 
He concludes, then, that the idea is both in the under-
standing and in reality, and advances to the position that it is 
~:tmlpossible to conceive of God not existing: 
' 
For, it is possible to conceive of a being 
t..Yhich cannot be conceived not to exist; and this 
is greater than one which can be conceived not 
to exist. Hence, .it- that than which nothing 
greater oan be conceived not to exist, it is not 
that than which nothing greater can be conce4ved. 
But this is an irreoonoilR.ble contradiction. 
Anselm etrengthens this argument~ 11 For if a mind could 
conceive a being better than thee, the creature would rise a-
bove the Creator; and this is most absurd • 11 5 Then, using the 
oonoept of degrees ~f being, Anselm explains why the fool is 
an atheist: 
To thee alone,. therefore, it belongs to exist 
more truly than all other beings, and hence in a 
higher degree than all others •••• ,(by, then has the 
fool said.~.there is no God ••• einoe it is so 
1. Deane, SA, 7. 
2 • Deane, SA , 7 .. 
3. Deane, SA, 8. 
4. Deane, SA, 8-9o 
5. Deane, SA, 9. 
evident to a rational mind,,that thou dost ex-
ist in the highest degree f all? Why, except 
that he is dull and a fool. 
Anselm recognizes that the e is more than one way in 
which a thing is conceived: 11 For n one sense an object is 
conceived 1'\l'hen the word signifYin it is conceived; and in 
another when the very entity, whi h the object is, is under-
stood.,n2 In the former sense, can be oonoeived; in the 
latter, not) 
22 
_Of course, it must be that Anselm is arguing 
for the logical, not the psycholo impossibility of con-
ceiving of God1 s non-existence~ he fool can hear and utter 
the word 11 God 11 and still conceive of His non-existence~ We 
think many things that we think d. not e:Xisto If it can be 
shown that all men have the conce t the greater than which can 
not be conceived, the concept oar ying with it as part of its 
meaning the actual existence of e corresponding object, then, 
it might be granted that belief i the actual existence of the 
object is logically necessary. t Anselm did not prove that 
the fool got this idea.. Saint logical absurdity 
in supposing the non-existence That is-, the existence 
'· 
of God is not self-evident to men : 
Yet, granted that every ne understands that by 
this name God is signified something than which 
nothing greater can be tho ght, nevertheless, it 
does not therefore follow hat he understands that 
what the name signifies ex eta actually, but only 
that it exists mentally. or can it be argued 
1. Deane, SA , 9. 
2. Deane, SA, 9-10. 
3. 
4. 
e Meyer, PST, 234. 
e Aquinas, ISA, 20-22. 
that it actually exists, unless it be admitted 
that there actually exists- something than which 
nothing greater can be thought; and this pre-
cisely is_not admitted by those who hold that 
God does not exi,st$1 
23 
Anselm himself holds that .God does exist.. The basis of 
his whole system was fa1 th.. He is famous for the expression,-
"Credo ut intelligam." ("I believe in order to know or under-
stand.") He held that faith is prior to reason in both logic 
and value. This is logical, for l'!There could we get in everyday 
life, in science, and in philosophy without basic presupposi-
tions, hypotheses, givens, and intuitions? Anselm describes 
himself as one who lifts his eyes to God, and tries to under-
stand what he believes. His order is not the rational order 
of first understand and then believe; he _saw that unless he be-
lieved, he would not kno'ti' or understand, for he is convinced 
that the effort to understand the problems of the universe with-
out faith is impossible. All this can readily be granted. No 
philosopher or scientist with his presuppositions could consist-
ently object to it. But the important fact for the ontological 
- argument is that Anselm is already a believer and that he ~ 
verses his position when _he oomes to the fool, for then he 
asks the fool .to place understanding first and faith second. 
He bases his hope of the conversion of the fool on the idea of 
the fool's understanding it, on the basis that if the fool has 
it in the understanding, he has the idea of God. But we may 
understand something, and still not believe it, and so we have 
1. Aquinas, ISA, 22. 
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no assurance that the fool gets the idea thus in th~ sense of 
getting a belief~ 
It must be admitted that Anselm is arguing on the 
basis of .!!Q. ~idea of God, as. do some proponents of the 
ontological proot.1 In answer to Gaunilon's objection that 
if .God is unique, then l're have nothing with which to compare 
Him ill order to "conceive11 Him,2 Anselm made the distinction, 
as did Descartes, and r~asonably, between 11 comprehendrr and 
11 conceive": 
Inconceivable is conoeiV.able ... although that to 
which the word inconceivable can be applied is not 
conceivable. So when one says that than which no 
greater is conceivable, undoubtedly what is heard.· 
is ooneeivable and intelligible, although that b§-
.ing itselfe •• cannot be conceived and understood.J 
It is this idea of God. 1 s uniqueness that gives Anselm1 s 
argument its chief plausibility~ For if it can be said that 
the tool gets the idea of God (as an ordinary idea) because 
he understands it, then the same can be said of something 
imaginary, as Gaunilon asserted. But Gaunilon goes on to 
make an admission by way of a qualification: "Unless it can 
be shO'trn that this being is of such a character that it can-
not be held. ..... like all unreal objects, or objects whose 
existence is uncertain. 11 4 This was all the opening that 
Anseim asked: 11 For by no means can this being than which 
a greater cannot be conceived be understood as any other 
than that which alone is greater than all. n.5 Of course 
1. See Hooking, MGHE, 307. 
2. Deane, SA, 148. 
3. Deane, SA, 168. 
4,. Deane, SA·, 146 .. 
5. Deane, SA, 163. 
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this disposes of Gaunilon1 s 11 lost island11 • Anselm continues: 
11 You see then, with hov-1 muoh just ·oe you have compared me tdth 
your fool, who on the sole ground the.t he understands .... would 
affirm that a lost island exists~'l Anselm then promised Gau-
nilon that if he could devise any hing to exist either in real-
ity or in mind alone (other than hat than which no greater 
can be thought), that he WOlllld di cover that thing 8.nd give 
Gaunilon his "lost island", a saf enough bargain for Anselm• 
C. A. Beckwith seems to have miss d this promise,.2 
Denying that anyone oan oo ceive perfection (in the 
strict sense employed by 
il, as a 11 perfeot devil" 
essence self-sufficient, 
ent) in an island or a dev-
se, and an island is not in 
artshorne writes: 
The question is, can a ossibility be real 
unless it would, if actua , be an effect of a 
cause, which is real, of he effect of a pos-
sible cause, which if act al would itself be 
the effect of a cause whi h .... (the series ul-
timately terminating in a cause which is real)?3 
As Barley remarks, the pr 
to discriminate betv-1een 
So Gaunilon•s objection 
of Anselm to7as nan effort 
God and all other ideas .. 4 
ideas is not valid: 
it holds only for imperfect or f nita things, because exist-
ence is not the necessary oonten of the idea of the finite, 
as Anselm hints in his rebuttal .. 
Anselm's mistake is well 
1. Deane, SA, 164 .. 
2. Beckt<Ti th, IG, 97. 
3. Hartshorne, MVG, 
304. 
by vlindelband: 
4o Sorley, MVI~, 311; 
see Frank, PRT, 36 .. 
5. Deane, SA, 161; see 
Taylor, Art.(l929), 
268-269 .. 
Anselm. proved only that if God is thought {as most perf.ect being)' he must be thought 
also necessarily as being or existent and can-
not be thought as non-existent.. But the onto-
logical argument of the Proslogium did not·show 
even in the remotest degree that God, i.e., 
that a most perfect being must be thought.. The 
necessity for this stood f~for Anselm person-
ally not only because of the conviction of hie ·. 
faith, but also by the cosmological argumenta-
tion of the Monologium. When he believed. that -: 
he could dispense with this presupposition, and 
.with the help of the mere concept of God arrive 
at the proof of his. existence, he exemplified .... 
the fundamental idea of realism whitih ascribed 
to concepts without any regard to their genesis 
••• the. character of ••• Reality .1 . 
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Because of this diversity of reason and faith in the 
argu111ent, R. R. Smart sees two possible interpretations of it 
--rationalistic and apologetic, as 11 acco_rding to the first 
interpretation the argument is purely rational; acco~ding to 
the second, ·reason and faith together form the foundation.of the 
argument .. 112 Smart· concludes that Anselm's real aim .is practi .... 
cal, polemical and apologetic, in the combating of skeptieism. 
What did Anselm, therefore, prove? Essentially .what_ 
Descart.es proved, that the fool, and therefore all mankin~~ 
can conceive of the idea of God, and that.if God is.thoug~t of 
as most perfeotbeing, He must be thought also as necessarily 
existent. He did not prove that the idea of a pe~tect being 
implies.the existence of God; he only proved that such an idea 
proves the idea of the existence of God. That is, .as the- Neo-
Thomists clearly see, in idea there'.is·'no guarantee of.· . 
1. Windelband, RP, 193; see 
Smith~ B0 1 ~51; Prall, Art.· (1926), ~~, 160 •. 
2. Smart, Art.(l949), 
161. 
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existence.1 Or as Watson interpreting Kant states it, "Theoret-
ical reason cannot make objecti:ve or synthetical judgments .. "2 
2) Somewhat inadequate in its treatment of the 
Cartesian formula 
a) Union ot the ontological and the cosmological 
arguments.--Kant' s treatment of the Cartesian 
form of the argument is somewhat inadequate in that, first of 
all, it separates what it found together--the ontological and 
the .cosmological arguments.. Due to this Kant did not quite do 
full justice to the subject of the inconceivability of the non-
existence of God. For while Descartes did not succeed in prov-
ing the existence of God, he did strengthen his original argu-
ment by the introduction·of empirical elements in the references 
to nature and causation .. 
b) .Uniqueness of the idea of God.,--The uniqueness 
of the idea of God has been called the crux of the ontological 
argument. While Kant illustrated well the difference between 
analytic and synthetic judgments by referring to one hundred. 
dollars in pocket versus one hundred dollars in conception, yet 
it must be observed that no contingent being can truly repre-
sent an unconditioned being. The ontological argument "was 
meant to refer only to our thought of Go'd, not to a hundred 
dollars~ 113 In some sense both the one hundred dollars and the 
lost island are beside the point. "With dollars the distinc-
tion between potentiality and full actuality is obviously 
1. See Duce, KGN4 236. 2. Watson, PKE, 56. 3. Inge, Art .. (1948), 49. 
· .. ,,1.1·:··, .. 
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irrelevant • nl Hegel also criticized K~.nt at this point: "One 
hundred Thalere are not related to themselves alone; they are 
mutable and periehable ••• with God concept and reality are in-
separable. 112 
In answer to the thought of Descartes that the idea of 
this unique or infinite being could not have originated with 
him, Kant takes_the position, and truly, that the mere concept 
of an infinite being can not be identified 1o1i th the infinite 
itself. Kant, however, was unfortunate in hie eXpression 
11 casting al-ooay (wegwerfen) conditions. 113 For it is not neces-
sary to discard conditions in thinking of the unconditioned; 
a self-sufficient being has all the conditions within; they 
are self-imposed, not thrown away. As to{· accounting for the 
idea of a perfect being on the part of imperfect beings, Kant 
eould have sholm that it can arise 11 from our observation of 
the positive, but mixed perfeetions which we think we have 
detected-in men and things. 11 4 To be valid, Descartes's argu-
ment would have to show that the idea itself needs to be in-
finite.5 It should.be noted also that Kant failed to observe 
the circular argument of Deseartes, his clear and distinct 
ideas both validating and validated by the ontological 11 proof .. 11 
c) Union of thought and thing.--The ontological 
argument asse~ts a conception to whieh Kant in the eritical 
period never attained--the ultimate union or unity of thought 
1. He.rtshorne, l-IVG, 311.!-315. 
2. Maier, HCK, 48; see Hegel, 
SL, I, 101. 
·-· 
1. Ha.rtshorne, MVG, 305-306. 
3 • Kant , KrV, B 638. 
4. Vance, RT, 76. 
5. See Bradshaw, PFF, 
42-43. 
2. Hartshorne, MVG, 310-311. 
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and thing. On~,the 11 hundert Thal r 11 illustration he simply as-
serts their difference. But tho ght has reference to being, 
and is meaningless without it. 1At some point) potentiality 
and actuality must touch, and at some point meaning must imply 
existence. 111. Hartshorne explain that while existence is not 
a predicate, it may be the mode fa thing, and that Kant's 
illustration of the hundred doll rs is actually to the credit 
of the ontological argument; it as to be opposed by a disjunc-
tion between meaning and its rent reality, o.r bet't'lreen uni-
versals and individuals: 11 0nly. f there is .QM individual · 
whose presence is universal, hav universals an intelligible 
ground in actuality. n2 me't'lrhere in the universe there 
is no ultimate union of thought nd thing, there appears to be 
no ultimate solution of em of knowledge, which is sim-
ply the problem of the relation f thought and its object. 
Thus, in the ontological argumen , Frank sees a beginning of 
a new phase in philosophy: 
Human thinking in its attempt to transcend 
the sphere of objective eality discovers its 
own subjectivity and anx ously struggles to as-
certain the truths of it own concepts ••• how 
human thought can grasp reality 't'7hich lies 
outside its own thinking 3 
How can we be sure of a eing who transcends everything, 
even thought? We can not. Ult mately, thought and being must 
be reconciled. Hegel's mind cold not come to rest until it 
arrived at their union in God. 11 For Hegel, therefore, the on-
tological argument consists aim in showing how·the notion 
1. Ha.rtshorne, MVG, 305-306. 2. Hartshorne, MVG, 310-311. 
by its very nature negates'its barren subjecti~e unity and 
attains objective existenee.nl The idea of God is a symbol of 
the union of thought and thing, just as He is a symbol of the 
union of existence and value. 2 
· Thus, the ontological argument can be viewed as an 
expression of the fundamental confidence of r·easen in itself, 
i.e. that one is not justified in stopping with 'Verification 
of sensible experience, but should go on to· the higher warrant 
-~confidence of thought in complete rationality. 
3) Reasonable in its view of necessary being and 
ens realissimum 
Then,.Kant 1 e reasoning onthe ontological argument is 
reasonable in its view of neoeseary being and ens realissimum .. 
Of course, his insight into the necessity'of a transcendent 
being is a true one. God can not be simply immanent, a link 
in a chain of causes. On the other hand, in the re·eogni tion 
of contingent beings, as the so'uroe Of their energy and life, 
He can not be a foreign power; Th~ solut+on of the difficulty 
is in the theistic ~iew of an immanent-transcendent Being. 
Kant's keen critical philosophical eye caught the dis-
tinction between. analytic ana·· synthetic judgm.ents, and the 
truth that the mere absence of conttoadi"ation d.oes not prove 
the actuality of an object bpt onl,y. the logical possibility 
of its concept. To say bluntly that God is a mere idea 
1. Schilling, ERR, 169; see Hegel, 
Die Absolute Religion, JUB, 
XIV, 42-43. 
2. See Brightman, Art. 
( 1~37) 1., 148. 
-;-·, .• 
--- ··. ~,. --·I 
. . ~- ... - . 
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sounds both irreverent and unreasonable, but so far as the on-
tological argument is concerned, that is a true statement of 
fact, for the concept of God here is not definite enough to 
refer to the God of religion. True, the thought of God as a 
unique Being leads inevitably to the thought of His existence 
as a consequent of His essence, 11 so that if any.ona knows the 
essence of the necessary being, he knm1s also on 't-1hat account 
th·e. necessary being exists .ul But the only 1..ray for one to 
know God's essence is through His self-disclosure. It does 
not come through human speculation;2 the ontological argument 
testifies eloquently. of this. 
Assuming that there ;is .an ~ realissimum, ht> definite 
connection~ between it and a necessary being has been made by 
the argument. ~·nit does not follow· that the only necessary be-
ing is that which contains all reality 1-1ithin itself ., 11 3 On 
the basis· of Hegel's theory of absolute idealism, of course, 
God viewed not as the most real of beings (as in the ontolog-
ical argument) but as the sole real being, all reality can not 
be denied. But Hegel's contention that to deny the existence 
ofGod is to deny all existence, is valid.onlyon the assump-
tion·of the truth of his own system; and a personal~ real-
issimum can be denied .. 4 It could concei'\tably be finite; and 
even if eternal,. it could be nature.. GallO't'7ay, "t4ho sees no 
sense in denying a sum of reality, is unable to identify it 
1 ~ Gaspard, Art. ( 1933) , 6~7 .. 
2., See Aquinas, ISA, 22. 
3. ~·Tat son, PKE, 290 ~ 
b,. Maier, HCK, 49 .. 
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as the God of the1sm91 If either absolute idealism or panthe-
ism were the most rational explanation of reality, this iden..:. 
tification could be made. For Spinoza, viewing things on his 
third level of the orders of kno"Jledge, sa't~ the totality of 
things, and called it God. But this God is not the God of 
theism92 
So Kant is reasonA.ble in his assertion that the neces-
sary being and the ~ realisaimum of the ontological argument 
are mere ideaso That we seem to have ideas intuitively pe~ 
ceived 't<7hich lend assurance of their objectivity is not against 
Kant 1 s assertion.. 11 My idea of space .... I incline to regard as 
real .... causality .... beauty .... goodnessH .I attribute these quali-
ties to the objects .. " But Hocking makes a significant addi-
tion: 11These ideas guide me only in so far as they are a:t the 
same time idea and experience, the idea in question being no 
other than the experience recognized .. n3· 
4) Significant in its empirical trend 
The empirical nature of Kant's reasoning in general is 
seen ·in the opening "t<Yords of the Eint.eilJung in the Kri tik der 
reinen Vernunft:· 11 E!'fahrung is ohne Zl'reifel das erste Product, 
welohes unser Verstand hervorbringt, indem er den rohen Stoff 
sinnlioher Empfindungen bearbeitet.u4 Eng~ahd notes the in-
fluence of Orusius upon·Kant in the latter's idea "that the 
very possibility' of a thing depends upon its findirl,g ~. place.· 
1. See Galloway, TPR, 386; 
Ryan, Art.(l935), 134; 
Maier, HCK., 49. 
2. See Spinoza, DE, Prop. XV. 
3 •. ·Hooking, MGHE, 
.. 307;,.308' 568. 
4 .. Kant, KrV, A 1. 
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in the texture of actual experience. 11 l 
Of course, Kant is right in saying that a definition· 
never implies the existence of the defined; a position trace-
able to Aristotle; a nomi~al definition is made genuine o~ly 
by resort to empirical fact: ·"God may very well be imaginary 
even if the definition of the imaginary God imagines Him to be 
real .... .,Analysis of definitions is not verification. 112 With 
the empiricism of Aristotle·behind them, Saint Thomas and the 
Neo-Thomists in general reject the ontological argument be-
cause it ie ~ priori rather than .@: posteriori .,3 
Maier sees in Kant 1 s position on experience a cha'llenge 
of one 1 s right to include God among scientific objects, on the· 
basis that for an object to be an object ·of knowledge in the 
strict sense, appeal must be made first to experience: 11vli th-
out experience, an object of science is impossible; no mere 
demonstration will conjure it into existence .. 11 4 Being is . 
activity, as Bowne held, and activi t·y is a revelation of a 
person or thing, the ~vidence of its existence., The actual 
existence of the being whose essential nature is not a predi..;.. 
cate tacked on to a subject, is activity, the empittical basis 
of the conception of the being. Indirectly agreeing with this, 
Pringle-Pattison 1-trites: 11The nature of Ultimate Reality is to 
read, therefore in its manifestation, and may be read there 
l. England, KCG, 37.. 
2. Brightman, Art.(~937)1, 
153~154; see Tennant, PT, 
I, 201-202; Hartshorne, 
MVG, 317. 
3. See Aquinas, ISA, 22-
25; Duce, KGN, 234. 
4., Maier, HCK, 47. 
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truly.nl And Hooking is of the same opinion that God can aP-
pear in experience only through His aotivi ty, and that if "no . 
ef:f'eot of God were visible in the· world, His existence must be 
always a matter of oonjeoture .. "2 Tracing the God-idea back to 
its beginnings, Hocking finds that the idea is an inference from 
very evident effeots.3 Apart from these effects, Hooking sees 
no reason for belief in an invisible cause: 11Men do not first; 
imagine a God !n abstracto,· then speculate about His possible 
powers, and then at last enquire whether such a being exists. 114 
Thus, Kant's reasoning upon the ontological 11 proof has 
been shown to be narrow in its disregard of the Anselmio formu-
la, somewhat inadequate in its treatment of the Cartesian for-
mula, reasonable in its view of necessary being and !n! realis= 
simum, and significant in its empirical trend .. 
. j •. Cosmological argument 
a. Background.,--In the tenth book of the Laws of Plato 
is found the beginning of the cosmological argument .. Only the 
soul has the power of self-motion, and it is the cause of all 
other motion.. Going from finite souls to a supreme Soul, Plato 
argues that the order and movement of the planets must be the 
work of an 11 order1ng mind, a Soul that is Supreme and Good., 11 5 
Following Plato, Aristotle hinted that every thing must have 
11 intelligence and nature" as prior oauees .. 6 . Connected with 
1. Prihgle-Pattisoni TIG, 175 .. 
2. Hooking,- MGHE, 2 5 .. 
3. Hooking, MGHE, 2lo. 
4. Hooking, MGHE, 216 .. 
5 .. Plato, CPPT~ 457, 46?; 
see 4.55-456. 
6.. See Aristotle in 
McKeon, BWA, 24?,. 
3S 
his name are the doctrines of motion, the Unmoved Mover,- and 
the four causes (formal, material, final, and eff~cient) t-7hioh 
implying purpose, imply a personal creativ.e God, Pure Form and 
Pure Act~ An infinite series of causes involves contradiction; 
consequently there must be a first cause.which is itself un-
caused;1 strangely, the 11 Unmoved Mover" impartsmotion~2 
Under the_ influence of Aristotle, through the mediation 
of Saint Augustine, turning from the .!!Priori argument of An-
selm, and arguing on J! posteriori grounds in the belief that 
he could cemonstrate the existence of God by a consideration 
o.f existin-g.·._ effects in the world ("All. our knowledge origi• 
nates f~om sense," sounding very muoh like Kant), Saint Thomas 
argued in five ways: 1) from motion, 2) from the nature of ef-
ficient cause, 3) from possibility and necessity, 4) from the 
gradation found iiJ. things, and S) from the 11 goverance 11 of the 
world.3 The first four of these "ways" are cosmological in 
character. Le Roy describes the first way as follows: 
. ' Cette preuve, que saint Thomas expose d 1 apres 
Aristote et qu 1 il donne oomme la plus claire et la 
. ~ ' I t plus simple de toute.s, pretend conc1ure a 1 exis ~ 
enoe· de Dieu par la rieoessl te d 1 un premier moteur 
immobile, principe des.mouvements que 1 1 experienoe 
nous montre dans le monde. Elle part d 1 un fait 
d'observation, le fait universal du mouvement, et 
oonsiste en .une application du principe de causa-
lit~ a 1 1 analyse de oe fait. En ~omme, elle se 
ronde sur une thJorie du devenir.4 
Likewise under the influence of Augustine, compelled 
1. See McKeon BWA 
254-25?; 340, 3l7-373. 
2. See McKeon, BWA, 373. 
- ..::.; -- ~ ;: ___ -:._-::;_~.:..:: ___ - ~ -- .: _:::•-
-~-----~-- ------ -
3. See Aquinas, ISA, 21-27; 
Garrigou-LaGrange, OG, 
96-97; Duoe, KGN, 234. 
4. LeRoy, Art.(l907), 130. 
11 to fall back upon the Augustinian conception of the 't.Yill of 
God as the sufficient reason, and indeed the efficient cause 
of finite existence, 11 Descartes as has been shown, advanced. 
the cosmological 11-proof • 11 1 Briefly stated, his idea "t-Jas that 
11 there must at least. be as much reality in the efficient and. 
total cause as·in its effect; for whence can the effect draw 
its reality if not from the oa.use? 11 2 
Among his five 11 proofs 11 of the existence of God, Chris-
tian Wolff advocated the cosmological., With Aquinas and Des-
cartes, he believed. that God's existence can be demonstrated 
by theoretical arguments. It was particularly against the 
rationalistic dogmatism of Wolff that Kant reacted-in his 
treatment of the traditional theistic arguments~ 
Wolff gibt zwei veraohiedene Va.riationen, 
im ersten Falle wird aus der Definition des 
ens a se, das zweitemal aus der Unm&glichkeit 
eines regressus in infinitum die Ausse~1elt­
liohkei t Gottes bewiesen·~ • •• Es muss daher ein-
en zureichenden Grund f~r unsere Existenz gab-
en, der entweder in una, oder in einem a.nderen 
Wesen liegen muss, aber sohliesslich immer aug 
ein We sen fi!thrt. o .• das den Grund seiner Wirk-
licbkeit in sich in seiner Existenz enth~lt 
also nothwendig wirklioh 1st! ••• Von diesem lens 
necessarium' wird nun bewiesen, dass es von 
and.eren Wesen unabh~ngig ist.3 . 
b., Statement 
-A statement of the cosmological argument of these repre-
sentative thinkers is made by Kant himself: 
Wenn etwas existirt, so muss auoh ein 
sohlechterdings nothwendiges Wesen exist-
iran. Nun existire zum Mindesten ich selbst; 
l. England, KCG, 23~ 
2. Descartes, MPP, 49. 
3 .• Levy, RC1"T, 14; see Wolff, 
~VG, 574-580, 636-638. 
·- · . .' 
_,. .( 
also existirt e1n absolutnothwendiges Wesen~l 
c. Kantts treatment, and-criticism of it-
l) Kant• s general ori ticism.-.... In the pre-critical"' 
period, Kant accepts the Wolffian statement of the argum~nt 
in general; but is uncertain on the absolute certainty of this 
_independent being as the argument depends upon the principle 
of sufficient reason,· and he regA.rds·it as 11 an ~bsonum that 
anything should nave the ground of its existence in itself. u.2 
On other grounds, Kant·held that .God is the logical ground. 
and the producing cause of the ·finite world. But in hie be-
lief in creation, he resembled his rationaiistic predecessors: 
Bence side by side with the concept of ~od 
as ultimate ground from whom all else follows 
as logical consequent is the concept of God as 
creator of substances in respect to~their ex-
istence and their.mutua:l relt!ttions • .J . · 
But in the critical period, Kant's general and consist-
ent criticism is that while olaimi'ng to be empirical, the cos-; 
mologieal 11 proof 11 is really rationalistic in nature: 
Das nothwandige Wesen kann nur auf eine 
einzige Art, d.i. in Ansehung aller m&gliohen 
entgegengeeetzen Pr!dicate nur duroh eines 
derselben bestimmt warden, folglich muss ee 
duroh eeinen Begriff durohgangig bestimmt 
sein. Nun is~ nur ein einziger Begriff von 
einem ~inge mogliah, der dasselbe a priori 
durohganglich bestimmt ••• ens realissime ••• 
ein altes Argument in verkleideter Gestalt 
tftr ein neues aufstellt ••• fusset sioh dieser 
Beweis auf Erfahrung ••• Dieeer Erfahrung aber 
bedient sioh dar kosmologisoh~ Beweis n~r, 
um ·einen nothwendigen Wesens uberhaupt. 
l. Kant, KrV, B 633; · 
for fuller st~tement, 
see Whitney, IKP, 207. 
2. England XCG, 55-56; eee 
Kant, UDG 1 4, Betraohtung (V, i, 14z); BDG, II, l57o 
3: England, XCG, 57 •. 
4~ Kant, KrV, B 634-635. 
-------- -- -----~--------- ·····-· --·-------
~--- ':'. '. 
·2) .. Vital poirits. ot consideration 
a) Validity of causal concept in general 
1) Hume's skepti9ism .. --Hume declared that the 
connection between cause and effect is felt or imagined, not 
observed,l thus, ~n_ot· a matter of human experience, except as 
a mental one, but only "constant· conjunction, 11 an effect being 
an event that. invariably comes after a cause. In the mP-.xim 
that "whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence," 
Hume found nd m~rk 11 of any .... intuitive certainty~n2 This was 
interpreted 'by Xant not as a denial of ce.usali ty as a fact but 
as an l! priori conception~ Hume also denied that cause is im-
plied in the t~ord 11 ~ffect," as it is only a relative term, 
thus not proving that every being must be preceded by-,a cause, 
"no more than it follows because every husband must have a 
wife, that therefore every man must be married .... .,opinion must 
arise from observation and experience.n:3 Granting that neces-
sity must arise 11 from some impression," Hume asserted._ that ne-
cessity (such as, 11 two plus two equals four") lies only in the 
underst~.=~.nding. L~ . 
ii) Kant reaction to Hume's skepticism.,--In say-
ing that reason requires 11 the existence of a necessary being 
as a basis for the empirical regress," that.reason makes 11 one 
step 11 from the experience of contingent beings 11 to the exist-
ence of a necessary being," R.nd that "everything contingent" 
1., Hume, THN, 45Lt-458 .. 
2 .. Hume, THN, :380, 389, 
459' 466. 
3 .. _Hume, THN! 383; see ?8-80 
with Perr er, RSP, 72. 
4~ Hume, THN, 392-394 .. 
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in the sensuous world nmust have a cause,nl Kant asserts the 
validity of the causal concept in general$ He did not answer 
Hume on the relativity which Rume asserted is in the word 
11 cause. 11 It should be noted that Hume shifted from 11 effect 11 
to "being. u "Rusband 11 and "wife" ~ correlative t·erms, just 
as are 11 cause 11 and "effect. 11 . Though 11 being" (the word used} 
does not suggest "wife," 11 husband 11 does, and for the particu-
lar effect, likel..Y~se, there is a. cause. Thus, while 11 cause11 
and 11 effect 11 are distinct terms, as Hume said, yet they are 
so related that one does imply the other. Actually, however, 
Kant fared. no better than Rume on causation, being unable to 
find in experience an adequate basis for it.2 But becoming 
needs a cause, and being (in the sense of coming into exis-
ence and remaining in existence) needs an explanation, as the 
Neo-1homists teach.3 The contingency of finite beings is apt-
ly expressed in the words of th~ poet, 11 Change and decay in 
all around ~-1e see. 11 Thus, there seems to be no decisive rea-
son for denying causation in ·general~ 
b) Validity of applying it to the world as a 
whole.--In all the references above, Kant im-
plies that the principle of causation may rightly be applied 
to the physical world as a. whole. 4 · John Stuart Mill states 
the case of those who hold the validity of this principle: 
Everything that we know (it is argued) had a 
cause, and o~red its existence to that cause. 
1 .. Kant1 Kr'\7, B 631, B 635, B 63ts; see also KpV, 53, 
61, 134, BDG , 64 • 
2. La "Plante, Art.(l938), 10. 
3. Duce, KGN 249. 
4. See also fant, E:pv, 130. 
How then nan it be but that the world which 
is but a name for the aggregate of all that 
we know, has a cau!e to which it is indebted 
for its existence. 
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But Mill's own belief is that this is going beyond ex-
perience; all that we know is that every event or change has 
a cause.2 Laird and H8ffding partly confirm this by throwing 
doubt up~n ·the concept 11 world, n3 for if God and .the l'torld are 
. -. 
viewed in external relation to each. other as are watchmaker 
and watch, then the world as distinct, 11 a totality ruled by 
lawtt is a concept to be questioned. But if it is only an un-
. .. ' " 
attainable ideal because of the inexhaustibility of experience, 
then all concepts are invalid, for they are the products of 
generalization, of abstr~ot reasoning that goes beyond the 
concrete objects of man's experience. Laird wonders, there-
fore, whether it would not be better to rest the proof upon 
simpler existential pre~ses, suoh as that certain things ex-
ist, but decides that though valid this is inadequate, eon-· 
sidering Leibniz1 s argumentum ~ oontingentia mundi (which 
Kant analyzes) "stronger than Looke 1 s form: 'I exist, there-
fore God exists,' or in the still more importunate form: 
•something exists, therefore God exists.• 114 For 11 to argue 
upon a oosmio soale" is to argue 11 to a cosmic scale.n5 Laird, 
however, sees difficulty in proving that the world is an ef-
fect as it might possibly be that reality and the world are 
identical--unless God is reality; but this is the very point 
1. Mill, TER, 142. 
2. See Mill, TER, 145~ 
3. S~e Laird, TO~ 24-25; 
Hoffding, TPOH, 61. 
4. Laird, TC, 86-88. 
S. Laird, Td, 88. 
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to be proved. However, a compl~t-ely coherent account of the 
world requires belief in God; but this requires, in turn, 
rising above physical. experience. 
Rume had; intimated· that 11 the uni·vere~~ •• may be stJlf ... 
existent, or as· Aristotle held, eternal,". ·not necessarily a 
denial of the existenoe,of God, but-only:of a certain relation 
of His to the world .1 . Aceord.ing to Watson, Hume a:rgued that 
ll'fhat which exists fr'om eternity cannot have a cause, since 
every cause implies tpriority in time and a beginning of ex-
existence.111. That is; oause belongs to members in a succes-
sion and not to a whole, for 11 i:f' we know the particular oauses 
of each individual bn a collection of twenty, it is very un-
reas~nable to ask afterwards for tthe cause of the whole twen-
ty~tn2 To this denial of oontin,gency by the assertion of the 
eternity of .the 't.Yarld, it is sufficient to reply simply that 
the ooncept eternity, (~s well as the concept of the eternity 
of ·the world) ·is tin assumption neither proved nor disproved 
by theoretical reasoning.' So,· while causation· applied to the 
world as a whole may be held as a rationalbelief, because so 
far as human experience goes, every effect is produced by a 
cause, yet in inew of the difficulties suggested, especially 
in the concept of eternity' which being uncertain, makes the 
world regarded as an effect uncertain; it appears that there 
is no rigid demonstration of the validity of causation as a 
universal. law. 
1. See Beokw1th, IG, 119; 
Hume, ET, 548-549. 
2. Watson, IRE, I, 254; 
. see Hume, DNR, 1909 
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c) Validity of calling a halt in regress of 
causesq--Kant denied the validity of calling 
a halt in the regress' of' causes, i.e. the validity of a first 
oause, for granting in general the causal concept, he limited 
' ' 
it to the sensuous 1-rorld.. He speaks of "Die falsche Selbst-
befriedigung der Vernun:f't, 11 "daduroh, dass man endlich all 
. Bedingung, ohne welche doch kein Begriff einer Nothwendigkeit 
Statt finden k~nn;wegschafft. 11 1 As Kant is here referring 
' ' 
to the limitation of human experience relative to universal 
matters, it may be said in reply that, on the same ground, 
nothing can be proved, as all reasoning is abstract, going 
beyond the given. In holding a universal law of gravitation, 
reason (on the part of scien1asts) allows itself to be satis-
. . . . ~ 
tied upon insufficient grounds. It applies as well to the 
law of causation which in general Kant accepts. Also itmay 
be replied that conditions are not "thro"t>tn a"t-7ay 11 by the cos-
mological argument, but put into the concept of a Necessary 
or Unconditioned Being, who imposes them on Himself. 
It there is a first cause or an absolutely necessary 
principle, it must be transcendent, according to Kant, i.e • 
. 
11 ausserhalb.der. Welt 11 and the ~eries of causes, as it can not 
be discovered in the series, and if it were, it would as a 
.member of. the ser.ies, be finite, an effect itself needing a 
' ,· 2 
cause.. On the other hand, there is no proof of a 11 hoohsten 
1. Kant, KrV, B 638. 2.. Kant, KrV, · B 64.5; see 
Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 
301-302. 
Wesen 11 above the seri~s, 'but only of 11 ein regulatives Prin-
zip.111 In this Kant is right. But GallO't·ray, Baillie, and 
Frank point out that an immanent first cause is reasQnable, 
especially with positivists and mechanistic biologists, who 
are either satisfied to remain in the world or to view it 
not as 11 made" 'but as 11 alive11 and "grow1ng11 , an organism.2 
As has been seen,3 Aristotle, tracing all motion to the 
Prime Mover, implied that without a First Cause there can be 
no other cause; but he did not place the beginning of its ac-
tivity at any point in time.4 Then, as now, time was a prob-
lem. Confronting the possibility that matter as well as motion 
and the Prime Mover may be eternal,.? Aristotle thus taught that 
-,the First. Cause is not necessarily first ·in temporal priority. 
Following Aristotle, Sheeri views "the argument from motion as 
••• independent of the question of the eternity of the world. n6 
That is, if the latter is true, it would not dispense with the 
existence of God. Turning away from the ontologic~l argument, 
and under the influence of the empiricism of Aristotle,.Duns 
Scotus and Thomas Aquinas argued from effect (in a finite uni-
verse) to First Cause.? Although the former attached no weight 
to arguments from motion, the latter and Nee-Scholastics in!· 
, 
general, including Garrigou-Lagrange, pave used it: lfThere is 
1. Kant, KrV, B 637; ·see . 
Cunningham, TOP, 78; 
.Hocking in Wi~ IK, :;a. 
2. See Galloway, ~~R, 388; 
Baillie..!. IR, 82"!"83; see 
.Frank, ~RT, 30 C.l3road, 
Hibb,. Jour., 24 0..92~ , 4.?-46). 
3. Vide supra, 34-35. · 
4. See McKeon, BWA, 304, 340-342, 
367-368' 470-484. . . 
.5. See :McKeon, BWA, 
. :3.5.5-3.59 374. 
6 .. Sheen, GE, 131. · 
7. Harris, DS. 1.52..;.153, . -
160; see Scotus, 11! Primo 
Principia; Duce, KGN, 
239=240; McKeon, SMP, 
307. 
no regress to infinity in a. series of movers which are aetu-
ally and essentially subordinate.nl 
Likewise, ·sorley, England, and H~ffding see no solution 
to the problems relative to God and the world, if there is an 
infinite regress of causes: 
What religion asserts is that existence would 
be meaningless if we could not ultimately find 
the origin of the whole causal sel"ies, in TJorhich 
our thought can come to rest, where all further 
questions fa=!-1 away ...... This l1ne of a:rsgument was 
adopted by Thomas Aquinas from A~istotle.o.Catho­
lio as well as many Protestant ·theologians hold 
it up to the present day .. 2 
Pointing to alleged gaps in the causal series, H&ffding 
~ ' ~ . . . 
directs attention away from regress of causes to law peculiar 
l '··.· \ ... 
to the series and to 11 the principle of unity to which this tea-
) 
tifies, 11 for 11 the inner motive power of the series--that which 
.. · 
is present alike in the totality and in the inner parts--must 
be the determining factor. 113 Then HBffding asks why there may 
not be an eternal series. This seems to be the orux of the 
whole subject. Is there contingency? May it not be that the 
Necessary Being is the universe itself? To confuse the prob-
lem further there is the ambiguity in the terms 11 oon1angent" 
. . '. 
and necessary," probably what Kant had in mind when he spoke 
of 11 ein ganzes Nest von dialektis~hen Anmassungen.n4' Bertrand 
• ! • 
Russell sees 11 no reason to suppose that the world had a begin-
ing at all," holding that the idea of creation is 11 really due 
1. Garrigou-Lag~ange in Duce, 
KGN,244; see Aquinas, ISA. 
Summa Theologioa, Ia; q 165, 
a 5; McKeon~ SMP, 30?; 
Mari tain, Dtl, 273.. · 
2 .. H8ftd1ng, '!'PORI. 3lt-35; 
-s~e England KoG, 59. 
·3. Hoffding, TPOR, 3'i', 4o· 
see Gaspard, Art.,(l933~,8. 
!f .• Kant, KrV ,B 637; see 
Laird, TC, 97-107. 
,~.,., '',·:--··-·or· · · "7 
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.to the poverty of our imagination. 11 1 Frank is of the opinion 
that creation does not imply a beginning of the world in time.2 
And Brunner agrees with him that we can have no adequate no-
tion and no experience of eternity, and also that 11 a logioal 
thinker will know that as long as he confines himself to thought 
he oannot speak of creation. 11 3 No objection can be made to 
these views on speculative grounds. Creation could be an eter-
nal process. If so, oan a finite being speak of it as he oan 
of a temporal event that he experiences? And can he speak of 
his own being as a creation? But if the universe is r~latea~to 
God as eternal Creator, then it can be viewed as contingent. 
This would dispense with an infinite regress of causes, which 
makes the problem of the relation of God and the world insolv-
able for Sorley and others. 
It will not be necessary to give in detail Hegelts con-
ception of the cosmological argument. However, he noted the 
admission of Kant concerning its strength, and thought it 
strange that one should attach no weight to it.4 He declared 
that Kant ~as in error in holding that it rests on the onto-
logical proof, and that it is a mistake to maintain that the 
cosmological argument requires the ontological to complete it, 
that is in regard to T~>rhat it has in general to accomplish.5 
But in defense of Kant it may be said that in admitting the 
1. See Frank, PRT, 46, 
quoting Russell, vfuy 
I am not a Christian. 
2. See Frank, PRT, 59~60. 
:3 • Brunner, PR 82-8:3 • 
4. Hegel, PR, III, 239. 
5. Hegel, PR, II, 246. 
46 
strength of the argument he did attach weight to it, he did 
shot-t 1 ts dependence upon the ontological argument, and did 
expose its weaknesses in accomplishing its general purpose, 
l 
viz., the proof of God 1 s existence. 
The helplessness __ of the human reason dealing with these 
problems, particularly the problem of eternity, is obvious. 
It ·seems, therefore, that the validity of calling a halt in 
'•'" 
the regress of causes by a.\ creation in time by a First Cause, 
has not been demonstrated. !t .-does seem, as Aquinas held,. that 
this is primarily a matter of faith rather than·of r~ason .. 2 
By faith t..re understand, that the new ,,.orld was discovered by 
>.1 .' ' . ·. 
Columbus. As we were not there, if we accept the idea at all, 
1 t must be on the author! ty of others. On the same basi·s, we 
may say' u 7T ( c)- T E:-l v 0 u JA- c \/ K Q. T n \0 L a-6 Q.. \. 
"" T 0 i) S. Cl... { OJ v"" s p 1{ fJ- ~ T l e eo c.l I "' This 
. ~ •' "< 
also is a reasonable belief. But here only One can_ speak with 
the authority of experience. Let it be perfectly clear that 
in either case authority may be rejected, but that with the 
rejection of the authority_ g.oes the rejection of the idea. 
~ t_j" . 
Plato and Aristotle can not speak with the authority of expe~ 
ience concerning the latter event.. A reasonable belief in ei-
ther the discovery of America or the temporal creation is not 
derived through abstract speculation. . In a case where one can 
have no experience of his: own, it is more reasonable to accept 
by faith the testimony of a competent ey&-witness (or one who 
1. See Kant KrV, B 632 1 634, 639. 2. See Aquinas, ISA, 2'l-9-25~. .. .. -
is regarded eo), than to spin a theory out of the flimsy 
threads of one's Ot11n _imagination. 
· ·d} Validity of identifying the First. Cause with 
God 
1) Nature of the First Cauee.--The first con-
sideration on the validity of identifying the First Cause l-7i th 
God--the nature of the First Cause (i .. e~ on the basis of the 
' - ·. '• . -
cosmological argument)-.;.;·~uggests the follo1Jring possibilities: 
a mere idea, an unknot-m but unified Cause, and a personal Be-
ing.. Which one of these possibilities did Kant favor? 
According to the five representative philosophers cho-
sen to state the cosmological argument, and according to Kant 
himself, there ie.no necessary ·connection between the ontolog-
. . 
ical and cosmological arguments in attempting to prove a First 
Cause.. Having rejected. the former, Kant naturally insists on 
keeping all its implications from the latter.l For him the 
· . postulate of an Ali-sufficient Being is a device of reason, 
experience not providing the properties of such a Being.2 
That is, for Kant, the God of the cosmological argument is e. 
mere ideao 
But on the basis of this 11 proof11 , Kant argues also for· 
an unknown but unified cause of all exietenoe, 18 Die unbedingte 
Nothwendigkeit, die "tdr, ale den letzten Trliger aller Dinge .. n3 
ii) Indefiniteness .of . the First Cau.se .---Kant 
concisely states the indefiniteness of the .nature of the First 
1., Kant, KrV, B 632-638 .. 
2. Kant, KrV, B 641; see 
B 62.5. 
3 o Kant, KrV, B 641 .. 
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Oause as found in the cos~ological argument as an empirical 
argument, i.e. apart from the assumptions of the rationalist-
ic ontological argument: 
Was dieses f~r Eigensdhaften babe, kann dar 
empirische Baweisgrund l(ioht lehren, sondern 
da nimmt die Vernunft ganzlioh von ihm Abschied 
und forsoht hinter lauter Begr~ffen: was plimlioh 
ein absolutnothwend\ges Wesen uberhaupt fur Ei-
geneohaften haben m&sse )~ 
Later, speaking of Unconditioned Necessity as an in-
dispensable need of the;mind, he pictures this idea as an 
abyss~ before whi oh reason ·stands · trembling in di sma.y: 
.· Selbst die EW:igkei t, so· sohauderhaft er-
haben sie auoh ein Haller schildern mag, macht 
lang dey sohwindelichten Eindruok nioht auf· · 
das Gemuth; denn sie misst nur die Dauer dar 
Dinge, aber td~gt sie riicht. ··Man kann sioh 
des Gedankens nioht erwehren, man kann ihn 
aber · aueh' nicht ertragen; dass
11 
ein 1r>Teeen, ¥ .• ,,: 
welohes 11 wir una auoh ale. das Hoc_hete unter 
allen moglichen vorstellen, gleiohsa.m zu sioh 
selbst sage: Ich bin von Ewigkei t zu El7igkei t, 
ausser mir ist riichts·., ·ohne das, wa.'s bloss 
duroh meinen Willen etwas 1st; aber woher bin 
ioh denn?2 · · · · 
Note that here at the end, Kant has come back. to the 
terrifying but necessary 'idea of eternity, and to the crux 
of the l!Yhole matterj for as we have· se;en ,3 matter is either 
eternal (along with or without another et.ernal reality) or 
it is dependent upon some eternal reality or first ·cause. 
Some kind of 11 unbedingte Noth"&rendigkei t 11 exists. But if eter-
nal unconditioned necessity is a requirement of the mind, as 
Kant says it is (and there seems to be no ground .for its de-
. " nial), then it is nQ! 11 etl!ras &bera.ue Mer'kwtlrdigee; de.se, .wenn 
1. Kant, KrV, B 635. 
2. Kant, KrV, B 641. 
. 3 • Vide supra, 40-l~.J ... 
man voraussetz, etwas existire, man dar Folgerung nicht Umgang 
haben kann: das.s auch irgend et't·ras noth"'rendigerweise existire,nl: 
(whe.ther it is matter or some other reality), but it is very 
remarkable that this 11 ganz naturlichen 11 conclusion is not "sich-
eren. 112 That is a case of what Regel notes in Kant--a degrad-
ing of reason~} Of course the questions are: 'ftlhat ·is that some-
thing? Has natural reason an answer? It is to be doubted in 
the light of John Stuart Mill's pathetic attempt to give content 
to the idea of a Creator as theGod of religion, for "the net 
results of Natura1Theology 11 was 11 a total blank" on the moral 
attributes, apart from benevolence, upon 't-7hich, ho"t-rever, strong 
suspicion was cast ( 11 no shadow of Justice in the general arrange-
ments of nature 11 ).4 
The same thing happens to Kant; the moment he touches 
the attributes of this Noumenon, he gets into difficulty. 
After speaking of an unknown substratum of the systemat-
ic unity and order of the t·mrld, ( 11 unknown 11 as incapable of be-
ing experienced) Kant remarks that, 11 K8nnen wir in dieser Idee 
ge'tiisse Anthropomorphismen ... • erlabuen, 115 and he goes on: II II Ken-
nen wir doch ••• einen einigen 't'7eisen und allgewaltigen Weltur-
heber annehmen? Ohne allen Zweifel; una n!oht allein dies, 
sondern wir mussen einen solchen vorausaetzen.n6 But having 
admitted the attributes of. wisdom and omnipotenc·e ~.'a necessary, 
l. Kant, KrV, B 643. 
2~ Kant, KrV, B 643. 
3. Hegel; PR, III, 243. 
. 4·. Mill, TER, 192, 194. 
5. Kant, KrV, B 725; 
see B 700, 706, 
715, 724. 
6. Kant, KrV, B 726 • 
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Kant nolf deni.es that we have any conception of this being, 
11 was es an sioh selbst sei, 111 which is in agreement with one 
of the basic concepts of his philosophical system--the Noume-
non a~d its unknowabil1ty9 And thenafter denying that there 
is any ground for justifying the.admiseion of a being with 
. . ' II "· 
properties dis:tinct from nature (uber.der N~;~tur 11 ), Kant grants 
that we are Justified in introducing into·the ide~ of a supreme 
cause other anthropomorphic elements, suoh ~-s 11 Veretand, ''~olga...; 
fallen, .... Misefallen •• ·.B~gierde und 't'Tilleri;. u2 But can a mere 
idea have these? If this.idea does not represent an exietenoe,3 
if there is no correspondence between noumenon and phenomenon, 
then reason has no basis for 1 ts .regul~.tive principle of unity, 
so essential in Kantts eyes. 
Elsewhere, Kant- 't4aver_s l,mcertainly: on this point, for 
. . - . U1 
speaking of God as 11 der einigen und allgenugsamen Ureache, 11 
Kant asserts: "Den· Gegenstand dieser Idee haben t·rir nioht den 
mindesten Grund sohleohthin anzunehme:n.n4 But personality is 
revealed by activity, and apart from e.oti vi ty, Kant has no 
ground for holding the attributes mentioned above. In another 
ill ob argument, Kant declares: 
·,~-- ·Die·h8chste·formale·E:tnheit, welohe allein 
auf Vernunftbegriffen beruht, i st die zt.Yeck-
mJissige Einheit derDinge, und das speculative 
Interesse der Vernunft macht es noth't-7endig, 
alle Anordnung in der W'e1t so anzusf(hen, ala 
ob sie aus der absicht einer a11erhochsten 
Vernunft entsprossen w~re.5 
1. Kant, KrV, B 726. 
2. ~ant, Krv, B 729. 
3. ant, KrV, B 729. 
4. Kant, KrV, B 714; see 
Kant in Hartenstein, 
KSW, VIII, 541. 
5 • Kant, KrV, B 715. 
But the cart seems to be before the horse here. An 
actual unity in the universe due to some unknown being's 
unity in aim and action is observed, giving the human mind 
its idea of formal unity. If this is not true, the source 
Sl 
of the idea must be sought elsewhere. Kant, brought up in 
Pietistic surroundings, had the idea of God before he began 
to philosophize. _Thus he had the attributes of God in mind, 
although his system called for the concept of an unknown but 
unified cause of the world. In personal belief he held a 
personal Being with definite attributes; in strict logical 
reasoning, he had only a mere idea. Kant is correct in main-
taining that while the cosmological argument does not provide 
the attribute_s of God, one is justified in believing in the 
God of theism, .as a reasonable hypothe.sis.l 
Thus, 'trlhile it appears that Kant admits too much of his 
personal belief concerning the attributes of God into his strict 
logical or theoretical reasoning, Kant is right that the cosmo-
logical argument does not present a full or definite description 
of God, to say not~ng of proof. For neither Catholic nor 
Protestant philosophers have made out a case for the validity 
of identifying the first cause with the God of theism. 
The final cause appealed to by Annice Donovon (evident-
ly Catholic) while not a part of the cosmological argument 
itself, gives it some support. 2 But her dependence upon anal-
ogy in presenting the henologica1 argument indirectly comes 
1. Kant, WHO, in Hartenstein, 2. Bee Donovon, HAE, 16-17. 
KSW, IV, 348 •.B. :s~? ·i\ ·· \' .,,-: -;;,~-'!'!:¥. 
-- ._, ,__,.. ,;.: '-..~ ~:\ ..:!!.Jo:.'\.:."~ \'. ~ -:._,'.\~. "-' 
~ -~ 6~.~;;~ ~J ~:~~~~~ b;~~§ 
~ .:.~ ~~~ j{ ~ 
under the condemnation of Beckwith and. others: 
The frequently repeated deolaration that l<Ye 
have in human aotion an analogy of the absolute 
orig1nati ve POl<7er of God is only another instanoe 
of the fa.t_al fallaoy of 1r16rds; whatever else man· 
has don~·, he has oreated nothing.,l 
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Hartshorne has shpwn that the axioms used by St. Thomas 
. to prove God1 s existenoe need-ed themselves to be justif1ed.,2 
Pollook, a Catholic, 't'rri tes: 11 St. Thomas tells us that a ration-
. al demonstration of the existenoe of God must be entirely ab-
straoted from any idea of rad1oal novelty or eternity of the 
universe. 11 3 But the oontingeiJ.CY of the universe is the crux 
of the 'toJhole matter, as ·""re have shown.. Of oourse, ~qs Pollock 
recognizes; the oosmos oan be eternal and still contingent, 
but not neoessar1ly so .. 
DeBurgh. seems to be one of those opposed to the general 
Neo-Soholastio dogmatism on the demonstrability of the existence 
of God. He writes: 11 I do not think tha.t the faots of non-re .... 
ligious knm,rledge are sufi'ioient to prove God's existence .. 11 4 
Speaking of the_~posmological argument direotly, he adds: "It 
. c=---
is not however a valid pro~f of God; for it gives at best a 
tran-scendent Absolute, an unknowable x, of 't'1hioh reason Rssures. 
us that it is, but as to~ it is, it is ~·rholly s1lent. 11 5. 
. . 
LeRoy is in agreement.with his position: 11 En tout oas, 
le premier Moteur, 'a supposer qu' il exist a, ne · serai t auoune-
ment ·1e vrai Dieu, le 'Dieu de la. vie religieuse et mora.le. 11 6 
1 .. Beokt-ti th, IG, 118; see 
Calhoun, GCL, 174; Brunner, 
· PR, __ 83; Frank 1:. PRT, 44 •. 2. See Hartshorne; MVG, 69. 
3 .. Pollook, .A.rt. { 1934) , . 28. 
'· ,. _· 
4. DeBurgh, TRP., 115. 
5. DeBurgh, TRRi 115. 
6. LeRoy, Art.{ 907), 
· · 136, see 144-145. 
As a result, the Catholic Church takes a hesitating position, 
in spite of appearances to the contrary. Garrigou-Lagrange 
gives a qualified statement, for having said: "The Church de-
clares that God's ~existence_ can be proved ••• from the visible 
effects," he adds: "Hence the Church in some measure gives 
S3 
her approbation to the validity of the~ posteriori traditional 
proofs of God 1 s existence." And he adds significantly: "It 
is not, however~ fo~ally defined that reason can demonstrate 
't'lhether reason alone can deduce explicitly the proper attri-
butes of the true Goa.nl 
As it is too7ell knmm that Protestants in general oppose 
even this qualified position of the Catholic (Neo-Soholastic) 
philosophers, it will not be necessary to go into detail on 
this. Dr. Brightman hits the point that is being emphasized, 
because t,ghile recognizing that the cosmological is more empir-
ical than the ontological argument, yet he declares that it 
11 requires only a t'lorld, any world, and at- its best is quite 
irrelevant to the essence of God. 112 It is_the writer's judgment 
that the cosmological argument, by its silence upon the 11 ef:f'ects 11 
of divine activity in men's hearts, is not sufficiently em-
pirical and that in the light of the arguments put forward by 
philosophers in defense of this proof, the 't-V"ords of Jacques 
\. Maritain on the ngrandeur et misere de la Metaphysique 11 are 
1. Garrigou-Lagrange, Og 
OG, 110-111; see 
Dunham, RP, 248~249. 
2 ~ Brightman, Art. ( 1937) 1, 
153-154: see Sorley, MVIG, 
323 ;. McTaggart, SDR, 191; 
Hocking, MGHE, 305. 
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' significant: 11 Sa grandeur: elle est sagesse. 
est science humaine ••• Elle nomme Dieu, oui. 
Nom ••• Vous ~tee vraiment un Dieu cache'. nl 
Sa misere: elle 
Mail p~s par Son 
4. Physico-theological argument 
a. Statement of the argument.--In Aristotle's assertion 
of purpose in nature, and doctrine of Final Cause (which has 
an end in vie't-7 from the beginning, and "17hich acting as a 11 pull11 
from on before rather than as a 11 push 11 from behind, co-operates 
'l•Yi th efficient cause in bringing matter and form together) may 
be seen the beginning of-the physico-theological (teleological) 
argument: 
It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not 
present because we do not observe the agent de.;;;,~-~ 
liberating ••• :If, therefore, purpose zs present 
in art' it is·. present also in nature e 
Hume also recognized purpose in nature, expressed in 
Aristolelian fashion that. "Nature does nothing in vain " and 
' 
regarded as a "maxim established in all the schools merely 
from the contempla.t~on of the works of Nature.n3 His state-
ment of the argument as interpreted by Watson is: 
The world.is 'nothing but one great machine,• 
subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
machines "t-rhich again admit of subdivision, to a. 
degree beyond 1-rhat ·human senses can trace and 
explain. All these various machines, and even 
their most minute parts are adjusted to each 
other ~ith an accuracy which ravishes into ad-
miration all men who have ever contemplated them. 
The curious adaptation of means to ends, through-
out all ne.ture, resembles exactly, though 1 t 
much exceeds, the production of human contriv-
ance •••• Since, therefore, the effects resemble 
1. Maritain, DS, 3. 
2. Aristotle, in McKeon, 
B\1A, 251; see 752. 
3·. 'Hume, ET, ·· 580; see 
581~583. 
each other, we are led to inter by all the rules 
of analogy, that the causes also resemble; a.nd 
that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to 
.the mind of ma.n .. l 
Christian Wolff states it as follows: 
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l. "In der sichtbaren Welt 1st eine Ordnung dar Natur. 11 
2. 11 Die Ordnung ••.• is zuf~llig." 
3. 11 Es einen Urheber der "Vlelt gebe." 
4. 11 Gott ••• der t;Trheber der Ordnung ist.n2 
Kant himself states it thus: 
Die Physikotheologie 1st der Versuch der Ve~ 
nunft aus den Zw~cken der Natur (die nur empirisah 
erkannt warden kbnnen) auf die oberste Ursache der 
Natur ~nd ihre Eigenschaften zu schliessen~3 
b. Kant 1 s general attitude toward it,.--Kant's general 
attitude toward the-teleological 11 proof 11 is both sympathetic 
and critical, as it is 11 der !\.lteste, kl~reste und dar gemeinen 
Menschenvernunft am meisten angemessene, 11 and yet being based 
on the other arguments (directly upon the cosmological, and 
indirectly upon the ontological), proves only 11 einen Weltbau-
meister ••• nioht einen Weltsoh&pfer. 11 4 As Kant' e treatment of 
this ·llproof 11 is briefer than that of the others, and as it 
appears reasonable to accept his contention that it is based 
largely upon the others, it will not be necessary to go into 
it deeply. 
o .. Consideration of the 11 proof 11 and of Kant's treatment 
1) Design granted.--In both the pre-critical and 
critical periods, Kant was impressed by the evidence of design 
1. Watson, IRE, 254-255; see 
Hume, ET, II, 518-524, 537. 
2. Wolff, VG, IV, 257,261, 270. 
3. Kant, KdU, 400. 
4. Kant, KrV, B 651, 
655; see DeBurgh, 
Art. (1927), 360. 
---- -.---..:.---=-------.-....--..... _____ --"--~----- -----~-- --- -..... - ------ ----=-~---~---- -----
56 
in nature,l but differently, one difference being that in the 
latter period he made a distinction in purpose: in the first 
Critique, purpose is outer, tfhile in the third Critique pur-
pose is inner.2 In the latter, also, is expressed the a't-re, 
almost religious reverence, that Kant felt in the· presence of 
the·sublime, which to him was an evidence of purposive pheno~ 
ena in nature, in which, prior to reflection, he sensed an 
"unknotm pO't-1er behind them. 11 :3 
Others, with varying vigor, sustain Kant in his will-
ingness to ·grant design in nature. Duns Scotus, tracing the 
teleological vie't-1 of nature back to .Aristotle, l'Yrote: 
.All agents act with reference to an end. But 
nature is also mechanical. .All natural forces 
act in a determinate manner, . e.nd. their behavior 
would not be diff~rent even if it were not direct-
ed to an end, if, that is, instead of being also 
purposive, it 't-Jere merely me~hanical. Hence the 
telelolgical character of the universe comes not 
from the lat-Ts of nature considered as mere uni-
formi tles but from an agent who directs and "t-rills I 
them .. 4 .""'"" 
--,=--=··~::-::::::::-:::~ 
Noting the relation bett1een causality and teleology, 
Cunningham sees neither proof nor disproof of the assertion 
of a cause and a purpose for every event, as an absence of an 
evident cause and purpose is no'disproof of their existence .. 5 
Inge holds that "The existence of a dlrective purpose •• oin 
nature.4.,cannot reasonably be denied .. 11 6. And acco:t"ding to 
Taylor and Cook Wilson, the advance of science has strength-
ened the argument: 
1 .. Kant, BDG, 56 .. 
2., See England, KCG, 156, 157. 
:3 .. DeBurgh, .Art.(l927), 361 .. 
4. Harris, DS, II, 1.56-157. .. 
5. See Cunningham, TOP, 
107-108 ' 110 .. 6. Inge, .Art.(l948}, .51. 
It tends to suggest the picture of a design-
ing mind "to7orking l..Yi th methods curiously .like 
those of the human mind. It is as if nature 
made expel--iments .... and rejecting the less sat-
isfactory, retained the better and even advanc-
ed in kno't-Tledge and skill.l 
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To see purposiveness is to see intelligibility in the 
universe, and to find satisfaction tor the demands of reason 
that there be rationality at the heart of things. Thus, while 
one may not be prepared to aooept the argument from design, 
and may not even take the first step beyond the granting of 
the evidences of design in nature (viz., the step of the nee_d 
. 
ot a Designer), yet it is_diffieult to see how anyone can re-
main unfelling and merely scientific before the manifestations 
ot adaptation and harmony 1~ the 't1orld.2 Kant was not able to 
do so. 
2) Need of Designer no"t; proved.-:-In the pre-critical 
period Kant wavers on the contingency of matter and its impli-
cation of a_ Designer, facing· the issue "t-7hether matter might 
be e·ternal or not, and thus independent) But in the_ criticAl 
period, he appears surer of his ground: 
Nun ist der Begriff eines Dinges, dessen 
Exi stenz oder Form 't'lir uns unter der Beding-
ung eines Zwecks also m8glich vorstellen, met 
dem Begriffe einer Zuf~lligkeit desselben (nach Naturgesetzen) unzertrennlich verbunden. 
Daher machen auch die Naturdingt welche 't..Jir 
ntir ale Zwecke m8glich tinden den vornehmsten 
Bewiss t&r die Zuf~1ligkeit des Weltganzen 
aus, undsind der einzige fiir den demeinen 
1. Wilson, SI, 848; see 
Taylor, DGE, 57. 
2. See DeBurgh, Art. (1927), 361, 
364; Wilson, SI, II, 571. 
3. See Kant, BDG, 64, 
99-100 .. 
Verstand ebensowohl ala den Ph.ilosonhen gel-
" ~ tende Beweissgrund der Abhangigkei t und c1es 
Ursprungs desselben von einem ausser der Welt 
existirenden und zwar (um jener Z'T•reokm&ssigen 
Form Willen) vorst&ndigen Wesens ••• Beweist 
sie etwas, dass ein solches verstl\ndiges Wesen 
da se1? Nein;· nichts wei t·er ala dass ll[ir naoh 
Besohaffenheit unseres Erkenntnissvermbgens, 
also in Verbindung der Erfahrung mit den ober-
sten Prinzipien der Vernunft, una schlechter-
dings keinen Begriff von der M8gl1ohkeit einer 
solche Welt maohen k8nnen, ale so, dass 1o11r 
una ein absiohtlich wirkende oberste Ursache 
derselben denken.l 
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He goes on to the effect that we do not observe the 
purposes in nature, but only think them--as guides for our 
judgment .2 That 18, Kant sees no actual design; it is EI.B if 
11 a notion or plan were the ground" of the empirical laws of 
nature; 11 the principle of Z't·reckm~seigkei t is a regulative 
principle for the ·reflective judgment·. 11 3 Apa.rt from moral 
considerations, physical teleology might lead to a demonol-
ogy as well as to theism, and so, as Engl~=~.nd points out, the 
final purpose must be shm·m to be oonsi a tent with the moral 
la't-7. 4 
Bowne,.however, presents the case for teleology in 
more favorable light for theism: 
The positive argument for design begins by 
showing that many processes in nature are de-
termined by ends. The aim of the eye is vision, 
that of the ear is hearing, that of the lungs 
is the oxygenation of the blood, th~=~.t of the 
manifold generative mechanisms is the reproduc-
tion of life. In all these there is a conou~ 
renee of many factors in a common result; and 
1. Kant, KdU, 33.5-336. 
2. See Kant, KdU, 336. 
3. England, KCG, 144-145; see 
DeBurgh, Art.(l927), 359. 
4. See England, KCG, 159. 
this result, to't'Ya.rd which all tend, is vie~-red 
as the final caus~ of their concurrence. Here, 
then is action for an end. But an end, as such 
cannot act except as a conception in the con-
sciousness of some agent 't·Jhich 't·1ills that endol 
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Against Kant, Bm,y-ne argued· that 11 we have the same proof 
that eyes are designed that 't..Ye have that watches are designed" 
and that 11 ii' eyes are not designed, "t<tatches are not designed..n2 
In a similar manner, Garrigou-Lagrange, follo't'lfing St. Thomas, 
argued using premises: t1Major: Things cannot act for an end, 
unless they are directed by some intelligent being which kno"t..YS 
the end. Minor: Things ~-1hich do not possess intellect, act 
for an end. nJ In reference to the 11Archi teet, 11 Garrigou-L?.-
grange insisted that all that is needed as proof of a design-
ing intellect l'1ho is· absolutely simple, perfect, _sovereign and 
inf'ini te, is in the other proofs, the other 11 four "t·Tays 11 of St. 
Thomas~ and that in the 11 five ways 11 are the- five attributes of 
God, viewed as First Movet', First Efficient Cause, First Neces-
sary Being, the First and Greatest Being, and the First Intel-
ligent Ruler. 4 But the problem that Kant -faced, arid to 't'Yhich 
in natural reason he found no solution, 'frWUld be the crucial 
fact for Garrigou-Lagrange, viz., is there a temporal first 
cause of' any kind? Is the world contingent or is it eternal? 
In other· words, the need of a Designer has ·.not been proved by 
the teleologic~l argument. 
J) Identification of Designer as God not.accomplished 
Kant appears to be correct also.in the judgment th::~.t the 
1. Bo11ne, THE, 86-87. 
2. Bowne, TI:IE, 11.5-116. 
J. Garrigou-Lagrange, GEN, 
316. . 
4. Duce, KGN, 268-269o 
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identification .of the Designer as God, has not been accomplished 
by the teleological argument: 
Nach bless theoretisohen Prinzipien des Ver-
nunftgebrauohsn(worauf die Physikotheologie 
sich allein grundet) kann a~so niemals dar Be-
griff einer Gottheit, derf~r unsere teleolo-
gische Beurtheilung der Natur zureichte, heraus-
gebracht werden.l · 
Even in the early period, Kant recognized that the guesses 
of man leave him in the dark. In the first Critique, Kant shows 
that pure reason had not established God as Creator 9 2 Hume had 
granted some validity to the teleological argument because he saw 
in design and order evidence of ·a being with a· remote likeness to 
human intelligence, but he did not attribute to this being any 
moral attributes; to Kant this was a serious omissio!l'.:3 Hume 
could see no justification for the leap taken·in the argument, the 
leap from a finite world to an infinite Author.4 Kant, also, while 
recognizing design in .nature, saw in it no strictly logical proof 
of God 1 s existence, because of the limitations of reason. The 
Obj act of speculation 11 ganz ausserhalb den Grenz en dar Naturwissen-
schaft im Felde reiner Ide.en liege. n5 Thus, Kant makes room for 
faith. Kant's discussion of the will indicates that while he 
saw no general teleology qn the basis of the speculative reason, 
he conceded it on the basis of the practical reason,.? 
Thus, teleology for Kant was first of all moral teleol-
ogy. The moral world is an intelligible ~·rorld, a concept of 
1. Kant, KdU, 4o6. 
2. Vide supra, 55. 
3. Kant, KrV, A 817 .. 
L~. See Watson, IRE, I, 2,56-2,58; 
Pringle-Pattison, t.riG, 12-13. 
5. Kant, .KrV, A 745. 
6. Kant, KrV, A 744. 
7. Kant, KrV, A 801-
803. 
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. 
11 reinen Vernunft in ihrem praktisohen Gebrauche. nl The basis 
of the union·of happiness and morality is a Supreme Being, a 
11 weisen Urheber and Regierer, 11 the 11 h8chsten Gut., • .-trelohes eine 
solche zweckmlssige Einheit allein m8gleioh machen kann.,u2 
This approach of the·praotioal reason has a 11 particular11 advan-
tage over any logical teleological approach: 
II Diese Moraltheologie hat nun den eigenthumlichen 
Vorzug vor der speoulativen: dass sie unausblieblioh 
auf den Begriff eines einigey, allervollkommensten 
und vern&nftigen Urweisens fUhret, worauf uns specu-
lative Theologie nioht einmal aus objectiven Gr~nden 
hinweiset, gesohweige una davon ~berzeugen konnte.3 
-In this view of general teleology, Kant held that the so-
called philosophers are but artists; above them is the real 
Philosopher who, strangely, does not exist, although each man 
has within him the idea of the legislative power of this Phi-
losopher: 
Wesentliohe Zwecke sind darum noah nioht die 
h8chsten, deren (bei vollkommener systematisoher 4 Einheit der Vernunft) nur ein einziger sein kann. 
Toward the· close of his li.fe, Kant made the connection 
between general teleology and a personal God more explicit: 11 Das 
II 5 hochste Pr1nz1p aller Zwecke ist Gott. 11 
The teleological argument may be considered in some 
sense an empirical approach to the problem of the existence of 
God. 11 There is no hard and fast distinction between !!: priori 
and~ posteriori knowledgeq •• apart from experience there is no 
1. Kant; KrV A 808_ 
2. Kant, KrV, A 812; 
see A 813-814. 
3. Kant, KrV, A 815. 
4. Kant, KrV, A 840; see A 839. 
5. Kant in Buchenau, KOP, I, · 145 .. 
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activity of reason. 11 l Yet it comes far short of the empiricism 
that is satisfactory to the writer, viz., direct experience of. 
God. It is true that the idea of purpose is a human concept 
derived from man's knowledge of his own activity, and as such is 
anthropomorphic; but as all man's knowledge is in terms of his 
own activity, in terms he can gral:tp, there is no escaping from 
all anthropomorphism. An illegitimate anthropomorphism would 
result from ignoring the fact that by hypothesis the purposive 
activities of God are in some respects unique.2 The elements of 
value, desire and satisfaction can not be separated from the con-
cept of divine purpose. And to see purpose or unity of purpose 
in the universe without grasping the purpose of the Designer is 
perfectly consistent~3 
Laird, DeBurgh, Taylor, and others agree that this ar-
gument does not prove the existence of the God of theism, the 
God of the great historical religions.4 The God that Hgffding 
puts forward in his effort to buttress the teleological argu-
ment is too indistinct in outline to suggest the God of reli-
gion.S Taylor regards the argument, even when supplemented by 
the moral·considerations which he advances, as incapable of 
proof.6 The writer, with DeBurgh, accepts in general the crit-
icism of Kant, but rejects Kant 1 s conclusion that, 11 lfe have not 
the slightest ground forassumingthe objective correspondence 11 
1. DeBurgh, Art.(l927), 
365-366. . 
2. See Tennant, PT, II, 115. 
3. See Tennant, PT, II, 117; 
Taylor, DGE, 77. 
4. See Laird, TC, 268; DeBurgh, 
TRP, 133; Taylor, DGE, ??;Ten-
nant PT, II, 122-123; Outler 
Art.tl947), 517-518; Mill, TER, 
176-177; Sorley, MVIG, 327. 
5. H8ffding~ TPOR, 56. 
b. Taylor, ~GE, 115. 
of the idea with rea.lity.l So the "t<rriter is led to· conclude 
with Brightman that, while the argument is the most satisfac-
tory (as most empirical) of the traditional theistic 11 proofs 11 , 
yet like the rest it fails because·its 11 strength is not strong 
enOUgh to prove, II as its 11 'tll'eakness iS not v.reak enough to refute, 
the reality of God, 11 2 This suggests the next point. 
III. The traditional theistic arguments and theoretical 
certainty 
1. The medieval and modern revolt. ~.gainst. intellectualism 
In relation to the traditional theistic argu~ents and 
theoretical certainty, the revolt against intetleotualism 't'1hich 
began in the medieval period v1i th the mystical stress on feel-
ing and intuition (in the broA.d sense of these terms), develop-
ed in the modern period around suoh names as Otto (numinous 
feeling), Schleiermacher (feeling of dependence), ~ames (feel-
ing of objective presenoe-- 11 something there 11 ), Bergson (intui-
tion), and Underhill (mystic feeling or intuition). 
a. Its significance.--Significantly, it was a revolt 
e.gainst the sepe.ration of thought P-nd life or of theory and 
practice,3 a reaction against the spectator type of philosophy 
with its detachment from life,4 a recognition of the non-ra-
tional (not irrational) elements of life (with more or }P,ss of 
cognitive content) ,5 e.nd the realization of the central >, 
· 1. PeBurgh ~ Art. ( 1927); Kant, 
KrV, A o2, B 651; DeBurgh, 
TPR, 133-134; 365-366. 
2. Brightman, Art.(1937)1, 154. 
3. Herman, MVM, 25.5. 
4. See Goudge, Art. 
( 1942) '14-15. 
James, VRE, 433. 
5. See Herm~.n, l-1.VM, 
270-271. 
/~ 
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importance of religious experience as essentially religious 
feeling, or at least, as immediate and the real be.sis for re-
fleotion.l It was a dissatisfaction not only with pur.e reason, 
:but with practical and aesthetic reason (as not going far 
enough), and a demand fo~ consideration of religious feeling 
as having rights of its o"tm; it was ·a leaving of the barren, 
bleak desert of speculation tdth all its spiritual 11 beggary. 112 
Orthodoxy, with its emphasis upon the intellect, with 
its failure to demonstrate its beliefs, and by its blindness 
to other than rationalistic elements in the religious life, 
was blamed for the rise of an unbelieving ra.tionalism~3 As 
a result, directly (by being unable to prove its beliefs) and 
indirectly (through loss of pres.tige' thereby) ' there "r>ras a 
loss of "some of the most vital and precious doctrines of his-
toric faith, and.a religious decline 11 .and impotence, uitnessed 
by the inability of orthodox rationalism 11 to make good its 
claims even 'tV'i th reference to the reduced theological content 
which ·it claimed to prove. 114 Orthodox rationalism l>Yas on the 
't'lrong path to reali ty)5 
b. Its safeguarding.--Of course, in any reaction, there 
. is danger that the pendulum swing too far the other way, and 
in this particular case, that reason not merely be put in its 
1. See H&ffding, 74 431· 433; · 
2. Windelband, Art.~l913;, 204; 
Bertocci, EAG, 3; Moore, 
TRE, 164, 166. 
2. See Hegel, PR, III, 156; 
Hooking~ MGHE 1 215; Duce, KGN, 45~; Kanli, Ethics, . 
86-93; Griffiths, GIE, 13-
15; Herman, MVN, 243. 
See Otto, I~, 3-4. 
Macintosh, TES 10. . 
See Baillie , OKG , 147-
148; IR 93-98, 104-
105, 20S, 219; Windel-
band, Art.(l913), 203-
204; Macintosh, TES, 
10-11. 
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Place, but that it be degraded or displaced altogether. But, 
at least, extremes serve to point out the position of the 
mean.l Herman seeks to take this mido.l.e-of-the-road-path: 
The most convinced opponent of mysticism 
is ready to admit that intuition has a large 
place in the discovery of truth. Even so 
doughty a champion of the scientific attitude 
as Mr. Bertrand Russell admits that 'much of 
the most important truth is first suggested 
by its means,• and goes on to point out that 
'even in the most logical realms it is in-
sight that first arri vee at "t-rhat ·is nevr.' He 
· sees an element of 't~isdom to be learnt from . 
the mystical 1:18-Y ~ •.• 'Tr~hich does not seem to be 
~ttainRble in any other manner.2 
Then, as a corrective of present-day mysticism, Herman 
recalls th~.t 11 i t 't<ras 't·rhen the disciples reasoned together that 
Jesus Himself dre't-1 near. 11 3. ·But to see the proper relation be-
t~..yeen feeling and reason in the me.tter of immediate experience, 
it must also be recalled that the disciples got nowhere in 
their reasoning until they came into the immediate presence of 
the risen Christ, ·Nhen "their eyes -v1ere opened 11 and 11 they said 
••• 
1 Did not our hearts burn "tori thin us? 1 114 It 't'J'as a heart-'t,mrm-
ing experience, of an objective reality, as more than one ex-
perienced it, and as it 1r.1as tied in 'IJ7i th history, Christ, ac-
cording to the context, being the subject of a long line of 
prophecy. 
2. The modern disapproval of the traditional theistic 
11 proofs 11 ~. 
a. Dissatisfaction of some Catholic nhilosophers 
. 1. See Hocking, MGHE, 57-
61; Herman, MVM, 274-275. 
2. Herm::m, MVM, 270-271. 
3. Herma.n4 MVM, 263 • 4. Luke,2 :31, 32. 
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Some Catholic philosophers are clissatisfied "t'-ri t.h the 
traditional theistic "proofs", for there-is not the unity in 
Catholic philosophy that is often pr_ofessed.l · While Oatholic 
philosophers generally follow Thomas Aquinas, there·ha.ve al-
't"lays been those l'Yho have disagreed with him,2 e.nd 11 even with-
in 'the field of Scholasticism these proofs were assailed by 
critics, especially by Duns Scotus and the Scotists. 11 3 And 
Edouard LeRoy, a modern Catholic philosopher, "t-7rites: "Ces 
argume:nns a.u fond, prouvent moine 1 1 existence de Dieu qu 1 ila 
ne determinant ses attribute, une fois son existence admise. 114 
He also says of these arguments: 
Elles sont actuellement sans effet; elles 
.ne convainquent personpe parmi les_philosophes 
d 1 aujourd 1 hui ••• L1 experience reli$ieus est de-
cisive .sur le peu d 1 importance reelle de la 
metaphysique savante en oette question.5 
A denial of the demonstrative force of the theistic 
11 proofs11 is made by Francis A. \·lalsh: 
There never uas a philosophy, except Chris-
tianity itself, ~1hich could be called a Chris-
tian philosophy or even a satisfactory philoso-
·phy~)df:··r.eligio:o. •••• Even in the case of scholas~ ·. :-: 
tic philosophy, the most that St. Thomas hoped 
to do, as he states in his Contra Gentiles, "1as 
to shm-1 that the conclusions arrived at in phil-
osophy "!;~ere not opPosed to Catholic truth as 
contained in the Scriptures and in the teachings 
of the Church, and ••• no philosophy ever justi-
fied a particular form of religious cult, nor 
laid a rational basis for6a definite approach to the complete idea of God. 
1. See McCall, Art.(1938)·, 
9; Kennedy, Art. ( 1912)1, 
698; Garrigou-Lagra.nge, 
sc, 248. 
2. Harris, ~s, II~ 152. 
3. Meyer, PoT, 23~. 
4. LeRoy, Art.{1907), 513; see 
Garrigou-LaGrange, SC,242-244. 
5. LeRoy, Art. ( 1907), 470-471. 
6. vlalsh, Art.(1934), 2-3. 
The same denial is vi~tually made by Maritain: 
Voil~ done la mis\re de la metaphypique ••• 
Elle eveille le desir de 1 1 union supreme, 
d 1 une possession SPirituelle consummee dans 
1 1 ordre m~me de la-realiti, et non plus seul-
ement de l 1 id~e. Elle ne peut pas ieAsatis-
faire. C1 est une sagesse que nous prechons.l 
In one s·ense Neo-Thomism is against rationalism as. well 
as agnosticism; for l'rhile affirming that reality can be known, 
it denies that it·can be fully understood by unaided (natural) 
reason.2 Thus, Duce can say that l:'eligion 11 within the limits 
of mere reason 11 is not the religion of a Neo-Thomist.3 St. 
Thomas held that. "the human mind can have' no pretensions to ~ 
proper kno't'lledge of what is beyond corporeal being. n4 Duns 
Scotus agreed.5 One should guard against referring without 
qualification to the statement of St. Thomas concerning the weak-
ness of argument from authority. For after considering the ob-
jection that 11 proof from authority is the weakest form of proof 
according to Boethius, 11 he ans"t<7ers: 11 For although the argument 
from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the ar-
gument from _authority based on divine revelation is the strongest .. 1~ 
Thus, while the majority of Catholic philosophers (as 
Neo-Thom1sts) teach that there is a theoretical certainty of 
God's existence, it is not a certainty based unon·abstract rea-
soning; for while it seems divorced from religious (i.e. mysti-
cal) experience, it is not actually so, for if there is, as 
1. Maritain, DS, 15. 
2. See Duce, KGN, 52~ 
3. Duce, KGN 313. 
4. DeWulf, SON, 111; see 
Aquinas, !SA, 16, 83. 
5. See Harris~ DS~ II, 150-+51. 
6. Aquinas, IBA, ~umma 
Theologica, la, q 1, a 8. 
these Catholic philosophers hold, a divine revelation and a 
divine aid in reasoning, they are religious experiences. 
b. General dissatisfaction of Protestant thinkers 
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There is a general dissatisfaction with the traditional 
theistic "proofs" on the part of Protestant philosophers and 
theologians. It is admirably and tersely stated by Brightman: 
lf!t is unreasonable to expeot formal proof of theistic belief. 8 l 
Knudson 't'lri tea: 11 'fhere ean be no strictly logical demonstration 
outside the field of mathematics and formal logio.n2 James was 
convinced that none of the arguments for G-od constitutes a 
"knook-down proof. 113 Evidently hinting at the dependence of 
mediate upon immediate experience (more of whioh will be said 
later), of seeming to imply, without justice, that what he says 
does not likewise hold in other spheres, he added: 
The truth is that in the metaphysical and reli-
gious sphere, articulate reasons are cogent for us 
only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have 
already been impressed in favor of the same oonolu-
sion.4 . 
Hartshorne, Field, ·and Sheen witness to the extensive 
rejection of these theoretical proofs,5 and Hooking, Bennett, 
and Proctor, doing the same thing, point the way to a more ade-
quate proof, Proctor declaring: 11 The trouble with all these so-
called proofs is that they start with something other than God, 
1. Brightman, -Rv, 31; 
see P<t, 1W7 ; Frank, 
PRT, 29; Sorley, MVIG, 
302; Mill, TER, 151, 
155; Rall1 OHR, 238. 2. Knudson, DG, 235. 
3. James, VRE, 444; see 
Beckwith, IG, 36. 
4. James, VRE, 74. 
5. See Hartshorne, MVG, 
5.7, 178; Field, Art. (1928), 324; Sheen, 
~I, 22 • 
.. ·-·- -·- --··-- -- ------------ -~----:___ -
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and from that j)ry to reach Rim11 ; Proctor concludes that 1-i' there 
is any knowledge of God it is not inferential. but immediate,.l 
e. Kant's contribution to this dissatisfaction 
KantJs direct contribution to the dissatisfaction with. 
the traditional arguments for God's existence is unquestioned. 
Pratt says.that they 11 received their death blow at the hands of 
Kant. 02 Kant 1 s conclusion on the arguinents ·may be summed up in 
his words: 
Das h&chste Wesen bleibt also tflr den bloss 
speculativen. o .Vernunft11 ein blosses •.• Ideal ••. des sen objective Reali tat auf dies em 1fege zwar 
nicht bewiesen, aber auch nicht widerlegt war-
den· kann.3 
Kant's indirect contribution to the universal. dissatis-
faation with the traditional arguments is t'he evidence (in his 
own reasoning on the subject) of the inadequacy of mere specu-
lative reason to deal with the subject at a11.4 If the writer 
were not going beyond such speculatiqn in his own treatment of 
the subject, he would stand self-condemned here. Just as ".fu!-
ligion within the. Limits of Ruman Reason" demonstrated ind1¥-
rEmtly that there is a reason within the limits of human (nat-
ural) religion--a mere speculative reason, so the Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft indirectly proves that pure reason (which might 
be described as 11 undefiled" by contact with moral and religious 
1. Procter, FKR, 2, 28; 
see Rocking, MGHE, v; 
Bennett, PSM, 91. 
2.· Pratt~ PRB, 194; see 
also ~egel, PR, II, 
239; Hartshorne, MVG, 
19-20. 
:;. Kant, KrV, B 669. 
4. Vide supra4 20, 27-30' 46- 7. 
·.· .•. :, ·:-· -: .· ~ 'I 
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experience) needs criticism. And it has received muah of it.l 
That it ls not all unjust, is seen in the fact that Kant him-" 
self towards the end of his life realized, that his 11 three . 
Ori tiques .... did not cover experience as a whole, and proposed to 
meet the omission by writing another critique. 1t2 
IV. The inadequacy of all theoretical theistic arguments 
1 •. General reason: denial of any theoretical certainty in: 
aq Rejection of~ priori (self-evident) propositions 
The inadequacy of all theoretical theistic argum~nts is 
witnessed, first of all, by the quite general denial of theo-
r~tioal certainty, as in the rejection ·o:r ~priori (self-evi-
dent) propositions. This is a contradiction of the rational-
istio position, for instance, of St. !homas (who b.elieved that. 
there are :first principles whieh amimmediately evidQnt, in-
demonstrable 11 exoept indirectly or by reduction to absurdity") ,3 
of Descartes, (eertainty due to elear and distinot ideas, which 
are innate as impressed upon the soul by God, or as intuitively 
present to the mind),4 and of Leibniz (who, :following Deeoa:rtes 
' , 
and Plato on innate ideas, held a correot view of the conserva-
tion of energy, but with no other proof than the Cartesian de-
duction from the·r.ationality of God) .. .5 But for Kant, there were 
no axiom~ and. completed definitions prioP to experience.6 In 
1. See Hartshorne.:z. MVG, 
1920; Vance, RT~ 282; 
Ormond CP, 78-til• 
2. Grif:fi t~s, GIE, 17; · 
see Ward., SK, 13.5. 
3. Garrigou-LaGrange~ OG, 96 
96; see Aquinas, J.SA, 
.5' 11' 14,, .21. 
4. Vide supra, 12. 
.5 • See Balfour'· TH, 225; 
Leibniz, DM, 29, 34, 
41, 44. 
6. See Kant, KrV, B 122, 
197, 200, 203~ ~~wi~, 
Art. (1930), .5<:>4 • 
part, the Neo-Thomists agree with Kant, although holding to 
the validity of first prinoiplesol 
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It would be too much to·expeot that the·rationalists 
would be silent during this attaok upoll the ~ priori in the 
old sense of th.e term. Nygren, for instanoe, deolares that, 
"Every age has that whioh it aeoepts as self-evident~~.the 
profo~ndest mark of an age.n2 Then there are those who hold 
that ~mmediate or true convictions are essential to knowledge, 
for as stated by MoTa~gart, 11 If we eould know nothing unless 
it were proved, we could never start l:!.t all. n3 Beok, alarmed 
at the swinging.of the pendulum frli)'lll. dogmatism toward skepti-
cism, describes the.latter as "a dogmatic disbelief 11 which 
suffers.Ufrom all the ills of dogmatism in addition to those 
brought about by·tailure to seek unconditional certainty, or 
to just;ity it where it is found in both science and mora1s. 11 4 
C. I .. Lewis, on the ot}?.er hand, although conceding that 
this danger. ·Of skepticism lends weight to the contention that 
probabl.e knowledge must have its foundation upon some antece-
dent certainty, withou,t. which there would be 11 an infinite re-
gress 9f probables 11 and although holding that there is 11 a 
knowledge of·nature which is more than probable because it is 
not merely. empirical, or.dependent on the content of the given," 
contends that the traditional rationalist's concept that meta-
physical first principles can be shown to be logically indis-
pensable, or "that lfhat is logically prior is thereby proved 
1. See Duoe, KGN, 52~ 89, 162. 
2. Nygren, Art.(1948J, 235. 
3. McTaggart, SDR, 45. 
4. Beck, CPR, 47. 
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to be certain, :finds no support from 1ogic and mathematios."l 
Vanoe, referring to Descartes's true propositions, points out 
that prejudice may be II clear and distinct' If and th8.t Descartes. 
traveled in a cir.ole, forsaking the 11 clear ·and distinct" cr1-· 
terion to ratify it by appeal to God, whom he said existed be-
cause he had clear and tlistiriet ideas' o:f Him.2 The kind of 
certainty to whioh l'lieman is partioularly opposed is just this 
mathematical and logical oertainty ii:f original axioms whioh , .. 
are held to be incontrovertable. These axioms, !~ill tless in · 
themselves, oome under his just condemnation when used apart 
:from experience to reveal the highest values.,3 His !!: priori 
is the Kantian, operation upon the occasion of experience. 
An !: J2rior1 . that somewhat resembles both Aquinas's :· 
first principles and Kant 1 s ~·priori is that of Edmund Hus-
serl .. · His phenomenological . intui tiona of truth or of es-
sences beyond the jurisdiction, and yet not prior to experi-
ence, differ from Kant 1 s ~priori in combining elements of 
form with those of content. ·According to Reinhardt, it was 
Husserl's purpose to get access to Kant's inaccessible realm 
of things in themselvea.~ 
So while the ~ Eriori can not be rejected in every 
sense of its meaning, its rejection in the old rationalistic 
sense is an evidence of the inadequacy of all theoretical 
theistic arguments. 
1. Lewis, MWO, :311-312, 
204. 
2. Vance, RT, 74. 
3. Wieman, Art.(l931), 5. 
4~ Reinhardt, Art.(1937), 
320' 330-331. 
b. Belief that logical necessity is not absolute 
inevitability 
The new view of logical necessity is a voluntaristic 
one, i.e .. n:ot implying absolute inevitability-. Like the re-
lated term, ".!!: priori 11 , "necessity". is an ambiguous word, its 
antonyms meaning both "contingenttr and 11 voluntary.n The terms 
. "uno~ndi tional" and "involuntary11 must be distinguished!, tor 
there are certain necessary relations which,. holrever, do not 
coerce the mind. Speaking of that which is intuitively cer-
_tain, Hume declared: 11All certainty arises from. the compari eon 
of ideas.and from the discovery of such. relations as are unal-
terable, so long as the ideas continue the same. These rela-
tions are resemblance, proportion, quantity, and number, de-
grees of any quantity, and contrariety. 111 lT.hether the ideas 
remain fixed is a matter ot appeal to exp~rience. Then there 
. is.neceseity in the sense of the truth whose denial is absurd. 
This requires penetration into the meaning of the denial in 
order to show. up the self-contradiction. Here again, the ne-
cessary is not prior to experience, i.eo before "careful in-
spection of the terms.involved, 11 na11 terms referring to exper-
_ience, there being nothing else to which they can refer.2 
There is no ..! priori reason or necessity for accepting 
a certain type of logic a·s the true o-ne, but once it has been 
accepted, and two premises properly used, the conclusion by 
1. Hum~, THN, 380-381; 
see Turner, PBO~- 8-9; 
England, VRE, 1~19. 
2. Hartshorne, MVG, 70. 
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intuitive insight necessarily follows. But one is not com-
pelled to accept the conclusion, for while being formally 
true (as validly :t'ollot'ling from the premises), it may not be 
materially true, which is only ascertainable by reference to 
ex.periena·e. ·More than ever, logic is now being related to ex-
perience. Speaking of the necessary circular motion in logic, 
0. I. Lewis makes it clear that he wishes to be understood not 
as denying that there are any necessary propositions, for "Who-
ever takes a given logic as true will find its principles un-
deniable, without contradiction, and therefore necessary.rrl 
But he hastens to add that this apart from experience, is not 
inescapability; there is the sense of self-evidence or neces-
sity that is imposed upon the mind by the given, the "brute 
tact"· of immediate experienoe.2 Thus, while not denying the 
~ priori, Lewis affirms that it is a creation of the mind, 
built out of the materials furnished by experiencee 
Thus, there is a certain sense in which universal prop-
ositions are necessary propositions. , 
ence. 
Rationalism is right in maintaining that 
every particular contains and presupposes 
universals and that every contingent prop-
osition contains and presupposes propositions 
that are necessary. But empiricism is right 
in denying that particulars oan be completely 
reduced to universals, and that contingent 
propositions can be completely reduced to 
proofs that are necessary.3 
Here again necessity is based ultimately upon experi-
1 .. Let'lis, MBO, 210. 
2. Lewis, MBO, 2lle 
3. Montague, WK, 126; 
see DeEurgh, TPR, 4-5. 
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Commenting upon. Dr~ Schiller's pook Logic in Use, 
A. C. Ewing, far from attacking it, is on the defensive, fear-
ing ~or the very existence of formal logic. Declaring that 
this discipline is not ua:.eless, El7ing admits the very point 
that Schiller makes--th~t it "cannot claim to give certainty 
to our reasonings .ul SGhiller in· his reply condemns "vicious, 
abstract thinking" and restates hia.objection to formal valid-
ity: 
It is not that every syllogism (or other. 
deductive reasoning) is void because of the 
am.bigui ty of i·ts middle term; but that 1 t is 
voidable; not that it must be in'tialid, but 
that it may become so~2 
Schiller goes on to ~xplain that the ambiguity results 
"' from use in two different cont~xts, thus imposing the obliga-
tion on the user, "the duty of . ~hewing in ~ ~ that in the 
tranfer of. the terms .from orie case to another no relevant am-
biguity has .arisen to ~estroy their identity) The empiricism 
here is pla.ln: 
Hence I maintain the completely empiricist 
position that every syllOgistic conclusion 
-needs to be verified in fact, to s: o,ame true' 
before it can be proclaimed 'true.' 
He expresses delight that Dr. Ewing also has abandoned 
logical necessity in its stri.ct sense' a.s "the pet theory of 
logicians 11 is changed by Ewing into a "logical obligation" in 
which an "ought 11 i a subst.i tut ea :ro·r a 11 muat • " ·Thus , it is 
clear that today there is a· st.rong trend away from a ooerci ve 
1. Ewing, Art.(l931) 10. 
z. Schiller, Art.(l9Jl), 12. 
3. Schiller, Art.(19311, 13. 
4. Schiller, Art.(l931T, 13. 
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abstractness 
The defect oommon to all theoretical theistic proofs is 
abstraotness,-i.e. the attempt to pass from idea to God (onto-
logical) or from nature to God (cosmological and teleological) 
1. Kant, KrV, 741, 754 .. 
' : 
: . 
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instead of from God to God (the experience of God). To try to 
determine the existence ot a religious ob,1eot by other than 
distinctively, concrete religious experience is just as unrea-
sonable as to attempt to determine the existenc~ of a physical 
obJect by religious experience. Appropriate concrete evidence 
is what is needed for the proof. 
bo Theoretice.l arguments not producers of belief 
Then, the traditional theistic 11 proofs 11 are not produc-
ers of belief; rather they are the products of belief, as has 
been observed in the cases of Anselm.and Descartes. Thera-
tionalist Anselm taught 11 that the office of the so-called the-
istic proofs is never to induce belief, but only and al~1ays to 
provide us 1-1i th an understanding of a b alief already firmly 
held. 11 1 Some philosophers appear to have taken themselves too 
. -
seriously; not so much depended upon their speculation as they 
imaginedo Kant was not one of these. To say the least, very 
f'e't-t are won to belief in God by these "proof's. 112 They are, as 
has been seen, unconvincing to the majority; to others, they 
are largely unknown.3 And as will be shown now there are other 
and better sources of belief than theoretical a.rguments. 
c. Not essential to believers 
Thus it is easily seen tha,t the traditional theistic ar-
guments are not essential to believers. Their faith does not 
11 stand in the wisdom of·men. 11 
1. Baillie, OKG, 1~7. 
2. See Beckwith, IG, 112; 
Temple, NMG, 19, 29. 
11 Es is durchaus n&thig dass man 
3. See Pratt, PRB, 183; 
Bradshaw, PFF, 1369 
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sioh vom Dasein Gottes ~berzeuge; es 1st aber nicht eben n~thig 
dass man es demonstrire."l 
~' ,. ', - _, ,._, 
1) Lack of formal argument for God's existence during 
the first two centuries of the Christian Ohureh on 
the part of Ohr1st1an writers. 
There is almost a total la.ok of formal argument for God 1 s 
existence on the part of Christian writers during the first two 
centuries of the, Christian Churoh (when 1.t was nearest the source 
... , . ., ~ -, .· .. ·
of its life and beliefs, if not also when it was the purest). 
This is in accord with the Kantian statement above (on the ne-
cessity tor formal· theistic arguments). But what is of more im-
portance, it is a conscious or 11nconscious agreement with the 
example of their own sacred scriptures, and in striking contrast 
to the practice of their contemporaries.2 Impressed by the 
paucity of theistic argument·in the writings of the Ante-Nicene 
. 
Fathers, L. T. Cole remarks: 
But the faot is that in most of these apolo-
gies no suoh reasoning is employed, and even when 
it is tound ••• it is only incidental and by way of 
illustration, to explain the rational charaote~ of 
the Christian d~otrine of God by a sort of argumen-
!!!!! ad hominem. 
One explanation for this is the practical interest of 
these writers, their emphasis being on life in their appeal to 
the non-Christians to Judge Christianity by its fruits in the 
lives of its adherents.4 For example, Theophilus and Clement 
1. Kant, BDG~ 168; see 
Knudson, vG, 203. 
2. See Knudson, DG~ 235-236; 
Cole, Art.(l898J, 45. 
3. Cole~ Art.(l898)~ 46. 
4. See cole, Art.(l~98), 
12, 46. 
~ 
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of Alexandria used the design argument, but for the practical 
purpose of refuting idolatry.·. 
There is another reason--the lesson learned from the 
history of Greek ph1losophy-- 11 the absolute ::f;'utili ty of any ef-
forts to arrive at a certain proof of the existence of God by 
... 
purely rational mathods" (Urational" as opposed to empirical 
and not irrational), as seen, for instance, in the failure of 
the Stoics to convince anyone (except themselves) of the di-
vinity of the world, by the use of their fatalistic and pan~ 
theistic arguments from design.1 There is some effort by 
Clement of Alexandria to demonstrate God1 s existence from the 
Aristotelian point of view, which is that all knowledge is de-
rived from sensation and understanding. But Clement is expli-
cit in denying that knowing is founded on demonstration by a 
process of reasoning alonee2 
Another reason f'or this restraint on the pa:rt of the 
early Christian writers is that t~e Christians, who were but 
infrequently addressed, did not need such arguments.. They 
had their sacred Scriptures (whose invariable assumption is 
that they did not need argument, its opening verse being typ-
ical in taking Goats existence for granted); they were near 
to the time of Christ (for them, (1-od in the flesh) and to the 
events of His life, death, and resurrection; they were also 
not far removed from the historic descent of th;e Holy Spirit 
at Pentecost and at subsequent times (demonstrations of 
1. Cole, Art.(l898), 47; 
s.ee · 22. 
.. 
2. Clement, Stromata, II, 
4, V, 12, VIII1 31; see Cole, Art. ( 189!j) , 36. 
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spititual realities and of the presence of God in His Church, 
and of Christ in the hearts of believers).l Shirl-ey:Jackson 
·case offers another, but oloselyrelated, reason; 
Doctrine was essentially a bold assertion 
of faith that did not need to be justified by 
· ·processes of human reason. · Its truth was guar-
anteed by a revelation so overwhelmingly con-
vincing that apologetic arguments on its be-
half w.ere entirely unnecessary .2 · 
The other class of monotheistic believers (who were, 
however, addressed by the Christian writers) were the Jews, 
·and the strongest argument for them was the simple a.pl'eal to 
their Scriptures 'tfhioh they regarded as author! ta.tive e The 
other class, although not monotheists, were believers in God: 
And when the Church finally turned towards 
the Gentile world, it was still the popular. 
religion of the poets, rather than the. phil-
osophy of the schools rqith which the apologists' 
first cam~ in contact.) 
Plato had written~ "All Hellenes and barbarians believe 
in gods .. "4 He spo·ke .of disbelief in God as a 1 disorder" and 
said that those ~1ho were unbelievers in youth give up their· ·un-
belief later in life. Thus, there was some slm.ptioism, espe-
cially among the Sophists, but "it was held by most of the 
early Christian authors and explicitly stated by many of them 
that the idea of existence of God is innate in man as a •nat-
ural opinion' • 11 5 In this they were doubtless wrong, but the 
1. See Knudson, DG; 235-236;. 
Macintoshol RR, 261; Walsh, 
Art.(l934J, 1-2; Baillie, 
OKG, 119, 121-122, 126. 
2. Case, ROD, 3. 
3. Cole, Arto(l898), 12. 
4. Plato, Laws, X. 
5. Cole, Art.(1898), 30; see 
Justin 1 Second Apology,VI; Clement:, Stromata, V, 14; 
Tertullian, Against Maroion, 
I, 10. 
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point is that the Greeks, as well as the Jews, needed no formal 
argument , for the ttaouble with the hea. then. 't-7orld was not athe-
ism but polytheism--belief in too many gods. While Frank may 
have made an over-statement in ·saying that atheism was unknown 
in Greek philosophy, yet it was· true that 11 theworld was still 
1 full of gods• .. ul 
Thus, there were several perfectly suffi.cient reasons 
for the scarcity of theoretical theistic arguments in the writ-
ings. of the Christians duririg the first .two centuries of the 
Ohurch. 
2) · Freedom of the Middle Ages from dependience on 
theistic arguments. 
··Likewise, the Middle Ages, "the ages of faith, 11 were 
free from dependence on theistic arguments; for not only was 
it natural for men to believe in God, as in .the former period, 
but now philosophy was in the service of the church, and to 
some extent, at least, subservient to it;~ phil.osophers (as 
Anselm and Aqu~nas). sought to express their faith in philosoph-
ical terms. The philosophy of the period was practical.ly all 
religious--Arabic, Hebrew, and Christian. Describing the 
·. twelfth and thirteenth centuries as the golden age of Oatholfc 
orthodoxy in whioh "the application of reason to religion reach-
·' ed' its zenith," Christianity being subjected to a "most minute 
B.nCi exhausti v-e 11 serutiny, MoGri:f'fert decl.ares: 
1. ·.Frank, PRT, :32-33; 
see Bail.l.ie, OKG, 119 .. 
2. See Perrier, RSP, ?3; 
Duoe, KGN .z. ~54-455; 
Frank, PR'J.' , :3 2 • 
But in the Middle Ages as a rule the intel-
lectual atmosphere and the rational principles 
generally accepted by thinking men were to all 
intents and purposes identical with those pre-
vailing when the historic system was framed, 
and so the application o-r reason to religion , '· · c· 
meant the confirmation, not the criticism~ of 
the old.l . . . . . 
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3) Independence of modern Ohristians in the matter 
So too, modern Ohristians,· although not· living in a 
time which may be characterized as an 11 age of faith," are not 
dependent upon the traditional 11proofs" for God's existence. 
For a reason that is above the change~ in character of the 
ages obtains--a reason that has alreadybeen,noted--that men 
are religious before they are philosophers. Rall even goes so 
far as to declare that 11 No man ever believed·in God·beoause 
God was demonstrated; 11 for. the very good reason that 11 the things · 
that count most in life.are not proved; they are experienced. 11 2 
. . 
!nkeeping with this, others are convinced that speculative 
thought has had the task of criticizing and clarifying religious 
ideas, but not of originating them.3 What has b.een shown to be 
true for particular periods of history, holds true in general--
for religious persons the source of the idea of God lies else-
where than in metaphysical argument. Oook Wilson is not alone 
in holding that religious persons would be dissatisfied, in 
fact, with theoretical proof, no matter how convincing it might 
be: 
1. McGiffert, RMR, 16. 
2.. Rall tT, .53; see OHR 
ix; Rooking, MGHE, 304 .. · 
3. See Bolflle THE, 7, 35 
37, 248; Leuba, PRM, 3o2; 
Galloway, TPR, 381; Pratt, 
PRB, 185; Hegel, PR, III , 
216; Wilson, SI, 83b. 
If we think of the existence of our 
friends,· it is the direct knowledge which 
we want; merely inferential knowledge seems 
a poor aftair •• o.We don't want merely in-
ferred friends. Could we possibly be sat-
isfied with an interred God?l 
For the modern believer, as for believers of all time, 
.belief is a matter of experience rather than of argument.2 
The Christian does not wish to be an 11 implicit Ohristian," 
but a real follower of Ohrist (who was person~lly acquainted 
with God and did not argue Hisexistence). Thus, the modern 
. . . 
believer's position ean be illustrated by reference to an- an ... 
cient document• The book of Job in the Ohristian.and Jewish 
Scriptures represents Zopher, in his reproof of Job, as ask-
ing, 11 0anst thou. by searching find out God?U:3 Obviously, 
.as Brightman notes, this implies a negative answer, but it 
does not imply (even were Job the spokesman) that Job and 
Jesus are at variance.at this point •. For the context of the· 
iattert S lVOrds, to Which attention is called, 4 indicates that 
Jesus was urging people to pray rather than to become philoso-
phers (worthy as that profession is), to seek and find God in 
prayer. And 11 finding God" is not synonymous with 11 tinding 
out God," as Zopher, speaking of the secrets of wisdom, asks 
~urther, "Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?n5 
Later, according to the record, Job did find God, although 
1. Wilson, SI, 853; see DeBurgh, 
'TRP, 15-18; Art. ( 1926) , 99; 
Knudson, DG 237 · 241. 
2. Macintosh, RO, 74; Marllno, PG, 
202; Baillie, IR, 86; Wilson, 
SI, 858, 850-851. 
3. Job, llt 7 .. 
4., Brightman, FG, 52; 
see Luke 11:9. 
5. Job 11:7. 
84 
with appropriate humility (akin to that of Aquinas) he acknowl-
edged that he had not found ~ God.,l 
·True, in Jesus one finds no trace of the discounting or 
·rejection of -reason, that is, of course, its~u-se within reason-
able limits .2 But·- neither do we find in Hilm any trace of the 
.elevation ot; reason to the level of ~ path to God• and Bright-
man gives a ~eason .· (apart fl"om th~ reason that faith is that 
path)-- 11Jesus was not $, ph1losopher;.9.,He usual1y presented His 
in~ights in pictures or in questions rather than in arguments.3 
While the idea of God should be held reasonably,4 and while one 
might be thoroughly. convinced that it would be safe to venture 
~·- ·-: ;-' : -.. 
out on the hypothesis that God exists, yet it is·not necessary 
. . 
to remain in that hypothetical and unsatisfactory position, but 
rather by means of faith to come into the immediate presence of 
God--actually find God. Is God an Ultimate Conclusion for faith 
--the faith that He~ be found, or is He (as an idea) merely 
an Ultimate Conclusion for reason?··; That is still the question 
~o be seriously discussed; we are here only on the approaches of 
the discussion. 
But to conclude on the independence of modern Christians 
from speculative theistic arguments, it is well that religious 
people have not had to stand in suspense. waiting for philoso-
phers to level the speculative doubts l7hioh they themselves 
raised.,5 
l. Se& Job, 38~1; 42:3; 5-6. 
Aquinas, ISA, 8J. 
2. See Brightman, FG, 53; 
see Matt. 11: 25. 
3. Brightman, FG, 53. 
4. See Brightman, FG, 55. 
5. Balfour, TH,· 38. 
d~ The dependence of Western philosophers upon the 
Christian-Jewish tradition tor their ideas of God 
Instead of Christian and Jewish religionists depending 
upon p:tlilosophers for their (Ohristian 1 s) idea of God, it is 
the reverse, as has been noted in the oases of Anselm, Desoar-
t es, and Kant, and co'Uld be shm·m to be true with others, as 
for instance, Hegel.l Speaking of the indebtedness of modern 
philosophy to medieval philosophy and·to the theistic argument 
of Descartes, Gilson traces the credit past Descartes directly 
· to Christian tradition, 2 and adds: 
Examples could easily be multiplied to show 
how the imagination of the classical metaphysi-
cians was absolutely possessed by the idea ct· 
the Biblical Oreator-God~3 
One who has read .Leibniz can imagine what,would be.left 
11 if the properly Christian elements" were dropped out.4 After 
_calling attention to Hume's recognition of the distinction be-
tween historical causes of religious belief and theoretical ar-
guments that follow such-belief, Sorley explains how scholastic 
arid Cartesian philosophies took over the idea of God• and then 
calls· fo:ttfair play: "Philosophy must not take over the reli-. 
gious idea of·God without recognizing that this idea has been 
reached by another path from that of rational thought.n5 Mac-
kintosh declares. that ·0 a religion based. upon philosophy is an. 
illusion that cannot last once l~e have seen how the religious 
elements of philosophy_were themselves-actually derived from 
1. See Maier,. HOK, 8. ·. 
2. See Gilson, SMP, 13-14. 
3. Gilson, SMP, 16. · 
4. Gilson, SMP, 16. 
·5. Sorley, MVIG, 304~ 
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the great historic religions. 111 
This position concerning the dependence of Western phil-
osophers upon the JewiSh-Christian tradition for their idea of 
God is no more a denial of, than it is discounted by, the facts 
that early Christian theology was influenced by Greek philoso-
phy, and that the early Christian theologians sought to put 
their theology into philosophical. terminology. Irenaeus, Ori-
gen, Clement of Alexandria, Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Ter-
tullian, Theophilus, ~nd others obeyed the Scriptural exhorta-
tion, which they viewed as coming from GodHimself, 11 0ome, now, 
and let us reason together," and by that very act recognized 
the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of coming 
into the divine presence in order to reason truly. Tertullian 
,.... . )f 
taught that philosophy is the 0paidf3.gogos" (1Ta..L~ boy, and cC.YW 
to lead, and thus, not the.teacher,< originally, but the servant 
who leads the child to the teacher) who brings the Greek mind ·; 
to Christ.2 He said that the Greek.Philosophers by divine in-
spiration sometimes hit upon the tr.uth, and that Plato was in-
debted to the Hebrews for his knowledge of God) The philoso-
phers, he declared, finding a simple revelation of God, began 
to dispute about Him: 
Nor need we wonder if the speculations of 
the philosophers have perverted the older 
Scriptures. Some of their brood, with their 
opinions, have even adulterated our new-given 
Christian revelations, and corrupted4it into · a system of philosophical doctrines~ 
1. Mackintosh, 'l'MT, 189; Temple, 
NMG, 9-10, Procter, FKR,62~63,31. 
2. Clement, Stromata, I, 5, 16. 
3. Clement; Exhort. to 
the Heathen, 6. 
4. Tertullian in Roberts 
and Rambaut, AOL, 131. 
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What was true and wholesome in Greek philosophy was bor-
rowed, according to Tertullian, as the Greek poets and Sophists 
drank at 11 the fount of the prophets," and watered their arid 
·minds there.nl Then asserting that'there is nothing older ·than 
the truth, Tertullian called the divine writings "treasure sourc-
es" from 't-7hich all later wisdom has· been taken.2 
Justin, who did not cease viet>ting himself as a philoso-
pher when he became a Christian, wrote: ''Straightway a flame 
was kindled in my soul .. ui found th,.s philosophy alone to be 
. .-' ';. . 
safe and profitable,. Thus .... I am a philosophe~. n3 He pointed 
out the differences ~ong philosoph'~~s, asking how one desiring 
to be saved could learn the true religion from-those who, in 
their wranglings, were not able to convince themselves.,4 Re-
plying to the claim that Plato and A:r:oistotl.e had the. true re-
ligion, Justin pointedto their contradictions, especially on 
the nature of·God, and invited the Greeks to. come· to Christ in 
order to 11 partake ·of the inoomparab).e wi.sdom, ". and to be 11 in-
.. st~cted by the Divine Word., n5 He appealed to ·a belief', common 
among Christians then, that Plato "G1as obligated to Moses, not-
ing the similarity of The -Timaeus to the first chapter of Gene-
sis, and asserting that Plato visited Egypt, learning the He-
bret-1 version~ there, being indebted· to Moses even for his doc-
trine of the Forms.6 
1 .. Tertullian in 
Roberts and Ram-
baut, ACL, 131. . 
2. Roberts and Ram-
baut, AdL, 131. 
· 3. ·Justin, ~ialog. 't1i th TriPho . ..! 8. 
4. Justin, ~ort .. addr. to the Greeks, 4. 
5. Justin, Discourse to the Greeks, 2., 
6. Justin, First Apology1 59L ~ort .. 
addr.. "'io the Greeks , ~2, ~ · · 
Tatian, also, was another voioe declaring that the 
Christian philosophy is older tha~ th~ ~recian; he poured 
scorn on 11 the pretended independenoe.of ~reek philosophers," 
arguing for the .superiority of Christianity over Greek and 
Roman religions and. philosophies.l 
This expression of the attitude of the .Ante-Nicene 
writers will indicate that Platonic and Aristotelian forma 
of theistic argument were inadequate for the Ohristian con-
tent. "Clement .of Alexandria .... shows that any. Ontological 
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or Ideological argument can only lead us to an 1 Unknown1 
which may be •understood• and given meaning 'by the Word 
alone that proceeds from Himo 1112 One may admit, with Gilson, 
that Plato's doctrine furnished the Church with important 
elements, particularly the Idea of the Good, which helped in 
the elucidation of the philosophical notion of God, and still 
question what Plato really thought of God, whether.he believ-
ed in. a plurality of gods or not, and contend that his con-
ception of God was very imperfeot.3 
Serious doubt is cast also upon Aristotle•s theoreti-
cal monotheism when it is learned that: 
He gave testamentary disposition that the 
image of his mother should be consecrated to 
Demeter, and that there should be erected at 
Stagira, on account of a vow he had made to 
the gods, two marble statues, one to Ze~s ' 
Soter, and the other to .Athena Soterra .. 
1. Tatian, Addr. to the Greeks, 25. 
2. Cole, Art.(l898), 38; see 
Clement, Stromata, V, 12. 
3 •. Gilson, SMP 44. 
4 ·s .. rn ,' !•I! • • Gilson, 1•1.. r.,; 
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So, Aristotle's contribution to the philosophical idea 
of God is granted, but with the qualification that "the attri-
butes of the Christian God overflow the attributes of Aristotle's 
in every direction.nl Speaking of pre-Socratic natural philos-
ophers, and of Soarates, Plato, Aristotle,, the Epiaureans and 
the Stoics, Oole remarks: 11 But none of these philosophers at-
tained-to a aonaept of God which aould-in any real or accepted 
sense of the word be called theistic. u2. 
Thus, it is alear that what~ver_indebtedness the early 
Christian philosophers felt to the Greek philosophers, they 
did not feel obligated to them for their idea of God. Is the 
claim df the-se ante-Nicene writers to aommunication of ideas 
in the ancient world unreasonable? The one who affirms it , 
would have the task of proving that the "wandering Jewn did 
not wander, a~d that Plato, for instanae, never journeyed .a 
number of years in Italy, Oyrene, Sicily, and_Egypt, and that, 
in partioular, he did not make three trips to Syracuse in 
Sicily to the aourt of Dionysius I~3 
St. Thomas owed much to Aristotle, but he did not get 
God's attributes from Aristotle's concept of the Motionless 
Mover and Pure Form; .Aquinas had to_. read into the concept a 
great deal, filling in the 11 Form11 from the Scriptures in order 
to make it detailed as well as theistic.· "The five Thomist 
, 1 .. Gilson, SMP, 50 .. -
2o Cole, Art.(l898), 23. 
3. See Edman WP xiv; Plato's 
Thirteen Epistles, seventh . 
epistle, posthumous, but 
generally considered reliable. 
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· proofs are hung expressly from the t.ext of Exodus."l Asking 
whether any created intellect by its natural powers oan see 
the divine essence, Aquinas answers, 11 No" 112 Meyer in stating 
the position of Ste Thomas, writes: 
Because ·our_- minds ar~ bo.und down to the 
sense world, the nature of God represents 
the unattainable for our speculative efforts 
•••• ';l'he boundaries of man's knowledge of God 
are most narro't4, _and man is dependent on rev.:.. 
elation for his knowledge of_ God .3 __ · 
Says Turner: 11 Sto Thomas moderated the claims of reason, 
set limits to .. its power of proving spiritual truth, and main-:-
tained that the mysteries of faith aould not be discovered and 
·cannot b.e proved by u~aided reason. u4 _ 
Thus, "the: argument for the. :dependen~e :of Western phil-
-osophers upon :the Christian-Jet.rish trad1 tion loses no weight _in 
any gene~o~s: acknowledgment_ of the indebtedness. that Christian 
thinkers have fe?-t to Greek.philosophy • 
.. 
e.· The value -of theoretical "proofs"· for the .existence 
of God 
Whil.e inadequate as-proofs, the theoretioal theistic 
arguments do have values '&1hich tnay be summarized briefly. 
They_have va1.ue as efforts.of the human mind to transoend its 
. . . 
limitations,- as attempts to give meaning to existence and to. 
the order and arrangeJllertt evident in existence, and as endeav-
ors to give oontent to the idea of S.od, an idea already held. 
1•- Gilson, SMP, 74; see 7.5-82. · 
f.. Aquinas, ISA, 83; s,ee Duce, 
KGN, 203; Garrigou-Lagrange, 
- OG, 3.5.5. 
-. 3 • Meyer, ·PST, 234. -
4. Turner, Art • _ 
_(1912), .550• 
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They have value as giving expression to the oonviotion 
of the religious oonsoiousnesa (a conviction derived from other 
than theoretical sources), and as poth aonfirmatory:· a:nd explan-
atory of this conviction. They sho'tf •: "on what terms the creed 
whiah is in fact adoepted .can most reasonably be held .. ul They 
indicate, as in the oase of Anselm, a prayerful lifting of the 
soul towards God in the desire to understand and to know Him, 
serving thus to heip safe-guard against misaonceptions of God. 
These arguments have an indirect value in that the very 
interest in them is an indication of an interest in religion, 
and a ·start toward proof in getting unbelievers to thin]$:, and 
perhaps to see that they actually do believe in God, 2 at least 
to realize that a belief that has·persisted through the ages 
should be examined for some possible warrant for its existence 
and pers1stenoe.3 
They have indirect value also in that in the very dis-
satisfaction felt over their failure may lead to the discern-
ing of the distinction between religious belief and religious 
argument, or between origin of belief and explanation of belief, 
and to the lesson that "rational considerations by themselves 
are never adequate to the ultimate problems of life," problems 
which are never solved 11 without faith and aotivity. 11 4 They 
point, in their failure, to something better, indicating that 
"the roots of religion lie in religious experience itself •115 
1. Balfour, TH, 263. 
2. See Baillie, OKG, 240. 
3. See Lewis, Art.(l930), 20. 
4. Rall, CHR, 238. 
5. Rall, OHR, 235. 
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The.result of excessive trust in speculation can but lead to 
the conclusion that religion has been correct and wise in look-
ing elsewhere for its main supportol The very Scriptures that 
ask believers to give a reason for the hope within them, never 
make any formal argument for God's existence .. They point else-
where, as do.es this dissertation, for the reason for the hope. 
The Psalmist was impressed,· no doubt, by the argument from de-
sign~ but his fervent outburst, 11 Theheavens declare the glory 
of God, 11 are the wot-ds of an awed worshipper standing alone 
out under a starry heaven, and not the cool, calculating argu~ 
ment of a lawyer standing in a courtroom pleading a case be-
fore men. 'fhe Psalmist found God in his own soul before he 
found .Him in nature.z· The problem of the distraeted Job was 
not whether there is a God, but why the righteous suffer, a 
. . . . 
problem. not .solved by the reasoning of men in several rounds 
of debate, but by the revelation of God Himself to the debaters .. 
So the "proofs" are evidences 11 of.the unshakable character of 
certain convictions which exJ)erienoe implants 11 ;:3 they do not 
achieve theoretical or logical certainty, .. 
1. See Hooking, MGHE; V. 
2. Psa. 19:1, 14; see 
Baillie, IR, 84, 86. 
3. Waterhouse, Art .. (1944), 81. 
I. Transition 
<'HAPTER II 
MORAL CERTAINTY 
l. Rala.tion to theoretical certainty: Kant• s Glauben 
Kant describes moral or practical certainty thus~ "Nein, 
die Ueberzeugung 1st nioht logische, sondern moralisohe Gewiss-
hei t, und .... sie (J:>eroht) auf subj eotiven Gr'll~den ( der moralisohen 
Ges1nnung) • ul. It is Xant 1 s Glauben: 11 Ist das letztere nur sub-
II J.ectiv zureichend und wird zugl.eich fur obJectiv unzureiohend 
gehalten. 11 2 From this, and from Kant's contrast of 11 theoret1-
cal11 and 11 practical11 in reference to both reason and knowledge, 
it may be inferred that moral or practical certainty as set 
over against. theoretical ~ertainty in Kantian terminology is 
not based upon .abstract reasoning (i.e. reasoning separated 
trom.both moral and religious experience) but upon the moral 
or praot.ical reason. (although s'f;;ill separated from. religious 
experience). As described above by Kant, practical certainty 
is psychological in na:~ure, with a shi.ft of emphasis from the 
intellect to the will: 11 ~raktisoh 1st alles, was,duroh Freiheit 
m~glioh 1st. n3 That is, .there are not two reasons, not two 
"distinct entities";4 for as Sorley, desor'-bing rationalistic 
ethics, puts it, "Reason is held to become practical by virtue 
of its subject-matter,' that is to say, by being applied to 
1. Kant~ KrV, B 857. 
2. ~ant, KrV, B 650 .. 
3. Kant, KrV, B 828. 
4. Laird, PS, 153. 
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practical or moral conduct.nl 
But neither method of reasoning is ideal. Theoretical 
reason is an undue emphasiel upon reason, narro't'i'ly viewed; prac-
tical reasoning is an undue emphasis upon faith and the will, 
faith likewise narrowly viewed. That is, speculative reason 
is part reason, just as the faith employed by the praotical 
reason is part faith... Kant by a curious ignoring of his re-- ;~ · 
striation of knowledge to sense-experience, now appeals to 
other experience----moral experience--failing~ ho~rever, to ex-· 
tend his postulate to. religious expe;-ience._. 
Sorley admits the novelty of Kant's contention for the 
primacy of practical reason in reference to the ideas of God, 
fre~dom, and immortality, although he affirms that the method 
. . 
was not altogether new, as Plato in his Republic passes from a 
consideration of ethioal.oonceptions to the Good.2 Tennant is 
practioally of the same opinion: "Moral arguments for theism 
were put forward before Kant ••• but they generally held a sub-
sidiary place.n3 
W. s. Hough clearly grasps Kant's distinction between 
theoretioal and. practical oertainty: 
Thus the Critique of Pure Reason leaves us 
·with the view. of the possibiltty of .a knowledge 
of things-in-themselves, only that we are foroed 
to take .this knowledge, not as theoretioal, but 
as practical, to regard its certainty, ·not as ob-jective, but as subjective orpersonal, and to 
1. Sorley, MVIG, 9; see Kant, 
·GMSin Hartenstein, KSW, IV, 
. 244·; WHO in same Vol., 345; 
hereafter all GMS & WHO ref-
erences will be found in this 
Vol. 
2 o Sorley, MVIG,. 2. 
). Tennant, PT, II, 
96 • 
designate it, not as science, but as belief .. l 
2 .. Historicai antecedents 
a. Conditions of the time 
95 
Kant's moral argument for the existence of God was 
called forth by the conditions of the time; an age was turn-
ing away from the claims of reason to.skeptlcism concerning 
those claims ... This illustrates a tendency noted by Mackintosh 
and Troeltsch that the progress of thought ls apt to proceed 
by way of the pendulum, "with violent.dashes from one extreme 
to another, n each new school taking "it's guiding interest" 
from 11 those elements iri the complex problem which its prede~ 
cessor had tended to overlook .. n2 Thus, Kant reacts to the 
situation of his time: 
Ioh behaupte nun: dass all Versuohe eines 
bloss speculativen GebraJrlehs der Vernunft in 
Ansehung der Theologie Ganzlich .fruchtlos und 
ihrer inneren Beschaffenheit nach null und 
nichtig sind, dass aber die Prineipien ihres 
Nftturgebrauchs ganz und gar auf keine Theologie 
ffthren, folglieh, wenn m~n nieht moralische 
Gesetze sum Grunde legt .. :;) . .· · 
Often, old and venerated buildings are torn down, the 
debris removed in order that a new and larger structure be 
built upon a solid foundation. Thus, while the Kritik der 
. . 
reinen Vernunft·seemed destructive of the great faiths of man, 
yet in it Kant anticipat·ed his construoti ve work in the Kritik 
dar praktischen V.ernunft.. That is, in the words of Edward 
Oaird, "the intellect, in order to vindicate its rightful claims, 
l .. Hough, Art. ( 1887) , 130 ~ 
2. Mackintosh, TMT, 181. 
3. Kant, XrV, B 664; 
EEG, 71 .. 
I 
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must renounce its false pretensions."l. Kant seems to have re-
garded his moral argument as an effective weapon against mate-
rialism, fatalism, free-thinking, unbelief, fanaticism, super-
stition, dogmatism and skepticism .. 2 He appears to have abol-
ished metaphysical knowledge as a basis for theism in order to 
make room for faith and its activity: 
Es ist demUthigend t&r die mensohliohe Ver-
nunf, dass sie in ihrem reinen Gebrauche nichts 
ausrich~et ....... Diese Moraltheologie hat nun den 
eigenthumlichen Vorzug vor der speculativen: dass 
sie unausbleiblich auf den Begriff eines einigen, 
allervollkommensten und vern~ftigen Urwesens 
filhret, 'tV"Orauf uns speou:t.ati ve Theologie nicht 
einmal aus objeotiven Gr&nden hinweiset, gesch-
weige uns davon ~berzeugen konnte.3 
b. Influences on Kant 
There were significant influences on Kant at this time. 
Webb calls attention to the tendency in the period before Kant 
to elevate morality above religion because the former had great-
er simplicity and intelligibility than the latter.4 Then, at 
home and at school Kant was under the moral earnestness and the 
strict discipline of. the Pietistic sect of Christians, acquir-
ing, thus, a sense of the urgency of the moral law, a belief in 
the radical evil of human nature, and the conviction of the need 
qf a complete right-about-face in the moral life. On the other 
hand, he seems to have revolted against Pietism in his "dispo-
sition to suspect those who indulge themselves in a supposed 
personal intercourse with God in prayer ••• a harmful and demoral-
izing self-illusion. 11.5 
1. Oaird, PX, 188; see 
Kant, KrV, B 773. 
2; Kant, XrV, B 780-792. 
3. Kant, KrV, B 823, 842. 
4. Webb, KPR, 15. 
5. Webb, KPR, 19-20. 
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Later, Kant became absorbed in mathematics and science; 
thus, he was at home in the field of science as well as in .the 
field of morality. This may have had some bearing in hie re-
striction of knowledge to the sense level; a tendency which, 
in view of his strong sense of his obligation to the moral law, 
11 made him so impressive an exponent of the discord between the 
deterministic world ••• and. the world of spiritual freedom into 
whioh we are summoned by our conecienoe .. nl His seeking of 
the resolution of this discord not in revealed but in natural 
religion, along with his tear of enthuEUasm and his unhiatori-
cal temper of mind, is another evidence of his r~action against 
Pietism. It appears that in maturity, he avoided regular re-
ligious observances. But he was always impressed by the evi-
dences of design in nature; according· to Webb, Kant did not 
separate the dual testimony to the divine existence, found in 
11 the starry heavens above ·and the moral law within .. 112 
Then too, Kant may have been influenced by the philo-
sophical movements and controversies of his day. In 1763, 
Mendelssohn took first prize from,the Prussian Acadamy of 
Soienoe on the subJect 111 Les ·veri tee mE{taphysiques' sont-elles 
susceptibles de la m~me evidence que lee verit~s mathe'matiques, 
et quelle est la nature de leur.certitude1 ? 11 :3 Mendelssohn's 
, answer to this problem was as follows: 
1 Ioh getraue mich, zU behaupten dass .die . 
metaphysiohen Wahrheiten zwar derselben Ge-
wissheit, aber nioht derselben. Fasslieh~e~t 
1. Webb, KPR, 21. 
2. Webb, KPR, 25. 
3 .. Kinkel~ Art. (1929), :392 .. 
fahig als die geometrisehen Wahrheiten. Das 
heisst: man kann di·e vornehmsten Wahrhei ten 
dar Metaphysik dureh ~usammenhAngende Sehl&sse 
bis auf solohe Grundsatze zurftekfuhren, die 
ihrer Natur naoh ebenso unleugbar sind als die 
ersten Gr&nde--und Heisehesltze der Geometrie, 
aber kann diese Kette von Sohl8ssen nioht so 
einteuchtend nioht so fasslich machen ais die · 
geometrischen Wahrheiten.l 
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This work was a dissappointment to the emprurioal Jacobi; 
it seemed to him to follow the dogmatism ofLeibniz and Spinoza. 
In 178.5, he wrote Briefe uber die Lehre Spinozas, addressing 
it to Mendelssohn, opposing. Spinozats application of mathemati-
cal demonstration to other spheres than mathematics, especial-
ly to the problem of the existence of God. That is, Jacobi 
denied that there is a demonstrable system of philosophy; he 
emphasized faith in the treatment of super-sensible objects, 
but gradually viewed faith not as feeling ~ut as reason. Thus 
while his philosophy was khown as the Gef&hlsphilosophie, it 
was a qualified empirical system, with a s·tress on faith: 
He believed that all knowledge comes by 
actual experience but that experience is more 
than mere sensibility. The supersensible is as 
much the object of experience as the sensible, 
.both being alike given in immediate pe~cept1on.2 
It is not necessary to relate how Kant 11as drawn into 
. . . 
this controversy; the important fact to note is· that he came 
to see that: 
Certainty is not a char~cteristic peculiar 
only to truths that are mathematical or logic-
al, but that it may pertain equally to moral or 
ethical truths. Such truths, in other words,· 
1. Kinkel, Art .. (l929), 
392 .. 
2. Crawford, PJ, 17; 
see 12~17. 
are not excluded from the very outset and in 
their own nature, from all possibility of at-
taining. to certainty.l 
But it was Orusius evidently who gav.e Kant his point 
of .departure for the moral ~rgument: 
Orusius•s aim, apparently, was to avoid the 
thorough-going determinism which he took to be 
characteristic of the ·Leibnizian philosophy. 
He sought to establish the fact of freedom, . 
particularly.of moral freedoml! ••• He emphasized 
the distinction between logical and real ground 
and prepared the way tor the recognition of the 
problem of objective connection. This positive 
contribution placed Orus1us in the direct line 
of philosophical advance and incidently furnish-
ed Kant with a starting point.,2 
3. Kantle preparation for the moral argument 
a. Changes in his thinking 
The chang-es in Kant's thinking during his philosophi-
· .. 
cal career indicate hie preparation for the ·new argument. 
Mackintosh notes a marked contrast betlreen Kant 1 s theism in 
99 
the pre-critical period and in the critical period. At first, 
under the influence ot.Newton, he rested hie whole case for 
God's e~istence on the uniformity of nature. Later, in his 
Dar einzig m&gliohe Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration~. 
Daseins Gottes, 11he propounded a curiously involved and invert-
ed version of the ontological argument, ascending from the 
concept of possibillty11 3 to an existential conception. But 
in the Kritik. der reinen Vernunft, he gave this up. 11In the 
Oritique g! Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment, 
Kant came to rest the whole weight of hie faith upon the moral 
1. Turner, PBO, 10. 
2. England, KOG, 39-41. 
3. Mackintosh, TMT, 92. 
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argument. 11 1 To use a·representation taken from.Kant himself, 
we may view the first Critique as the first premise, the sec-
ond Critique as the second premise, and the third Critique as 
the conclusion; of the Kantian syllogism, 11 1n which Kant at-
tempts to bring together the apparently antithetic premises, 
the ideas of nature and spirit, of necessity and freedom. 11 2 
In his pre-critical period; Kant was still under the influence 
of Wolff, even when trying to secure a theism satisfactory to 
the praottcal reason, thinking that he. had ~established a meta-
physics of morale from the pure concept of the moral law ~11th­
out reference to empirical oontent. 113 Hough tracing the change 
in Kant from the first to the last Kritik, observes: 
The farther the Kantian investigations ad.:. 
vance from the doctrine of kno"t-rledge to the 
doctrine of Ideas, from this to the doctrines 
of moral freedom and the moral order of the 
world, from these to the philosophic doctrine 
of the natural freedom of phenomena (bodiee)--
which coincides with the critique of aesthetic 
and teleological judgment--the more ~istinctly 
things-in-themselves oome into view. · 
b. An early hint 
Kant gives an early hint as to how he is going to emerge 
from the uncertainties of speculation.. For while God is not 
given on the basis of pure reason, 'T•Yhat is inadmissible in 
speculative reason is permissible in practical reason--i .. e .. , 
:hypotheses for. answering questions and supporting dogmatical· 
conolusions.5 
1. Mackiritosh.z: TMT, 92 .. 
2. Smith, CCP~~ 132. 
3. England, KC~, 180.181 .. 
.4 .. Ho\,lgh,· Art •• ( 188?), 134 .. 
.5 4 .See Kant, KrV, B 20-21, 80lt-80.5.. . . 
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i 
c. His oonceptio~ of pbilosophy.~There is a further 
preparation for the new,oertainty in religious matters in 
Xantts conception of philosophy1> All it can do in the spec-
ulative realm i.e to. analyze and.define the theoretical and 
. I 
practical situations of !life; but the key to the riddle of 
the universe .and of lif~ is in the moral conscience. Like 
s.e~se-experience, moral experience reveals a systematic 
unity of presupposed ooridi tiona, having a n·oumenal reference 
and a f~etion of defining reality. as a whole, and postulat-
ing a 11 universe in which the values.of spiritual experienee 
are supported and conserved. 11 1 
I 
Moral choice appears to be basic to the new argumen~o 
For Kant, to aot rightly means to aet in aocord lri th the con-
cept of universality, .the need for right aotion applying to 
every individual under ~very possible .circumstance. He did 
I 
not make it clear that what is right for one man is right 
' for another under the stime.ciroumstances, but his principle 
is .correct in general .. 2 , For Kant, conscience is: 
An instinct tc1 pass ju.dgmeats upon ourselves 
in accord with moral laws. It is not a mere 
faculty but an instinot; and its judgment is 
not logical but judioi~i. We have the faculty. 
to judge ourselv~s logic-ally in tel;'ms of moral-:-
ity •••• But conscience haa the power to summon 
. tts again.st our w+ll 1aefore the judgment seat ..... 
It is thus an instinct ..... a judge passes jy.dg-
ment, he does no~ merely form a judgment .. ~ · 
d. Practical bel~ef in God.--Then Kant was heading 
toward his moral argument and moral certainty in coming to 
1. Smith, OCPR, 571. 
2 .. See Laird, PS, 1.54-1,55. 
3. Kant, LEt 129. 
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see that belief in God is of practical as well as of theoret-
ical value. Holding that only sense objects oan be known, 
Kant had to explain how metaphysics treated God as existent. 
An inde~ to the explanation is found in Kant's discussion of 
the absolute totality of conditione. We oan not picture the 
whole of appearance, but the whole of practical reason oan 
function in our lives in concrete form. For while the abso-
lute totality of all appearances is only an idea, an unsolva-
_ble problem ( 11 weil es im praktisohen Gebrauoh des Verstandes 
ganz allein um die Aus~bung nach Regeln zu thun ist. 11 ),1 yet 
God can be believed in on the practical basis of the necessi-
ty of this belief for reason and its work. Thus, the practi-
cal reason imposes a moral compulsion to believe. That is, 
facing the moral conditions of lite, we are commanded by the 
moral law to think of God,. In Grundlung ~ Metaphysik der 
Si tten, beginning with the assumption that ordinary moral ·· ·; 
judgments are dependable, Kant sought to justify the supreme 
principle of morality .2· 
-e .. Strong argument· for the freedom of the "(ttill 
Finally, Kant prepared the way tor the moral argument 
and moral certainty by p~esenting a strong argument for the 
freedom of both the human and the divine ~rills. He had de-
clared that God, freedom, and immortality are proper objects 
for metaphysios, and. that every other subject 0 dient ihr 
bloss zum Mittel, um zu diesen Ideen und ihrer Realitlt zu 
1. Kant, KrV, B 385; unless othe~ 
wise stated, all references in 
this section refer to this work. 
2. Kant, GMS, 237. 
I 
.'; 
-l 
i 
i 
I 
I 
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I . II " . 1 
gelangen' II requiring the~ 11 um Ub(3r die Natur hinauszukommen ~II . 
. . I 
T't1o causalities, nature ~nd fr~edom, constitute the problem.2 
The second, used in a v1ot1d-'tn7ide sense·, is 11 das Verm&gen, 
einen Zustand von selbst l anztifangen, .. deren . Causali t& t also 
' ' . 
nicht nach dem Naturgesetze. 'tn7iederum unter einer anderen 
. . . . I . 
Ursaohe steht, welch sie :a~r Zeit nach bestitnmte. 11 3 Man as 
belonging to both the sensible and the intelligible "t-Torlds 
is both determined an.d free; he is free as. an intellectual 
and moral being. The co~mos is God's free act, showing His 
ability to begin som~thi*g by Himself--spontaneity. _Freedom, 
' . -
human as well as divine,lis noumenal and timeless, affecting 
. I . 
the phenomenal •. It contt!dns no empirical element, is ind.e-
1 
pendent of the will, andlfree from the coercion of sensuous 
impulses.4 As noumenal, .human freedom is a postuJ.ate. Later, 
Kant came to see that it: n-is as much given as the moral oon-
! 
science on which he base~· it .. n5 
I . . 
·. :. 1~Denn sind Erscheinungen Pinge an sich selbst, so ist 
,• . ' I . 
Freiheit nicht zu retten~ 11 6 . In the.t case, nature is 11 die voll-
• ~ 1 • 
I 
. I . . . , 
stlindig und an sich hinreichend bestimmende.Ursache jederBe-
, 
gebenh~i t .• n7 ·In denying 1 th~s, and that the idea of freedom 
is phenomenal., Kant is. seeking a 'free cause both immanent in 
. I 
n~ture ·and above nat.ure: '.uwir · kgnnen .... ~der Sinnlichkei t unab-
, , . . ' .. 
h~ngig bestimmt. 118 . Kantiis referring not only to man but to 
1- B 395, footnote~ 
2. B ,560; GMS, 260. 
3. B 561. 
4. B 562~ 
5. DeBurgh, FMR, 156; 
see Kant, GMS, 296; 
KdU A xii-Xiii. 
6,. B ;64., 
7, B 564 . 
. 8., B .585 .. 
1 :-:· 
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a necessary Being that is 11 gleichwohl von der ganzen Reihe 
I ' 
auch eine nichtempirisch~ Bedingung.nl So determination (as 
~od's method) rules the physical order, but there must be a 
I 
~Being at the end of.the causal regress to set the chain 
into motion. If the only causality were that of nature, there 
would be no beginning of;things, for the only spontaneity in 
the universe is that of personality--the spontaneity of free-
dom so essential to a Fi~st Cause. 
II. The moral argument for the existence of deity, a new basis. 
for religious certainty 
·1. Implication of Moral Ruler in moral experience 
a. Kant 1 s opening statement.--Kant's opening statement 
; 
in the first Oritigue is 'as follows: 11Prak.tiseh ist alles, was 
durch Freiheit m~glich ist. 11 2 This linking of "freedom" and 
i 
"practical" appears to be the real beginning of the argument on 
' 
a new basis for the existence of ~od. For now Kant introduces 
the moral laws, revealed :in moral experience, viewed as laws of 
freedom, as 11 geh~ren diese allein zum·prak.tisehen Gebrauche der 
rein en Vernunft, u.nd erlauben einen Kanon. n3 Reason is for the 
purpose of telling us, 11 ~as zu thun sei, wenn der Wille frei, 
wenn ein Gott und eine k~nftige Welt ist. 11 4 So the ultimate 
purpose of nature is moral. 
i b. Happiness in a ~moral world.--On this fo~ndation of 
the moral purposiveness qf nature, Kant carries on the argument 
1. B 828. 3. B 828. 
2. B 828. 4. B 829. 
:.' 
by considering the question of happiness in a moral world: 
. . 
Alles J;nteresse mein·er Vern,lnft (das specula-
tive. so wol~ ala das praktische) vereinight sioh 
in folgenden·drei Fragen: 1 •. Was· kann ich wisfen? 
2. Was sol.l ich thun? 3_. Was darf ioh hoffen? 
10.5 
The object of all hoping is happiness, which _is defined 
as the satisfaction of all desires·. No'\11 the moti V"e of happiness 
is the foundation of practical or p:ragmatical law, while the 
'tfor-thiness of happ~ness is the foundation of the ethical law. 
Having made this.di,stiriction in terms, Kailt takes up the con-
sideration of the world as moral in nature, nsofern sie allen 
sittlichen Gesetzengemfiss wire (wie sie es denii nach der Frei-
heit dar vern&nftigen Wesen ~ein kann, una, nael::l.d.er notwendig-
en Gesetzen dar Sittliohkeit sein soll}. 112 
c .. The Summ.umBonum and moral oertainty 
_But there.is no happiness for the one unworthy of it; 
intelligence is required in order to· secure it. In. this way, 
~ . . . ' . 
Kant comes to the Summum Bonum: and moral certainty •.. · ·The Summum . 
Bonum is the absolutely necessary goal of mor.al belief; it is 
Supreme Intelligence: 
Ich nemie die Idee .einer sol~hen Intelligenz, 
in wejfeher dermoralisch vollkommenste Wille, mit 
der hochsten Seligkeit verbunden, die Ursaohe 
aller Gluckseligke1 t in der 11fe1t 1st, sofern sie 
mit dar. Seligkei t (ale d'r W~rdigkeit.· glucklich 
zu sein) in genauemVerhb.ltnisse steht, das Ideal 
des h&chsten Guts ,3· 
That is, moraii ty !list nur m:&glioh in~ der intelligibel-
. en Welt unter einem wei sen Urheber und Reglrer. n4 . We are in 
3. J3 839. 
4, B.840~ 
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man 1 s moral goals, involving a Being distinct from nature and. 
yet.its cause, who shallicomb:1;ne 11 the laW's of' nature with the 
moral law. n4 But in ord.~r for this Being to bring about. this 
'' . 
. ' 
combination, He must have a consciousness of' moral. ends, which 
implies a will.. J'It :f'o1lO'tfS that the supreme ground of nature 
is a Being who has acted with intelle'Ot· a~a·. will,· or .in other 
3 .. Sorley, MVIG1 338 .. + 4 .. Olark, IKP, z82 .. 
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l'tords, God. 11 1 In Kant's desc:t'iption, this is the God of Theism, 
omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and eternal.2 Of the exis.t-
·enoe:: of this Being, Kant is· morally certain) We ought ·to. pre-
' 
suppose God 1 s existence .. ; 
' 
The moral argument, which appears in the first Critique 
in its simple and concen1;rated form, must be.supplemented by 
references to other Kantian works of the same period. 
I 
d .. Respect for moral law: moral certainty 
According to what is perhaps the inost:f'amiliar of the 
I 
sayings of Kant, the mor~l law within .filled him "mit Bewunder-
ment and Ehr:f'uroht.n4 This respect for moral law, and its ac-
.. 
companying sense of obligation, are facts of moral experience, 
constituting the foundation of the moral argument for the exis-
tence o:f' God, for as it has been seen, these facts imply a mor;.. 
al Order, which in turn, ·implies a Moral Ruler. 
Now obligation is viewed by Kant as involving universal 
and necessary precepts, i .. e. precepts with an objec_tive basis, 
one beyond the shifting :f;'eel.ings ·.of· the. individua;t: 
Jederman muss ~ingestehen dass ein Gesetz, wenn 
es moralisch, d .. i~ ala Grund einer Verbindllchkl(~~ 
Gelten soll, absolute Nothltendigkeit bei si~h funr-
en m~sae; dass das 11 Gebot·: du sollst nioht lugen, · 
nicht etwas blos fur Mensohen gelte, andere lernnnf-·-
tige Wesen s'--oh a'ber daran nioht zu kehren hl!tten, 
und so alls ~brige eigentliohe Sittengesetze; dass 
mithin der Grund q.er Verbinglichkeit0 hier nicht in der Natur des Mensohen oder den Umstanden in der 
Welt ••• gesuoht we:t"den m~sae .. 5 
Boodin agrees with Kant here. The. Ought 11 1s not the 
1. Clark, IKP, 282. 
2. B 843. 
3. B 847. 
4. Kant, KpV, A 289. 
5 • Kant, GMS, 237 • 
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I 
projection of the ideals: of tl;l.e individual or of the race at 
I 
. any time .... not my will, ~ut the eternal Ought be done~ nl 
I 
i 
Following Plato, 13ood1n ~onfersontologioal reality upon it, 
seeing·· evidence of its· opj ecti vi ty in its operation in the 
I 
i 
concrete liforld, and declaring that it ·does not grow out of 
our inclinations and impulses. · 
I 
I 
Evidently to driv:e his point home, Kant, a little far--
1 • • ' 
ther on, continues: 11 Es 1st ~bertlll niohts in der Welt .... was 
ohne Einsohr~nkung f&r glut ~nnte gehalten warden, als allein 
ein guter Wille. n2 "That! ·is, th~· will is good,.· independent of 
t:Qe feelings playing )Xpoh 1 t, and the good actions resulting 
from its exercise. It shines· as 1~ein Jut'lel .... ~als etwas das 
seinen vollen Werth in sioh selbst ·hat 0 n3 . Even man t s love for 
God is ruled out as havip.gno moral worth, because it does not 
stem from a sense of CI:uty, i.e. "Nothwendigkeit einer Handlung 
aus Aohtung f~r Gesetz ~ '"4 · Of course, here Kant goes too far, 
i '·: 
for he ignores the facts: that.law is for law-breakers, and that 
loving God with Godts help and. by roroe of habit, is as m~oh 
a moral act as .loving with effort and from a sense of duty .. In 
. . ' 
fact, the man who is lOYfll to his wife in this latter way is 
ln·a precarious moral po~ition .. 
This sense of binding obligation, joined with a unive~ 
sal viewpoint which is. s~lf~imposed, is the well-known 11 oat e.:. 
~orioal imperat1ve .. 11 5 .. Ip. keeping with his thought that oniy 
i 
1. Boodin, Art., {190?), 468, 
4?0; see Rashdal1, TG~, 
211~212; ·Perry, Art ... : 
{ 1911}' 288-293 0 ... i 
. I 
I 
·1 
i 
2.,Kant, GMS 241~ 
3 .. Kant, GMs: 242. 
4~ Kant, G~S, 248; see 
.5. Kant, GMS, 250; ··see 
24?. 
262 .. 
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the good will oan, without qualification, be called good, and 
. . 
that·only respect fo:r moral law, qua moral law has moral mer"it, 
Kant guards his use of rtfeeling11 of respeot for law; it is 
prompted by reason, a .r~tional belief based.upon data furnish-
·ed by pure reason, whicq, while objectively insufficient, is 
' 
subjectively satisfying.: By reason, thus, one can orient him-
' 
self to super-sensible objeots .. l. This idea of respect.for 
moral law will come up ~gain. But as suggesting a Moral Law-
: 
Giver, it has within it i1the seeds of 11 moralisohe Gewissheit 11 
! 
concerning the. existenc~ .of Goa. .. 2 
I 
2 .. Implica'tion of Divine Law-Giver in moral experience: 
autonomy of will . 
a .. Slow transition from law to Law_;Giver.--At first 
. . I 
sight, Kant•s doctrine df the a~tonomy of the human will does 
not se.em to imply the e~stence o_f a Divine. Law-Giver reveal-
: . 
ad in moral experience, 'as the transition from moral law to 
Law-Giver ·is slow ..3 . In 'tact, autonomy· of will seems to negate 
a law-giver other than m:an, .for complete independence of will 
' . ; 
as held by Kant, means freedom from all external compulsion or 
restriction. Hence, according to Kant, we should look.upon 
l 
! 
moral precepts as binding upori us not 11 weil .sie Gebote Gott~$ 
sind, sondern sie ale g&~tliche Gebote ansehen, darum, weil. 
wir dazu innerlich verbipdlioh sind. n4 . That is.., the laws . 
I . 
should be obeyed' not through fear of (nor even through rever- . I . . . . . . . 
en·oe for) God, but out o~ reverence for the law 1 taelf. 
1. Kant, WHO, 348-349. 
2. Kant, KrV, B 8.57. . 
3. Kant, GMS, 288 ff .. 
4. Kant, KrV, B 847. 
Pringle-Pattison interprets Kantts position here: 
Man as noumendn or purely rationalbeing, 
gives the law; man as phenonomenon receives 
it ... ~.As long as!the authority imposing the 
law is separate :from the conscience to which 
it appeals, the ~ight to command may be called 
in question ..... The moral. Bollen is his neces-
sary Wollen.l 
i 
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'rhere are many eviidences that Kant 11 made.the transition 
••• very hesitatingly. 11 2. For instance, in harmony with his un-
reasonable and inoonsis-t;iemt statement that man is a completely 
I 
independent being ( 11 unreasonable11 as not squaring rni th the ac-
! 
tual facta· of man in relation with other human, if not also, 
·, 
di yine beings, ·under hum:an, if not also, divine .laws, and "in-
' consistent" in appearing': to take God from the throne of supreme 
rulership ·over the kingdpms of nature and morality, l<Yhere he 
had placed Him to guarantee that virtue be rewarded with ha~­
piness),) K_ant declares ,that man is a .moral legislator, subj ec·t 
. to the "tfill of no ·other being4 ·in the employment of his free, 
I 
' practical reason, acting\ independently of any foreign influ-
enoe.5 Likewise, although he believed in 11 das radicale B~se 
in der menschlichen Natur," and rejected the ontological con-
. I 
ception·,af pet"fection on; the ground that obedience to moral law 
should .. not be tor the purpose of realizing one' 8 perfection, 
Kant stili asserts that the latter is better than the theolog-
i,cal divine w111.6 Martineau and Lamont object; however, that 
.. 
. . 
1. l?ringle~Patti son.t PR,! 22l.t-225. 
2 .. England, KCG, l7ti. 1 
3. Vide supra, lOl.t-106; Kant, KpV, A 
240; Rashdall, TGE, 149, 1.54, 172, 
174; Lamont Art.(193~) ~ 196; 
Gleason, Art.(l934).t 229-230; 23.5-
237; Boodin, Art.{l;~07), 4?1. 
4 .. ·Kant, KrV, . B 847 • 
5 .. Kant· KrV, B 847. 
6. See Itant,. GMS, 291; 
· see KrV ,B 839• 
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it takes two to create a~ obliga.tion.l Of. course, Kant would 
reply that he viewed ideal man rather than the actual self as 
the other who.shall Judg~ mants actions. But Abbott, in his 
interpretation. of Kant h~re, shows the logical outcome of this 
I 
view of the ideal judge: i 
Such an ideaii ~ed person (the authorized .': 
··judge of conscienqe) must be one who knows the 
heart, for the tr~bunal is set up .in the in-
war.d part of man; 'at the same time he mustbe 
all-obliging, that is, must be conceived as a 
person in respect iof whom all duties are to be 
regarded as his cdmmands •.•• Now.s1noe such·~ 
moral being must ~t the same time possess all 
power ••• einoe otherwise. he . could not give his 
commands their prdper effect (which the office 
of judge necessarily requires) .... hence con-
science must be conceived as the subjective 
principle 0! a responsibility for onets deeds 
before God. l · . ·· 
A question obtrude's itself here.,· Suppose 11 the subject" 
't~hose will II ist in allen Randlungen aich selbst ein Gesetz' n3 
I 
on the grounds of Kant• s (own belief in the radical evil of hu-
1 
. . . I 
man nature, and his oorre~ative view that the only absolute 
good will is Godts will,4f considers it rea.sonable to accept 
. i : . 
the judgment of a wiser apd holier being, and makes that will 
l 
his own by a voluntary chbice" · Could not the 11 bidding11 then 
be viewed as internal? I~ so, Kant will be able to reconcile 
the two views of the autopomy of the will and God as Law-Giver 
I 
I (or, autonomy of will verisus the ca tegori oal imperative) , to 
! 
break up the apparent ant~gonism of morality and religion,· and 
1. Lamont, Art.(l931), 
105-lOb .. 
2. Abbott, FPE 322· see i, 
Laird, Art., {1934), 87 ·I 
• I 
3. Kant, GMS, 294. 
4. Kant, RIG, 99; see 
Brunner, MED, 129. 
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to dissolve the seeming threat to·the autonomy of ethics coming 
from religion· .. !·. 
The opening wedges to X:ant•s 11 wide-open ease" for God 
as Moral Law-Giver revealed in moral experience, are his con-
ceptions of the objectivity of moral laws as universal and nec-
essary, and respect for law as essentially respect for person-
.· ali.ty, tOgether with .his (at first) half-hearted and qualified 
concessions. 
According to the second· Critique, although the moral in-
centive' respect for la~r, is viewed as produced by reason alone, 
yet:·. 
Achtung geht jederzeit nur auf Personen, 
.niemals auf.Baohen ...... So gar das moralische 
Gfi'setze selbst, in seiner feherliohen Majes-
tkt, 1st diesem Vestreben, sich der Achtung 
dagen zu erwehren, ausgesetz.2 
Then Kant adlnits that under oertain conditions God's 
commands may be regarded as moral la~1s .3 
b. The transition aocomplished.,--Although the transition 
from law to Law-Giver, in the implication of the Divine Law-
Giv~r revealed in moral experience, was slow, it was finally 
accompli shed .. · 
In the·first Critique, rulerehip (which, as has been 
seen, Kant explicitly affi;ms)4 and morality itself are joined 
1. See Campbell, Art. (1949) ,' 343-345; 
Ames Art.(l928), 295;,..301; Blake,· 
ArtJ1928), ·129-13~; Schneider, Art .. 
(1939),·so; Fouillee~ Art~(l905), 
19; LeRoy Art. (1907J, 156; Hall, 
Art.(l904$, 157, 160; Smith~ BC, 73; 
Beck, OPR, 19-20; Knudson, JJG, 229; 
Knox, .Art.,(l902L, 315-:316. .·.·. . · 
2 • Kant, KpV, A 
1:35-137. 
3 .. X ant , MS , 24. 
4. Vide supra, 107. 
in the being of God, where moral laws reside: 
Ich nenne die Idee einer solchen Intelligenz 
in welcher der moralischvollkommenste Wille,- mit 
der hBchsten Seligkei t verbunden, die Ursache 
aller Gl'flckseligk~i.t in. der We1t 1st .... ,.das Ideal 
des hBchsten Guts.~ .. ., ._Dieses aber 1st nur m8fl1ch 
...... unter einem wei;sen Urheber und Regierer.. · 
' -
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i 
. -
In the third CritjJgue, Godis viewed. even more definite-
! 
ly as moral legislator: 
Die Wirklichkei~ eines h8chsten moralisch=ge-. 
set ze gebenden Ur]iebers 1st also bloss t&r den · 
praktische~ Gebra~ch unser Vernunft hinreichend 
dargethan.. 
1 
.. · . . . 
' 
Then later, God 1d declared nholy on the ground of the 
coincidence of His will Jith the pure moral la't..r tr the latter 
I ' • '. 
i 
oweing "its validity not ;to an arbitrary act of volition an 
. I 
God 1 s part, but to its o.Jn oontent., 11 3 
·.: 
Kant had already ~de it clear in this Critique and else-
' 
where that he is not ass~rtiJng that God. is the ground of obliga-
1 
tion; that is the human r;eason._ What was needed was a deepen-
ing of the conception of 1autonomy·iri harmony.with_Luther1 a new 
i 
and profounder evangelic~l explanation of duty.,4 
I 
In this transi tio~, there i.e an elevation of morality to 
the level of religion tha;t adds strength to the imp7J.1cation of 
! 
the Moral Law-Giver revea!,led in moral experience: 
I • 
Auf solohe Wei~e f'flhrt eine Theologie aunh 
unmi ttelbar zur R$11gicm_ .1 d.i .. der Erkenntn1.ss 
unserer Pflichten ,: als gottlicher Gebote; weil 
die Erkenntniss un:_serer P:flioht, una. des darin 
uns durch Vernun:ft
1 
auferlegten Endzwecks, den 
Begriff von Gott zuerst bestimmt hervorbringen 
. ' 
1, Kant, KrV, B 839-840,. 
2. Kant, KdU, A 429. · 
3 ... England, KCG, 178-179; 
see Kant, RIG, 282 .. 
4. Mackintosh, TMT t 25. · 
konnte, der also 'Schon in seine~ Ursprunge von. 
der Verbindlichkeit gegen diesea Wesen unzer-
trennlich 1st.~ ! 
! . 
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Thus, in this sph;ere of religion, there is no external 
compulsion, no Tyrant, S:lthough, there is an external Legis-
. i . 
lator (vietfed also as immanent). 2 By siding in with Omnipo-
. ' ·I 
tent ~fill, man. reoognizeis moral theonomy while preserving in-
I: 
I 
taot his moral autonomy of3 . 
'. 
I On this . level, Kap t also dissolves his difficulty con-
earning the mQtivating po~er of the feelings. He has been in-
terpreted as committing the unp. sychological act of w1~ftg7' out I . -
the ~ction of. feelings u~on the .. will.. It drew :from Henry the 
i 
charge that Kantrs ethic~ are impracticable: 
: . 
Take this doot~ine into the streets, preach 
it to the ordinarr man, and what effect will it 
have? .Say to thent you ou~ht; that is the supreme 
law for your actipn. Apr s? .•.. Is this going to 
suppress the multitudinous motions of self-t-rill, 
the insistent ola~ms of passion? 1 The law is 
weak against the :t'l~sh', a saner psychologist has 
told us, for a mere moral imperative supplies no 
PO't-7er to fulfil i "Ps behests •..•• so, then, what 
steam is to the lpoomotive, that thJ: roused and 
energized emotion~ are to the will. 
Acc.ording to Henrt, Kant reached this law-worship of 
i . 
the Pharisees by losing sight of the Giver of the law ... If this 
I 
be true, Kant regained his .vision of God •. It is true that so 
I . 
radical was his reaction\against what he regarded as an undue 
I . , 
I " . 
emphasis in his day uponiteeling (as in Pietism and the GefUhls-
. I . .. . 
I 
philosophie), and so determined was he to press the point that 
I 
Webb, Art.(l920), l. Kant, KdU A 471; seeiRIG, 3. See 
100-101' i96-l97' 238~ 123-124; Royce4 PL, 240' 250-252. . 26-28, 37-38' 2-43. 
2. See DeBurgh, FMR, 156-t-157. 4. Henry, Art. ( 1899) , 84-85. 
I 
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morality is a matter o'f regard for moral la1-1, and that the 
latter detenmines the will and reason, that he denies that 
. 
feeling also determines them. That is, the constraint in 
11.5 
obliga1iion is not feeling but r:eason~ Yet Kant recognized the 
inalining power of feeling.· Respect for moral law is a feeling 
produced by reason·. Now, in addition, on the level of religion, 
Kant ad.mi ts the motivational power of Christian love: · 11Liebe 
Gottes aber, atts eigenerfreier Wahl und aus Wohlgefall~n am 
Gesetze {aus Kindespfliaht) .. ul 
. , Thus Kant, by raising morality to the high level of re-
ligion, has reconciled his conceptions of the autonomy of the 
human will and the Moral Law-Giv~, by practically identifying 
bot-h pure er ebj eeti ve nroral ·1a1-1 ·with the obj eoti ve er trans-
cendent Law-Giver, and also the mo-ral law w1 thin man toTi th the 
indwelling Law-Giver, by ohanging.his stern conception of duty 
tor duty 1 s sake· alone by honoring the motivational power of · 
love {still unoommanded, in a sense), and by transforming exter-
nal compulsion into an internal prompting through the voluntary 
a~oeptanoe of both law and Law-Giver, and by free, loving obe-
dience to both,· thus making 1 t possible to do ~hat othenrise 
would be self-contradictory, i.e. obey a command with gladness 
and witla moral merit ( 11 Denn ein.Gebot das man etwas gerne tun 
soll, ist ia s1oh,_widerspreoh~nd 11 ) *2 In fact, without a divine 
La~Giver and Judge, and the knowledge of Him, there would be 
1. Kant, ~G, 282; see LeRoy, Art. {1907), 158; Beck, CPR, 42. 2. Kant, KpV, A 148. 
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no morality; moral laws, even if they existed, would be inef-
fectual.l And there would have been no moral argument for the 
existence of God had Kant not clearly ma~e the connection be-
tween moral law and Moral Law-Giver. 
3. Implication of -God in aesthetic eXPerience 
a. The intuitive judgment of the beautiful, the sublime, 
and the holy.--The intuitive judgment of the beautiful, 
the sublime, and the holy constitutes an implicRtion of God in 
aesthetic experience. In such a case it is not, nein blos re-
flectirendes Urthe1111 ; 11 Es 1st aber auch ein lesthetisches 
SinnenurthRtl mll>glich, wenn nlbtlich das Pr~dicat •.• kein Begriff 
·-
von einem cGbject sein kann. 11 The determining ground is 11 Emp-
findung11 immediately bound up with the 0Gefuhl der Lust und Un-
lust.112 Kantts concept of the non-cognitive judgment of the 
beautiful and the sublime expressed in his third Oritigue is a 
step in the direction of the practical certainty of the exist-
ence of the holy, the immediate apprehension of God. This work, 
not a'part of Kant's original plan, resulted from three later 
considerations: 
to give clear expression to the relation be-
tween the free subject and the phenomial world; 
.•• to provide for the consideration of aesthetics 
as based upon judgments of taste; and ••• to deal 
with the problem of a teleological consideration 
of the world, as indicated by the peculiar char-
acter of living beings.' · 
1. Kant, LE, 40. 
2. Kant, UPU, in Harten-
stein, KSW, VI, 388. 
3. Watson, PKE~ 390; see 
Macmillan, uOP, 7. 
I 
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The judgment of the beautiful is intuitive: "-Schon 1st . 
das, was ohne Begrif:f'e allgemein geflillt .. "1 
Um zu unterscheiden, ob etwas sch8n sei oder 
nicht, beziehen wir die Vorstellung nicht durch 
den Verstand.auf das Object zum Erkenntnisse, 
sondern durch die Einsbildungskraf.t (vielleicht 
mit dem Verstande verbunden) auf das Subje~t und 
das Geffthl der Lust oder UnJ.ust desselben .. 
This direct appeal to the feeling of pleasure is seen 
also in the sensing of the sublime; it does not depend upon a 
mental concept.. The sublime, an indeterminate concept of rea-
son, is the 11 schlechthin gross, 11 not merely magnitude, but 
11 was !bar alle Vergleichung ist.n3 The respect that accompa-
nies the vision of the sublime seems to be similar to the re= 
spect for moral law and the Law-Giver~ And Kant does go on 
to make the sense of the fearful an aspect of the sublime; 
God is to be feared, i. e. respected: 
• 
So ffirchte» der tugenhafte Gott, ohne siQh 
vor ihm zu fftrohten, well er fhm und seinen 
Geboten widerstehen zu wollen, each ala keinen 
von ibm besorgliohen Fall denkt. 
Kant is still clearly in the realm of practical. reason, 
for aesthetic taste ( 11 ein l!sthetisoh-praktisches Urtheil 11 ), is 
not dependent upon proofs, not even upon det_erminate concepts, 
although the judgments of the beau~iful, the sublime, and the 
holy are objectively valid, 1 .. e,. not being subjective in the 
sense of private judgments.5 Lewis views these intuitive 
judgments as immediate prizings of the directly presented, and 
1. Kant KdU, BO 32; 
see A 67; Lewis, AKV, 
457, 464, 4~6 .. 
3. Kant, KdU, A 79; see A 84, 94 ... 
4. Kant, KdU, A 102. 
5. Kant, KdU, BO 140, A 233 .. 
.. . --------~-~-- -----------------
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as such, not judgments, that is, if expression is not given to 
! 
them. He suggests that the value fo.und in the experience is ·•--
; 
' 
the best possible kind of evidence of value in the object, that 
the value thus directly found need not be appraised in. order to 
. l . 
be revealed and enjoyed, :rnor comp~red with any other value, and 
that the value is indubitable: "There· can be no such thing as 
i 
. i failure of correctness 111 the .apprehension o:t' a value-quality 
' 
characterizing immediate\experience. 11 1 Without going further 
into detail, it ·may be cdncluded that this is a noteworthy ad-
, 
dition to Kant's moral a~gument,2 with important bearings upon 
I •. 
the later discussion of Jxperiential certainty, particularly in 
relation to the immediac~ of feeling and its relation to cogni-
1 
I 
tion in the intuitive apprehension of Godo 
Thus the question of the third. Critique has been answer-
ed. According to Kant', there is a higher form of apprehensign 
than the hypothetical und1erstanding; the intuitive judfitnents of 
I 
the beautiful, the sublim~, and the holy bring men into touch 
with the supersensible.3 j 
bo The intuitive j~dgment of a teleological ·universe 
In the third Oriti~ue, another implication of God in 
' I • 
aesthetic experience is :f'~und--the intuitive judgment of a 
I 
I 
teleological universe. K*nt unites the teleological and moral 
I 
arguments, God being regatded as the adequate and supreme Cause 
of the natural and moral orders, and 11 die Welt, als ein nach 
1. Lewis, AKV, 433; 
see 407, 416-417, 
434. 
2. Kant, UPU, in Hartenstein, 
KBlf', VI, 394. 
3. See Macmillan, OCP, 26. 
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Zwecken zusammenhangendes Ganze und als System von Endurse.chen 
anzusehen ••• auf eine verstlndige Weltursache.nl This, however, 
does not amount to complete proof: 
0 Es giebt ein physiche Teleelogie, welche einen fur unsere theoretisch reflektirende Urtheilskraft 
hinreiahenden Beweisgrurld an die Hand giebt, das 
Dasein einer verst!ndigen ~elturs~rche, anzunehmen 
Wir find.en aber in una eines vernunftigen, mi~ 
Freiheit (seiner Kausalitat) begabten Jesens uber-
haupt auch eine moralisohe Teleologie. 
Watson interprets Kantts thought here: 
But as the moral ends or purposes "trhich we pur-
sue, and the laws which express the universal prin-
ciples of action, are determined~ priori, we can-
not from the mere consciousness of the moral infer 
the existence of an intelligent cause outside of 
ourselves •••. We cannot conceive of the possibility 
of the harmony with nature of the end demanded by 
reason ex·aept by presupposing that this harmony is 
produced by a Being who is both intelligent and 
moral, in other words, by God .3 . . 
Because Kant 1 s moral argument is formal, and more or less 
theoretical still, Watsonts caution concerning this argument is 
well taken. For apart from God•s self-revelation of Himself in 
special revelation experience .and in general Christian expe~1-
enoe, we would indeed have "no positive knowledge" of Goats ex-
istence and would be confined to thinking of Him merely in terms 
of analogy. A being 0 lrho transcends all experienoe 11 of course, 
can not be known, but this is not the trans~end~nt~immanent God 
of theism. And though we are entitled, or even compelled, to 
think of God as intellectual and moral, if we think of Him at 
1. Kant, KdU, A 409; see A 435. 
2. Kant, KdU, A 414; see A 429. 
3. Watson, PKE, 467, 471; 
r see 472. . 
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all, 11 this does not enable us to knot.f Him as He is 11 nor 11 to give 
attributes positively to Him .. 11 · And if the idea of God is mere~:·-
ly a regulative principle, Watson seems right in his conclusion 
that not only God, but also freedom and immortality are "placed 
upon a thoroughly rational basis, 11 1 which means, upon Kant's 
own limitation of knowledge to the trirorld of, sense, that these 
beliefs, in spite of his denials, are unreasonable.. This weak-
. . 
ens Kant's argument for God by means of the intuitive judgment 
of a teleological universe .. 
c$ A rational faith: moral certitude 
God is.the properobje()t of a. rational faith and of moral 
certitude. That is, the 11 gew1ssheit 0 of his existence is prac-
·tical (moral, pragmatic) rather than theoretical (speculative, 
doctrinal) • :rt 1 s reasonable for men to assume ( "anzunehmen 11 ) 
.that He exists, taking His existence .as a postulate or a ground 
of explanation:2 
Folglich mussen wir eine moralische Welt-
urs~che (einen Welturheber annehmen um uns 
gemass dem moralischen Gesetz, einen End.zweck 
vorzusetzen, und, so weit ale das letzere 
nothwendig 1st, so we1t.
11
.1st auch da.seerstere 3 nothwendig anzunehmen, na.mlich es sei ein Gott. 
The last reference has this footnote: 11 Dieses mo~alische 
Argument soll keinen objectivgftltigen Beweis vom·nasein Gottes, 
an die Hand geben. o4 
This rational faith, while a product of reason, is also, 
1. Watson, PKE, 472-473.. . 
2. See Kant, KdU ..t A 424-430; 
KrV, A 819-B tl57; KpV, A 
5-7. 
3. Kant, KdU, A 420. 
4 .. Kant, KdU, A 420o 
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strangely (for Kant), an hi:storical and ecclesiastica~ faith, 
founded on the Christian Scriptu:res, revelationbeing regarded 
as an experience upon whi~h reason plays and scholarship inter-
prets .1 Here Kant has a broad vie't-r of faith--not only theoret-
ical and rational (moral, ,practical~ pragmatic) , b~t also hia•-
tori~al, and religious (eccle~i~atioal and" seligma.ohenden").2 
A fitting conclusion to this 'thought of rational faith and mor-
al certitude is found ·in Kantt a ot"ln words! 
Zwar 'tfird freilich sich Niemand r~hmen k~nnen; 
er wei sse das ein Gott ••• sei .... Alles Wiesen ( wenn 
es einen Gegenstand· der blossen Vernunft betrifft) 
kann man m1ttheilen.~ •• Nein, die Ueberzeugung 1st 
nioht logische, sondern moralische Gew1ssheit.3 
III. Detects of the moral argument 
1. Formalism or externalism· 
The first defect that strikes one in the moral argument 
of Kant is its formalism orexternalism. God is not the Given 
as in the doctrine of the religious l!; priori or of religious em-
piricism, but is an external figure brought in from the outsideo 
To Griffiths, this is an unsatisfactory position: 
. . 
The ideas of re+igion are certainly not the 
product of an inference based upon the facts of 
the world as a scientist sees them, or on the 
implications as a Kant might discover.. The re-
ligious valuation of life .is as primitive and ·. 
as fundamental in hlliilan experience as the eco"""' 
nomic or the moral.4 
That is, the God of· the moral argument is not the given 
l. Kant, RIG, 212-213 • 
2. Kant, RIG, 213. 
3. Kant.! KrV, B 847; 
see~ 855, B 857. 
4. Griffiths, GIE, 164. 
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God of the religious eonsoiousness • but the ir1f.erred God of .·phi-
losophy. Galloway sees in thepostulation of God for the union 
.. ' .. :. 
of the diverse elements of virtue ·and happiness. an artifieial 
arrangement which is untrue to the psychological motive~ that 
prompt men to believe inGod.1 
'!'hen, its formalism is . seen in the purpose for ·'t-rhioh 
God is brought in-~asa mearis to the happiness of n1an, a pur-
pose at odds with Kant's own ethical prineiple that 'a person; 
should never be treated as means, but as an end in himself. 
In this argument, however, God is 11 deus ~ maohina introduced 
to effect the equation.between virtue and happiness.n2 Pringle-
Pattison sees the same fault and declares that 11 the thoroughly 
meehanioal idea of such a Power weighing happiness against vir-
.· tue cannot be charmed out of. the letter of Kant's. theory • 11 3 
Couched inthis formalism, also, is the tendency toward 
the "Pragmatic fallaey, 11 i •. e .. the 11 eonfusion between the value 
an~ the truth· of religious. beliefs. n4 Ho't•Jever; this is not a 
·deniai of a·relationshfp between.value and truth, but an asser-
tion that usefulness 1 tself .is no eri terion of .truth, and th8.t 
th~re must be obherenee among beliefs,} 
·2., Impraotioallty • ...:...The 1mpraet1cality of the moral or 
praetioal a~gument is .seen in the ~aot that it is still a theo-. 
retioal argument .. Frank shows that this new argument is·not 
essentially different from that of Descartes, nexoept that here 
. 1. Galloway, TPRt 391-392 •. 
2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 34. 
~3. Pringle--Pattison, PR, 267. 
4. Wells, Art. (1917), 653 ... 
5. See Brightman, Art. (1918), 
74. . 
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the existence of Goa is based on the sovereignty of our moral 
rather than on that of our logical reasoning.nl This founda-
tion is not as firm as Kant seemed to suppose: "The supposedly 
indestructible moral nature of man proves to be extremely vul-
nerable when confronted with the necessities of practical life., 0 2 
Then Frank decla~es that on the basis of ethical autonomy, mor-
al independence may be used as an atheistic argument. This 
would be true-had Kant not gone on and affirmed that God is. Law-
Giver. 
The charge is made practically that seeing the failure 
of the theoretical reason on the question of God's existence, 
Kant simply changed the name of this reason, making a division 
within the realm of thought~ Procter holds that the God of the 
moral argument is a construction of the mind.3 Sorley points 
out that by his separation of the theoretical and practical 
reasons, Kant withheld from the former, material that should 
have been presented to it (data of moral experience), as out-
side its range; and then Kant made the practical reason the 
supplement and corrective of the t~eoretical reasono 4 
The whole attempt to construct a theism which 
should satisfy practical reason, while remaining 
unacceptable to strict theoretical reason, indi-
cates .that Kant while rejecting the content of 
the Wolffian metaphysics, still conforms to its 
method. He conceives himself to have established 
a metaphysics of morals from the pure concept of 
the moral law without reference to empirical con-
tent. But since his criticism of the ontological 
argument had rendered any such metaphysical method 
1. Frank, PRT, 39. 
2. Frank, PRT, 39. 
3. Procter, FKR, 61. 
4. Sorley, MVIG, 2. 
--~-----·---.........:.·---·----··-~-. __ , .... ----- __..:.. ____________________ ~· ··-· --: _ .. ~------·-··-------·~.-- ~---------· -. 
of deducing reality from concepts invalid, nothing 
remained but that he should secure himself against 
his own criticism by separation practical know-
ledge from theoretical knowledge. . 
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Harris is even more severe upon Kant at this point than 
Sorley. For he declares that Kant in his. first Critique post-
ulates an irrational universe by robbing "human reason of its 
birthright--the right to know (in principle at least) the Uni-
verse, the Eternal Moral Law, and God Himself in their~ 
naturea.u2 Pointing aut--what many thinkers have seen--the in-
consistencies of Kant in knowing that external objects are un-
knmfable wi thaut knowing something of their. true natures and in 
.declaring that external things cause 11 phenamena11 in our minds, 
when an internal causation (the only one of which he could be 
sure according to his doctrine of the .relativity of knowledge 
or of the Naumenon) could nat be applicable to external 11 things-
in-themselves,11 concludes that .Kant has 11 no reason.whatever 
for supposing that external things exist. 11 Consequently, Harris 
raises the question whether Kant as a philosopher 1-1as justified 
in believing in .God, for while in the second and third Critiques 
his arguments seem conclusive, they are only rational on the 
basis of the asst~mption of the rationality (especially the moral 
rationality) of the universe, which basis Kant had practically 
denied. That is, this assumption is necessary to give Pa ration-
' 
al correspondence between theory and practice," for beliefs which 
are found to be practically nece·ssary for the efficiency of man's. 
1. England , KCG, 180-181. 2o Harris, CO, 67o 
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moral and spiritual life must also be theoretically and specu-
latively true.nl 
Harris appears to be correct in his contention that if 
the universe is not rational (i.e. if there is no possibility 
of objective knowledge), 11 we are not entitled to assume that 
what is necessary in practice is also objeetively true .. "2 But 
it should bereealled that Kant denied a divine rational Ground 
only in the sense of an inference from the sense world. 
Tennant,argues ~hat Kant in his second and third Critiques 
is still.on theoretical grounds: 
If the summum bonum has its possibility of 
realization guaranteed by the conception itself, 
Kant in principle employs-the ontological argu- "l 
ment in ethics after demolishing it in theology.J 
From this and from its ignoring of religious experience, 
it is to be concluded that the 11practical11 argument is not 
practical enough. 
3 .. Narrow view of Christianity 
The third criticism of the moral argument is that it 
presents a narrow view of Christianity; it is an undue empha-
sis upon morality. There is no mistaking Kant's emphasis in 
the following: 11 Alles, was ausser dem guten Lebenswandel der 
Mensch noah thun zu k&nnen vermeint, um Gott wohlgef3.llig zu 
warden, ist bloser Religionswahn und Afterdienst Gottes. 11 4 
England, however, clearly differentiates religion and 
1. Harris, CO, 70. 
2. Harris, CO, 70. 
3 .. Tennant PT, II, 97; ·see Or- . 
mond, OP, 135; Maier, HCK, 69. 
4. Kant, RIG~ 270. 
morality: 
That which constitutes a moral person·is 
the consciousness ofabsolute obligation; but 
that which constitutes a religious· person is. 
the awarenes.s of a yet higher order, a spirit• 
ual order, which not o:rily lays a :powerfu+ con-
straint upon him but excites in him a feeling 
of adoration and an impulse to worship.l 
. . . . . ' . . 
Referring to Kant direatiy, England also says: 
He did not. penetrate into the dist.inction · 
between the sense of sublimity awakened by the 
physically great and. powerful on the one hand, 
and on. the other hand awakened by the appre-
hension of G<;>d •.•• This.self.reverence, charac-
teristic as it is of the moral consciousness, 
is not the essential feature.of the religious 
experience e 2 .· · .... 
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In fact,· according to Griffiths, "the sense of God·is 
prior to and eondi tiona the sense of duty;" and. "we could have 
no knowledge ·of moral obligationunless we already believed in 
God's existence~: 
The voioe of dtity was and is first of all 
the voice of God; it was the voice of God be-
fore Socrates fashioned the concept of virtue, 
or Plato formed the idea of the Good, or Kant 
•• ~duty.3 .. · .· · 
Morality itself. meansmore than keeping commandments; 
it is 11 the quest of the highest and most inolusi ve ideal 't-7hich . 
1 t is possible for man to seek after. n4 .. Applied to religion in 
. . 
its narrow sense, however, morality makes for legalism. Thus_, 
Baillie views Kant's desoription ot religion as too 11 moralistic 11 
in the unworthy sense:· 11 It. savours unduly of what Saint Paul 
1 .. England, VRE, 91; see 
DeBurgh, FMR 28-33; 
Stooke, Art. { 1926) , 69-70; 
Alexander, STD, II, 341. 
2. England, VRE; 90 •. · 
3. Griffiths.! GIE, 250· .. 
4. Baillie, ~R, 274. 
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called tthe righteousness of the lawt.lll Speaking of .Troeltsch> 
and his following of Kant in .general, Baillie wri tea: 
Troeltsoh will have none of Kant's tendency to 
represent the.a priori elements in morality and 
religion as if' they were the whole of morality and 
religion respectively~ In the realm of the theoret-
ic reason Kant did not.make this mistake, but al-
ways insisted the the matter of experience was no 
less necessary to it than was the form~ But when 
he comes to treat of the practical reason he seems 
to forget thia~ ••• In the realm of religion he seems 
to speak as if the bare thought of a moral order--
' the recognition of our duties as divine commands' · 
--wer~ the whole legitimate content of historic re.;;.: •' 
ligion. Cle·arly this is an inheritance from eight-. 
eenth century rationalism and deism. 2 · 
Thus the .moral argument presents such a narrow vi.ew of 
Christianity that it is a question whether the God of the argu ... 
. . 
ment is the God of religion~ Oona.equently, the oharge of Harris 
that Kant reduced Christianity t.o ethics does not seem unjust.3 
4 .. An arrested hypothesis 
Finally, the moral argument of Kant may be described as 
an 11 arrested hypothesis .. " By "hypothesis 11 is meant "a. tenta-tive 
theory or supposition provisionally adopted to explain certain 
facts, and to guide in the investigation ot others," in contrast 
to a 11 pqstulate 11 which though frequently used as a synonym is 
•ra proposition which is taken for granted," an 11 essential pre..: 
requisite 11 an. "assumption of the possibility of doing. some.:.·. : .. · . 
. ' 
th:tng~"4 The difference between the two.words in regard to an 
objective basis, and to probability and 'POSsibility is also seen 
l.·Baillie, IR, 274; see 
Mackintosh, OAG, 27. 
2. Baillie~ IR, 240; see Sorley~ 
MVIG, 3Jl-332; Griffiths, GI~, 
·. 97-106; DeBurgh, FM;R, 147, 169. 
3~ Harris, CO 17. · 
4 .. Webster's Collegiate 
Dict., fifth ed., 
491, 776. 
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in the chart belol-t, where the "possible" is located in the 
range of pre-hypothetical faith. The postulate represents the 
unprovable basis, the alternRte to infinite regress in seeking 
reasons, the foundation of hypothetical. faith. Kant did notal-
ways make this distinction, for while in one setting he denied , 
the use of "hypothesis" in regard t·o .God, in another place, his 
11 Glauben 11 , as a 11Voraussetzung" was an 11 Annehmung", necessary 
for a 11 praktische ttegel, 11 and·given by the 11praktische Vernunft, 11 
. 
11 bei der wir die M~glichkei t der Ausffmrung 11 ma.y grasp. 11 Ein 
solcher Glaube 11 being., 11 es ist ein Gott. 11 Under this so-oalled 
11 hypothesis 11 we are to aot 11 als ob 11 we knew there ~rare a Goa. .. 1 
By an °arrested 11 hypothesis-is ineant one that 11 remains 
subjective" and 11 hardl.y distinguished fr~m maka-:..bel.ieve .. nZ It 
is a part faith, arrested or out short in its development toward 
knowledge or certainty. This oanbe made o:t.ear best by a diagram 
iri whioh this part faith is located in relation to whole faith: 
FAITH 
I. Pre-hypothetical II .. Hypothetical III. Post-hypothetical 
a. Psychological: 
Disbelief---Doubt----..:.-supposal--... .,..Belief..o;..---------Certainty. (both disbel. (neither disbel. · · . · .. · .· .·· ·· 
and:belief) nor belief) 
b$ Logical: 
Impossible---Possible---Probable----:...-conting~nt;...-:... ... _Certain 
• . · ( faotu~l) .. . . .· . 
Ignora.nce---Opinion-------------:--Belief--..;.--Knowledge. as Cert .• 
1. Kant, KrV, B 801, B 798; 
KAW, in Hartenstein, KSW, 
VIII, 559-.560 •· 
2~· Carmichael,· Art. 
. (1949). 5.5-
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Here, at a glance can be seEm the broad so ope of fa.i th 
in its various negative and positive aspeots. These items shade 
off into one another, the boundaries not being definitely fixed. 
In going from I to III (the three types being defined when dis-
cussed), there is a progressive increase of kno't-rledge and a de-
crease of volition (the will to believe). Note that in'~" are 
the three forms.of Kant's 11 oonviotion"--opinion (Meinung), be-
J.ief (Glauben) and knol'Iledge or certainty (Wiesen) .1 It should 
be particularly ·noted tha't belief in its narroto7 sense lies be-
tween II and III in both 11 a 11 and 11 b 11 , gradually shading off into 
each side. That. is, belief does not disappear at either of its 
indeterminate boundaries, but gradually passes over into supposal 
and opinion on the one hand, ·and into knowledge and certainty on 
·the other~ The failure to see this, as well as·the broad expanse 
of faith ha~ been a prolific cause of confusion •. While belief 
and knowledge (or certainty) should be distinguished, in that in 
a strict sense belief has for its object that 1-rhicp. is unproven 
(either what is immediately known or not demonstrated),2 yet it 
can.not be .said that the one who knows or is certain is a disbe-
liever in the object of his knowledge or certainty; rather, his 
belief is more intense. The conviction may result from an exam-
ination of the ground.s of the belief .3 
In the following discussion no distinction will be mach~ 
between faith and 'belief on the ground that to consider fa.ith as 
1. Kant, KrV, B 8.50 •.. 
2. Hodgson, Art.(l888), 70. 
3. Webster's Internat. Uiet. 
· (2nd. ed.), 248. 
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more than belief, more than in~ellectual assent,l is an over-
refinement. Forwhile "1ove11 is both· a noun and a verb, this 
is not true of 11 faith 11 ; 11 believe 11 must serve.asits verb. ,Then, 
historically, such a distinction is unwarranted. In the early 
Christian Church, a 11 believer11 was a follower, one who took "the 
way", and 11 believe 11 was used synonymously with. 11 reoeive 11 .. 2 Ana 
11 belief 11 is still used in ohuroh ciroles as a term for life-com-
mitment, and not for a mere .assent of the mind. And in ordinary 
usage, belief is frequently existential and active. If a father 
in a factory hears that hie child at home is dying, and believes 
it, hie feelings are stirred, his will is moved, and his feet 
start hurrying him home-wardo 
a. Pre-hypothetical faith.--By pre-hypothetical faith is 
meant the weak faith 't4hioh is. based upon littJs or no evidenoe, 
in contrast to the faith of the hypothesis-maker, who, while. not 
having sufficient evidenoe to amount to knowledge or certainty 
in their striot senses, still has sufficient, or even strong ev-
idence(;· upon 't·;rhich it is reasonable to act. While in its unrea-
soning aspect it amounts to mere credulity, pre-hypothetical 
faith, when reason enters, describes the psychological area be-
tween doubt and disbelief, and the logical area between ignorance· 
(or impossibility) and probability.· Kant 1 s narrow definition of 
faith as "readiness to give assent to teetimony 11 3 could describe 
this type of faith. At beet, with reason present, it would de-
scribe only hypothetical faith .. 4 Russell's purposeful narrow 
1 .. See Johnson, PR, 190. 
2. See John 1:12. 
3. Kant, WHO, 343-347. 
4 .. Kant, LE, 90. 
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treatment of belief, ho't'tever, refers only to pre-hypothetical 
faith:· "I propose ••• to treat belief as something that can be 
pre-intellectual and cRn be displayed in the behavior of ani.-.,-.·· 
mals."1 Hickman, on the other hand, with a broad view of belief 
as running the whole gamut of human history in its higher ranges, 
including 11 the most elaborate statements of creed and doctrine, 
deolares: "In its lo'li':est range it amounts to nothing more than 
credulity, 1/fhioh almost wholly la.oks reflective reason," as be-
ing spontaneous and taking its objects for granted.2 He adds 
that 11 a large portion of his system of beliefs the average in-
dividual takes over from his group without muoh reflective 
thinking. n3 
Thus, indisoriminate relianoe on authority is an example 
.· . 
.. 
of pre-hypothetical faith. It is a·natural and essential course 
for man before the development of his reasoning powers; in this 
sense all belief rests at first upon authority.4 Yet this at;.._ 
titude need not be uncritical, as even the ohild 1 s acoeptanoe 
of the authority of his parents may be based upon a trust due 
to experience;5 he soon learns that his parents are worthy of 
trust, and so gradually passes out of' this pre-hypothetical stage. 
No man is born with a belief' in God, but 11 we are all born with 
a tendency to believe what we are told. 11 6 As with the infant, 
the race in its infancy displays this tendency of "unreasoning 
1. Russell, HK, 144. 
2. Hiokman, LPR, 440. 
3 • Hickman , IPR, 446-447 • 
4. Temple, NMG, 19. 
5. Temple, NMG, 19. 
6. Inge, FAI, 72. 
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trust in authority and blind obedience. 11 1 fJnfortunately, it is 
a true description of the attitude of' some modern adults. And 
strange as it may seem, the faith expressed in the moral argu-
ment by Kant, by implication, has been placed in this category: 
He too readily. assumed· that :the convictions 
about which he was 'morally certainl lfere the ·· · ., 
product of 1 reason• ~ ••• It is more than· likely 
that Kant's fervant belief in God was based not 
on a postulate of· praotioal reason ~ut upon cer-
tain psychological conditions originating wjth 
his mother, who, he testified, was a sweet-tem-
pered, af:t"ectionate, pious woman ••• who led her 
children to the tear ~f God py pious- teaohing 
and virtuous example. 
While this throws doubt upon any belief that Kant's faith 
in Goa was the product of reason, pure or practical, it _is no 
denial that his reason later played upon the belief thus acquired. 
Perhaps Catholics in general are no more examples of indiscrimin-
atory reliance upon authority than was.Kant. In the words of a 
Protestant profes~or of theology: 11 Even the Roman Catholic appeals 
to reason, to conscience, as corroborating his other evidences 
for being a Catholic. 11 3 And the Catholic Bauer writes: 
' However the act of faith is reasonable and ra-
tional in i tself 1 for by it lire accept truth on the Word of God, jus'ti as every day we accept truths on 
the word of man. The greater p~=trt, and the most 
important part of the knowledge that we possess, 
is the gift of others •••• And 1f·we accept truth so 
freely from men, then it is reasonable to accept 
truth from God •••• This authority (for Catholics 
and non-Catholics alike) •• 4is a truth arrived at by a process of reasoning. 
But while ·natural and essential to man under. certain 
1. Frank, GWU, 17. . 
2. England, VRE, 127-128. 
3. Faulkner, MOF, 10. 
4. Bauer, MNF, 205. 
conditione, pre-hypothetical faith is unsatisfactory; it is 
unnatural and unwise that one's faith should remain in that 
stage. 
13:3 
b. Hypothetical faith.--By hypothetical faith is meant 
the 11 holding for true bf something which is not already veri.:.:: 
.:f'ied by experience or demonstrated by logical conclus1on, 11 1 
but which has some grounds of support$ As has been indirectly 
shotnni, faith in the word of another may represent a stage be-
yond blind acceptance of authority, as in the ·advocacy of "tra-
ditional" faith by a Catholic in the ttsubmission of the intel-
_lect and will to a revealed .doct.rine on the authority of God 
reveal1ng.n2 But Bauer appears as confused as Kant was ori the 
hypothesis and the postulate~ For toJ'hile recognizing that the 
validity of the hypothesis of God 11 s existence tr will be deter-
mined by our own experience in eo far as it does give an explan-
ation of the universe that will give us peace of souln and while 
declaring that in faith as a postulate, 0 we assume that God ex-
ists because His existence is necessary to ue 11 ("living out the 
assumption" rather than testing and "verifying His existence by 
experience" as in hypothetical faith), Bauer is unfortunate in 
selecting his first example and exponent of faith as an hypothe-
sis: 
One of the leading exponents of faith as an hypo-
thesis is Hans Vaihinger •••• According to his philos-
ophy all desirable and worthwhile objects must be 
treated 'as if1 they existed even though they do not 
exist in reality .. 3 
1. Inge, FAI, · 1. 
2~ Bauer, MNF, 3. 
3. Bauer, MNF, 10. 
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'fhis is not testing and verifying 11 just as we test any 
other hypothesis," for if 11 Vaihinger would not admit that God 
really existed, 11 1 how eould he be said to have any kind of faith 
in God? Later, Bauer does better in giving.an example of hypo-
thetieal faith, for he interprets Hooking thus: "Hence, if the 
hypothesis of faith is to have any value for us,. God must be 
known by experienoe. 11 2 But again.Bauer shows his confusion on 
the difference between a postulate and an hypothesis by saying: 
Finally there are those who like F. e. S. : 
Schiller make the postulate of faith and then 
test it, .observing 1 how it 11orks 1 , so that the 
presuppositions of scientific knowledge and re-
ligious faith are the same. So too, is the mode 
of verifioa:tion by experience.. The assumptions 
whieh work ••• are verified and accepted as true.3 
11Hypothetical11 describes one stage.or aspect of faith. 
But the religious man would rebel against the use of this ad-
jective as descriptive of his faith if no other descriptive 
'ttord were granted him, such as 11 post-hypothe:tical".. He would 
rebel if he were told that 11The Rel~gious Other" is an object 
of: faith (in its .narrow or hypo.thetical sense) , and never can 
become an Object of Experienos or Knowledge. For it is not 
11 the experimental attitude 11 that repels him; it is the narrolt 
use of the term" faith", i.e. the ignoring or slighting of dem-
onstration as a part of experiment. For thousands, 11 The Relig-
ious Object", while not an Object of" complete proof", is still 
a complete Personality revealed in 11 present experienoe. 114 No 
1.. Bauer, NNF·,; 13; see 
Hooking, MGHE, 214-21.5. 
2. Bauer, MNF, 13.· 
3. Bauer, MNF, 22. 
4. See Brightman, ITP, 
4.5-47. 
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one can experience a part of God; personality is not divisible. 
It is a unit, known and recognized.by its activity. If God's 
activity can be located in a human soul, there God is. There 
WO'Uld be less objection to the use of "hypothetical faith" if 
there were more reference on the part of its users to the re-
sults of the experiment, as in the case,, for instance, of Mack-
intosh who declares: "Like every other form of knowledge, faith 
is a response to a reality which evokes, invites and rewards 
aoquaintance. 0 l 
Because hypothetical faith is faith that has not been 
vindicated by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion, 
it involves an act of will. Kant's stress on the will in his 
moral argument will be recalled. Of course, Kant would revise 
the description of Inge 1 s above to read "which cannot be veri-
fied by experience or demonstrated by logical conclusion" in 
reference to the existence of Goa.2 The use of 11 eine transeend-
entale Hypothese," by the pure reason, he considered inadmissa-
ble, except in oases of defense.3 Yet in practical reason, what 
was theoretically insufficient, could reasonably be held as a 
belief or "postulate", and he illustrates it by the bet.4 Kant's 
use of 11 postulate 0 is more oonsistent, as it is generally agreed 
that a postulate is unprovab'le, while there 'is not this general 
agreement-~cohoerp.:Lng: the<:;l;l,ypothesis .5 
1. llfackintosh, OAGJ. 64. 
2~ Kant, KrV, B 77~, B 781; 
see KAW in Hartenstein, 
KSW, VII~, 558. 
3. Kant, KrV, B 801, B 804-
805; see WHO, 347. · 
·4. Kant, KrV, B 8.52-853. 
5. Kant, WHO, 347 .. 
Kantt s stress on the will in faith, and the necessity ,_ .. 
of action in morals and religion, "t-Tas carried on by William 
James.. His essay on "The Will to Believe 11 in the book by the 
same name, he described as 11 a defense of our right to adopt a 
believing attitude in religious matters in spite of the fact 
that our merely logical intellect may not have been coeroed. 11 1 
He calls it a "voluntarily adopted faith.n It has been shown 
that this does not describe ·faith in its initial stages, and 
·it will be shown that having been voluntarily adopted, it can 
not be rejected at will, when it enters the post-hypothetical 
stage. 
Even in the hypothetical stage, t,here are limits to the 
activity of the will. James divided hypotheses into living 
and dead hypotheses·: 
· A live hypothesis is one t<Jhich appeals as a 
real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. 
If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion 
makes no electric connection with your nature--
it refuses to scintillate with any oredibilitT" 
at all ••••• To the Arab, however ••.• the hypothesis 
is among the mind's possibilities; it is alive.Z 
James goes on to connect the live or genuine hypothesis 
with attitude and action. Men must act -,:qhile they are waiting 
for proof in moral and religious matters, or as Rall puts it, 
while they are going after the.evidence.3 Pascal's wager, to 
which Jame's refers, is a good illustration of this kind of faith. 
. . 
But James shows that it is only a living option for one who has 
l. James, wa, 1-2. 
2. James, WB, 2-3. 
3. Kant, KrV, B 829, B 833; 
see James, \1B, 22; Rall, 
OHR, 238 . 
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already a tendency to believe. And also, 11 as a rule we disbe-
lieve all facta and theories for which we have no uae. 11 1 He 
decides that 11 our non-intellectual nature does influence our 
convictions" and that 11 there are passional tendencies and voli-
tions which run before and others which come after belief. 11 2 
In Pluralistic Universe, is found the famous ladder of faith: 
It might be true somewhere~ you say, for it is 
not self-contradictory. It may be true, you con-
tinue, even here and now. It is fit to be true. 
It i-tould be well if it~ true, it ought to be 
true, you presently feel. It must be true, some-
thing persuasive in you whispers next; and then-- 3 as a final result--It shall be as if true, for you. 
While not one step is logically·neoessa:r:-y, yet as James 
goes on to show, life exceeds logic, the practical reason going 
ahead, and the theoretic reason coming along after the conclu-
sion has been reached. On this basis one could reasonably ac-
cept religious be1iefs on authority, 'ti'hen he has neither the 
time nor the ability to study natural theology. For, 11 the 
field of cognition does not square with the field of action, 11 4 
and 11 every man must adopt some attitude towards God."5 And it 
is not unreasonable for ignorant men (or men whose knowledge 
does not equal that.of the experts), 11 to trust and implicitly 
follow the expert; on the contrary, it is unreasonable to set 
up an ill-formed judgment in opposition to real l,mowledge. 11 6 
Dean Inge applies this to a manta setting up his judgment a~ 
gainst that of his God1 s. 
1 .. James, WB, 10 .. 
2. James, tv.B, ll. 
3. James, PU, 329. 
4 .. Gomperez, Art.(l938), 53o 
5. Temple, NMG, 7. 
6. Inge, FAI, 79. 
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But it is the contention of this dissertation that an 
hypothetical faith .in respect to the existence of God, even 
on this high_level of accepting the best authority on moral 
and religious matters (even though that authority be God Him-· 
self), is still a part faith, and unsatisfactory, ·as every man 
.has it within his power (if he carefully follows conditions 
laid down for a successful exPeriment), to find out for_him-
self.whether God exists or not. There is a post-hypothetical 
stage of faith. 
c. Post-hypothetical faith.--By post-hypothetical faith 
is meant the faith that one has in the existence of some object 
or person after he has conducted a successful experiment, such 
as the faith of one who has come to knot~ God in personal ac-
quaintanceship. There is no prima facie evidence that thfs is 
impossible. No definition can preclude its actuality .. 
1) Make-believe definitions.--Make-believe defini-. 
tiona, "to7hich substi tu'te a conoep·tion of part faith for whole 
faith, have been given and accepted as preoludi~g any possible 
real knowledge of God or even-of His existEmce. Of course, 
..... 
any one has a right to define a word as he pleases, i.e. in 
accordance with his purpose and the way he is going to use it 
(~s the writer has done above), but·he should be aware of what 
. he is doing, and not u·se it to settle· a question which can be 
settled, if at all, only by discussion. That is, one should 
be on his guard against one of the evils of intellectualism, 
used in what James calls its "vicious sense.tt 
\ 
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James lays a foundation fer his discussion of· this evil 
by gi>ing back· to the inte.lleetualism of Socrates and :E>lato, 
who taught that what a thing really is is told by its defini-
tion; sinee then,. we have been taught. that 11 the essences of 
things are knt:>'"to1~ whenever we .know their def1ni tiona • 11 1 So far 
so good,. declares James, .but 11 the misuse of concepts begins 
with the habit .of. employing them privatively as well as posi-
t1vely11·; for a useful practice becomes a method and then a ty~ 
ranny whioh defeats the purpose of·the concept, which is to 
make things intelligible. ·Ooncepts are still held when they 
have become intelligible, and are used to deny facts: 
Thus it oomes that when once you have oonoeived 
thi~gs as independent, you must proceed to deny the 
posst~ility .of any connection among them, because 
the notion of connection is not contained in the 
definition of 1ndependenoe.2 
Thus, a photographer is denied by definition the priv-
ilege of doing anything else. Thus, too, a believer can be de-
fined so narrowly as to preclude his being a knower as well. 
True, 11 the Christian life is a life of faith," but the question 
is, what uae is going to be made of that concept? Will it be 
used to deny other descriptions of that life, as by a descrip-
tion of the life in O;llY one stage of it, or by an inadequate 
description .of it even in its initial stage? For there are 
stages of that life as there are stages of belief. One should.· .. 
not givea static.definition of a life.that refuses to become 
statec, or ceases by becoming static. And this dissertation 
1. James, PlJ, 218. 2. James·,. PU, 218...,.219. 
,· 
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seeks to show that the 11 believer" (used in the historic sense),l 
is also a 11 receiver 11 of Christ, and thus, that the Christian 
life at its very.inception is a coming into contact with, and 
a reception of, spiritual life and reality. At least no make-
believe definition can preclude its possibility or actuality. 
2) Make-believe hypotheses . 
·a) A controversial subject.--The subject of make-
believe hypotheses is a controversial one, because the subject 
of hypothe~es in general is controversial, at least, at the 
·, . ' . 
very .start it can be said that the discussion can not be brought 
to a sudden close by the old and_fainiliar discussion-.stopping 
statement that "scholarship is agre~d. 11 2 
b) A fictiona1 11 als ob 11 ~--Kantts 11 hypothesis 11 is 
a fictional 11als obi'. He should have consistently employed 
11 postulate 11 in reference to God1 s existence instead of some-
times using 11 hypothesis 11 as.he held that there can be no knowl.-
edge by man. of transcendental reality.3 For an hypothesis will 
either work or not work. If it does not work it should be dis-
carded and the name dropped.4 Kantts arrested and unworkable 
"hypothesis 11 of the moral argument is not a real hypothesis. 
For although admitting the possibility of experience other than 
sense experience, and gradually rising to the idea of God as 
Law-Giver revealed in moral experience, and thus heading toward 
the full conception of the immanence of God (realized late in 
1. John 1:12. 
2. See Ayer, LTL, 184. · 
3. · See Kant, KAv1 in Harten-
stein, KSW, VI~ 558. 
4. See Bennett, CVM, 
65; Hobhouse, Art. 
( 1904) ' 93-101;. 
Jones, FE, 63. 
~4~ 
~ife), Kant stops short, not going on to the proper sphere for 
I 
the discussion of a religious object, i.e. re~igious; experience. 
I 
I 
For, contrary to Frank,l it is precisely in the immapence of God 
I 
that He can be revealed and become known. The si·tua!fiion today · ' 
' i ! 
is different than it was when the phenomenalism of Kant was gen-
i 
erally accepted: 11 The maker of postulates on the moral and re-
! 
~igious basis has now to recognize that his postulat
1
es need to 
be about realities otherwise known.u2 
But some have not grasped this. i For instance, Bauer, re-
! 
ferring to religious experience, writes: 11 Even admi~ting experi-
ence as a criterion for testing the validity of fai~h as a hy-
pothesis (which we do not do), it still fails by thJ defects of 
its own case."3 I But if the data of experience are tike 11 wet 
I 
clay in the hands of men," and their value, therefo;e 11 purely 
subjective," then it is difficult to explain the geljleral agree-
ment among the scientists and others (including Christians) who 
I 
have conducted successful experiments. This agreem~nt can only 
be explained thus: the 11 given" is given and not cre~ted.4 '· .. ' 
The experimenter does not find 11 what he wants" but ~he given, 
! 
which neither the will nor desire of man can change).. Were it 
r 
not for this,genera~ agreement on eJ_CPerience, communication a-
1 
mong men t"lould be of no value. And if to1ha~ Bauer s
1
ays l!Tere true 
concerning objective experience, it ~ould apply 't-tti th even more 
force .to the more subjective, theoretical, theistid arguments, 
i 
I 
' 3. Bauer, ~F, 96. 
4. Jones, F~, 55. ~. See Frank, PRT, 44. 2. Lyman in Macintosh, RR, 259. 
i ~~ 
I 
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which he defends. 
While Bauer-,. following Tennant, is ·undoubtedly correct 
that "what is called· the truth of religion or the validity of 
religious experience eannot be established by the ipse dixit 
of that type of experience" (i.e. it must·be interpreted in 
the ·light of all experience), yet if the hypothesis of God's 
existence is not a workable one, incapable of being tested by 
immediate religious experience, then theoretical arguments, 
·even when based on the evidences of Goats· existence found in 
nature, will not (contrary to Bauer' ·s belief) , prove the ex-
istence of the God of religion. As has been seen,·Vaihinger 
is not an exponent of hypothetical faith; an hypothesis is 
based upon fact, not upon 11 fiction 11 • So Bauer is not refer-
ring to a real hypothesis when, in criticism of Vaihinger1 s 
view, he declares: 11 Thus, the idea of God, and not God is the 
object of our faith. His existence, if you wish to call it 
that, is something purely sub.leotive; it is a·kind of mental 
hypnotism by which we oall the imaginary real. nl But this 
more fittingly describes the theo~t1aa1 arguments for God's 
existence; apart from an pbjeotive experience of God Himself, 
these arguments (espeeially the ontological, the others de-· 
pending upon it) onJ.y provethe existence of the idea of God. 
"Truth is not made by the intellect knowing, nor by the 
fact that the hypothesis ••• 'works 1 ." 2 True; granted also that 
"truth is what it is, despite what we wish it to be," and that 
1. Bauer, MNF, 101. 2. Bauer, MNF, 99. 
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God exists 11 not because He is 1 useful' to us, nor because He 
satisfies our needs, 11 and that 11His ability to satisfy our 
spiritual needs follo'tTS from His existence. 111 . But the truth 
not made by man may be received and known by man through its 
working. Apart from the verification of God's existence in 
human existence (the most convincing being in defirite reli-
gious experience), man has no way of ~owing that God exists. 
Bauer's theoretical argument is unconvincing to the writer. 
For if, 11 lti thout God there can be no values, u2 then the pres-
ence of values in the working of an hypothesis (especially in 
mystical experience) can be used toward the verification of the 
belief in God's existence. 
Bauer has obtiously confused the truth of an hypothesis 
't'li th the demonstration of its truth. 11 A hypothesis is not true 
because it works, 11 3 but through its working it can be shown to 
be true. 'frue,. a belief may be 11 just as true though never ver-
ified." But the question is, how will it be known to be true, 
if it does·· not work? And granting that II a hypothesis may be 
proved false at any time, 11 4 how can it be proved false other-
wise than by its not working? Bauer thus does actually believe 
in verification. And he explicitly grants that the hypothesis 
of the lat-1 of gravitation "was acted upon, tested, and found to 
be true. 11 5 Pragmatism is wrong in making 11 truth a process of 
verification," for this makes 11 truth identical with its 
1. Bauer, MNF, 99. 
2. Bauer, MNF, 999 J. Bauer, MNF, 98. 
4. Bauer, MNF, 98-99. 
5. Bauer, MNF, 187. 
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verification; what we verify is that a thing which we believe 
to be true is in fact already true. 11 1 Thus, in spite of his 
words to the contrary, Bauer believes that a true hypothesis is 
verifiable. On the other hand, in the words of Brightman: 
If the eXperiment leads to results from which 
nothing rational can be inferred, either the ex-
periment was a failure or some new hypothesis must 
be devised on which the facts of the experiment 
can be explained, and on the2basis of which future experience can be predicted •. 
If, as it is generally agreed, the universe is rational 
(and this is a pre-supposition of the possibility of any knowl-
edge as well as of all experiment), then nature can be expect~d 
to give a rational answer· to the inquiring mind. ·. And when a 
religious hypothesis works in the demonstration of God's activ-
ity (and thus, presence) in the human soul in distinctive reli-
gious experience, here is proof of the highest order that God 
exists.3 It is strange that those who hold so firmly to the 
reality of the revelation of God in the Sacred .Scriptures (as 
Bauer and many other Catholics) Bhould stress theoretical theis-
.tic arguments at the .expense of experimental proof, for distinc-
tive religious experience is an aspect of revelation. 
c) False hypotheses and hypocrisy 
So-called "postulates" or 11 hypothesestt, if not based on 
some evidence, and not soon reinforced by more evidence (where 
this is possible), are in danger of being put·to unnatural uses, 
which, putting an unwarranted strain upon the will-to-believe, 
1. Bauer, MNF, 188. 
2. Brightman, Art.(l938) 2 , 139. 
. ----- ---------:-+--·---------·- ---------------- --~-·-- --- -
3. See McGiffert, 
RM:R, 137 • 
are liable to land the holder in hypocrisy; an unworkab~e hy-
pothesis is a false hypothesis and logically transformg the 
honorable will-te>-believe into the unworthy will-to-make-be-
lieve, the 11 als ob" of those who act as thoughthe.y believe in 
God even though they know that God does not ~xist.l 
For after all, there ar.e limits to the natural·.and rea;. 
sonable exercise and power of the will-to-believe, conditions 
in which "faith itself cannot be em.t'oroed by any willed effort 
or intentional deoision. 11 2 By simply willing it, 11 we can not 
believe that Abraham Lincoln• a existence is a myth. 11 3 · This 
suggests that the legitimate sphere of faith in its voluntary 
aspect is where the evidence (of either personal experience or 
on the authority of the experience and testimony of others) is 
not sufficient to coerce the intellect, and yet where the hy-
pothesis is 11 al1ve 11 • This is psychologically sound: 
The will is not something ~epa.rate from aad 
independent of the intellectual and emotional 
nature •••• It is a faot that belief oan in some 
measure be actually brought about by ~ish and 
nourished by systematic aots of. will. 
I~ this sense, fatth reinforced by the will, is a maker 
of truth: 
There are certainly some regions of reality 
which are unfinished. We are endowed with wills 
only beoause there are such regions ..... In such 
regions the will-to-believe is justmfied, b.e-
oause it is no will-to-make-believe, but a ver-
itable will to oreate the truth in which we be-
lieve. What !believe of my fellow men goes far 
to determine what my fellow men actually are.5 
1. Vide supra, 39. 
2. Frank, P.T, 42. 
3. James, WB, 4. 
4. Hickman, IPR, 446. 
5. Hoeking, MGRE, 140. 
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But granted that there are unfinished areas where the creative 
po"t-rer of faith can be effective, where 11 faith in a fact can help 
create the fact, 11 1 (such as a man's belief that he can come into 
the presenae of God, and come to know, 'thus, that He exists), 
yet faith oannot fly into the teeth of evidEmoe or reality and 
still remain faith. Unsupported faith is not a real faith. A 
willed aot,.unsupported by any evidence at all, threatens "be-
lief in its vit~l nerve," and lla belief that believes only in 
itself is no longer a beliet.fl2 
d) Possibility Of knowledge in a true hypothesis 
i) Part faith vs. whole faith 
One of the reasons for not seeing the possibility of 
khottled.ge in .a true hypothesis is the failure to detect the 
difference bet"t'!7een part faith and whole faith.. An arrested hy-
pothesis.~s an express-ion of part faith, which itself represents 
an arrested development. But in oondemming this stage of faith 
("t'l1h1oh has to do.'with mere probability) as 11 utterly false, 11 3 
Baillie betrays a narrow view of faith. It is rather an inade-
q~a.te.desoription, only true as.far ~sit goes., Faith in its 
more mature stage is more than a bare probability judgment, more 
than acting on "the nobler hypothesis."· As knowledge increases, 
t~e voluntary aspeot of faith so manifest in tts earlier stages, 
gradually deminishes,4 until it requires no 11 great heave of the 
will to' sustain it. n5 Certainly the general dhristian conscious-
ness 'tfill sustain Farmer in his view that faith, at least in 1 ts 
1. James, WB, 25; see 
Hooking, MGHE, 143 ~· 
. 2 .. Frank, PRT, 42. · 
3. Baillie, IR, 378. 
4. Vide supra, 35~ 
5. Farmer, TBG, 53 • 
developed form, has "too much oc>mpelling conviction in 1 t for 
all this • 11 1 " · 
On the other hand, Sheen~:in defining faith as "the sub-
mission of the intellect· and thta will to a revealed deotrine on 
account of God revealing," and by viewing an aspect of faith 
which is just as traditional as;the view which Sheen upholds 
(i.e. faith as an approach to G~od) ; as a recent development, 
has just as marrow a conception: of faith as those who restrict 
faith to 11 a sum of possibilities or a hypothesis to be confirm-
ed or else tl;le practical acceptance of some hypothesis which 
appears more apt than others to satisfy our needs, tendencies 
and hope • 11 2 Kennedy, also unde1r the same Scholastic influence, 
reveals the same narrowness: 11 P'aith and science i.e. knowledge 
by demonstration cannot eo-exie1t in the same subject in regard 
to the same object .n3 
Galloway, however, rejec,ting this Nee-Thomistic view, 
holding that faith enters into knowledge, further envisions 
the wide range of faith by dec:Laring that it occupies 11 a kind 
Of middle pos1 tion in human li:re, II neither 11 purely practical 
nor purely theoretieal,.but ·something of both," a response of 
the whole personality to the o'bj eat, 11 that brings 81 full assur-
a~oe.u4 'l'h~s, "Knowledge andfaith11 do indeed 11 relate them,.;j 
selves to one another in the expanding process of human exper4.-
enoe, u.5 resisting any narrow a.nd statio defini tiona. When one 
i.; -Farmer, TBG J. .54;_ see 
Eones, FE, b3-6LI-. · 
2. Sheen, GI, 27-28. 
3. Kennedy, Art.(l912), 700. 
4. Galloway, FRR, 329-330. 
5. Galloway, FRR, 331. 
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says, "I know" with a tone of Certainty, tt can not be said 
that.he has ceased to bel.ieve any more than it can be said that 
he had, a false faith before he couldm~e-this statement. Thus, 
it can not be denied that taith and kno~.yledge, al.though strictly 
ditferent, are still ~elated~ 
. · ii) The disti:J?.ction, ·yet connection, between 
11 beiief 11 ~nd 11 kn~wledgell 
In post-hypothetical..faith, there is a distinction be-
tween "fai th11 and 11knowledge8 , .but there is . also a connection 
bett'leen- them. Kant rightly- contrasted belief -with knowledge,. 
but he also taught t~t opin;ton can become knowledge by supple-
. . 
mentation of objec~iveevidence.l ·Catholic write!'s, generally, 
unl·ike Protestant thinkers, do ·not distinguish bett1een faith 
- ' ·,' . 
·and knowledge. In,this, the Catholics .follow St., Thomas in llis 
view of· faith as· a. .higher form of -knowledge)~ Some Protestant 
W!'iters, as ~ill be seen, see also the connection of faith and 
: . . . . 
; }tnowiedge, supporting' the viel1 point of this, dissertation that 
in the concept of whole faith there ls room for both ·the dis-
. . 
tinctionbetweeri 11 faith11 and "knowledgett, and for their jOint 
adtivity, or their mingling without loss of identity in the case 
of successful. ei.perimemt .3 _ The objection is not to the defini-
.tions that separate these 'Tfttords, but to . the negative . and ille-
gitimate use made of them that negate the possibility of their 
being joined in-post..;.h~pothetical·faith.4 
1. Vide supra, 3.5. 
2. See Aquinas, ISA, 9.5-
96;· Aubrey, PTT, · 142 » 
34 Vide supra, 35 .. 
4. See-Jones, FE, 
63-64. 
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Taylor, granting the customary distinction.between things 
that we know and the things which we believe but do. not know, 
raises the question whether there is a difference in kind here. 
Granting the existence of some truths whioh can never be more 
than objects of belief (as contingent), he is concerned to as-
sure the connection between· belief and knowledge. He says: 11 'fllone 
of us rJould say that a man know.s a proposition which he merely 
holds to be either more likely to be true than to be false.nl 
But he adds: "the only intrinsic character which discriminates 
opinion, belief, and knowledge, must be degrees of assurance and 
confidence. 11 2 It is not a question then of kind of difference, 
Dut rather of how far one is along on the sc~le of faith broadly 
aoncei ved} In agreement rli th this, Watson in Kant ian fashion, 
distinguishing between credulity (belief resting upon no evi-
dence) and faith ("conviction to 't~hich all that is deepest in 
nature and human life bears witness 11 ), concludes: "Hence faith 
cannot be abolished by knowledge, but the strongest faith must 
be the result of the amplest knowledge.u4 
Procter explains the similiari ty of faith and knol-7ledge 
on the ground of relationship between a subject and an object, 
characterized by a common factor, 11 the peculiar psychical con-
dition called 'belief1 .. 11 5 In agreement with the position that 
faith is broad in its scope, he writes: 
It is arbitrary to confine faith to religious 
objects that transcend the sphere of sense-per-
ception. Besides, there is no class of objects 
1. Taylor, Art.(l929), 6. 
2. Taylor, Art. (1929) , 8. 
3. Vide .supra, 35. 
4. Watson, IRE, II, 14. 
5. Procter, FKR, 5. 
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beyond the legitimate claims of knowledge.l 
Furthermore, in Procter's view, no arbitrary distinction 
can be made between faith and -kno"t-rledge in degrees of certainty: 
Though the.krtower may speak contemptuously 
of 1 mere' faith, and contrast its subjectivity 
with the superior objectivity of hie knowledge, 
the believer on .the other hand, speaks just. as . 
contemptuously of 1 mere knowledge• and contrasts 
· the doubtfuln~se of theories "t-Ji th his own more 
secure faith .. 
Such a situation can only be poseibl.e on the ground of a 
broad conception-of faith held by the common man.and the:philoe-
opher alike. Cunningham recognises that although the .one ~-1ho 
asserts that he believes that the earth is spherical is not un-
der the same logical compulsion to ~ubet~ntiate his claimas the 
one who knows it, yet: 
We do not ordinarily suppose that. belief is 
entirely arbitrary and unbound by logical con-. 
siderations. However-different knowing and be-. 
lieving may be' and however loose the connection .. 
between them, it is commonly assumed that they 
are s~fficiently connected to render belief a-
menable to knowing .3 · · 
Applying this to religious knowledge, and denying that 
faith is merely a postulate ( 11 a belief.we have resolved to.oling 
to because of its indispensable value to our iriner life"), Mac-
kintosh declares that Christian doctrines " have been generated 
in th.e mind and heart of man by the self-revelation of God.n4 
A note has been struck that.should be emphasized--that 
whole faith is a 11 response of the whole personality to the 
1. Procter, FKR, .5. 
2. Prooter, FKR, 7. 
3. Cunningham, POP, .51. 
4. Mackintosh, CAG, 56, 
.57. 
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object.nl In hie recognition of the limite of the will-to-
believe and the place of the will in a united personality, 
Hickman implicitly is in agreement with those who oppose call-
itlg;': an arrested hypothesis faith in the full sense of the 
word, on the ground that one 11 convinced against his will is 
of the same op:tnion etill, 11 as 11 the will is not something sepa-
rate from and independent of the intellectual and emotional 
nature •11 2 As Hickman goes on to elaborate this, he brings out 
the.breadth of faith: 
Even a cursory examination of one1 s belief 
in regard to anything will usually reveal the 
presence of all these mental processes; intel-
lectual, volitional and emotional. Some beliefs 
are strongly intellectual, some strongly voli-
tional.3 
Inge is also against any division of the faculties of 
man that destroys the unity of man and his activity: 
The normal history of religious feeling is 
summed up in the words, Fear, Dependence, Love 
•••• Love iA implicit in Faith from the first •••• 
The religion of feeling cannot become true ltill 
it has passed throagh the crucible of the will 
and the intellect. · 
Something of this Kant must have felt between the writ-
ing of the second and third Cri tigues, and even the e.wkward 
phrase "practical reason" seems to indicate 11 a haunting sus-
picion on Kant's part that after all, the will that could dic-
tate to theoretical consciousness is a cognitive function. 11 5 
1. Vide supra, 53; 
Jones, FEf 50, 53. 
2. Hickman, PR, 445. 
3. Hickman, IPR, 440. 
4. Inge, FAI, 70-71. 
5. Hocking in Wilm IK, 
48-4·9. 
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iii) Verification of religious belief 
Closely associated with the discussions of part faith 
versus whole faith, and the distinction, yet connection between 
11belief11 and 11 kno'tfledge 11 in the more general subJect of the pos-
sib111 ty of knowledge in a true hypothesis, is the consideration 
of the verification of religious belief, which has all along been 
inevitably touched upon. For even the exPression_ 11 true hypothe-
sis" is suggestive of t~is thought: 
An hypothesis always presupposes certain char-
acteristic features presented in concrete experi-
ence for the elucidation of which, in terms of the 
intellect, the hypothesis is framed. If we speak 
of belief in God as a working hypothesis to explain 
1 faots 1 , the facts must already be, in some sense, 
relevant facts.. An hypothesis is, after a11 1 but 
an intellectual device by means of which wha~ is 
given in immediate experience is clarified and made 
to stand distinctly in consciousness in relation to 
the wider context of life •••• The essence of reli-
gion lies always in the immediate; religion react-
ing to the world1 both before and after the hypo-thetical stage. 
Hooking and Griffiths, along with a host of others, have 
grasped the fact that the essence of belief is its grasp of 
reality in immediate experience, the sense of standing immedi-
ately in the presence of reality, a reality which does not need 
to be argued. With their conception of the true nature of an 
hypothesis the expression "hypothetical faith" is no hint that 
11 probabili ty is the guide of life11 (a dogmatic denial, by the 
way, of any other guide of life), for to them faith also has 
its post-hypothetical aspect, and thus faith verified and vin-
dicated is also ~ guide of life.2 
1. Griffiths, GIE, 4; see 
Hooking, MGHE, 150-153. 
2. See also Hickman, IPR, 
448; James, VRE, 58. 
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Griffiths even gives a caution, thus, concerning the·use 
of 0 hypothesis 11 : 
In religion ••• our awareness of God ••• is pre-
eminently factual and not hypo·thetica.l. It is 
in concrete experience before it can be in any 
hypothesis. To speak, therefore, of the idea 
of God as an hypothesis is misleading, for it 
gives the impression that the essence and jus-
tification of religion must be sought in the 
constructions of the discursive reason, and not 
in the immediate contacts of the soul with real-
ity. Any and every suggestion that the ground 
of religion lies in the intellect and not in the 
bed-rook of concrete apprehensions1 .. lea.ds us astray and prejudices the inquiry. 
DeBurgh, a..lso holds that faith is a whole response, a. 
"response to God's omnipresence" similar to the direct experi-
ence that one has of himself, a knowledge thus that is personal 
and by acquaintance, which means that "the truths of religion 
carry us, in large measure beyond the range of ••• probable rea-
soning," as "religion speaks with a clear assurance where meta-
' physics is skeptical or tentative or silent. 11 2 
Only a narrow view of faith:could have prompted the fol-
lowing description of the beet that man can hope for in this 
life: 
We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of 
whirling snow and olinding mist, through which 
we get glimpses now and then of paths 't'lhioh may 
be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be 
·frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we 
shall be dashed to pieces.3 
On the other hand, Frank, describing just one pha.se of 
faith, does it from the vantage ground of a broad view: 11 Faith 
1. Griffiths, GlE, 4; 
see Niebuhr, MR, 138-
139; Jones, FE, 64, 80. 
2. DeBurgh, TRP, 31. 
3. James, WB, 31. 
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as obedience, faith as trust, faith based upon submission to 
authority rests in the last resort upon faith as certainty, 
faith as knowledge. nl He illustrates this: 
... Just as the wor!d, if it is· not to topple 
over, must have its equilibrium based upon 
something which does not need any 1 support, 1 
so faith. based upon c·onfidence in authority, 
must in the last resort, rest upon something 
which :is2certain in itself and needs no prop-ping· up. 
That is, "revelation" should include its literal sense--
" the expression of God Himself. 11 So Frank concludes that faith· 
down on bed-reek is 11 the encounter of the human heart 't.,.ith God. 11 .3 
Here there are no 11 blinding11 mist and sno't-1 storms. 4 
Consequently, in.the words of an expert on religious 
·. I 
matters, u Jf/ a-TJS 11 ( i:P.. the sense, obviously, of knowledge) 
>I r I -11 ta-T 1 V .... U 1To a- l a.. a-IS rr (actua~ nature, substance), and 
he goes on to declare tha~ through faith (as an hypothesis), 
' I / 11 c~o..pTup7\.ttY\ et-a-.v ( I 5 o l 7T(O e:cr-tauT€:-flO <.," the 
11 good report 11 coming not from man .(not 11 good reputation 11 ) 
I 
but from God (as good news). In this sense, it is true that 
r ~ .r. Jl ' 1 ' o ~ · 6 11
_0 1\l cJ!E-UWr II ••• 11 (:'X t-l rn \) f--Lo...pTUf l a..v (:-V <A.UT'f, II 
"TD 1fV€:-U\-Lo... o-uvp....~fTupc-1 T~ TrVeJ'\A-~Tl ~p._'Qyn7 
in a dual testimony. The hypothesis is justified by the demon-
stration; the believer (in the narrow sense) has become a knower 
(an advanced believer). 
lf.h.ile Frank is strictly correct in denying that ·11 the 
l. Frank, GWU, 19. 
2. Frank, GWU, 20. 
3. Frank, G,iU, 20. 
4. Vide supra, 153. 
5. Reb. 11:1-2. 
6 • John 5: 10 • 
7 • Rom. 8: 16 • 
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spontaneous feeling of the proximity" of God is faith in the 
general use of the term, as havi-ng pas,sed over into knowledge,l 
' . 
yet one on guai_"d against aJ1Y narr~w view of faith ~rill perceiv~ 
that a knower beeomes more intensely and more rationally a be-
liever. 
Thus, to Baillie's question, "In what sense is it true 
that we are ever able in this life of ours to verify our reli""' 
gious beliefs?)U:3 it may be answered, 11 In experienee, particularly 
the experi eace of God. " 
3) Make-believe moral arguments 
Make-believe moral arguments are the logical products of 
make-believe definitions and make..:.believe hypot~eses. Kant' a 
ala ob moral argument for God•s existence, while of value for 
unbelievers in getting them into action-that may develop into 
something more convincing, as will be shown, is only a fictional 
als ob argument when persistently held in the absence-of further 
evidence. Ryan warns of its danger. Using pragmatism as an ar-
gument for the existence of Go-d, Ryan guards it: 
It is not argued here that recognition of 
Godts existence is expedient as a mere ~egu­
lative principle of human conduot. Fiction-
alism is as unwarranted and dangerous in the-
odicy as in other fields of philosophy •.•• 
Thus the present argument do~s not urge that 
men act 1 as if 1 God is real.~ 
1. Frank, PRT , 42-43 . 
2. John 4:42. 
3. Baillie, IR, 378. 
4. Ryani Art.(l935), 
145- 46~ 
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An hypothe-sis of the ala ob type, loti th no hope held out 
of discovering, or learning, or proving anything, even if it 
can be conceived as begun by anyone, can not, ~f oarried on, 
cure anyone of atheism, for if carried on long enough will only 
result in one becoming tired of the farce. The ala ob of it-
self stands too near atheism.l Beiief in God was held by Hans 
Vaihinger as a regulative principle, "necessary for the on-
going of life, but known to be a fictione 11 2 Br~ghtman points 
out that the American pragmatism of Geiger's is even more ex-
treme than that of Vaihinger's, for Geiger asserts 11 that ail 
our metaphysical ideas are fictitious, but that we are bound 
to act as if they were true. 113 DeBurgh speaks to the point 
here: 
To appropriate a well-known saying of Dr. 
Johnson, those who world give tardour 1 to 
virtue must also give 1 confidence to truth. 1 
When religion subordinates the claims of 
truth to those of practical interests it 
sinks below the level of morality •••• But there 
is further evidence, yet more conclusive of 
the primacy of theoria in religious experience. 
Not only is that religious experience generated 
by knowledge; not only does it in turn react, 
by way of clarification and enrichment, upon 
the knowledge in which it h!s its source; 
knowledge is also its goalo 
So the ala ob argument that·has value in initiating ac~ 
tion that may lead to knowledge and some kind of certainty, be-
comes fictional when it stops short of that behavior and conse-
quent knowledge. For while it is true, as borne out by the 
1. Vide supra, 48-51. 
2. Brightman, PG, 21. 
3. Brightman, RV, 106-107. 
4. DeBurgh, TRP, 169-170. 
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testimony of countless numbers that. II 1T [ ir re-O ~~l. Y~P c::J e7 
lb V 1Tf otrt-p )<c£}-'-C-VoV (TF-J $elf, ffTr ~o-T l\h nl . 
a belief that is obtiously hypothetical (the will-to-believe . 
being present in the 11 must 11 ), yet such belief should not be 
declared to be the only belief, nor regarded in the same light 
. as the belief of the believer, who has carried the experiment 
through and received the reward of his faithfulness and dili-
gence, for this same multitude also testifies that God 11 TClJS 
>t:l<j-n_To7Ja- t \1 ~bid V }J...L.tr8 tA Trod cfT'Y\ S 
y ( V €:- T<A. L . 112 And the writer of t:ttose lines gives ex-
ample after example in evidence. But it need not be taken on 
the authority of this writer or of the thousands who l'Till eon-
firm it; in fact the ·a:uthoriti.es .on thj_s subject·. (both God and 
man) seem to urge·men not to take these statements except as 
challenges to conduct the same experiment, i.e. to experience 
God in order to find out not only that He is, but that He is 
good. 
These, then, are some defects of Kant•s moral argument 
for the existence of God: 1.) formalism or externalism, 2) im-
practioali ty, 3) narro1.v ·vie't'IT of Christianity, and 4) an arres-
ted hypothesis. 
IV. Value of.the moral argument 
1. Morally and religiously helpful .· 
In spite of its defects there is some value in Kant's 
1. He b • 11: 6 • 2. Reb. 11:6. 
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moral argument. In the first place, it is morally and reli-
giously helpful. Interpretating Kantls postulate of the moral 
reason, Royoe writes: 
Sense and speculation ali~e fail you. But · 
none the less you must aot as if God were your 
eonstant and visible companion; as if the moral 
law, which you must regard as his only direct 
revelation, were spoken·in your ear1by him as by your next friend at this moment. 
Royoe is impressed by the heroic in this postulate and 
in its being followed. It is the attitude of the soldier, 
sure of his duty, sure that the right will win, but only be-
cause 11God is at the helm." Life, then becomes tolerable, 
even glorious, because we make it so by our active faith: 
Awake, arise, be willing, endure, struggle, 
defy evil, cleave to good, strive, be strenuous, 
be devoted, throw into the face of evil and de-
pression your brave ory of hatred and of resis-
tence, and then this dark universe of destiny 
will glo't.r with a divine light. Then you will -:r 
commune with the eternal.z 
11 This is the victory that overcometh the world, not our 
intuition, not our sentimental faith, but our live, our moral, 
our creative faith. 11 3 So it is the idea of the mor;.l order 
joined with an active faith that not only takes us out of our 
subjective prisons, but that sends us out into the world to con-
quer in God's name, but also to be rewarded with victory and 
fellowship with God. But here, Royce has gone beyond Kant; 
Royce's hypothesis works; it is not an arrested hypothesis. 
1. Royoe, SMP, 113~ 
2. Royce, SMP, 116-117. 
:;. Royce, SMP, 117. 
1.59 
2. Personal and existential 
Then, Kant's moral argument is personal and existential. 
Through the ages the pendulum of philosophy has osc1llated be-
tween nature and man. The early Greek thinkers, seeking a clue 
to the nature of reality, looked outward to the universe, and 
defined reality in physical terms.l The Sophists turned their 
gaze toward man and the universe within. (Socrates had a liRe 
approach). Passing over many centuries, we see the pendulum 
still swinging. The first age of the period of modern philos-
ophy, the seventeenth century, was naturalistic. 2 God, if be-
lieved in at all by philosophers, was viewed as the Source of 
nature. The second age of this period, while retaining this 
view, witnessed a return of the pendulum towards man, to 11 the 
study of the wonderous inner l'torld of man's soul. 11 3 In Kant we 
see the culmination of this trend, and the influence that domi-
nated the third age of the modern period for fifty years. In 
this age, the personal values were supreme. 
This oscillation of thinking, but in one direction only, 
is evident in Kant himself. At first, and for a number of years, 
under the influence of Newton, he was very much impressed with 
the argument of design, an argument concerned with the universe. 
But in turning to the moral argument, he was turning to human 
experience and personal values •. Then, late in life, as will be 
shown later, he went farther in the direction of personal ex-
perience, religious experience based upon a new conception of 
the personality of God. 
1. Thales, Anaximander 
and Anaximenes. 
2. Royce, SMP, 28. 
3 • Royce, SMP·, 32. 
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Intrinsic values are personal. Things and the world 
itself, are instrumental to man.l Moral values, in particular, 
belong only to personality. So when a person describes the 
world as "good," he means that it is good for something to him; 
or if he is using "good 11 in the moral sense, he means that the 
world ministers to his moral deveiopmentt duty made manifest to 
his senses or the raw material of the spiritual life, as Fichte 
taught. Even Mill's pessimistic judgment of nature, as Sorley 
pointed out, is due to a personification of nature, or is an 
argument against nature as a result of an omnipotent, benevolent 
will, involving a personal view or standard.2 Sorley regards 
history as a gradual spiritualization of matter.3 Perhaps Mill 
m~y-be regarded as a 11 speculator 11 who 11 in curious self-forget-
fulness, fixes his thought on the physical system and forgets 
himself. u4 
Surely metaphysical speculation, going from idea to exis~­
ence, will not work. Kant 1 s refutation of the ontological argu-
ment spells the doom in advance of any attempt to found ethical 
idealism on this basis; a movement in the opposite direction, 
however, is legitimate: 
Ethical ideas are facts of the personal con-
sciousness, and they are realised through the 
will and in the character of persons. They have 
therefore a place in existent reality ••.. They 
claim objective validity; and this claim is not 
invalidated by their being conscious ideas, any 
more than the objective validity of any other 
1. Sorley, MVG, 118. 
2. Sorley, MVG, 122-123. 
3. Sorley, MVG, 124~ 
4. Bowne, THE, 120. 
kind of kno"t-iledge is affected by the fact that 
the process of knowing is a process in some one's 
mind.l 
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An argument like this is sometimes styled·"anthropomor-
phic." It has to be guarded. But when human qualities are the 
basis of the inference, it is properly called anthropomo~hic, 
in the opinion of Sorley. That is, if one argues that because 
man has power, goodness and intelligence, therefore God must 
have these qualities, only in a higher degree, then 11 the proce-
dure is anthropomorphic, and we may say that man is making God 
after his ot·m image. n2 But Sorley says that 1111hen we think of 
God's goodness, we are dependent upon this quality as we know it 
in man for our idea of it in God. England uses 11 anthropomorphic" 
in the non-technical sense of "personal. 11 He notes that Ward 
viewed Kant's whole system as anthropomorphic in the long run, 
as Kant in his t;Copernican hypothesis finally interprets the 
world in personal terms, as the postulates"~of morality are per-
sonal. Rejecting dogmatic personalism, Kant saw the necessity 
of interpret!:n~r-.-~' the highest in terms of the kno't.Yn highest, and 
said that 11 any predicates l"Te may as sigh to God ""t-rill .inevitably 
be tinged with symbolic anthropomorphism. 11 3 That is, the lang-
uage of eternity must be translated into the language of time, 
the known always giving the clue to the unknown. England holds 
that Kant's personalism is most evident in X:antts argument, 
where he contended 11 that the facts of man's moral life presuppose 
l. Sorley, MVG, 185. 
2. Sorley, MVG, 496. 
3. England, KCG, 193; 
see Ward, SK, 192. 
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a systematic unity of ends," and that 11 the supreme unity defi-
nitely lose§: its formal character and becomes the intelligent 
author and supreme member or sovereign (Oeberhaupt) of the 
realm of·ends."l From the point of view of strictly transcen-
dental thought, · 11 God is declared to be a mere Idea. In the 
.realm of moral philosophy, God is again and again affirmed to 
be actual reality. 11 2 
Concerning the starting points, methods and goals of 
Kant and Hume, Pringle-Pattison sees little in common between 
Humes's "critical contemplation of the works of nature" and 
Kant's argument from "the intrinsic worth of human personality. 11 3 
To Pringle-Pattison, the Kantian idea of value as central and 
as a determining factor in philosophical explanation is sound, 
the position of all idealistic philosophy since Kant: 
Every form of philosophical idealism appears 
to involve this conviction of the profound sig-
nificance of human life, as valuable as appro-
priating and realising these values. And with-
out such a conviction, argument about God or the 
universe would seem to be a mere waste of time; 
for the man to whom his own life is a triviality 
.is not likely to find a meaning in anything else.4 
This criticism should give pause to those who seek to 
minimize the importance of man, as does Schuyler: 
There is in all of us a kind of sub-conscious 
vanity •••• We cannot bear to think we are cosmical-
ly unimportant. We can ••• no longer believe that 
we are literally at the center of the physical uni-
verse. Nevertheless it is still possible for us 
to believe that we are at the apex of c~eation •••• 
There is no good reason for believing this; but ••• 
l. England, KCG, 191-192. 
2. England, KCG, 199. 
3. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 46. 
4. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 236. 
men have little diffic~lt.y, in believing what 
they l1ish to beli.eve .1 .. 
Of course, the last statement of.Sohuylerts is as true 
of him as of anyone else. And it ignores evolution: 
And so Da~~in may be taken as replacing man 
in the position from which he was ousted by Coper-
nicus. Man appears, according to the doctrine of 
evolution so interpreted as the goal and crown 
of naturals long upward effort ..• and accordingly, 
man is once more •.• set in the heart of the world, 
somehow centrally involved in any attempt to ex~ 
plain it.2 
Size is not greater than intellect; avoirdupois does not 
make the man. Man is gradually achieving conquest over nature 
in every aspect, prying into its secrets, harnessing it to his 
purposes. 11 The very term environment indicates a subsidiary 
function. 11 3 Man can remain humble with such a belief in his 
relative impor~ance. It is not domte 1 s view of the heavens de-
olaring the g::Lory, not of God, but of Kepler and Newton; nor is 
it 11 S't1inburne 1 s 1 Hymn to Man 1--'glory to man in the highest 1 for 
Man is the master of things. 11 4 But it is the.belief that there. 
is a likeness bet1·1een man and his Cosmic Father. If there were 
nothing in common between the nature of God and the nature of 
man, no oommunication betlreen them could be possible. "Ideal-
ism takes its stand on the essential truth of our judgments of 
value and the impossibility of explaining the higher from the 
;:I.Ol-ter .n5 The exclusive claims of sense-perception are negated 
by the Kantian idea of intrinsic and personal values as pointing 
to God. He and human persons are beareirB, conservators and 
1. Schuyler, Art.(l948), 46. 
2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 41-42. 
3. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 38-39. 
4. Pringle~Pattison;TIG, 238. 
5. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 
41-42. 
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increasers of values. We owe a great debt of gratitude to Xant 
for his part in the development ot this idealistic position. He 
had a marked influence not only upon his immediate successors, 
but upon later idealists in their. fight w~th ri~turalism, so that 
today we owe to them the present philosophical emphasis of value 
in dealing with theism.l H8ffding1 s theism is an emphasis upon 
the conservation of value. Pascal's conception of 11 the thinking 
reed 11 as greater in death than the universe 'tihich crushes him, 
is not outmoded in philosophy. Royce and some other absolute 
idealists argue from the finite self to the Larger Self. It 
would seem that (for thinking) it is nearer from man to God than 
from nature to God. It was from Keats that Bosanquet got the 
si_gnificant description of the world as 11 the vale of soul-!·' 
making. 11 Mill seemed to have regarded it as 11 the vale of tears" 
with his pessimistic treatment of the problem of evil. But 
Bosanquet 11 frequently speaks .... as if the moulding of individual 
souls were the typical business of the universe. 112 
And being personal, the moral argument is li~ewise exis-
tential. Kroner sees the influence of the moral argument of Kant 
upon Kierkegaard and his doctrine 11 that not.thought but the exis-
tent thinker alone can be related to God 11 and 11 that not a philo-
sophical system but the living man alone •• ·:ne who repents, can 
judge about the existence of Goa.3 Kierkegaard taught that the 
standpoint of the believer must always be existential. 
We have not left the thought, then, that moral values 
1. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 38-39. 
2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 256. 
3. Kroner, PF, 48. 
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are personal, but making explicit what has been implicit, for 
personal and existent~al can not really be separated. Existen~ 
tial values are not cold theoretical abstractions; they have the 
warm glow of persons, persons with feelings as well as intellects, 
feelings that can be stirred and that stir to aotion. In one way 
or another men fight for moral values, for the things that seem 
most worth-while to them. They put their lives b~h~nd the things 
they prize most in life. It is only natural that men fight in 
one way or another, and when they are compelled by moral consid-
erations to fight in any way for that which they value most, the 
only ethical question involved is whether they are true values, 
i.e. worth ,fighting for. 
Pringle-Pattison holds that we must go to_ the moral and 
religious man himself, and not to some philosopher weaving ab-
stract theories about him, :t'or·a conception of mo:ral ~nd :t'~li­
gious experiences.. 11 They may be explained but not explained 
a't"'ay. ul Some consider that moral and religious persons are vic-
tims o:t' wis~t'ul thinking. As a criterion of value, 'tfisltlful 
thinking, no doubt, should be rejected, but it should be recog-
nized at the same time that wishes have a part to play in the 
manifestation of reality. 11 Things reveal themselves .soonest to 
-those who most passionately want them. 112 James goes on to give 
the reason :t'or this: 11 our need sharpens our wit." Sorley agree-
ing 't'li th this, declares that "things are not what they are beeauee 
we ti'ant them so to be, but they are revealed to. the man who has 
wit to discover, and his wit is often sharpened by his need to 
1. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 252. 2. James, PU, 176. 
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know. 11 1 This is existential thinking. 
Involved in this passionate desire for things is faith, 
an existential relationship, "expressing the set of the ~rhole 
self. 112 And Welch means by this a relationship with objective 
reality which is practical and not speculative, an•· existential 
relation between man and God, faith being man's response to S.od.'s 
giving of Himself in revelation in Christ and the Holy Spirit. 
Thus, the moral argument of Xant is not only morally and· reli-
giously help~ul but is also personal and existential. 
3. A guide, thus, to the eoncept of the God of religion 
In the next place, Kant's moral argument is a guide to the 
concept of the G.od of religion. Metaphysical (or abstract) argu-
ment as employed both by Kant and the dogmatists, as has been 
shown, brings us only to a metaphy,sioal God; the moral argument 
with its appeal to concrete moral experience, ho1.gever, brings. us 
in our thinking to the God of religion. Bowne speculating upon 
the attributes of God, faced the fact that those that he consid-
ered, were only metaphysical ones, not attributes in any properly 
religious conception.3 He illustrates his meaning by·a reference 
to Aristotle, with whom, he says, the idea of God had a 0purely 
metaphysical function and significance, 11 God appearing 11 as prime-
mover, as self-moved, as the primal reason,etc., but not as the 
object of love, trust and worshipo 11 14-
Bowne1s conclusion that a God arrived at by logical or me~­
aphysical reasoning is llethioally barren, 11 5 is supported by the 
1 •• sorley, :MVG 1 6-7 •. 2. Welch, Art.~l948), 23. 
3 .. Bowne, THE, 248. 
4. Bowne, THE, 248. 
5. Bowne, THE, 248-249. 
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findings of Mill in his natural theology. Granting that the 
system evident in the universe points to one God rather than to 
many, yet he views Paley(s argument from design (the watch illus-
t»ation) as not a metaphysical argument but an argument ·f.rom ex-
perience, proving, however, only an intelligent being, as the ar-
gument from design is only 11 an inferior kind of inductive evidence, 
called analogy." . In the adaptations in nature, Mill sees the pro-
bability of an intelligent author, but because of the presence of 
evil in the world, and because of- dependence on means, he regards 
every evidence of design as evidence against the metaphysical at-
tribute of omnipotence.l But Mill is even more sure of the im-
possibility of metaphysical arguments proving moral attributes, 
i.e. proving the existence of the God of religion.2 "The only 
inference that can be drawn from most of it, respecting the char-
acter of the Creator, is that he does not "tr!ish his works to peri·Edt 
as soon as created. 11 3 He wavers a bit on benevolence, but quick-
ly concludes, 11 If we look for any other of the moral attributes, 
we find a total blA.nk11 ; he even goes so far as to add, "There is 
no shadow of justice in the general arrangements of Nature," and 
11 ~hese, then, are the net results of Natural Theology on the ques-
tion of the divine attributes.n4 
On the other hand, to accept the postulate of a perfect. 
Being is to accept the moral attributes necessarily included in 
the conception. Xant. "played" with this idea a great deal, toss-
ing it back and forth, but ··,it is to be doubted that he ever really 
1. Mill, TER, 131, 168, 176-177. 
2. Mill, TER, 189. 
3. Mill, TER, 190. 
4. Mill, TER, 194, 192. 
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rej ect.ed -t.he idea • Had he done so, he woul.d have contradicted-
himself when he came to the moral argument. Bowne regards the 
moral qualities as the highest one·s::_ "The true, the bElattti:t"ul._~ 
' . 
and the good,- l.ove, goodness. and righteousness-these are the 
onl.y things that have absolute sacredness alid unconditional· 
worth. ttl T~en -Bowne. proceeds by a moral postulat.e, 1. e. by a 
mingling: o~ faith in the id.eal o-f a perfect.. personal being and 
anappea~t.o experience, (the experiences of our moral nat,ure, 
of the s-tructure of societys and of the course of history), 't() 
the moral a~tributes o:f God. Our mo_ra:L nature; for instance, 
must_ have a mora1 author,- ~s· ttthere ia no way of deducing the m 
moral from the non..:.moral.n-2 ~But arriving at a -concept of a mora1 
Author and the God of re11gion is nat arriving at certainty of 
his existence through religious experience. It is only an ap-
proach. 
4. Suggesti«ag a way of approach into the iminecliate presene.e:_. 
of God .... ~the way of faith 
a. The activity of faith.;;;._Then, fina1ly, Kantts inora1 
- - . . 
argument for the exi$tence- of God ·suggests a way of approach into 
the immediate presence of deity~~the way of faith, for faith, in 
the f'irst place, -is active. It does. things. In the words of a 
keen observer of :human conduct, it buil.ds arks, stops the mouths 
of lions, and obtains promises, the rtwitnesstt (~itera1 for ttgood 
· report"; l of the Spirit. 3 Referring to the failure of the trad-
itiona1. theistic arguments-, .Rall. declares: rtA11 this points to the 
fact that rational considerations by themselves. are never adequate 
1. Bowne, THE, 249. 
a. Bo~ne, THE, 261-252. 
3. Heb. 11:2. 
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to the problems of life .. · These questions can never b& settled 
without faith and action.-11 1 Faith is the tendency toward act'ion, 
even action itself, for while it is a gif'1t (in the sense of pa.r1t 
of the original int&llectual equipment of mankind), it is a1so an 
ae~evement·,2 a venture or adventure.. The author of the eleventfu 
chapter of Hebrews, adiscerning student of Jewish history, indio:" 
cates that faith is not an insurane~polioy agains~ the troubles-
and dangers of lite, not a sa:tety-devie&, but a· force- thav keeps· 
men poised and a~ their tasks. The faith of Jesus· Ohrist did no~ 
keep Him out of trouble, but it kept Him in trouble, in a double 
sense., True, Ohr1stianity does. provide sheiter in the time of 
storm, but f'ai th 1s perverted when one seeks a refuge· in the rear 
when duty calls to the front. 
Perry, in contrasting belief and theory; stresses the act-
i vi ty of' fai thl 
Before. theory. can become· belief', 1 t must be as--
similated to the plan ot life ...... He who makes plans 
for the ~~rrow, or·construots a bridge, or prays, 
believes ••• ~Now 1 t is clear that theory can no more 
take the place of belief than a stone can take the 
place of bread .. Theory does not ~1rectlynour1sh 
and sus~ai~ lif'Q, as belief' does. · 
Aokno't-rledging the importance· of knowledge· t"or- life and 
the desirab111 ty of' certainty-, Rall, however, declares:: 11 Action 
is imper~tive. 14 Hl>ff'ding, referring to Kant's postulate· of God;· 
· writes: 0Ethically considered, the command is, 'Make life, the 
life thou knowest, as valuable as possible'. 115 Or, as Rall puts 
it: "Live and see what life brings to·you. T~s is the empirical 
1. See Ball, OHR 238; Lewis, 
Art.(1930), 1~; Dewey. QO, 205 ~ 
2. Dewey, L§ll, 21. . . 
3. Perry, PPT, 8. 
4. R~ll OHR, 238. 
54 H6ffding, TPOR~ 372. 
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method •••• Act, try, experiment, observe •••• Take your best in .. 
sights and theories and put them to the test of practice.nl 
b.,, The necessity of faith.--Faith is necessary. It i$ 
not too much t.o say with Rall that the "right to believe is the 
right to live;tt2 for it can be shown that faith as used in this 
" . . ·. . 
dissertation in its broadest sense·, and as covering the whole 
. . 
range of human life, is necessary t;o knowledge,_ activity and 
religious experience. Faith is faith wherever found and however 
manifested. _Religlous ;faith is not grounded in a special human 
facuity; it is primarily distinguished from any other faith in 
its religious Object. I . . . . Ferre slipped from his usual breadth of 
vision 3when he wrote,_ "Without faith there can be philosophy, 
but no religion.n3 Now as ·a matter of empgasis,. one might say . 
. -· . ·. . .· 
that. reason is primary in philosophy, ~d that faith is pr\tmary 
in religion. But philosophy presupposes faith in reason and in 
philosophy itself, if ±n~no.tging::'more. One could say that "With-
out faith ~ (anything) is impossible"--philosophy, science, re-
ligion; invention, discovery, progress, civilization, and life 
itself. 
Faith, as the primary condition of reason,-is necessary to 
- . 
all kinds of knowledge. Idealism has demonstrated the dependence 
· · of our knowledge of other persons, even the knowledge ·that they 
exist, upon faith. We have to assume,_ as Bowne points out, 11that 
the laws of' intellect are valid for all alike, and that all have 
the same general objects of experience.u4 so· it is either faith 
1. Rall,_ FFT, 83. 
2. Rall, CHR, 241. 
a. Ferre, FR, 220. 
3_. FerrJ, FR, 220. 
4. Bowne, THE, 128. · 
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or solipsismo And the latter is "absurd to the pitch of insan-
ity.nl In the form of hypotheses, faith is essential to advance 
in scientific knowledge.. The scientist lives, works and achieves 
by faith~ The great English scientist, Sir Arthur Eddington, 
speaking of the customary and thoughtless division of facts and 
faith between science and reli'gion, respectively, acknowledges 
in strong terms the dependence of the whole science of astronomy 
upon faith; there are no purely observational facts about the 
heavenly bodies.2 The scientist can not lay claim on all the 
facts, dumping all faith into the lap of religion. And faith is, 
likewise, the condition of historical knowledge: 11 To impeach all 
historical evidence because it cannot be proved or because the 
memory is not infallible would render life impossible., 11 3 . After. 
speaking of the view held by some that science is the only trust-
worthy source of knowledge, being free from the 11 farce of faith," 
Kerstetter brings out the importance of faith not only in physi-
cal science, but also 11 in the realms that matter most, in ethios, 
politics, religion and philosophy, 11 adding: 11 For the truth is 
that science, philosophy and religion all rest solidly on faith. 11 4 
We should beware of any feeling, implicit or explicit, 
expressed or unexpressed, that we shoUld have a neat solution 
for every problem: 11 Who dares to say that we ought to be able to 
explain everything, or that it would be impossible to live if we 
could not explain everythingo 11 .5 Something, surely should be left 
for faith or practical reason. All men, including 11 the just 11 
1. Bowne, THE, 128. 
2. Eddington, EU, 2.5. 
3~ Xuizenga, Art.(1948), .560; 
see Taylor, DGE, 126. 
4. Kerstetter! Art. (1948), 39; 
see Hopwooa TF, 107. · 
.5. H8ffding, TPOR, 192. 
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can live without full explanation, and without impeaching either 
the· goodness. or- :the_- power o~ God i~ the absence of that. explah-
. . 
·. ation, but no one. can. l.ive.·without-f'aith •. ·~he whole human race 
> • •• lives oy f'ait.h a-lone~~l -Hence it: is well that ~aith has such 
marvelous recuperative powers: -_-
But each- time thai_ the earthly body . of a belief 
is- laid in the dust'· it rec~ives a .more glorious 
_ spiritual_ boqy ~- • • .. Faith, ~which -ia an :aC:ti ve _belief 
in_ the reality ·of the ideal, -is.· the very b~eath by 
-which htimahity lives,: a~ it: will •reconstitute it--
·_ self afr_esh as long as t.he r:ac~·endures.? _ - -
c. The primacY of -~a:i.th~-;.,.F_aith is- prima~y, both logical-
ly and chronologically. -·rt'~s :intuitive, >and K_ant•s teachmg that __ 
kll.owiedge begins wi~h ~ntui~ions, _and that.: the intuitions of time _-._ 
'and space as- forms o:t' ·knowledge are. ours. before their content is 
fil~ed in by exp~liieuce, -seems reasc<>n~bie.3- Withou,t faith phil• 
oso phy could not -get, -stal_;-t·ed. ~- Tak.~ any pllllos o pher and notice -
his _presupposition or-p:resuppos;ttions •. These are foundat.iona~, 
. - - - - - - --
f'irst-~ruth.s tlilit -save:~J:le -phi~osopher t'rom backing o~f into an .. · 
.. infinite regre_ss-of ar~umentu :-Starting with Socrates, ration-
alist and ma~ of'taith,,"~na:trac_ing- the progress Qf philo~JOphy as 
Cbrist_ianity), -it is ~o·_-be: not.ed -that: .fa.ith geta an inereasingl.y _ 
~argerpl~c& until.i.tl.ctheCllt"i$t.i~il. phl1osophy of theMiddl.e Ages, 
-· - . - . - . -_-. : - . - - . - - -··._- . 
faith ge~: priniary_pl.~ee.: .Not o_.p~ sot. but tJie goal of many phil-_· 
- ~:u~opb.ers h~s ·:heen God- anc( ~ortality~~ma~tters of faith. All be- ·-
tween s~r:t.~ point and goal.;-~ther~- is ticthe l.eap of faith,tt the ·. 
. . - . -~ . . . 
· -~· Balfour, TH, 1.as~ 3~ Kant, KrV 1 B 730. 
2~ Pringle-Pattison, 'riG,: S2. : 
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from the instances, limited in number, to the deciaration of 
universal. law; the leap_ from idea to object; from the given 
self to the external world which is assumed, but not di:eectl.y 
. experienced; the active faith that accepts t]le assumption of 
the interaction of bodies and of body and· mind, the faith with 
wh:ich Kant and Royce pcstu1ated God-
Farmer declares that the modern mind is worried epistem~ 
ol.ogically, for. it holds t.hat reasoned thinking is a guide to 
truth, and yet has feelings of misgivings which are mounting; 
that we are in a bad way if shut up to this method of arriving 
at t.ruth, aa: 
Science and philosophy seem incapable by them-
selves of guiding. and controlling men (including 
scientists and·phi1osophera). on the issues about. 
which decisions have continually-to be made before 
science and philosophy a;r-e r~dy with the answers, -
but always they seem to imply or presuppose a 'faith' 
which goes beyond anything that. science or phil-
osophy coul.d ever on its premises fully justify. _ 
Moreover' there is a grow~ awarene~s that trust 
in reaaon itselfJ even wh_ en reason is narrowly re-
strict.ed to the . .Laborat.ory method,. rests on a 
species of 1 faith' .l -
Hocking, following Bergson, teaches t.ll.at. not.hing can be 
- --
truly.known unt.il it. is known intuit.ively, and that. nknowledge 
begins with intuition; and intuition is_ always ahead .. i'2 Herman 
grants that often intuition is the forerunner of reason, although 
"intuition comes as the crown and reward of a long process of 
patient intellectual research"" many timea.3 This can not imply 
a denial that ill reasoning must rest on presupposition,_ some 
~iven_furnished by t'ai~h~ "Human reason, then, as modern 
1. Farmer, Art. (1947), 135. 3. Herman, lVNM, 276. 
2. Hocking, TOP, 208. 
scepticism has shown, does not rest upon itself. Rational con-
clusions are dependent on certain premises "t-thich reason itself 
is unable to prove. nl Russell says that 11 even in the most logi., . 
cal realms, it is insight that first arrives at what is new. 112 
If faith is primary in this general sense, there can be 
little question about the primacy of faith in the religious 
.realm.3 Augustine taught that the foundation of reason is faith 
in revelation l'7hich trurnishes the data upon which reason 't.J'orks: 
For the Augustinian, 'the safest way to reach 
truth is not the one that starts from reason and 
then goes on from rational certitude to faith, 
but ••• the way whose sta:rting:'point is fa!th and 
then goes on from revelation to reason.' 
Faith is the most characteristic attitude of the religious 
man. The writers of the Jewish-Christian Sacred Scriptures ex-
hibit this in presenting no formal argument for God 1 s existence, 
but rather putting it forward as a postulate not only for the 
religious man to stand upon but also as an hypothesis to advance 
from in the discovery that God not only 11 isll but that He is good 
and a rewarder of the diligent seeker after Him.5 
d. The reasonableness of faith.--In connection with the 
general subject of the value of Kant's moral argument as suggest-
ing a way into the immediate presence of God--the reasonableness 
of this approach of faith should be considered. There is plenty 
of room for this concept in the broad view of faith that has al-
ready been presentea.6 
1. Frank, PRT, 39; see 
Kerstetter, Art.(l948), 42. 
2. Herman, MVM, 270; see Rus-
sell, Art.(l914), 787-788. 
3. Thomas~ NC, 3-5; vide supra, 
170-l?G. 
I 
4. Schilling, Art.(l948), 15; 
see Gilson, LPMA, 17. 
5. See Gen. 1:1; Pea. 34:8. 
6. Vide supra, 35-52. · 
. . : . . 1?5 
1) Interdependence of faith and reason.•-Gne of the 
constituent. elements of this view·is the interdependence of 
fai"t#h and reason. On the one· hand,- faith is the very life-blood 
of reason. To what has been, said on the dependence of reason up• 
on faith in securing know~edge of. all kinds,l may be added the 
more general statement of •·Kerstetter: 'tiliat., "Without· faith reason 
could do nothing. 1~2 He concludes: 
And thus it is. tJlat reason cannot say to faith, 
'I have no need· of thee. • Without faith reason~ ... 
is prostrate.; It has no ~ega. to stand. on. It can.;.. 
not movfa •. But walking on "t#he ground of such pre-
;reason convictionS it can mQve out bit by bit and 
push back the darkness of. the dim unknown.. But this 
is not al:L• . Even as it ~alks on the ·s~ndals . of faith, 
reason must be crowned w1t.h the crown of faith. If 
· without basic faith, reason has ·no legs to stand on, 
then without crowning faith,. reason has no arms with 
·which to reach upward or feel its way fo~ard. Rga~ 
~on, to be ~ruitful; must. begin and end 1n faith. 
On the other hand 1 ttt.enable faith ought always to be 
guided, so far as possible, .bY the light of reason.•t4 By his 
qualifying w.ords. ttcso. far as possible,'" Kerstetter has guarded 
t.he truth of the interdependen-ce of faith and reason, saving 
faith from any slavish dependence· upon reason, or from any con• 
cep:tion like faith coming cringiilgly in. to t~e presence of an 
. . 
austere and absol.ute: monarch- c)r judge for permission to live 
· a.nd to express <:onvictions that transcend those of reason. :I.t 
is true, however, ·t.hat reason does faith a favor by examining 
. beliefs and by safeguarding men. :fr·om credulity: 
Reason has· the task of examining our beliefs, 
and of safeguarding us against credu1ity. Reason 
· insists that. belief shall harmonize w.ith our whole 
J.. Vide supra, 52-60;· 
see Rail, CBR, .240.. · 
2. Kerstett.er, Ar'ta. (194.8); 32 •. 
a. Kerstet.t.er, Art. (1948), 4?::43. 
4;.. Kerst.etter, Art. (1948), · 32. 
experience. Everyone.knowe what it means to 
trust in something or some proposition which 
could not safely be trusted~ Reason takes 
note of such a disappointing experience, and 
erects an inhibition against belief at ~hat 
point. In another direction, reason acts as 
the critical judge between conflicting believ-
ing tendencles.l 
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It in sound believing and reasoning there is this inter-
dependence of faith and reason, then it does undermine the posi-
tion of the irrationalists, such as Barth, who "spurn reason" 
as well as shaking the foundation of the rationalistic empiri-
cist extremists 11 who overlook or minimize reason 1 s dependence 
on faith~ 112 
2) Moral and spiritual experience factual.--The fact 
is that moral and spiritual experiences are as factual as bio-
logical experience. Science, mathematics, psychology, and 
philosophy use postulates; the postulate of God is as rational 
as the assumptiorts of the uniformity of nature, of the exist-
ence of other human minds, and of the many faiths of every-day 
life which are, nevertheless, regarded as facts. 
I have not yet straddled a radio message and 
ridden it from New York to London, yet I have 
faith such mesBages are sent. So I do not doubt 
those truths of God which my reason has not yet 
lassoed and galloped to the end of time •••• With 
youthful faith I accepted the doctrines of the 
church. With smart learning, I rejected all of 
them. Now with some wisdom sired by humbled 
pride and conceived in suffering, I know they 
are true. Onoe I assigned to myself the duties 
of the Supreme-God-Supreme-Court-Justice, to pass 
on the reliability of G~dts statements and the 
nature of His creation.~ 
3) Faith and reason harmonious partners.--No doubt 
1. Hickman IPR 459. 
2. Kerstetter, lrt.{l948), 39. 
. ~ .. · 
3. Landone in Kepler, 
CRT, 202. 
· .. 
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one of the chief causes of the idea that faith is unreasonable 
is the failure to see not only that faith and reason are inter-
dependent, but also (and partly in .consequence of this relation) 
that they are, t'l7hen. working naturally and properly, harmonious 
partnerso In the view of this dissertation, both reason and 
faith as natural endo't'tments of man, are gifts of God, both being 
thus essentially reverent in their attitudeso Thus, while at 
times reason has appeared unbelieving, and while consequently, 
religiously-minded people have viewed reason with hostile glances, 
it can be shown that throughout the course of history this essen-
tially reverent reason has been a believing reason. 
This was true at the very beginning of recorded philosoPhy. 
Although Thales, the first known Greek philosopher was a physi-
cist, it is reported that he declared that all things are full of 
gods.l The Pythagoreans give evidence of the influence of the 
Orphic religion upon them. Xenophanes, the theological Eleatic, 
was the first among the Greeks to declare that God is one. This 
was at a time when the current religion was polytheistic, and when 
the Hebrew prophets were attacking.idols. While this god may have 
been only supreme among gods, the direction 't'ras tol';rard a· spiritual 
monotheism. For Xenophanes, Mind had cosmic significance, Ulti-
mate Reality. He said, 11 Without toil he (God) rules all things 
by the power of his mind. 11 2 So much so was reason reverent for 
Heraclitus that reason is the name of God, Logos, a concept that 
after a proce.ss of development becomes ·God incarnate in John's 
Gospel. Empedocles recognized the cosmic significance of mind; 
1. See BSkewell, SAP, 2. 2. See Bakewell, SAP, 8. 
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it was 11 flashing through the whole universe with S'!f7ift thoughts."l 
This spiritual, sacred and ineffable reality he called God. Pass-
ing over Anaxagoras and others, we come to Socrates. This phil-
osophical rationalist was a believer. Reacting against the myths 
of the polytheistic religions of his day·, he had a spirit~a.l con-
ception of God approaching. monotheism. He believed in revelation 
(Delphi Oracle and "the Voice") and in immortality. He believed, 
in fact, that he had a divine mission as a philosopher. There 
can be no question of the reverence of his pupil, Plato. His 
followers, the Platonists, and also the Neo-Platonists, influenced 
the thought of the early Church through its philosophers--Origen, 
Clement of Alexandria, Tatian and Tertullian. 
The philosophy of the Middle Ages was practically all re-
ligious--Arabic, Hebrew and Christian: 11 The existence of God 
and the reality of divine revelation were truths so evident that 
the philosopherts task could only be undertaken on the basis of 
their assumption. 112 Contending that there was a real Ohristian 
philosophy of the Middle Ages, Gilson wrote: 11 Thus I call Chris-
tian every philosophy which although keeping distinct the two 
orders formally, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation 
as an indispensable auxiliary to reason .. 11 3 
Modern philosophy begins '"i th the name of Rene Descartes. 
He believed that he had a mathematical demonstration for the 
existence of God. Many other names of reverent, scholarly 
1. See Bakewell, SAP 46. 
2. Meadowcroft, PS, 42; see 
Windelband, HP, 264. 
3. Gilson, SMP, 37. 
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philosophers could be mentioned that belong to this period. One 
has to go no farther than the titles of many philosophical books 
of the contemporary period to realize that philosophy has not 
lost its usual reverence, such as The Meaning of God in Human 
Experience by Hooking, Philosophical Theology by Tennant, and 
Space, Time and Deity by Alexander. 
4) The seeming irreverence of reason.--Since reason 
is essentially reverent, why is it that it appears at times as 
unbelieveing? In the first place, it must be remembered that 
~eason is a tool. In the hands of a human being, reason dis-
plays limitations.. These are due to at least two causes: :~: 
1) man is finite, and 2) man is a sinner. 
There is a Chinese proverb to the effect that one can 
not draw water from a deep well with a short rope. The first 
reason why the 11 rope 11 of ordinary reason is too short to reach 
the depths of the 1i7ell of knowledge is that man is finite. Even 
when he transcends, momentarily,. his finitude, his reason never 
becomes Reason, else he would become God (Rationality, the Logos). 
A Pauline intellectual modera~ion is needed today, which in the 
effort to get the synoptic view, confesses that 'tiTS see 11 in part, 11 
and 'f.!hat the part seen consists of distorted images-because we 
11 look in a mirror poorly silvered. 111 
11Man•s reason cannot be equated with God1 s Reason ••• sim-
ply because such an equation fails to take realistic account of 
our actual state of sin •11 2 Something is radically wrong 't'ti th 
1. I Cor. 13:9, 12. I 2. Ferre, FR, 238. 
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men's desires. This is implicit in three definitions offered by 
Brightman. "Value means. whatever is a.ctually liked ••• desired •••• 
The opposite of value is disvalue or evil or worthlessness. 111 
Then later he defines true value. For a time the writer was 
puzzled by the'se definitions.. But is this not the solution?-
If man were good by nature, his desires would be good, and he. 
would not choose the evil and worthless; then there would be no 
need to offer two opposites to disvalue, viz. value and true 
value. As it actually works out, hmr1ever, here is disva.lue at 
one extreme, true value at the other, with value, a mixture of 
both, in between, for good men desire the good, and evil men--
the evil. 
Philosophy, in general, does not take account of sin as 
sin. But sin (not simply evil) takes account of the philosopher, 
who can sin in 11 thought 11 and 11 word 11 as well as in 11 deed. 11 And 
there is nothing u;tore unreasonable than sin, unless it be the ·' -
sinner.· This is the type of reasoning that can not be trusted, 
~he reasoni~g ?f men who have refused the divine invitation, 
•
11 0ome now and let us reason t6gether, 11 2 the reasoning of the 
rich f~oi' who reasoned within himself) 
Thus there is but an appearance of conflict betl'teen rea-
son and faith. The real conflict, as Ferrehas shown, is be-
tween reason and Reason, between the reason of finite, sinful-
man and the Reason of God or revelation. The philosopher who 
1. Brightman, PR, 88-89. 
2. Isa. 1:18. 
3. Luke 12:16-17. 
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refuses to accept the divine invitation to reason in God's pres-
ence, who refuses to repent of his intellectual sins (to which 
philosophers are particularly liable), and be made a 11 nel't crea-
ture" aan not even "~the kingdom of God, 111 as spiritual things 
are spiritually discerned just as musical things are musically 
discerned.. If finite reason is our only source of knowledge, 
then we are condemmed to ignorance in large areas of truth. The 
writer agrees with Ferrlthat revelation is ultimate truth, and 
as such "can never be proved by anything less than itself.2 
John Salisbury made the complaint tha~, "The philosophers have 
rushed to submit the sky to their reason. n3 It o.oes seem rather 
presumptuous, to say the least, for a finite philosopher to in-
vade heaven, trying to enforce the claims of reason upon Ration-
ality. 
The term 11 finite 11 has been used here to distinguish a 
narrow conception of reason from the broad one upheld by this 
dissertation. Here is a sample of the narrow view: 11 By reason 
is meant that faculty of the human mind by which man arrives at 
truth without any supersensuous ·aid: this implies his under-
standing conscience and experience, all acting under natural 
conditions.n4 With such conceptions of reason (as well as nar-
row views of faith and experience), it is no wonder that faith 
and reason have been regarded as foes. When it is said that 
~eason has uttered its voice on the rationality of a subject, 
1. John 3:3. 
2. Ferre~ FR, 243. 
3. Gilson, LPMA, 65. 
4. Field, SHC, 3. 
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it must be remembered that·abstract reason does not reason; the 
question is who has reasoned. Is it some unreasonable wicked 
man whose reasoning powers have been dulled, if not destroyed, 
bi sin? Is it the ordinary ungodly man (not necessarily "£-ticked 
but without God in his life)? Or is it the man whose intellec-
tual powers and vision have been quickened and aided by the 
spirit of God? To talk o'f such a one trying 11 to improve revela-
tion by means of reason" is absurd; he would not desire to set 
"the sun by my old wooden clock,"l or "invade heaven, 11 figura-
tively speaking. 
5) The general harmony of philosophy and religion 
On the t-7hole, the relation betl4feen philosophy and re-
ligion has been one of harmony. Reference has already been ~ .. ~,, 
made to the faith of the early Greek philosophers. The Churoh 
Fathers pointed out the disagreements among these philosophers 
as a proof' of the superiority of' Christianity over pagan phi-
losophy and religion. What was true, (approximating the Chris-
.tian revelation), these Church Fathers attributed to the direct 
or indirect influence of the Old Testament, pointing out the 
communic~tion and exchange of ideas due to travel in those early 
days. And there is no doubt of the fact that Platonism and Nee-
Platonism aided in the statement of the theology of' the early 
Church. 
After a study of' the relations of faith and reason in the 
Church of the first two centuries, the writer found that reason 
1. Field, SH~, 4. 
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was honored and employed, was recognized as limited, and viewed 
as relative, that abstract speculation (separated from faith and 
revelation) was frowned upon and used only to a limited extent, 
and that faith (faith in general, in Christ, in the Christian 
Scripture.s) 't-tas held as necessary, as central, was elevated 
above reason, and regarded as bringing knowledge and certainty. 
Reason and faith 't•7ere so united that Ohristiani ty was vie'li\,ed as 
both a religion and a philosophy. 
At first sight, the claims of faith and reason in these 
first two centuries in .the ::Ohurch, seemed opposed to one another. 
But the reconciliation came in the facts that the reason honored 
and used 't!fas not the reason limited by human infirmity, clouded 
by human sin, and unaided by the Scriptures and the Foly Spirit; 
and the faith made central and exalted above reason was not cre-
dulity, belief with no foundations, and unrelated to knowledge 
and certainty. A believing reason and a reasonable faith, thus, 
were joined in mutual agreement and support, rational partners. 
Four positions concerning the relation of faith and rea-
son assumed by the Medieval philosophers are: 1) Primacy of 
faith, held by followers of Tertullian~ God has revealed Him-
self in Scripture, has provided for our salvation, and that is 
all that is necessary; 2) Primacy of faith, moderated--Augus-
tinian. Anselm made it famous by his "I believe in order to 
understand~; 3' Primacy of reason. This was not extensive; 
it was the poSition of the Latin Averroists, a turning away 
from the Koran to Aristotle. The Christians who followed them, 
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found themselves in an inconsistent position; 4) Balance of 
faith and reason. This was the position of Thomas Aquinas, 
St. Bonaventure, and others. A distinction was made between 
belief and kno't'11ledge. St. Thomas made a distinction also be-
tween Preambles to Faith (as the existence of God, His attri-
butes, and immortality, that are both revealed and open to 
rational proofs), and Articles of Faith (Trinity, Incarnation, 
etc., accepted by faith alone}. 
Speaking of the advance that Christian philosophy made 
over Greek philosophy, Gilson writes: 110n the supposition that 
St. Augustine added something to Plato, and Duns Sootus added 
something to Aristotle, the history of Medieval philosophy will 
have a proper objeot. 11 1 ' These words are significant when we 
remember that Gilson holds that a Christian philosophy relies 
on revelation; it is also significant in the light of his words: 
Thus Greek philosophy, out loose from Chris-
tian revelation, survived in this medley of Aris-
totelianism and Nee-Platonism; it l-asted for 
several oenturi es, from the thirt·eenth to the 
sixteenth, and not a single ori2inal idea that 
we know of ever oame out of it. 
Only one philosopher of the Modern period will be·seleo-
ted to show that mutual contributions were made by religion and 
philosophy. Kant made an important contribution to Christianity 
in his position on faith in the Moral Argument for the existence 
of God. But one is impressed with the fact that the contribu-
tion was not one-sided, that the God he was talking about was 
the God of his contemporaries, whose attributes (discussed by 
~.Gilson, SMP, 403-404. 2. Gilson, SMP, 409; see 
Hegel, PR, II, 159. 
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Kant) were revealed in the Scriptures read and believed in by 
those contemporaries~ 
Concerning the contemporary period, it can be said that 
since the decline or disintegration of liberalisml (Horton calls 
it "the death 11 and Ferre"describes it as a near death)2 and the 
improvement in the position of the conservatives ,3'' 11 the gulf 
between our 'liberal and conservative churches" being "visibly 
narrower, 11 4 there has naturally resulted an improvement in the 
relations between faith and reason. In England, liberalism has 
gone 11 into solution11 ; there as "t-.tell as on the continent, ~a 
steady growth of theological conservatism.sinoe the World War" 
has occurred.5 Horton points to such divergent thinkers as 
A. E. Taylor, John Oman, Dean Inge and William Temple who are 
"unanimously opposed to the type of liberal theology which pre-
vailed before the l'lfar," and who, however, are not opposed to 
reason, holding that 11 divine revelation and human reason ••• 
' 
are not ••. contradictory ••• but correlative principles. u6 In 
Europe, in general, BiblicalUin contrast to specualtive) theol-
ogy has become dominant, and the influence of this new movement 
11 is felt very strongly in our country.u7 To W .. Norman Pittinger 
th~s is a salutary influence: 
1. Gibson, Art. (1945), 68; 
Horton TT, Part II, 1-2. 
2. Horton, RT, Ix; TT Part 
II .z. 8; . Ferre~ Art. { 1948) 
331j. 
3. Ferre', Art. (1948), 336; 
Gibson, Art.(1945}, 68. 
4. Horton, TT, x. 
5. Horton, CET, x, 173. 
6. Horton, CET, 169; see 
149 for Temple's change. 
7. Pittinger, Art.(l945), 
179. 
The religion of the Bib'le is central and norma-
tive in Christian faith and life ..... • The theology 
which emerges from a study of the Bible. is indica-
tive of the proper line of development in the in-
tellectual statement of that faithand life.,l 
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Amos N. Wilder speaks of "the, generally ackno~rledged · 
revival of, and interest in, biblical theology • 11 2 The Agape 
theological trend, rising in influence, is. a movement bt:tck to 
the Bible and to the faith of the early Church.3 
This general. change ·in the theologi'cal atmosphere in 
' :. . 
recent years has been accompanied by a decided swing toward 
"the right 11 on the part of individuals--liberals such as Edwin 
Aubrey, John Bennett, Robert Calhoun, Walter Horton, and Edwin 
Let'7is. Since his disallusionment over humanism, Aubrey, a 
self-styled dialectical mystic, has progressed toward a more 
con~ervative position.· Although influenced by crisis theology, 
he can not be considered an irrationalist for, like many others 
under that lnfluence; he still has a trust in reason. This can 
but spell better relations· bett-1een reason and :f'ai th. L~. Personal 
tragic experiences, reflection on World War I, with its after-
maths of economic collapse and failure of peace efforts, led 
Calhoun to see 11 the shallot,mess of modernism, 11 and not only to 
move 11 from philosophy to theology, 11 but also to move 11 theolog-
·ically to the right.n.?· Horton declares: 11 The exigencies of 
our times is dratd~ng me ••• theologically to the right. 11 6 In a 
letter to the writer (March 17, 1948), he wrote: 
1. Pittinger, Art .. (1945), 179. 
2. 'IJ'ilder, Art. ( 1946) , 3. · 
3. Ferre"', Art.(l948), 338-339. 
4. See Aubrey, LCF, Preface., 
. 5. George Ra.un in·report to 
class in Syst .. Theol., 
B. U •. School of Theel., 
1947-1948. ~- . 
6 .. Horton, RT, ix; see 42. 
My earliest writings belong to my liberal 
period. Realistic Theology and most that fol-
lows belongs to a more conservative period~~~· 
I sometimes say that I prefer the term 'Nee-
liberal' or 'repentant liberal' to the term 
1Neo-orthodox' to describe my stand. 
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Edwin Lewis, "moving from left to right .... seems to make 
out a good case for orthodoxy," his emphasis being 11 on Biblical 
and historical fact., 11 l His c~ge of position receives perhaps 
its best confirmation from.the.criticism he received over the 
publication of an article, the criticism coming from his liberal 
friends who felt that he had deserted them and had betrayed "the 
cause": 11 In the fall number, 1933 ,. of Religion in Life, I pub-
lished an article entitled, 'The Fatal Apostasy ·of the Modern 
Church. 1 u2 He goes on to admi.t the change and repeats t..rhat he 
had said in other publicat1ons.3 In this, Lewis has not gone 
over to irrationalism.4 
Nels Ferre', also, is doing much to strengthen the part-
nership between reason and faith, occupying as he does a media-
ting position, critical of the faults, as well as commendatory 
of the virtues, of both liberals and conservatives. He thinks 
that conservatives "like Van Til, Henry, Ockenga, G. ~Tilbur Smith;: 
and others 11 have much truth to tell, and praises fundamentalism 
for "having held the main fortress'while countless leaders went 
over to the foe." He looks to the future when liberalism with 
its 11 stress on reason, experience and love,n will. 11 flower once 
1. L. F. Danner in report to class 
in Syst. Theel., B. U. School 
of Theol., 1947-1948; for change 
of Bennett, see report of Tyler 
Thompson to same clase. 
2. Lewis, CM, 
3. See Lewis, 
L~. See Le"t-1is, 
268. 
9. FD, v6 vi. GO 6 
' 1 ' 
more, when a new and fuller faith gives these their fuller 
reality-content. nl 
6) Future partnership of faith ~.nd reason 
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From this historical survey of the relations of faith 
and reason, it can be confidently asserted that they can remain 
partners, for it is still true that reason and faith need eaoh 
other. They supplement, as well as challenge an~ check, eaoh 
other. One reason for the needed co-operation is that reason 
is primarily grounded in the actual, while faith is primarily 
grounded in the ideal. Faith is a 11 'T.,.ill to believe" while rea-
son is a challenge to belief.2 
But faith must become more and more reasonable and co-
operative. And reason must become increasingly religious and 
reverent. There is a trend in this direction. Man's self-
confidence has received a serious set-back in the experience of 
two world-wars in one generation, and the fear 6f a third more 
horrible still. He stands in conscious weakness facing what 
seems to be the inevitable, the complete break-down of the ef-
forts for peace. Why does not God intervene? The fact is, 
God is still saying, "Come now and let us reason together." 
But as long as man depends on reason, he will not "listen to 
Reason." And until:he ~oes listen to Reason, there seems to 
be no way out of the present terrible 11 mess 11 into tr1hich mR.n 
has gotten himself by his false independence. 
But when reason becomes fully reverent, really respectful 
1. Ferrs, Art.(l948), 337. I 2. Ferre, FR, 218. 
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of God and His authority, and reason and Reason generally be-
come harmonious, 11 two basic needs 11 of the modern world will 
have been met, adequate authority and intrinsic motivation.l 
~hey are sadly needed in the present moral slump. 
There is a simple illustration of this conception of 
the partnership of faith and reason. A Christian is walking 
happily along hand in hand TtTi th reason and faith. Suddenly 
reason stops, saying, 11 I have gone as far as I can reasonably 
go. Ahead is unfamiliar land to me. It is the realm of the 
mysterious, the sacred. Faith is the adventurer, the pioneer; 
take a firm grip on his hand, and trust him impliaitly as a 
guide." The challenge is accepted and a spiritpal discovery 
is made. Then reason moves up to the advanced position, and 
puts its endorsement upon the validity of the experience. 
It. is the wri tarts conviction that a reverent rational-
ism is possible. He has adopted the Augustinian-Anselmian type 
that finds expression in the statement, 11 I believe in order to 
understand (or know) • 11 He believes in a reason that looks · 
t·oward Reason, a rationalism modified by the revelational type, 
~.e. a religious empiricism. That is, while he believes that 
man can not 11 lift himself by his boot-straps" to go from rea-
son to Reason, he believes that the Holy Spirit is able to save 
man from his impaired vision due to sin, and to inspire him by 
His indwelling and by His illumination of the Scriptures, so 
that man can rise above his limitations due to his finitude to 
1. Ferre~ FR, 240; see 
Aubrey, PTT, 4-7. 
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11 think God r s thoughts. after Him11 and thus in a measure to approx-
imate Reason. The measure of this approximation would depend 
only upon the capacity and the willingness of the believer to 
be helped by the Spirit. Man would believe and rely in order 
to know and understand, and he would know and understand in pro-
portion to the belief and reliance. This is a modified ration-
alism, a reliance upon reason--up to a. certain point--which 
makes room for faith, its partner, faith not only in reason but 
also in.Reason (reason inspired and aided by the Holy Spirit, 
including, thus, spec~al· revelation). 
e. The paradoxical nature of faith 
Then faith is paradoxical, It is both conditioned and 
conditioning. Socially a,nd psychologically_, faith is conditioned. 
A child grows up in a religious home, church and community; he 
hears the Bible read; he inherits beliefs. These influences con-
dition his faith, through the exercise of 'tolhich he is f~converted. 11 
Knudson holds that Christian theology is as much a source of 
Christian experience as Christian eXperi'ence is a source of Chris-
tian theology.l But it should be noted that in the broad view, 
it is the faith of the Bible writers, and in turn, the faith of 
the adult readers of the community, that created the faith of 
the child. The experiences of the Bible writers, in turn, were 
conditioned by faith. So the Bible is both a conditioner of 
faith and is conditioned by faith, as a total revelation experi-
ence of those who come to God by faith. Knudson sees this: 
1. Knudson, VRE, 91. 
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"Without belief there would probably be no religious experience"; 
and "There oan be no tru.e faith 1-ti thout revelation and no revel-
ation without faith."l 
-Faith is also both'·~determined and free. For people are 
compelled to believe something, but free as to 't1hat to believe. 
"He that cometh to God must believe," that is if he chooses to 
know that God exists, but man is not forced to make this choice. 
Then faith is also paradoxical in appearing to be at the same 
time both rational and either non-rational or irrational. Per-
haps this paradox can not be completely removed. Kierkegaard 
sees in the story of Abrahamls attempted saorific~ of his son 
!$sao (requested by God) the crowning proof that faith is wholly 
irrational. Were it so, there would be no paradox at this point. 
The question enters also, to whom is faith irrational? To the 
one aoquainted with God? Can it be supposed that 11 the Friend 
of God 11 considered the request of God an unreasonable or absurd 
request? There is no evidence of it; in fact, "t-Yi th no amimal. 
·sacrifice in sight he declared, 11 God will provide," believing 
that if the worst came, God would raise Isaac from the dead. 2 
To some, this is an irrational faith; to the author of the 
Epistle of Hebrews it is a rational faith; he considered it 
. perfectly reasonable to trust God implicitly and finds evidence 
for it in this very record. There is a simple illustration of· 
the paradoxical nature of faith, which at the same time illus-
trates the nature of :f'ai th ,as< a :;gif,t; from God (as part of man's 
1. Knudson, VRE, 
94; PTR, 165. 
2. Gen. 22:8; Heb. 11!17-19. 
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original equipment--tne capacity to believe), as active (a gift 
to be exercised), necessary (as to ·reward), and a voluntary act 
(requiring the exercise of will-power). Christ once told a fish-
erman, 11 Le1t down your nets. 11 1 Having fished all night without 
suc0es~,he was no doubt wet, cold, _tired, and discouraged. In 
some sense, therefore, e:x:peri ence, reason, and feelings l-7ere all 
against his letting down the nets, but yet, at the~~ of 
Christ, he did •. :· Row can this be explained? It is simPly faith, 
confidence in a Person and_in Ris woras, in a Person who inspired 
co'nfidenoe. Otto has shown the necessity of this ra.t)-onA-1, non-· 
rational-.fa.i th: 
By the continual living activity of its non-
rational elements, a religion is guarded from 
passing into 1 rationalism. t . By being steeped 
in and saturated with· rational elements it· is 
guarded from2sinking into fanatici~m or mere mystioality. . · 
So, although it may seem non-rational, or even irrational, 
11 1f l a- Tt u (j O..L Y~P ol c7 7T (J 0 a- t:r. X 6 fJ- t:-vo v Ttf 
86CJ '6T1 >f:.a-Tft/ Ka..'t Tots ~·J<[1\TCJ'0o!v 
l ' ' ·' '/ / 
a....'uTDV ~~~ea...rro~ol')'\s Y!v~To...L .. n3 
This is just as logical as that the-hypothesis of the scientist 
precedes the discovery or demonstration. The atheist 11rho refuses 
the divine invitation to reason in·the divine presence ("Come, 
now and let us reason together") , 4 who folds his e .. rms and sits 
dolm, saying, "Bring on your evidence, I 1 m waiting to be con--
vinced, 11 or, "If there be a God, let hi~ ~rove his existence 
l. Luke 5:4. 
2. Otto, IH, 146 . 
3. Reb. 11:6. 
4. I sa. 1: 18.; 
. ------- ____ , --- ---------------------~- ..... -· 
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to me, and then I 1 11 believe, 11 does not knm-1 the value of 
Ka.nt 1 s practical _suggestion~ "Postulate God, 11 nor does he see 
that it should mean going out.into life, impelled by an active 
faith to collect the. evidence and be re"t>Jarded 11i th knotrl'ledge. · 
The divine metpod seems unreasonable in reversing the human 
"seeing is believing" into 11 believing is seeing. 11 The itfle 
··unbeliever has not adjusted his sails to the heavenly breezes 
that bear men's boats into the Harbor of God. He does not 
have the attitude that is nece.ssarily active and venturesome. 
On the other hand, many an adventurer who has gone out 11 by 
faith ••• not knowing l>7hi ther he went, 111 has returned, kno't'1!'ing 
where he has been. 
f_ The emotionally-satisfying character of faith 
Finally, faith is emotionally satisfying. Often, we 
are not able to give reasons for a belief that we feel is true: 
'There is a pleasurable sense or feeling of 
repose~ of im·1ard stability, such as comes from 
the resolution of difficulties, the demolition of 
obstacles, the harmonizing of conflicting elements• 
•..• Bagehot 't11as so impressed 't-ti th the emotional 
content of belief that he called belief the emotion 
of conviction.2 
It becomes more than psychological certainty when faith 
merges into·knowledge. ·Kant implicitly recognized this connec-
tion of belief and knowledge in his use of the word Ueberredung, 
"tr.rhich could rest on eith,er subjective or objective grounds.3 
It is seen also in the testimony of a great saint: 
1. Heb. 11:8. 
2 • Hickman, .IPR , 444. 
3. Kant, KAW, in Harten-
stein, KSW, 559. 
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Here is a view of faith, pas~, present, and fu_ture, and proof 
that .belief does not<cease when it merges into knowledge; 11have 
believed" and 11 am persuaded" Q-e perfect-tenses, indicating 
that,the belief and persuasion of the past had not ceased, but 
't!fere still in operation when Paul wrote these words in a state 
of knoltledge. 
Thus Kant reaahed the high point of his argument on the 
moral certainty of the existence of God in what he said and 
implied about faith, for as has been seen, faith is active, 
necessary, primary, reasonable (though paradoxical), and emo-
tionally satisfying, leading into the immediate presence of 
God, and mingling 11i thotrt losing 1 t s identi ~Y, with knowledge, 
and perhaps even with certainty. Thus·, the· consideration of 
faith has been a natural tran$1t1on from the subject of moral . 
or practical certainty to the subject now to be discussed--
experiential certainty, in which a higher degree of both cer-
tainty and certitude willbe sought .. 
1. II Tim. 1:12 (writer's 
underscoring). 
ORAPTER III 
EXPERIENTIAL C~TAINTY 
I .. Relation of experiential certainty to theoretical certainty 
and practical certainty 
1. Definition: Ueberzeugung .. -- Experiential certainty is 
conviction, predominantly psychological which; in contrast to 
both the other certainties, depends upon concrete religious 
n 
experienceo As Ueberzeugung, 11 die subjeotive Zulanglichkeit 
f~r mich selbet," it stands. off from Kant• s Meinung (II opinion", 
theoretical), Glauben ("belief", moral or practical), and Wiesen, 
11 die objective Gewissheit, (f~r Jedermann)," (to be used la.ter 
in the correlation of logical and psychological oertaintiesl.l 
2 .. Preliminary comparison of the three methods of arriving 
at certainty 
In a preliminary comparison of the three methods of ar-
riving at certainty is seen the making good, in part, by the 
experiential, or experimental, method, of the defioienolee of 
the theoretical and the practical methods. For Kant's pure· 
reason~ even when· supplemented by his praotioa.l reason, was 
still not whole reason, permitting no play of reason upon re-
ligious experience, and involving the incongruity of trying 
to arrive at knowledge of a'religious object through other 
than religious :exPerience;: for moral experience, contrary to 
Kantian usage» is not strictly religious experience .. 
1. Kant, KrV, B 850. 
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Likewis-e, in the first tlto methods • the fa.i th emuloyed 
was a 12at-t faith, out short in its activity and development 
either by its restriction to experience of the idea of God or 
the wol'ke of God (in the tl'aditional theistic arguments) in-
stead of being permitted to go on to an experience of God 
Himself, or by its limitatiottto a make-believe hypothesis, 
condemned before-hand to remain unverified, as dealing with 
a transcendental object, which, according to Kant, cannot be 
known. 
Thua, although Kant• s purpose was to save men from · . 
skepticism and agnosticism, his limitations upon experience, 
his doctrine· of the noumena, and his impractical, make-believe 
argument (as founded upon make-believe definitions, and a make-
believe hypothesis, that may easily eause the will-to-believe 
to degenerate into the w111-to~mak&-believe, and faith into 
hypocrisy), leave his follotfere periloUsly close t-o both skep-
ticism and agnosticism. In fact, Dotterel' goes so far as to 
oall Kant's system "Agnostic Rea3!i.t!m."l 
In this chapter also will be seen the fulfilment of the 
high ides.l of 11practioal reason" (Kant's 'ln.oral. certainty11 ) in 
a trul.y ttpraetical" certainty, i.e. experiential. certainty; tor 
"in its proper sense, experiment is 1praot1cal• ••• of the essence 
o...r'soienee ••• a method of discovery of truth ••• by practical. 
activityu~ 11 ari outtee of fact 11 being worth 11 a ton of theory.n2 
The experience favored will be whole exper~enoe. 
1. Dotterer, Ar-1t.(1938) ~ 607; 
see Bennett, DBK, 17. 
2. Macmurray, Art.(l.927), 
193-194. 
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II. Contemporary empha-sis on religious ex:perienae 
1. An age-old appeal 
The contemporary emphasis on religious experience is 
nothing new; as an appeal to experience in general. it is age-
old, goin,g baak to the dawn of philosophy, although it is 
Aristotl.e who stands out prominently; he taught that the first 
principles of phil.osophy are derived.from experience.l As a 
distinctive religious appeal, it goes baek to Job, ~rho declared: 
11 I will l.ay mine hand upon my mouth; I have heard of Thee by 
the hearing of the ear, but now my eye seeth Thee .. 11 2 This 
appeal 11 as affording a more trustworthy foundation for belief 
than assent to or demonstration of theological propositions 
has •• Qbeen a perennial featu:rse of religious history .. 11 3 For 
~en during the 11 dark ages 11 the mystics kept religious experi-
ence aglow, even as 11 at the dawn of modern philosophy" Berke-
ley waged war on ove~abstraction, and pled for experienoe.4 
2. Stimulation by Wesley, Sohleiermacber and modern science 
The appeal to religious experienae was stimulated by 
John Wesley, Friedrich SOhleiermacher and modern science. 
Ferre", declaring that llno other teacher of the Christian Ohurch 11 
has ever emphasized experience :tor the 11 discerning and confessing" 
of the truth-values of Christianity as did John Wesley, calls 
attention to Professor Oell1 s claim that the reference to experi-
ence became central in Methodism; 11 In fact, 'the appeal to 
1. See Aristotle, in McKeon, 
BWA, 218, 689-690; Buck-
ham, IW, 81 .. 
2. Job 13: l. 
3 .. Martint EPR, 4-5. 
4. Buokham, IW 81; see 
Berkeley, TD, 98.101, 
134. 
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experience is so pervasive and pot-rerful as to determine its 
historic individuality.' 11 1 Case thinks that Hume and Wesley 
had much in common, the former 11 in deriving kho't-7ledge from 
subjective experience," the latter 11 *n mazing the emotionally 
satisfying the ultimate test of convictions. 112 
Case probably had in mind some such statement of Hume 
as the follo't-ting: 11All certainty ?-rises from the comparison of 
ideas and from the discovery of such relations as are unalter-
. .· .. 
able, so long as the ideas continue the sa.me~"3 To determine 
whether the ideas remain fixed, however, necessitated an appeal 
to experience. To say that Wesley made 11 the emotionally satis-
fying the ultimate test of convictions" is to ignore the well-
known fact that he made a three-fold appeal--to Scripture, to 
reason, and to experience. He did emphasize experience, find-
ing certitude in it; 
The soul as intimately and evidently per-
ceives 't1hen it loves, delights, and rejoices 
in God as when it loves and delights in any-
thing on earth. And it has no more doubt 
whether it loves, delights, and rejoices or 
no, than whether it exists or no .•.• an inward 4 proof which is nothing short of self evidence. 
Schleiermaoher,·the father of modern theology, was 
also a large contributor to the swing from rationalism to 
empiricism in religion.,5 Holding that theology is not called 
upon to prove the existence of God, since there is a universal 
feeling of absolute dependence upon Gad,6 he declares that 
1 .. Ferre~ in Benjamin, Art. 
(1939J' 517. 
2. Case, HCD, 163; see Hume, 
ET, 548. 
3. Hume, THN~ 380. 
4. Wesley, St.:iO, I, 88. 
5. Sohleiermacher, UR, 15,17,~4. 
6. Schleiermacher, CF, 133, 136. 
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this God-consciousness in man bec·omes stimulated by Christ, 
fellowship with Him being-the result of the experience of re-
generation.l Thus for Schleiermacher, theology was not specu-
lative but descriptive, a setting forth of 11 th& contents of 
the religious aonsciousness~"2 Christian theology is 11 not a 
system of metaphysias, or an effort to explain the world of 
man and natu:tte, but a formulation of truths given in the re-
ligious experience" of the theologian.3 But Schle1ermaoher 
went further than Wesley in his appeal to experience, in making 
it the final court of appeal, the seat of religious authority.4 
11 As time went on.,.~ the feeling of Sohleiermaoher came into 
greater prominenoe- .. 11.5 Sheen points out that Sabatier defined 
religious experience for modern times by declaring that moral 
and religious truths are known only by a subjective act.6 
The progress of modern science has also resulted in a 
greater emphasis upon religious experience, breaking down old 
lines of conflict between rationalism and empirioism, until 
today it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a non-
empirical philosopher. There is an almost universal appeal 
to experience, in one degree or another, so that the problem 
is to find out just how empirical one is.? This strong em-
pirical trend can be traoed back to Locke and his shifting of 
interest f:ttom subJect-matter to scientific method. 
1. Sohleiermaoher, CF~ 476-4??. 
2. MoGiffert, RMR, 28~. · 
3o MoG1ffert, RMR, 287-288. 
4. McG1ffert, RMR4 287. 5. Sheen, PR, 42- 3. 
6. See Sheen, PR, 42-43 •. 
7. Benjamin, Art.(l939)~ 517; 
see Ward EP, 167-16~; 
DeWolf, RRR, 188; Martin, 
EPRf 113., 
-" r~:·~:.~·-~-~--~~-;c::.~.~----:-----------------------.... --.~ ...... ipll, 
. ·" 
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3. General usage of 11 experience" and 11 relig1ous experienoe 1~ 
a. 11 Experience 11 .--In contrast to Kant 1 s marrow view of 
experience as a consciousness ·of objects through sense-perceP-
tions, the general usage of 11 experience0 today is marked by 
breaith. Experience is our entire conscious life, "what is· 
immediately present in the complex; changing field of attention 
of some partieular conscious self either at the focus or in the 
fringe," 11 the very stuff of reality.nl Buckham, considering 
experience as br~ad as life itself, seems to warn against mak-
ing experiene-e per.!!! identical with consciousness, knowledge, 
pure emotion, givenness or feeling in the sense of non-mental 
agitation, as·-~e:r:per~ence-feeling is cognitive feeling, intent-
i ve- feeling, value-feeling .n2 D~wey and Mead are explioi t in 
considering both subjective and objective aspects of experience, 
as mutually continuous in "one sphere of existence or reality" 
so that 11 any question of the poasibil1 ty of knowledge--kno't7ledge 
of the subject by the object--is simply nonsense. 11 3 Brotherston, 
I 
commenting upon this making of experience antecedent to knowledge, 
this 11 heavy-weighing of the object" that threatens the existence 
o~ the subjective aspect, sees the remedy in the recognition of 
the "antecedent unity of subject and object in primal teeling. 114 
Ward, also with breadth of vision, notes that any one object is 
11 only a part of a 'presentational continuum.• 11 .5 Bertocoi 
1. Brightman, PR, 9, 322; Art. (1929), .5oO; see RV, 16.5; 
King, BB, 317. 
2. Buokham, IW 84-86; see 
Moore, Art. ( 1902.) , 82; 
Martin, EPR, 114. 
3. BrothersnQQ,Art.(1943), 14. 
4. BrothersUCQ,Art.(1943), 19-
21. 
5. Ward, EP, 333-334; NA, II, 
264-26.5. 
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observes that Ward has a oonception·of the eomp~ex unity of the 
subject, and that experieno-e, thus, 11 oann-ot without mutilation 
be reso~ved into three departmenter·,-" cognitive, ·theoretical and 
praotical .. l This ·brings out ari emphasis very comm-on today--the 
duality of subject and object in the unity of experience. In 
this view·t while the relations of subjeet and objeet are more 
intimate than is usually the case in epistemological dualism, 
subject and object are not made numerically one. There is no 
indication here that newey, Mead, Brotherston, and Ward are 
epistemological monists~ Ward, with others, holds that "experi-
ence does not begin with a disconnected man1fold,"2 and that 
the subject has selective powers in experience, justifying 
Bertocoi in his conclusion that for Ward, "experience is the 
process of becoming expert by experiment,"' ioe. in an adjust-
ment to the whole environment by the whole self. Ward enlarges 
his view to inalude,the "result of intersubjective intercourse 
'- .' ·:- ; ~. >_ • ~· 
••• eXperience with a capital E, the common empirica~ knowledge 
of the race. 11 4 · 
In this sketdh of a cross-section of opinion on the 
nature of experience is seen diversity due to different emphasis 
(especially on subject and object), but no contradiction, as the 
extremes can be brought together by balancing the just claims 
of both subjective and objeotive_aspeots of experience fn the 
suggested conaapt.of the unity of experience. This has an 
lo l3ertooc1, ~G, 97; see 
Ward, NA, I!, 134-135. 
2. Ward, NA, II, 97 .. 
3. Bertocci, EAG, 96-97. 
4. Ward, NA, II, 152. 
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1mp~rtant beat'1ng ·on the-"possibility. at kllowl·edge or God (as 
ot any kne>wledg.e~, a:nd the· extension of exj)er-ienc-e ·to the 
empirical kn0~ledgeof 1Jhe·rao"S1s a eol."reotive -of· possible 
error in the,private ·'experience of Gea (as ef all private 
expev1tmoe) .. 
b.. ''Religious e:x.pe~1enGe11 ··· 
"Religious ex.per1enaett as used ·in this cUsse:rta:tion is 
that d1st1no't1ve personal e:xpez-ie-ne-e, that direct awareness of 
' God, l~thioh 'tfas championed by William James and others who 
followed him, who_ turning from ratiocination as 11 a rel~tively 
superficial and unreal path.to deity, 11 consider what religion 
has specifically to report, the divine being viewed as always 
present, in relations of actual 11 g:\ve and take.nl 
Buckham begins with the ~indubitable experience of the 
reality of seives,n raises the question whether the personal 
realm can be confined to human persons, and concludes that it 
must include One above all the rest .. 2 Buckham. thus e~eva:tes 
relig~ous experience to the level of definite interpersonal 
relations.. This is true also of Brightman.3 
Dra'tdng a distinction between the idea and t.qe reality 
of ·God, which the older philosophers often i~nored in the 
reverence of 11 a :system of proofs as being God Himsel1', or as 
revealing God, or .... constltuting values which were the supreme 
ends of life--ends in themselves,n4 condemning those who set 
1. James, V~, 448 454-455; 
see Broad.z ,Ar1rJ1926) , BS. 
2. Buekham, J.W, 164 .. 
3. See Martin, EPR, 34; Bright-
man, PR, 4.15; .Art.(l929), 
55?; Ferm, CAT, 61-63. 
4 9 Wieman, Art.(l931), 4; see 
Day, GIU, 146. 
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religious expe-ri-ence apar-t· fvom·the rest of·life (a condemna-
tion of' only a narrow·mystic1sm), ai\-d holding-that we must 
have both a se1ent1f1e method· and nt'Y·stiei·sm for ·our knowledge 
of God, Wiemanoontends for distinctive religious e:xper1enee 
in terms ··of beauty and love. 
When this reality lays hold on a man, and a 
man gives himself to this reality, the transae-
1J1en ooeurs at levels far de·e:per than any in.tel-
lectual formula •••• It is caused by the living 
God and the living man meeting ..... It1 can be oom-pared to love between human persons. 
' . 
Finallyt Hooking champions an individual, selective ex-
perience of God, warning against mere dependence upon tradition 
for ideas of God, on the ground that if God 11 spoke in times past 
unto the .. fathers by the prophets, 11 He oan speak to us, for in 
' '· 
fundamentally that same manner is God known by all God-knowing 
men at all times .. u2 
The one who desires to be both a true rationalist and 
a true empiricist, and thus, to promote the unification of 
rationalism and empiricism, would not, on general principles; 
object to a broader view of religious experienoe4 There oan 
be no objection to the breadth of an overflowing river with 
its ill-defined boundaries--until definiteness, depth and 
power are needed. So without denying that a man's vision of 
a sunset, under oertain oon~itions,(as for instanoe, when 
"taken in its relation 11 to God),3 may be a religiollts experi-
ence, dietinetive religious experie~oe at its best, i.e .. 
1. \fieman.t· Art. (1944), 57; see 
RESMt ~4, 204, 214, 15-16, 
22-23. 
2. Hooking,_M~HE; 229-230. 
3. Brightman, PRt 415. 
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oondi tioned; dynamic, direct, interp-ersonal Chri·stian experi-
ence will be placed in the foreground. Such a direct spiritual 
vision of God is so.definite that the qualifying words "taken 
in its relation to God 11 are superfluous.. General religious 
experience, in this view, will serve as a background for coher-
. ' . 
ence purposes; tor coherence can-be secured if nothing inharmo-
nious with the facts of life as a whole are ~llowed entrance 
into the discussion~ even though all the facts of life are 
not considered~ And religious experienee "at its best 11 would 
include all values p~esent in such experience on all lower 
levelso 
4. Transformation of the traditional theistic arguments 
into empirical 11proofs11 
Further evidence of the contemporary interest in reli~ 
gious experience is seen in the transformation of the tradi-
tional theistic arguments into ~mpirioal "proofs". 
a).Ontologioal argument.--Oonsidering the ontological 
~rgument in its older form as 11 the most glaring instance on 
record ot the common fallacy of.begging the question," and 
agreeing with Hooking that no theistic proof can be deductive, 
D. 0. Macintosh, a religious realist, views the ·ontological 
argument.in its t~ue form as a report of ~XJ!erienoe: 
· ~here are some ideas which we never could have 
had without first having had an experience of the 
realities of which they are ideas. In such oases 
one can pass 1~ediately, without doubt or diffi-
culty, from the idea of an affi~mation of the ex-
istence to that o~ which it is an idea~ Such an 
idea is that of Absolute Reality as a Whole ••• It 
is in the experience that the proof of the exist-
ence is to be founa..l 
20.5 
Professor Rooking, an ·idealist, also has revised the 
ontological 11 proot 11 • Reoognizing·that idealismis confronted 
'tdth the pragmatic principle, and thus, with "the substantial 
values of orthodoxy, 11 he pleads for a return to existential 
thinking: 
The doctrine of hell made religion at one time 
a matter of first rate importance: getting your 
soul saved- made a dif.ferenoe in your empirical 
destiny.. If your idealism wipes out your tear ·ot 
hell, and with it all sense of infinite risk in 
the conduct of life, your idealism has played you 
false~ Truth must. be transformed; but the trans-
formation of truth must be marked by a conservation 
of pot-rer .. 2 
Consistently with this, Hooking modernizes the ontolog-
ical argument.. It is not enough, he declares, for God to be 
found at the level of thought; He must be found at the level of 
sensation also-. The old at-gument had 11put the cart before the 
horse., 11 "My real must already be given in order that my idea 
may be found real ...... If my idea of God is real, it is .real in 
experience.n3 Revised, then, the argument is: "I have an idea 
of God, therefore, .I have an experience of God. 114 
Then Hooking passes from mind and nature to mind: 
Reality can only be proved by the ontological 
argument; and conversely, the ontological argument 
can only be applied to reality. But in so tar as 
reality dwells ·in Self, or Other Mind, in Nature, 
an ontological argument may be stated in proof ot 
the~r existence~ Thus the Oartesian certitude may 
1. Hooking, MGHE, xvii. 
2. Hooking, MGHE, x1 v. 
3. Hooking, MGHE, 313. 
4. Hoeking, MGHE, 314; see 
Hartshorne, MVG, 299. 
with greater validity be put in the form: I think 
myself, therefore, I exist, or I have an idea of 
self, Self exists.l 
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Hocking sees an element of surprise in this: looking 
for man, we come unexpectedly upon Goa. The way to man is via 
God, the God of nature through which man·is divinely oreatea.2 
For Hooking, the object of certain knowledge is three-fold--
Self, Nature, and Other Mind; and: ·Goa·, the appropriate obj eot 
of ontological proof, includes these three: 
Thus. it is that idea may give back the reality 
of which idea is forever robbing us: for while 
idea is the greatest enemy of the actual, it is 
only through idea that idea oan be held firmly to 
its compelling and controlling object, the real 
as found in experience.) 
So, finding God as a necessary object of experience, 
Hocking asks what other proof there is of the existence of any 
being, "than to find, or demonstrate that being in experience' 
For my power of recognizing existence is summed up in the word 
'experienoe.' 114 Not enough detail has been presented to attempt 
any vindication of the claim her.e to demonstration; but the pur-
pose ot sho't11ing Hooking• s part in the reconstruction of the old 
theistic arguments (which effort itself is evidence of the pres-
ent emphasis upon religious experience),· has been aocomplished.5 
b) Oosmolog1oal argument.--Maointosh has revised also 
the cosmological argument. Against Kant, he sees in it no un-
justifiable use of causality, for men, including Kant hims~lf, 
1. Hocking, MGHE, 314; see 
Royce, CG, 43-44. 
2. Hooking, MGHE, 301-)02. 
3. Hocking, MGHE, 316; see 315. 
4. Hooking, MGHE, 302-303. 
5. See also Jarratt-Kerr, 
Art.(l947) 1 )24-325, on Marcel (Oa~hol1o), EA. 
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apply 1 t b-eyond ·the reach -of direct· exp~ri·enee.; · · Bu1J with Kant, 
Mae-intosh holds· that the old argwnen't -eottld not tell us that 
the :f'irs·'b· clause inferred was "what we m·ean ·by el-odlf-: 
·We are still upon the ,ground o.f Agnosticism 
.... $There is a causal argument, how·ever, which 
doe·s reach to the God ot religion as the ulti-
mate oause.l- -
He is referring to the argument from 1ndi vidual rel1.;.· 
gious experience. 
o) Teleological argument·.,--Beoauee of the demand today 
for teleological explanation of· the facts of existence, there 
has been a revival of the old teleological argument, ·but in 
revised forms., Field con~ide);"s that the appeal to purpose as 
a satisfactory prlnciple_ o~ explanation has considerable force. 
He believes that it points 111n the direction of a God or a 
lUghest Pu~pose. n2 
Ret' erring to the detraction which teleological exp,l,ana-
tion suffered at the hands of Kant and Darwin, Macintosh de-
clares that there is a teleological al:tgument which is valid.--
. .. - - '. .·' ., - . 
an empirical one--*'the argument from the practical expe.rience 
Qf spiritual t salvation• tt3: 
Through a critie~l and sufficiently sympathetic 
e'bady of the hi.sto:t-y ·of· practical rellgioas experi-
ence there arises an understanding of what it is 
that the religious ObJect really can be depended 
upon to produce, the religious Object being a.~.f.1ned 
as 1rb.at Factor in human experi·ene e which prod~ces, 
on occasion ot man•- s continued right relation a 
definite and qualitatively predieable result.-4 
1. :Macintosh TES, 95. 
2 .. Field, Art .. (l928), 32.5; 
see .332-333 .. 
:; .. Macintosh, TES, 97 .. 
4. Macintosh, TES, 9?. 
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Henry No Wieman is known as a naturalist__ic theist or a 
scientific empiri·ci·st.. Martin: thinks that. Wieman·• s argument 
for GO<~. 1~ a. form .of the ontologioa.l.modified by the ·teleo;J.og-
1cal argument: n:ae would ·make the question of 1proof 1 ·of Ged' s 
existence irrelevant by ·dei'itiition, ·in terms of 1 the best there 
is .or can be' , or • that upon 1-thioh lite depends for enhancement 
and support .. •"l But Wieman is not clear$ While, however, he 
appears to repudiate. the whole approaoh to religion by way of 
religious experience, he has. _declared that if God is not an 
object of sensuous experience, He is a system of concepts. 
But the latter he den1e~ in saying that God is "not a logioo~ 
mathematj,.cal entity,"2 adding: 11 But if He be an object of ac-
quaintance, the system of conQepts refers to certain experi-
ences, while :1f He be not an ·object of sense experience, He 
cannot be s~ientifi~ally known .. u3 
5. Reconstruction of the moral argument into experiential 
form 
Still further evidence of the contemporary interest in 
religious experience is found in the reconstruction of the 
moral argument into experiential form.. Speaking of the dead-
end that one comes upon in going· from ends .!!! nature to ·the 
end of nature, Outler finds a Wa"! out, i.e. 11 to look away from 
nature to ~ur ·o111n inner pe:reonal experience_, 11 considering the 
ll.meaning of the universal and unavoidable sense of obligation 
1. ~art1nl ~R, 106. 
2. Wieman USM 28, 29; 
see Art.(l944), S?-58. 
: -~ 
j. Wieman, RESM, 28~ 
vide supra; 202-203. 
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and right and wrong; 11 for ·it our moral eonvietions are not 
illusory,· "we shall haveto·in:fer·a·supreme·moral intelligence, 
whose purpose i·s to create and sustain·· the more:l ·order and 
its values•"l · It can be seen at onoe· that this has 1 ts rise 
in Kant's 11 praetieal reason.tt ·But this leads beyond mere 
acceptanc$ of Theism: 
It leads to· a·belief' ina Providence concerned 
with the destiny of every individual person, and 
to the conviction that behind the ·visible scene 
of the world's history lies an unseen secret dr~a 
of the dealings of God with t~e individual soul. 
What is implied in .Kant is brought out in Pragmatism 
and Theism. Macintosh states•the ground for the pragmatist's 
postulate of God's existence; 
His existence or belief in His existence is 
morally necessary; not simply, as Kant seems to 
have felt, to guarantee immortality and the ade-
quate happiness of the virtuous in a future life 
but rather for the gaining of that special experi-
ence of deliverance, of liberation~ of moral UP-
lift through religious dependence, which in the · 
language of moral religion itself is called 'sal-
vation• 0 It is thus the feeling that there ought 
to be a God, transformed by the 'will to believe' 
into-=tthe assertion that there must.be, and is 11 a God.,.., · 
As the untransformed moral argument is only an unveri-
fied hypothesis, verification must come through the revelation 
of God in the experience of salvation. 
Sorley, a theist, does not state the problem as did the 
old theists, "Does God exist? 11 ; he asks~ "H9w is the universe 
1. Outler, Art. ( 1947) , 
· 92• see :Rashdall 
PR: 62-6~, 74, 7~. 
2. Outler 7 Art.(l947)t 96; see Garnetu, G!U, 23-32, 43-44, 
63-64; Ward, SK, 131-136. 
3. Macintosh, TES, 94. 
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to be understood and interpreted?lll The moral order is. an ex-
pression of the divine nature, and physica·l nature·is 11 the 
medium for the production and perfection of goodnes-s in finite 
,m1nds.n2 God is the 11 final home of valu·es.n3 He wrote Moral 
Values and the Idea of God in criticism of H&ffding's The Phi-
losophy of Religiono The latter had based his position on 
KantJs treatment of value apart f::rom that of knowledge, and 
had viewed·the conservation of value as 11 the characteristic 
a.Xiom of religion," analogous to the axiom of causality, both 
being constant in changes.4 But Sorley goes further. If values 
are conserved, tt must be by something in the order of cosmic 
forces 11 favorable or sympathetic to these values. 11 That is: 
11 It is impossible to hold as H~ffding does to the faith in the 
conservation of value, and to justify this belief without being 
led on to postul.ate a power and will that conserves them. 11 .5 
Tennant, also a theist, considering that the fallacy 
of Kant's moral argument was a confusion of the two senses of 
"experience, •• sees no necessary connection between the exist-
ence of ideas in a mind with the existence of actual beings, as 
"ideals and ideas may thus exist without even becoming va11d, 11 
to say nothing of becoming real. If an idea has not first come 
from a perception, there is no direct passage to its oounter-
part.6 With Pringle-Pattison, Tennant views man as a part of 
nature, so much so that the latter oan not be explained as a 
1. Sorley, MVIG, 309. 
2. Sorley, MVIG, 467; see 
Gallowayt TPR, 392. 
3. Sorley, MVIG, 472. 
4. H~ffding, TPOR, 12-13. 
5. Sorley, MVIG, 170-171, 
173; see 351. 
6. See Tennant, PT, II, 98. 
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whole without taking man and his moral val'U-es into considera-
tion, as 111 organie. to the worl~.• 11 Tennant guards his words 
here; he does not meanthat man is·an emergent product of aes-
mio evc:ilutiotl; but rather that man is 11 of one piel)e with 
nature •. ul 
Nature, tnen, has· produced moral beings, is 
instrumental to moral life, and, therefore, 
~enabl~ te 1 instrumental' moral valuation, and 
is relatively modifiable by operative moral 
ideas,--or rather, by moral agents pursuing 
ideals.2 
Thus. causal explanation and teleological explanation 
are co-partners: "The imperative of ·auty can be categorical 
without being literally absolute, and without directly bring-
ing us into close relation with the central truth of existen-
tial kind., about the univerae. 113 The revised moral argument 
lies in the general direction of the argument from religious 
experience .. 
III .. Certainty in immediate relig!6us experience 
1. Meanings of 11 immediate. 11--The f~rst requisite in a 
discussion of certainty in immediate religious experience is 
the-determination of the meaning of "immediate." This is not 
easy due to the diverse uses of the term, but out of this 
divergence arises a ge~eral agreement on three aspects of the · 
term. 
T.he first meaning of 11 1mmediate 11 . iS "not inferred," 
referring to the'datum of knowledge. This is implicit in 
1. Tennant, PT, II, 100-101. 
2. Tennant, PT, II, 103. 
,3 .. , Te1;1nant, PT, II, 95. 
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Russell's use of the term.· It is more- -or-le'Ss ee:rtain ex-
perience, ·fott'·while all data·, · aceord1ng -to Russel~ have some 
unoertaintr, and sh:~ld-, theretore, if possible-, be referred 
-&e oth.~·d-ata, tet, 11 unles-s· these ·ether data: had some degree 
of inde~emient ·credibility, ·they -would -not oolllfirm the orig-
inal ·da:ta .. nl s-o what is taken as a premise-must be viewed as 
undeniable·, clearly and distinctly "here and now• n 11 When you 
pass from 1i.lae vague to the pre-eise by ..... artalysi s and refl.ee-
t1on ..... jiiou alway-s ran a certain risk sf error. 11 2 In contrast 
to beliefs, erro:rs in faets are impossible.3 
Agreeing with Russell that llimmediaoytt is freedom from 
the me411ation of reflection are Brotherston(holding direct-
contact w1ta·real.ity),4 Whitehead and Dewey, following Bradley 
in his criticism of intelleetualism (ultimates being what are 
found in immediate experience 11 if this e~erience 'tfere stripped 
of all i:aterpretation11 ),5 Tennant (perception having 11 a foot 
in both worlds, the subjective and objective 11 ),6 Boodin ( 11 ex-
perienee, the stuff revealed in our immediate feelings and 
sensations, the starting point of all investigations, "1mmedi-
' ' 
ate luminosity" and. "felt consistency"),? Royee (a direct ex-
perience of time),8 H8ffding (the illusory only arising 
1
' through a false causal explanation which is confounded with 
1. Russell, I~, 155. 
2. Russell, Art.(l918), 500 
498. 
3. Russell, Art.(l919), 56. 
4. Brotherst·en, Art. (1933), 
450. 5. Mack, AIE, 28; see 9, 60. 
6. Tennant, PT, I, 45-46; 
see Sehlipp, Art.-(1935), 
135.' 
?. Boodin, RtT, 1.5; see vii; 
·Art.(l9)4), 164. 
8. Reyee, WI, IT, 113; see 
149.. . .· 
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immediate observationu),l Lossky' and Macintosh (direct, non-
inferential awareness in direct con-scious and eognitive rela-
tion),2 Lowenberg and Tollman ( 11 the immediately given pre-
analytical complex11 ),3 Rashdall (immediate judgments about 
good and evil naivinely implanted 11 ),4 Brightman {immediate 
reference to the self, the only 11 given 11 ),5 arid Balfour, 
Procter and Wieman.6 No philos9phers.appear to oppose this 
general view of immediacy, except the Neo-Thomists; to them 
it is 11 out ~f this l'1orld, 11 i .. e. the beatific vision.? 
Merging into the meaning of 11 immediate 11 as "not-
inferred" is 11 intuitive 11 the self-evident, the knowledge by 
acquaintance. John Grote distinguished knowledge by acquaint-
ance from knowledge by judgment: 
In all philosophy, this division has been 
more or less recognized, and the tt.ro kinds of 
knowledge have been called, the one intuitive 
or immediate, the other mediate, conceptual, 
symbolic, representative, and by various other 
names.8 
He goes on to use 11 intuitive 11 and "immediate thoughtn 
in the sense of knowledge by acquaintance. For him, knowledge 
by judgment, on the other hand, is not 11.Q! a thing but about 
it.n9 
Moore shows that in one sense all experience is immediate: 
Every 1 tem in the passing. sho't~T of conscious 
process may be grasped, enjoyed, or lived through 
1. H8ffding, TPOR, 97. 
2. Macintosh, RC 201. 
3. Tolfnrun.1 ArtJ1935), 356. 4. RaShdal , PR, 141; see 8o 
5. Brightmant Art.(l944), 
691.!-696. 
6. See Balfour4 TH, 163; Proc-ter, FKR, 6 ; Wieman, RESM, 
27-29. 
7. Duce, KGN, 435; Aquinas, ISA, 
Sum, Theol., ~ 1~, Art. 11. 
·a. Grote, EP, 201. 
9. Grote, EP, 204. 
simply for what it is in itself. !his is 1m= 
mediacy in its primary and posttive signifi-
eanee. Usually, of course, we take·the items 
of our ex:periencenot simply for what they are 
in themselves, but in their meanings and con-
nections •••• The objects of our immediate ex-
perience ••• take on new meaning as they acquire 
connections in experience.l 
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These new connections enrich the content of immediate 
experience. Bergson, although he made intuition and intel-
lectual analysis complementary, made them also distinct, some-
what like the difference between knowledge of acquaintance 
and knowledge by description, intuition for Bergson being a 
method requiring "uninterrupted contact with reality," such 
as the mystical experience.2 
Holding to the intuitive vision, Hartshorne, however, 
limits it to 11 a tiny circl.e of facts," the greater range of 
rel.iability of human knowledge being due to "imaginative and 
inferential. leaps ••• beyond immediacy • 11 3 
Oliver Martin lists the three factors of perceptual 
krlo't'lledge as: "1) ••• the given element, that which is intui-
tively felt; 2) the appearance, i.e. what an object or thing 
appears to be; and 3) what we consciously and reflectively 
take it .... to be .. u4 By th~. first, Martin means the residue 
nwhen on analysis all •mental' elements have·been abstracted 
••• the vague sense of the world pressing in upon us ..... The 
given is always innocent of error .... imm.ediate and certain.n5 
While as part.s of conscious experience all three of these 
1. Moore, TEE, 213-214. 
2. Moore, TRE, 116-117, 150-
151, on Bergson, LS, 258. 
3. Hartshorne MVG, 178» 
4. Martin, Art.(1938), 337. 
5. Martin, Art.(1938), 337. 
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elements may be regarded as imm~iate, yet the last element 
being reflective, is not immediate in the usual sense of the 
te1'm.l 
Dewey also ·limits the intuitive grasp by warning that 
often, 11 1mmed1ate knowledgefl is confused with knowledge from 
previous mediation.2 
Russell. makes a self-evident truth in its absolute 
sense depend upon naoquaintanee·with the fao.t whio.h eorresponds 
to the truth. 11 3 Brightman traces the terms 11 acqua1ntance 11 and 
"description" in the discussion of immediate experience back 
to John Grote; These terms were later utilized by James, 
Russell, Borley and others.4 Wieman declares that it was James 
who coined the phrases~5 At any rate, it is with Russell that 
the terms are usually associated, for the pr1noiple of ac-
quaintance (empiricism) is at the center of his thought, a 
principle whioh Sellers traces baok to Looke. and Aristotle, 
but applied now to particulars as well as to universals.6 
Russell defines his position: 
We have aoquaintanoe with anything of whioh we 
are direotly aware, without the intermediary of 
any prooess of inferenoe or of any knowledge of 
truths. Thus in the presence of my table, I am 
aequa1nted with the sense-data that make up the 
appearance of my table--its color, shape, hard-
ness, smoothness, etc. All these are things of 
which I am immediately oon~cious when I am see-
ing and touching my table~'l 
1. Vide supra, 211-213. 
2. De~ey, LOG 144. 
3. Russell, PP, 212. 
4. Brightman,ITP, 83, 
foot~ote. 
5. Wieman, RESM, 25. 
6. Sellers, Art.(l949), 496. 
?. Russell, PP, 73. 
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He makes it clear that our knowledge- of the table ,!!! 
.! physical object is not direct knowledge, ·but knowledge by 
description, involving "some knowledge-of truths as its source 
and ground. «1 11 The particular shade of oolor that I am seeing 
may have many things said about ito .... But such statements 
though they make me know truths about the color, do not make 
me know the color itself any better than I d_id before. 112 
With others already mentioned, Russell lays down knowl-
edge by acquaintance as the foundation of all knowledge.3 The 
subjective aspects are sense-data, introspection, contents of 
consciousness, universals, and even some oases of memory, as: 
This immediate knowledge by memory is the 
source of all our 'knmfledge concerning the past: 
without it there could be no knowledge of the 
past by inference, since we should never know 
that there was anything past to be inferred.4 
Brightman, in his favorable comment on Russell's illus-
stration of color perception, writes: 
If I am acquainted with the color yellow, I 
may describe the circumstances under which any-
one may have an acquaintance with yellow, but 
I cannot describe yellow. The only reason that 
anyone understands yellow is that he has, or has 
had, an acquaintance with something yellowQ Ac-
quaintance, then, is direct ·or immediate or in-
tuitive knowledge; description is indirect or : 
mediate or inferential. My own present conscious-
ness I am acquainted with.-' 
In so far as memory may be considered a part of present 
consciousness, there would be no disagreement between Russell 
and Brightman here on its immediacy. Tennant also uses 
1. Russell, PP, 72-74. 
2. Russell, PP, 73-74. 
3. See Russell, PP, 75o 
40 Russell, PP, 76. 
5" Brightman, ITP, 84. 
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11ae-quatn1J'an·oe-" for- 1~1-ate bowl·ed-ge·~ l 
· · n Instantatteo\ls u is the· thi-rd meatting ·of ·11 imm.'Sdiate. 11 
This meallin·g • al.:though ll:ot exactly d:es·e:t-ipt·i ve, is in general 
philosophi:f'a:L·use., Te-nnant, for instance-, agrees with Russell 
in his 'e.one·eption of imme-<tiaoy 1:D· this sense•.-the ph-otographic 
flash. It is Brightman• s "mystical momen:t;n in which there is 
"an inta:it.ilr.,e ap.Jllreh:ension o:r ·God-, u legioal cer-tainty applyiBg 
II only te :presetat .exper1 enos while -1-t 1 s present, 11 the "S1 t'\:ta'ti on 
l!bqoeri-en·eed" in- contrast to the llfJ.itua·ti·on Believed-in, 11·•'tb.:e 
former beil'lg 11 aot'11dly·tp-res·ent in oonsoiol!lsness ;" and 0 the~· only 
basis we haveter any knowledge, belief, :faith, truth, or error.u2 
It is the psyeh~logj.oal mom·e~.rt rather tharl' the mathemat1oa1 
1mstant, ··the former having content as the lattets o!annt>t have; 
it :is :tfhl.e .. eolll.tent that d.istlnguishes. it from other mom-entt:1•' 
James am.d Mead cal.!ted it the 11 speoio'tts present," a~s-1gn1ng 1 t 
no arbitrary length•r .It,. is .no't a mathematical point, not even 
a moving point; it is rather a line oro.na field of vision with 
fixed limit.s across ·which_ a pamerama movEts.n4 It-is 1ihe moment 
of immediate experience upon which all meiiate knowledge ae~ 
pends,. "the ground of all 1mplioation.a, inta~enoes, ass1amptiens 
wha1iever," through whese narrow portals the valid enters human 
eonseiousness.S · 
So while the immediate is called 11 instantaneous," 1t 
is io:ng enough, has to be long enough, 11 for the genuine 
1. !emnant, PT II, 95. 
2. Brightman~ PR, 169, 
166' 347. 
3. See Oarr, Art. (191;6), 1. 
P~-
.#-• c.· 
._. .. 
4. Oar~, Art~(l916), ll; see 
Werkmeister, HPI, 538. 
5. Carr, Art.(l916)j l?; see 
Royce, WI, I, 25o-257. 
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apprehension of' the da·ta. of direct experience, because otherwise 
there would be no ·such thing as direct experien~e "Of which ·any-
one oould be aware .. ul Lewis oalls it the "epistemological present." 
2. Examination of denial 
a,. On general grounds: dootrine·of probability 
1) Uncertainty concerning the doctrine of uncertainty 
As might be expected in any consideration of the denial 
of certainty in religi·ous experience, particularly in its gen-
eral aspect--the doctrine of probability--there is much unoer~ 
tainty. This arises from at least three sources: different 
motives, different views, and inconsistenoy.-
Without going into detail, it is noted that different 
motives prompt the adoption of the doctrine of probability: t~ 
avoid rationalistic dogmati~m, to favor agnosticism, to test 
hypotheses, to innoculate against skepticism, and to provide 
an answer to the question, 11How true is knowledge? 11 2 
The .lack of agreement on the subject of probabi11ty3 is 
witnessed by the different views on it, particularly on the 
following question: is probability objective (relation between 
events) or subjective (relation between beliefs or proposi tiona)? 
Donald Williams and Hans Reichenbach, for instance, favor the 
former,4 while T~nnant and Keynes adopt the latter, Tennant, 
howeve~, viewing probability as originally and essentially a 
1. Lewis, AKV 331. 
2. Nolting, CTP, 122o 
3. Nolting, OTP, 51; see 
Balfour, TH, 178. 
4 .. See Williams~ Arto (1945), 67-61j; 
Nolting, CTP, 79. 
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"characteristic~ of beliefs rather than of propositions."l 
~ . 
One aspect of the subjective view is t~e "frequency theory", 
originating evidently from games of chance and developed in 
mathematics. It was at this point that Kant clashed with 
Descartes, Kant holding that mathematical certainty could not 
be applied to philosophy, although in the pre-critical period, 
he granted that one can have certitude in the field of,meta-
physioal knowledge of Godo2 
Another point of disagreement on the doctrine of prob-
ability is on the question whether certainty should be sepa-
rated from truth or knowledge. Oarnap holds the concept of 
0pertect knowledge", that is, "knowledge which cannot possibly 
be refuted or even weak~ned by any future experience," in con-
trast to nimperfect knowledgeu or knowledge 11 which hae_only a. 
certain degree of o.ertaj,.nty ,. not absolute certainty~ n:3 
Likew~se, there is disagreement on the question of de-
grees of certainty, and whether certainty is merely normative 
or also descriptive6 By implication, Butler was against de-
grees of certain1;y,4 as ~s also Nolting in his view of cer-
tainty as a limit or standard, for !?-e held that while it is 
possible that our empirical judgments are absolutely true, we 
have no way of knowing it, as complete verification is impos-
s1ble~5 On the other ha,nd, I(:~:n:e-e views certainty as both 
1. Tennant, PT, I, 278# 
see Keynes, TP, :3-5o 
2. See Kant, UDG 1 284-294; KrV, B 741, B 
754. 
3. Oarnap, Art.(1946) · · 599; see 
Kaufmann, Art .. (l94~)J. 60{-604; 
see Boutroux, Art.(l~16'' , 605; 
Oook Wilson, SI, II, 569; Nolt-
ing, OTP, 3-4, 20-21, 26 ... 
4.. Butler, AR .1....3. · 
5 .. Nolting, OT~, 48, 49. 
220 
normative and descriptive~l 
2) Inconsistency in the denia1 of all certainty 
Then, the denial of oertaintyin religious experience 
on the general basis of the doctrine of probability is further 
complicated by inconsistency, or at least by self-contradiction, 
on the part of the deniers of all certainty. This is seen first 
of all in the expression, "Probability is the guide of 11fe, 112 
uttered sometimes· with all the dogmatism of a divine pronounce-
ment. Nott while no objection oan be raised to probability as 
l! guide to life, the use of "the" in the expression constitutes 
a dogmatic denial ot the existence of other guides of life. 
It is supposed by some that scientists subscribe to this 
dogmatic farm of the doctrine of probability,~but they seem to 
hold that certainty is one of the guides of life. There appears 
to be no unoertainty in their statements concerning the destruc-
t! ve. polorers of the hydrogen bomb. Judged by their warnings, 
they are certain that one such bomb of a specified weight would 
destroy all forms of higher life over vast stretches of the 
surface of the earth. Thus, certainty, not probability, is 
what scientists are offering mankind as a 11 guide11 to sustained 
11 life11 on the earth. It is hard even far a scientist to re-
fute the logician--until the latter is brought down to earth 
and made to face concrete fact. To the objection of the logic-
ian that the validity of this scientific proposition has not 
l. Nolting, OTP, 70; see 
Keynes, TP, 10-11. 
. . :-.·---- _________ .. _ - ---- _·- ---·-----·- ~--
2. Usually attributed to Bishop 
Butler, AR, 3, but probably a 
sim111ar statement was uttered 
by Carneades before him • 
,._..,.;;··· 
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been logically guarante~d, and cannot be completely or con-
clusively proved until_all the evidence is in, i .. e .. until 
the. last ma~ P,as died, . it. may; be. replied that oerta.U1ty does 
not require complete p;root but only sufticient.proot. Seien-
titio oerti~inty is not simply psyohol.ogioal, not simply 
t.Jebel:'zeugung, "subjective ZulAnglichkeit ttlr mioh selbst," 
but ala? logical,, i.e. lfissen,, "objective Gewisshe1t (tftr 
J ede~mann) _. ul The .ltnowled~e of the -scientists eeno-erning 
the atomic .bO]llb, has,,J:>eC?ome public knowledge, a matter. ot 
~ - . .• .. 
race EJtperienoe. :: 11 It is knowledge which can_ .be verified by 
anyone who Will fulfill the requisite conditions .. u2 · 
There is another way by which the doubting logician 
may b~oome certain that one blast of the atomic bomb can 
prove ~ts effectiveness and its dest_wotive powert and that 
~he conditions of the tirst_explosion can be reQ.uplicated 
closely enough to produce the same results, and that is by 
taking his stand near the place of the next test .. 
Oan there be any. reasonable doubt that while there 
may be a gap between· ~he theory and practice of the log~oian, 
which in this case undoubtedly would amount to inconsistency 
if he were unwilling to make this personal test, that there 
is no gap between the.theory and practice of.the scientist, 
and in the case of a show-down, as above~ that there is no 
actual gap bet<&Teen the theory of the scientist and the 
1. V1de_supra, 195. 2. Werkmeister, HPI, 169. 
·--- -· ·~- ~- :.. - -~.....::.-=. -- --- ~- -:_-: __ . __ ----- _:: ___ _ 
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practice of the· log1eian; that is, :'lnlles·a the lat'fter is stark 
mad? 'fhe -l:ogieian'kliows· ·t)ia1i·"1Jhe theory ·of the· sc1enti·s-t 
ecnoeaim'g .. ·ev-el!f 1 the ·llmexpledea .. hydrogen --bomb ··1.:s ·based upon 
ebjeet1ve ev14enoe, .ttoajeet11:vett in 1ihe ·double sense-·ef net 
being demen:strate<! in the .!'!!.!!!!! of ~ per-sen,. but 1m. sci ell~·: ; 
1i1f1e laboratori-es :by several pettsons., He·re ·is -llobjective 
evideaee ana oe-rt1tud::e •• 4en·tliis meon-lit and ·dream-visited 
planet,.nl evidef}ee worked aut in the sttnshine and the ligh.t 
of the thoreughly a111akened ··state. And is there any reason-
able doubt that thesesoientists would rather·work with the 
11
-vert tim.e ideals of objeeta ve evidence and eerti tude" tha.Ir 
"playll.with atom and hydrogen bombs, or with the finely-spun 
logical theory that. the seien.tifie hypotheses involved have 
not been perfectly demeiistrat:ed?·· And this certitude or eer-
tainty, .although very praotioal is net Ppraotioalu in the 
Kantia.n. sense or in the sense that it is incomplete. Fer 
it is not divoreed from life, having been w~rked out in the 
laboratory, and known to be workable in every-day life .. 
It is at this point that the Kantian d1st1nc~ion be-
tween ''theoretiea111 and «praetieal" reason is seen to break 
down. ttaless it is mafte to mean that there are actually two 
reason~, it is 1Utobjeetionable in the sense ot halding as 
reasonabl.e that whioh oan·nat be demenstrated on objective 
granuans·bt~t whieh is still satisfying on sttbjeetive greunds; 
1. See James, WB, 14. 
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but it breaks down at the point where 'Objective, concrete 
evidence is presented-to reason,-·for then theoretical reason 
either ceases to remail'l ·theoreti-cal. ( 1 .. e.. purely abstract 
and speculative) face to face with objective, concrete facts, 
or it ceases to remain reason in the ref.usal to consider such 
evidence. On the other hand, practical reason ceases to 
remain either practical or reasonable by rejecting this 
evidence, and by refusing to apply ~t to life if it can be 
made to work. Reason can not be torn apart. 
Then, there is inconsistency in the use of "certainty" 
and 11 certainly0 in the denial of all certaintyol The one who 
is quoted so often as being against all certainty was not 
only dogmatic on itt as has been shown,2 but he was also self-
contradictory, for he ·also declared: "However, it is certain 
that doubting implies a degree of evidence, 11 3 Dogmatism 
might be expected and excused on the part of the believer in 
the possibility of certainty in some beliefs• but of all 
people the denier of all certainty would not be expected to 
be certain that there is no certainty, or even to use the term 
"certainly". If Bishop Butler is to be taken as denying logi-
cal certainty, there is inconsistency here, for above he did 
not say, "I am oertainn (certitude), but "It is certain." He 
did not define lthat he meant by the term 11 certainty", probably 
not detecting any lurking ambiguity in it.4 Consequently, ·to 
1. Vide supra, 220. 
2. Vide supra, 219~ 
3. Butler, AR, 351-352 (under-
scoring is the present writer's); 
see Welf, Art. (1913), 329. , 
4. Balfour, TH, 178~ 
- .---.-· 
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quote him as an authority for the ;f'aot·that t_nere is no oer-
. . . - -
tainty of any kind, :or .. even that there is· no logical certain~ 
ty, 1. s but t_o add a voice to the din and confusion on the sub-
- Jeot .. 
J} ·Gradually diminishing vigor of assertion_ of 
· probability · 
Consequentupon this lack of consistency and clarity, 
there is a gradually diminishing vigor- of assertion of p:rcib-
abili ty. This is seen, -for instaroe, in the qualifications · 
. . 
of the denial- of -ce:rtainty .. -- In- fact, long ago-Bishop Butler 
- -
qualified his famous statement 'tt1'tl1 these significant- words:·-
. . -
. 
11 where more aatisfa.otory avi_dence cann<Jtcbe .had. ffl He also 
said that ttthis alleg~d_doubtfulness" concerning religious 
· • n2 
_ matters;• 11 may be man• s otm fault •=-
_- Many today, as for instance Tennant, while denying log-
ical certainty, hold to- certitude respecting basic postul-ates 
so likely to be true that a scientist- Ji't1ould stake his life on-
them~u3 Brightman, in accord with this_posi-tion as against 
. . 
.Wieman and. Knudson, ~oes not apply the denial of certainty to 
immediate ex:Perience, i.e.-to any oonscious state at a given 
. - -
moment of the self .. 4 -For Brightman, "-this datum self, th,is 
' 
present exper..ience:is 'the only indubitabl~ fact we have.n5 
Although God thus i:s not vie~ed a~ ~- datum,6 in ans1.rer to Pro-
fessor Lewis, Br1ghtmanden1es that he wquld deprive the soul 
1. Butler, AR, 3 .. - _ 
2. Butler, AR, 351. _ 
3. Tennant, P_T, I, 278 '- 282-283. 
4. Brightman, Art.(I94L~-), 694-
696; Martin, EPR-, ~10-111;39. 
5. Brightman, .Art. (1929), _ 
560-561.-
6. Brightman,, Art. ( 1929) , · 
562.. . 
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of its certainty~of faith, but rather asserts that he accepts 
the formula of·Karl Gross--"theoretical relativism, practical 
absolutismo 111 There is no conflict here between certainty con-
cerning the self and certainty concerning its states, as Bright-
man (and rightly in. the opinion of the writer) does not distin-
guish between the self and its a.ctivity,.2 He.declares that 11 it 
may be a question .'torhether the object of consciousness is given 
in the same sense in which the activity is given," as 11 in all 
experience, there is, indeed, reference to an obj eot, 11 yet a-
greeing l1i th Descartes that "while there can be no doubt about 
the act of referring (the cognito), "there is always some doubt 
about the accuracy of the description of the object. 11 3 Of 
course, description is not a part of immediate exl>erience. 
Without pausing to consider the objection that is raised to the 
restriction of the term 11 experience 11 to consciousness, thus 
seemingly excluding the object,4 it may be noted that Bright-
man has extended his conception of certainty to apply to pres-
ent experience while it is present," thus making room. for the 
certitude of the mystical moment, mysticism.standing for 11 an 
immediate consciousness of God, 11 an 11 actual contact with the 
real. ,5 
Donald C. Williams also. qualifiesthe doctrine of proba-
bility~ "Most of our beliefs, including most of our philosophical 
beliefs, are held not with a warrant.of demonstrative certainty. 116 
1 0 Brightman, Art,. ( 1932 )i 142 .. 
2. Brightman, Art,.(l948) , 295. 
3. Brightman, Art.(l948)1, 295-
296. 
4. See Martin, EPR4 32-33; Brightman, PR, 13o 
5 ~ Brightman, PR, 432, 433. 
6. "tnTilliams, Art. ( 1946) , 619 .. 
• 
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Tennant also, unable to see why phenomena ( 11 appearings") should 
be viewed as veilings, and holding to the posf:!il?ility of a "raP-
port" betl'teen subject and object, denies that all knowledge is 
relative in the sense of "comparative 11 .1 Dr. DeWolf~ writes: 
~It must be freely admitte(l that absolute certainty, regB:rding 
most matters of importance at ~e~st, ls beyond the reach of 
human reason."2. 
Today there is.a decline in the force and scope of as-
sertions of mere probability, a doctrine which used to be ac-
cept-ed in some quarters as certain, passing as 11lega:l tender. 11 3 
b. On particula~ grounds 
1) Denial o:e.direot or unmediated apprehension of God 
Then there is a denial of certainty on particular as 
well as on.general grounds, as, first. of all,.the denial of 
direct apprehensionotGod. Contending that all. experience is 
interpreted experience, and that man•s mind is apt to err in 
interpretation, Knudson takes his standon only a relative car-
- . . 
tainty in Christian. eXr>er1enoe.4·. He questions th~ position of 
Rudolf Otto; in fact,. the position or Knudson }lere is largely 
a questioning one: · 
·rt is by no means certain that there is suoh 
an original psychological ~atum as the numinous . 
·theory assumes •••• Inany oase·it remains for the 
.prese~t undeoid.ed. whether. religious eJtperi ence 
is ultimately p'eroeptua1 or inferential~ Even 
if religious experien~e be perceptual this fact 
does not establish its validity •. Perception may 
l.,.Tennant! PT, I, 252,249; 
see Lew s, MW'O, 154. 
2. DeWoJ.f,. RRR, 119. . . 
J. See Whitel. Art.(l939), 323; 
Stace, Arli.(l947), 29. 
.4,. See Knudson, DG 102, 
225-227; VRE, 2S; Art. 
(1935); 449 •.· - . 
be deceptive, and to a large degree is such •••• 
There may be no such divine object or objects 
we think we perceive.,l 
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In reply, it may be said that if religious experience 
is all inferential, i.e. mediate, there would be nothing to 
infer, and nmediaten loses its right to existence. Religious 
experience, if it were perceptual, would not of itself be val-
idated by the perceptual element, but other factors might come 
to the aid of suoh validation. While perception is often de-
ceptive, the very fact that Knudson has to qualify the state-
ment by the words "to a large degree" indicates that man has 
learned to correct the false impressions and to make allow-
ances for them. On the basis of perceptual deception there 
may be no external world, bu~ no sensible person takes that 
bare possibility seriously. Knudson himself does not take it 
seriously: 
Only through experience do we know what truly 
exists. Through it we have first-hand knowledge. 
If we experience a thing we are certain of it. 
Experience and it alone furnishes a valid basis 
for oertainty ••.• The em~irioal test is the only 
adequate test of truth.z 
This viewpointKnudson carries over to religious experi-
ence, referring to John Wesley1 s position that it is "the strong-
est of all arguments" and ~!the most infallible of all proofs .. fl3 
Theri, later, Knudson admits ~agreement with many philosophers) 
that it is the mind that errs in inference rather than that per-
. ., 
oeption dece1ves.4 Strangely, too, he speaks of 11 the immediacy 
of perceptual knowledge" as relative. For after mirid acts on 
1. Knudson, Art.(l935), ~: Knudson, VRE 21-22 .. 452· see VRE, ~2. Knudson, VRE' 28,. 
2. Knudson, VRE, 1~22 .. ' 
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perception, it ceases t-o be an ·immediate· experience. And on 
his basis, there can be no ·kno1'7ledge until the mind does so 
act. Yet he ·also say-s that perceptual knowledge "carries with 
it a sense of assurance and conviotion or.reality that the me-
diaoy of inferential. knoti'l.edge lacks or possesses in a less 
pronounced degree,."l 
- Garrigou-LaGrange believes that common sense ideas (in-
cluding the idea of God) are the result of spontaneous reason-
ing, and that_ for justification .the process must be made ex-
pl.icit by 1!. posterioridemonstration,.2 But_he qualifies this 
in two ways. _In the f'irst.place, common sense beliefs are 
justified by thedogmatio f'ormulas.of the Catholic Church, and 
secondly, an idea of' common sense (particularly, the idea of' 
. God) is a. feeling of assu·rance, which Leonard Duce explains as 
a rational movement-of mind not-come· to full consciousness, or 
-· . -
as spontaneous reasoning.3 ·-In -LaGra11get s belief in the onto-
logical and immediate presence of Goa· in the human soul, and 
in his (LaGrange's} denial ?f immediate awareness of' God, Duoe 
rightly sees a contradiction and aproblem that LaGrange does 
not solve. But in putting cognition into- feeling and in re-
lating feeling and reason, LaGrange-is heading toward a sol.u-
tion' which tdll. come up later -in. connection 1'7i th the polarity 
of reason and feeling. Then, it is strange that LaGrange did 
not see that in God'-s presence in the human soui is the illu-
mination so necessary for thereception of religious knowledge, 
1. Knuftson, VRE, 72. 
2. Duce, KGN, 210. _ 
3 ~, Duce, KGN, 199, ?200 .. 
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the necessity and..po.ss1):!il~ty of lfhieh LaGrange·reeogn1Pled--
the "sup.ernaturalizing11 of the mind as a participation in 
Deity.l Thinki~g ~nly of thoge who receive the supernatural 
revelation 1nd.irectly,· and 1gnor1.ag all alleged cases of 
revelation to and through men (a strange stand for a good 
·catholic), LaGrange· 1l:eclares that since there is no immediate 
conscious· reltition between man·and God, revelation must be 
given indirectly .. 2 Later,, however,··LaGrange admits that there 
is a vital and inspiring relati~n between-the soul and Christ 
or God.3 And while it is true that for the one who receives 
the revelation from man this relation is, in part, a result 
of revelation; yet for the one who receives it trom God., it 
is a revelation experience itself, and not of propositions 
merely, but of God Himself, as will be shown later. 
2) Religious experience psychologically less com-
pelling than sense experience 
· The second denial of certainty on particular grounds 
is that religiou~ experience is psychologically less compel-
ling than sense experience. This is the position of Knudson. 
Religious experience, he holds, is conditioned by subjective 
tactors and by antecedent belief in a way and to a degree that 
sense experience is not.4 Aside from the fact that Knudson 
~ppears self-contradictory at this po1nt,.5 it will be inter-· 
eating to note later the mystias' reaction to this opinion 
1~ buce, KGN, 317Q 
2~ Duce, KGN, 331 .. 
3. Duoe, KGN, 3344 
4. See Knudson, Art.(1935), 
452-4.53. 
Sa · See Knudson , VRE, , 6o .... 66. 
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thai; rellg:t·ous ·axper4-;·eu-ee is le&s -ce'r'tain (as psyoho;Logioa.lly 
les~ oompell,.ll!lg) tnan se~seeJti)erienoe .. In a sense, all ex-
perien,..ee is~i.Dllllediate as ultd.ma'ti~]Q conscious expe:r:at-enee .. l 
But the qlt:es1lion· to com~ up lat-er· is: whether tl:l.·e ooJ:tSe.ious 
. . 
~el'l.&Bee ot an external p.hy·sieal obj ef.Jt i·s imme.diat-e in the 
s.ame sense 1~ wh;1.~h thf) .. o.ons~.ious experience of G0d is immediate .. 
. "' 3) Restriotion of "immediaoy11 to 11 insta.nta.neousnessll 
The third denial of. ·c.ertainty of re:J_igio:as e-xperience 
in a particular se.nse is :f'otmA in the restr~ct.1.on ot .. the mean-
ing of lf1mmedia.ey 11 ·to "~nstantaneousness" •2 To what has 
already been sa1P, indirectly on this,3 it may be added. that 
Knu.~son in this has departed f~r. from the general philo~ophioa.l 
usage .. 4 IV&Jl: if' a message oamet.o the ~J~.ind of man as swiftly 
~s lightning,. 1 t is not ~n immediate experi·enoe .in the str1~t 
sense ot the wo~d if it is mediated from the outside., a.~,,_n 
the· perception of physical ebJeotsQ It is to be quest:i.oned, 
therefore, that Knudson cottld have meant the followipg~ 11 J;n 
ge~uine vel1gious experience the human and the divine int·er-
mingle .. ".5 'f~at sounds more like the mystic 14ho believes that 
b.e has experienced God 11·1mm.ediatelytt in the full sense of the 
term, and 1f true it negates all of Knudson's denial of immedi-
ate apprehension o:t' Godq .Apd as will be shown more fully later, 
conditioning of an e~ezaience is not against the immediacy 
elaim. For if there be revelation, then in the last ana1ysis 
1. See Brightman, PR, lo 
2. See Knudson, VRE1 74o 3. ~ide supra, 217-218. 
4. Vide supra, 211-217 .. 
,5. Knudson, VRE, .53. 
:;:,·.,.-
immediate Ohr1st1an ex.perienee is ultima.t~, tor revelation 
1s a God-expe·rience; tllaoaog1eal. ict_eas mt1·st ·have a S9ttroe, 
must be x-eo~i ved from somewhere before ·they ·are passed on, ·. 
in; the. fc~ ot teaching in th~ oond1 tioning of ·experienceo 
It th,e~e is no intmediate experience-in tb.e sens,·of non-
ref'leetive knowledge. there will be nothing upon which to 
r.efleot. 
4) S~tisfaeticm l11i th a r,.e!J;sonable .eertait)ty 
T~en, the denial of ~rtainty in tteligiou:s ex.perienee 
on Pal'ticular gl'ounds 1incls express1ron in the_ :thoagh'b·that. man 
should be satisfied with a "reasonable ·deg;ree11 of oerta1n1Jy9 
!D~s is advocated by BishQp MeClonpell. His treatment of the 
subjeet is more practical tb,.an theeretical, fer recognizing 
that the whole mi.n.d has d·emand~ for certainty \that. sh~uld be 
aat~stted, he ventures to say: "We must 1nf:!1B1i upon certainty 
of the -s~e kind as that fol' whie~ we seek in real lite-tla.e 
certainty that comes out of life~ that issues in Ufe.ul E:e 
goes O.lil: te show the naturalness of the desire for certainty:, 
as it is a desire for satisfaction, a ~esil'e that finds sat-
1afaot1on in a Kantian att1 tude of' faith: 11 We learn the truth 
ey venturing to assume it is true; and. living as it' it t-rere 
true,."2 But McC-onnell earlli:es this postulate farther than did 
Kant in his second Orttique~~ 
1. McConnell, RO, 7-8. 2$ McConnell, RC, 9-10. 
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.5) .A modif~ed f);egati-ott ·et certainty 
Finally, the -denial·· of eertainty on partieular grounds 
assumes a modified farm.- ·Fer ·Mo6onn-ell; tor instance, wri test 
"It is the purpt>se · o·f this e·ssay to emp-ha'Biz-e the ·elaim that 
Chririianity leads to certainty by deepening and enriching the 
life~ nl This is in line with the viewpoint ·of this dissertation 
--the necessity of a broad ·view of' expel'"ien·ee. M-eCJonnell is 
insistent upo·n satiefactien of the entire life as a cr1 terion 
of truth. Thus, he re-cognized that the human min.C!\ "sees some 
truths as necessarily true," refusing to ignore its distinc-
tive interestse2 All this should receive the blessing of both 
the religionist and the scientist, tor it takes one out of the 
hypothetical stage characterized by the description, "ever 
learning and never able to c~me to the know1edge ef' the truth,"~ 
and out of the unscientific position of clinging to hypotheses 
that do not work out in daily lite.· In his concluding chapter, 
McConnell writes~ 11 ~-te conolucie that ~hristian belief is bath 
root and fruit of the <Jhristian 11fe,.n4 Here we get something 
that was notioeabl~ lacking in his chapter on the scientist--
both s·ides of the exper1ment. So his fear that the scientist 
would be "vastly amused. at the desperately unscientific char-
acter" of his proeedure, seems ungrounded, as also his fear 
that the practical man lfould be the first to object to this 
"practical oertainty11 that"oomes out of lif'e.,.5 Somewhat in 
1 .. MeOonnell, RS, .53; 
see .5-4. 
2. MeOonnell, RO, .55. 
~. II Tim. 3: 7 .. 
4. MeOonnell, Re, 194. 
.5 .. MeOennell, RO, 31. 
--- ·-·--~-·- --~ ·-·- ·--------- -·- --- - - ---·------· ------ ·----- ·-
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the spirit of W1lliam·James, McConnell has one question to ask 
concerning the experience of the mystics: "Do they mean life? 
Do t~ey come out of life and make. for life? ttl So, denying 
any "abstractly infallible standard" McOonnell holds a modified 
certainty with a broad view of experience, 11 a function of many 
factors," including the Bible and the Ohurch.2 
3. Affirmation of certitude in religious experience 
a. On g~neral grounds 
l) The age-old contrast between knowledge (certainty) 
and opinion 
~he age-old contrast between knowledge (certainty) and 
opinion, th~ first general consideration in the affirmation of 
certainty in religious eXPerience, goes back to Plato and the 
early Greek philosopheraG To Plato, knowledge was infallible 
and indubitable incQn~rast to ·opinion, which is due to sense 
experience. He held that knowledge is of the nature of intui-
tion, coming like a flash; and due to .recollection of experi-
ences in9: past life in which the soul had clear and full vision 
of spiritual realities. Thus one is able to recognize a just 
act because he has a memory of justice in a past life. Plato, 
consequentlyt opposed the doctrine of' relativity in knowledge 
held by the Sophists.3 Here are intuitive or immediate ele• 
ments that have survived th~ crash of dogmatic rationalism. 
Locke was on the main line of philosophy historically 
1. McConnell, RC, 176. · · 
2. McOonnell, RC, 2lOi 213; 
see Oalhoun, GOL, 994 · 
----·-. --~ --
---- --- ·--- ---------. -
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when he distinguished between knowledge and opinion~ In the 
paragraph on Method in the Introduction to his Essay on Human 
Understanding, he describes opinion as llthat assent which "tfe 
give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have 
no certain knowledge. 11 He said, " 1 With me, to know· and to be 
certain is the same thing; what I am certain of, that I know; 
what oomes short of certainty cannot be called knowledge.•"l 
On empirical rather than on rationalistic grounds, Locke was 
as certain of God's existence as wa.s.Descartes. 
Edwin Lewis fairly represents those today who carry on 
this tradition: 
Knowledge and. certainty are obviously in-
separable. When we say, 'I know,' we are also 
saying1 '! am certain.• We simply cannot know withouv at the same time being certain •••• A 
situation in which we elaim to know, but in 
which at the same time we oonfess to some un-
certainty, must be described in some other way. 
We do ~ know, otherwise we should not confess 
unaertainty •••• on the other hand, there can be 
certainty where there is not knowledge •••• Be-
lief and knowledge are inseparable but not 
identical. If we believe something, it is be-
eause we already know something, and if we know 
someth2ng it is because we already believe some-
thing. . 
2) The necessity of oert!tuie to the business of 
daily life as well as to philosophy 
On general principles, the necessity of certttuQe to 
the business of every-day life as well as to philosophy is 
stressed by several philosophers. · Hocking contends that, 
1. _'l'urner, PBO., 7; see 
Locke, Works , IV , 145 • · 
2. Lewis, POR, 144; see 
Maritain, DS, 10. 
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'~he life of knowledge as well as the life of action swings 
.... in irregular rhythm or alternation between this pole of 
certainty and the region of exploration, tentativeness, prob-
able hypothesis.ul As an idealistic experimentalist, he joins 
the experimental idealist Dewey in the quest for the remainder 
of.reality in the conviction that he has some certainty 11 in 
hand. 11 
Declaring that Descartes was "really as sure of the 
stove as of himself," Temple call.s academic doubt "an extension 
ot nursery make-believe, 11 in "hioh philosophers pretend that 
they "do not know that there is a sun, or that Napoleon existed 
or that selfishness is bad," in order to see whether they can 
prove tb~se things.2 Of course, the sincere effort.of Des-
cartes to understand the basis ot knowledge should not be 
viewed as infantile; the condemnation falls more just1y upon 
those who lteep up the pretense, i .. e. who continue to "pretend)' 
that they are unoertain conoerning objects of experience. 
Oook Wilson oalls .attention to the inoonsistenoy of 
those who.hold theoretioa1ly the mere probability of the exist-
ence of their friends, but whose actions prove otherwise.3' 
Wilson appears to be saying here that theory and practice oan 
not logically be divorced thus. It would seem that the man 
who says that he is uncertain of the existence of a friend in 
1. Hooking, TOP, 443 .. 
2. Temple, NMG, 66; see 
Werkmeister, HPI, 173 .. 
3 .. Wilson, SI, II, 852oo;o 
853 .. 
whose presence he is standing in conversation, is "leaning 
over backtfards 11 in defense of some theory, rather than having 
11 praotical oertainty11 in any reasonable sense of the expres-
sion. With the three degrees of Ueberzeugung held by Kant in 
mind (Meinung, Glauben, and Wiesen), England sees little pur-
pose in restricting knowl.edge as certainty to an "ideal un-
attainable either in practioe or in soientifio investigation, 
for 11 If I stand without an umbrella in a downpour of rain, I 
do not simply believe it is raining; I know it is. The belief 
••• is Slfallowed up in certitude .. " 1 
The oonduct of life would beoome impossible 11 if we did 
not have the right to treat as certain much that is quite 
incapable of being proved, 0 but life would become well-nigh 
unbearable if onets 11 belief in a friend's honor or a wife's 
fidelity" were always with the mental reservation, "'so far 
as I have hitherto tested them .. • 112 The presence of one doubt 
because the evidence is not yet all in (the end of life and 
experience not having yet come), would create, truly, an 
"uneasy suspicion which would make me undeserving to have 
either loyal wife or true 1'riend. 11 3 
3) The essential characteristic of a datum--
non-inference 
Another general affirmation of certainty in religious 
experience is the corteept that the essential characteristic 
1. England! VEE, 127~ 130; 
see Kanu, KrV, B ~so. 
I 
2 .. Taylor, DGE, 132, 134 .. 
3. Taylor, DGE, 135 .. 
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of a datum is non-inference.l It may be that all human experi-
ences, except the initial ones, are conditioned, and that our 
perceptive experiences and everyday words embody theories, yet 
Russell is far from being a solitary believer in the possibility 
of "whittling" away the element of, interpretation and approach-
ing a "pure datum.u2 Theoretically, one can hold that all data 
are uncertain, and that they should be confirmed by other data, 
where possible. But "unless these other data had had some 
degree of independent credi.bi.li ty, they t-tould not confirm the 
original data. 11 3 Thus, Russell, with all his agnosticism, is 
compelled to admit that there are 11 classe·s of statements which 
are certainly all true. 11 4 These include not only the glven 
whlch is immediately known, but .also synthetic principles which 
are known without being inferred • .? 
0. I. Le't-tis declares in agreement wlth this that "one 
cannot be mistaken about the content of an immediate experi-
enoe."6 Here 11 content 11 should not be confused with the object 
itself, even though it be the immanent-transcendent God. In 
this direct experience, coincldence of subject and object i.e 
not necessary; what is needed is a transcendence of self. 
Interpretation after the experlence is granted. A questlon 
to be treated more fully later is whether there is any cogni-
tlve content ln consclousness before interpretation, so that 
it may be truly said that the datum is given, and that the 
1. See Russel,?-..1 i:MT4 1.5.5-1.56. 2. Russell, IJli!'J:, 1.5 • . 
3. Russell, IMT, 1.5.5. 
4. Russell, IMT, 1.5.5-1.56. 
5. See Russell, Art. 
( 1949) ' 2,54. 
6. Lewls, MWO, 131. 
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percipient is aware ot i't(s presence. Lewis declares that 
napprehension of the quale, being immediate, stands in no need 
of verification. 11 1 Lewis is emphatic on this: 
There is an absolute certainty of the empirical 
which has be~n recognized--the immediate apprehen-
sion of the given. Such direct awareness is not ., 
1ndub1 table knowledge of an ob.l eo~ but the content 
of it is an absolutely given fact •. 
According to Lewis, the only alternative to skepticism 
is that ~ know~edge is more than probable.3 And Widgery 
declares that in nature, society and religion, the theory that 
we are always acting on probable hypotheses is inadequate, in 
fact, "definitely false 11 as 11 in each instance there is rather 
an awareness, a-form of direct relation of experient with a 
reality. ''4 
4) Dua1ity of subject and object in a unity of 
experience: knowledge a relation between two 
distinct terms in intimate union .. 
Many, dissatisfied with Kant's "artificial cleavage" 
between sense·and thought,5 holding that actual experience 
is not split .into subjective mind and objective thing (as 
inte_racting freely when thinking is going on), 6 make a. gen-
eral affirmation of certainty by seeking to show the duality 
of· subject and object ~n a unity of experience, knowledge 
being viewed as a relation between two distinct terms in 
intimate union. This is epistemological dualism,? although 
1. Lewis,. ,MWO, 125;. see 134. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 310. 
3. Lew~s, MWO, 311 •. 
4. Widgery, Art.{1924), 488. 
5. See Calkins in Wilm, 
IK, 18-19. · 
6. Crane, PHL, 6. 
7. See Lovejoy, RD, 42. 
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SUbjQC1:; and 'object are Viewed as more inti!Jlate than is often 
the casa in this theory of knowledge .. · Subject and ol)jeot are 
not made identical with ea.eh other or with one's exPerience 
of them as in epistemological monism:· 
All that epi~t·emological dualism asserts 
about the objeet is that it is not identical 
with the idea of it; and all that it asserts 
about tlli.e idea is that it re:ters to, or1de-scribes, or (simp;I.y) knows-, the object. 
To the objections of epistemological monists that the 
dualists simply state the problem of knewledge and that i·f 
the gll;].f between subject artd object is na)'b erossed, slt,eptioism 
is the result, the epistemological dualists answe~.'lihat knowl-
edge is just this situation ot subject set over agains'b the 
objeot, and that the gulf' is actually erossed, but "with.Q'l'tt 
the possibllity of the idea• s ev~ being one with. the eb.j&ct."2 
One of the ·Primo1ples ag~eed upon by per~o-nallsts is the fel-
l-owing: ttWhat is present 1n knowledge is always oonseiou.s 
exPerience referring beyond itself; no nonmental object is 
ever present. uJ 
On this broad foundation there ie plenty of room tor 
'Uhe view of duality in unity of.experienee .. Epistemolegieal. 
man!sm;. inconsistently, has tried 1Jo retain belief in. the 
i:adependence of objeete-.4 Partly f0r this reason, perhaps, 
1t 1a trtlle that: lfOompa:ratively few thinkers :1m. the Jil.i.story 
of p~il~sephy have believe« that idea and objeet are 
1 .. Br1ghtman,.ITP, ?8; see 
P~, 414 .. 
2. B~ightman; ITP, 81; see 80. 
:;. Werkmeister, HPI, :;26. 
4 .• See Brightman, PR, 414;. 
Lovejoy, RD, 188, 256; 
264. 
necessarily identical in rational knowledge. 111 
Several bases are offered for this unity in duality. 
Ormond finds it in the mind 1 s purpose! 
The world of the metaphysician, like that 
of the mathematician and the physicist, is 
dual, but the terms of its duality are no long-
er opaque in their inner nature, but are terms 
which spring directly out of consciousness and 
conscious experience. If we take them in their 
verbal form as inception and realization, it 
will be seen clearly how pyrpose becomes the 
natural term of mediation~2 
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Although the scientist may regard himself as a mere 
spectator, avoiding 11 any presumption of community of nature 
between himself and his object," the metaphysician is not 
satisfied with this external! ty: 11 The subject-nature of ~1hich 
the knower is conscious cannot tolerate the idea of an alien 
nature in the object. U:3 It is purpose that connects the real 
and the ideal worlds, for the physical world is regarded as 
the "realization of the ideal tforld in which it arises as 
merely conoei ved content .. ,4 
Ward has developed this concept in terms of the organic 
unity of experience, of subjective and objective factors as 
11 oo&perant members of one whole., 115 Of course, it is the in-
dividual's experience·which is first o~ all the unity. For 
Ward there is no strictly independent world; it is presented 
to the knowing mind. ~hus Ward expands the idea of unity, 
going from the indi~idual to nature. Only on this basis where 
l. DeWolf, RRR, 132-133. 
2. Ormond, CP, ;4; see 
Jones, FE, .53. 
3. Ormond, CP, 9~ 41. 
4. Ormond, OP 5~. 
5. Ward, NA, II, 152, 153. 
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·nthe knower and the known are not utterly disparate" (both 
being ultimately and essentially spirit), can science become 
intelligible.l Then Ward strikes a note that has often been 
struck against a false rationalism--the unity of the experient 
in the unity of experience: "Presentation, Feeling, Conation, 
are ever one inseparable whole, and advance oontinuously_to 
higher and higher forms. 112 It may well be that "experience 
does not begin l'li'i th a disconnected 1 manifold, 1 1' but that the 
philosophers have severed the connections.3 
By implication,. Tennant holds that immediate experience 
is 11 the source of all cognition , the primary interaction between 
subject and object, which constitutes awareness or direct, 
involuntary acquaintance. 11 4 This is true also of Ward, Baillie 
and Boodin. The last, like Ward, is con~erned with getting 
away from an ext~eme dualism that would prevent such confronta-
tion~ 
This concept of consciousness greatly simpli-
fies the problem of energy. It destroys the old 
conceptual cleavage between mind and body, or 
physical energy on the one hand and psychological 
processes on the other, by making consciousness 
a fact independent of .energy. Nature knows no 
cleavage of energetic interactions. Why should 
we by oyr concepts, put asunder what nature has joined?-' 
Brotherston, speaklng tor pragmatic empiricism, is also 
interested in bringing subject. and ob-j act closer toge!tlher in 
1. Ward, EP, 111; see NA, II · 
185 .. 
2. Ward, NA, II, 191. 
3. Ward, NA, II, 97; see 
Bertocoi, EAG, 57-58, with 
Balfour, Lectures, 257-258. 
4 .. Tennant, PT, I, 28. 
5. B_ood.in, Art. ( 1908) , 
232; see Ward, EP, 3.53-
354; _Baillie, OKG, 155. 
thought: 
.lfhat is antecedent in knowl.edge is nei11he·l' 
subject nor object but the felt and desired 
un1 t~ of both.. It is the uni'tfy of a tensional 
field. It is that tension to unity, organic 
· ... and phil;osoph1c, whioh life-proc'ess, when it 
attains the reflective level, is never without. 
:Tb.ua, it is seen by inner per-ception. 
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~With Ward, Deaa Inge contends for the organie unity of 
-the real world, and the Jtuni ty in 4uality of thought aRtl ob-
ject." Differing from Ward on the nature of reality, Inge, 
however, regards it as:· 11 a realm in. whleh thought and thing, 
fact and value, are inseparable. P2 No objection can be x-aised 
to this~a.s long as thought ana·~objeat remain distinct. Nor 
eaa oue~ for a similar-- reason, ~:-eject Shinre:r• s tautological 
statement tha.1s the un.lvers·e is. one-or unified, and that 1t is 
reasonable 'bo~viewGod, man and the world as "unified in one 
inclusive whole ... , 'fll;'f.a4 .Morgan finds an illustration for 
,·, •.' 
his belief in "one world, psycho-physical from tt)p to bottom," 
in the unity present in man .. 4' It may be that· Vance goes too 
far in raising the question, 0Should we not become what we 
know fol' the t~eetug moment of our oontempla'b1on? 11 ; yet 
kaewledge does demand 11 some similiari ty between the kne,tiRg 
person and the known .z-eality-. 115 
It would be an extreme epistemological dualism. that 
would violate the Hegelian d1ct~m, adopted by Pringle-Pattison, 
l., Brothe:rs'tion, Al''ti .• ( 1943) , 18. 
2. Inge, ia Muirhead, OBP, 193-
195; see Schilling, EKH, 100; 
Hegel, JlJB, ~II, 294-+29.5. 
·3~ Sntmer, 00, 15. 
4 .. MQ~gan, ill Muirhead, 
. ~P, 278; see 300. 
5. Vance, RT, 205, 208. 
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that "Thoughts do not stand between us and things, shutting 
us off fro~ things: they rather shut us .together with them. 11 1 
For the knower can not be 11 extruded from the real universe :. 
and treated as if he did not belong to it. 02 Pringle-Pattison 
holds, thus, that there is an essential relation between the 
knowledge of the knower and the object of hie knowledge, not 
as two unconnected facts~ but as "two elements in a single 
fact • 11 :3 
Thus, one aspect of the duality-in-unity view is the 
position that there· is self-transcendence in a unity of ex-
perience, in which view knowledge is regarded as due to an 
immediate rapport between subject and object. Watson, re-
jecting the idea of the original awareness of the mind of' its 
own states only, writes: 
The contrast between subject and object is 
strictly correlative, and where there is no ex-
plicit consciousness of the object, there is no 
explicit consciousness of the subject9 What we 
must say, therefore, is that in the feeling soul 
there is an implicit or Kague consciousness. of 
both subject and object. 
With the others mentioned, he holds that experience is 
on.e, that 0all distinctions must, therefore, fall within it. 
We can distinguish phenomena from reality, but we cannot sep-
a:rate them."S As it is to be questioned whether there is any 
knowledge of the self apart from knowledge of the not-self, 
1. See Bertocei, EAG1 ;a; 
. Hegel Die Absolu~e 
·Religion, JUB, XIV, 33. 
2. See Sertoeci, EAG, 56-
57. 
:;. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 
115; see Maritain, IP, 
185-186. . 
4. Watson, IRE, II, 76. 
5. Watson, IRE, II, 96. 
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and as these knowledges are inseparable in actual awareness 
(although separable theoretically), it seems reasonable to 
hold with Watson that there is one world, a world in which 
"the rational subject finds himself.at home because the world 
itself is essentially rational. 111 
Another geneFal concept in favor of certainty in reli-
gious exp~rience is-that of the mind1 s capacity for active 
commerce with the object of its knowledge. Maritain defends 
the position that being, not ideas, is the object of intellect: 
To maintain ••• that the object of our intellect 
is not the being of things but the idea of being 
which it forms in itself, or more generally that 
we apprehend immediately only our ideas, is to de-
liver oneself bound hand and foot to skepticism. 
For if that 'to7ere the case, it 't\fould be impossible 
for our·mind under any circumstances to conform 
itself to that which really is, and truth would 
be unattai~able •••• Ideas ••• are our instruments of 
knowledge. 
Of course what is immediately present in the mind is 
not the 11 thing11 -but its perception) But instead of ideas be-
ing viewed as intervening between the self and its objects of 
thought, it seems more reasonable to regard them as "instru-
ments" of bringing the unified self into closer relation with 
its object of thought. Charla~ A. Bennett rejects the view that 
because "we knol7 'tti th idea, therefore we can know only idea 11 : 
The facts might be exactly as Feurbach de-
scribes them, yet it might still be true that 
ideas reach reality and that we can have valid 
knowledge of that which is other than idea ••.• 
1. Watson, IRE, II, 106-107; 
see Crane, PHL, 51-52. 
2. Maritain, IP, 186. 
3. Vide supra, 214. 
---------------------,----------------------
Ideas, he seems to think,, interpose a limiti. 
ing medium between the mind and its object. 
.. . . ·~ In similar vein, c. I. Lewi~ complains of the error 
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common to rationalism and pure empiricism--the attempt .to 
separate the mind from something else called experience, an 
impossible task as real experience must include one of its 
elements, the mind~2 · 
The unity of sub.j ect and op.1 ect, according to Gr1ffi the, 
is resident in self-consciousness, as any awareness, in the 
very nature of the. case, is a 11 bridging of the gulf that sep-
arates me from it.n3 Griffiths saves himself from monism here 
by seeing subject and object together, but not as identical. 
And paradoxically, Scott declares: 11 I can break through the 
circle of my privacy simply because, as conscious, I am never 
in it • 11 4 In the eyes of Rufus A. Jones, a rea1 mind is in 
active commerce with a real. world: 
One thinks his object in the same unified 
.· pulse of consciousness in whioh he thinks 
himself and vice-versa. There is -no self-con-
sciousnes.a without object-oonsciou.sness 1 and there is no object-consciousness withou~ self-
oonsaiouaness.. Outer and inner, knower and 
known, and not two but forever ope. The tsoul,' 
therefore, isnot something hidden away in be-
hind or above our ideas and feelings and will 
activit!es. It is .. the aotive living unity of 
personal consciousness--the one psyobia inte-
ger and unity fora: true peyohology.,5 
, ~'·. ' . 
Another phase of the duality of subject and objeot in 
1. Bennett, DBK, 33. · 
2. Lewis, MWO, 25; see . 
Jones, Art.(1921), 455. 
3. Griffiths, GIE, 217; see 
214; Temple, NMG, 70-71. 
4. Scott, Art .. (l920), 130 .. 
5·. ·Jones, Art. ( 1921) , 456 ~ 
see (Henry) Jones, FE, 
51. ' 
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the unity of experience-is the ntt1ty of subject and object 
in teeling. Oognition is not.an ex~ernal matter: it is an 
experiesee·ot the soul, and consequently has reteremce no 
feeling~value as well as to knowledge of the facts eoneerming 
the object. "The most promising theories of the psyohologieal 
oo.nsti tU:tiom of religious experience are those whieh find 1 ts 
es~ence in more complex mental processes containing intellect, 
emotional and volitional tactors."l The existence of souls, 
0 living centers oapable.of feeling the"beauty and grandeur of 
the world •• ·.is lthat is t>eally significant in the universe."2 
·For James, .feelings are 11 the germand·starting point of cog-
n1t1onn; and. feeling is ·used as 0 a synonym of 1mmea1ate ex-
perienoelt (God and man having 11 bnsiness together0 ), 11 the 
deeper source Of rel1gion, 11 from which translations a:tte made 
into 11 philosophical and theological form.ulas. 11 :3 
Bradley emphasized what has already been said concern-
ing manls dependence upon immediate experience as the start 
or the basis of mediate knowledge, and concerning the unity of 
non-identical elements in that immediate experience, a union 
so close in the knowing act that subject and object can be 
"in no sense distinguished." That is: 
•w~ have in teeling diversity and unity in 
one whole, a whole implicit and yet not broken 
1. Moore, THE, 181; 
see Langley, Art. (1929), 225-226; 
Retig!'O"''EJ,Art. 
(1912) , .501-.50.5 .. 
2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG 11:3-114; 
see Brotherston, Arto(l943),21; 
Pratt, PRB, 25, 22-24. 
3. Jamesi PP, I, 222; VREl 431, 
516-5 7i Moore, TRE, 1~. 
up into terms and relations. !his immediate 
union ot t~e one andthe many is an ultimate 
fact from which we start.•l 
~o some·, the idea of the 1twedlock·n of ia·ea and thing, 
connotes only an immpossible monism. Already, we have seen 
that in some sense, 11 they two shallbe one" if' there is to be 
any knowledge at all. Robles also explains knowledge as a 
duality in unity~-a unitt of purpose and interest in immedi-
ate experience: 
To know, then is to make immanent that whioh 
first presents itself' as transcendent, to receive 
into the intimate and immediate sphere of the 
t ego' the sphere of the 1 non-ego 1 t1hich, irreduc-
ible in 1tself1 presents itself in its character of 'otherness. Contact is thus established be-
tlfeen a subject aDd an object, and a mysterious 
and in_eftable nuptial union is consummated, the 
otfspring of which is 'the known.• For something 
1 1s born' in the act of knowing; in .the 1nteriOJ:~­
ity of.the tego 1 the 'non-eg01 comes into being, 
in such a way, however that in spite of the con-
- summated union, the 1 ego• and 2•non-ego
8 preserve 
their irreducible •otherness.• 
To sum upt it may be said that the reaction from the 
subjectivism ot Kant and others is a natural and reasonable 
one. For if they are right then knowledg~ is a miracle de-
void ot any explanation~ But assuming what m'tlst be assumed 
in order even to get started in reasoning--the necessity of 
assumptions-and assuming, thus further, that the universe 
is rational and 1ntelligible3 (the irrational being due to 
the part-vision of man), and taking 11 universe 11 in its literal 
le Mack* AIE 12-13; see 
Bradley, AR,.105, 569; 
Lipps in Laird, PS, 82. 
2. Robles, MPPt 55; see 
Maier, HCKt 38. 
3. See Russell 1 Art.(1914), 792-79~; Br1ghtman, Art. (1930) 2 , '15 9 
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sense, the writer is led to take his stand on the duality of 
subJect and object in the unity of experience, and on the 
possibility of knowledge, therefore, a knowledge due to an 
intimate union between two distinct terms, a union intimate 
enough to result in knowledge. That is, he holds that the 
gulf between the knolfer and the object of his knowledge can 
be narrowed until what has been passing freely between them 
may do so intelligibly as well~l It 1s necessary to bring 
knower and known close enough in immediate experience to make 
(mediate) knowledge possible. For if knowledge is not possible·; 
there is nothing to talk about, and no purpose in any argu-
ment or discussion (including this dissertation). But, 11 the 
most striking fact of experience is knmdng that we know. 112 
Dr. Brightman raises a relevant question: How much knowledge 
by acquaintance is there?3 This can be answered by two words 
--
11 much," 1f "knowledge by acquaintance" is used in the broad 
sense, for all knowledge by description depends upon 1t4; but 
11 11 ttle11 if 11 knol'rledge by acquaintancetr is used in the narrow 
sense, "knowledge~' being distinguished from "knowledg~clf\im, It 
and. 11 immediate" in reference to physical obJectrPbeing con~ 
sidered less direct than in reference to God--a distinction 
to be made later. There is no knowledge by acquaintance of 
external obJects themselves, but only of the direct perception 
1. ·See MM. er :R HOK, 4.5; 4. See Russell, PP, 79:f Murphy, U , 67-68. 92; Werkmeister, HP, 
2. Jones, Art.(l92l), 45.5. 53?; vide supra, 21~.;. 
3. See Brightman, IT.P, 8.5. 218 t 227-2,0. 
5 .. Vide supra, 214. 
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of their sense-data., 11 In immediate personal consciousness, 
if anywhere, there is a true case of knowledge by acqua.1nt-
ance.11l One is directly acquainted, strictly speaking, with 
only that which·is immediately revealed to the human spirit. 
It may be inferred from this general treatment of 
duality in knowledge, that if the religious Object does not 
come within the range of immediate human experience,2 then 
the ideas about Him have no explanation. Resort can not be 
had to revelation, for to be real it must be an immediate 
religious experience., In view of the dependence of the knowl-
edge of God and of other realities upon immediate experience, 
it is not to be wondered at tl).at "the predominating aim of 
philosophy has been to conquer what Whithead has called 'the 
bifurcation of nature1 for which ])escartes is so largely to 
blame,n3 and which Kant was far frQm remedying by his doctrine 
of the noumenon .. 4 
.5) Some content of knowledge in general awareness 
without particular attention and reflection 
a) Four types of knowing: awareness, apprehension 
comprehension, explanation 
Another fact in favor of certitude in religious experi-
ence upon general grounds is that there is some content of 
knowledge in general awareness without particular attention 
1. Brightman, ITP, 86. 
2. Macintosh, TES, 243-244. 
3. Brightman, NV, 26. 
4. See Knudson, PP, 112; 
Dewey, IDP, 29~297$ 
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and retleo~1on,, aue 1m t-he :t'i~st <Plaef3 to. the exi stenee of. ~ 
tour types o:t' knowing-.,..a.waremess, apprehension, e·omp.rehensi-e.n, 
aftd ~lanation. .,As .. ·'a1l ~~owing, obviottsl:y, cle:Penda upon ·a 
lm.ower (the ego-centric predicament) and as und,oubtedly all 
EPJW~+e~ee, except, t~t · w)l~ch .1$ :1lli t.ial, is EHilllldi tioned as 
w~l as oQmscious, B~ightman must ~e correct ·in his belief 
that 11 1t is :im.J>o.ssl.ble. • .1Jo separate any experience f'r&m our 
thGUght about 1 t," .,and that 111 p·tn:•e• religious experiene.e, . 
purged o:r all id.~a and be;Lie;f'- 1-,s an. abstraction, as unrea.l as 
ia 'pu:tte• sensation in psyohology. 11 l .. Others agree with.f;l;l;is, 
but troDJ. a different angle~ For them, · ther.e .is no experience 
1ih,at i_s. altogether ~:tl"ipped of oogni·tiv.e el~meats, holtever 
elemental and vague.. ,The distinetion between the ':'knowl,.edges 
o:t' perception and ·Gt' .oono.eption is nothing new. llJ?J;:at1nus 
S·AA~ t4at sensations are -obscure thoughts and. 1n·t'ellig1Ma 
o~ spi:r-1 tual though,ts are clear sensations o tt2 But .this view 
has ~e~e1 ved .a great impetus from empiricism and from the. 
1':\ew. 1;heQJ""Y·ofpepeeption, In contrast to the view of Qon-
cep1U.on suggested by Kant and developed by 0. I. ~ewis is the 
n~w view that 11 sensa..-data alffl first perceived (1-.e .. r-egistered 
in the passive ·mind) and then conc~eived (i.e. ordered) under 
eopoep.ts by .the act1vi ty .Qf the ,mind. u3 Adm1. tting that the 
most of what we perceive is simultaneously conceived, or prac-
tically so, Nolting sees the importance of the new distinction 
.... ' ... ' 
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in this, "that what is given in perception is independent ef 
any power of the will to alter .or deny,11 while in eo:m.cept1ea 
there is a measure of con~rol.l In harmony with this view is 
the modern conception of knowing as a prooess ita which th~l'e 
is a polarity (not contradiction) between thought and feeling, 
1n whieh.cognitive activity in various stages of development 
can be recognized all along the line between tlile extremes; 
that is, in every awareness there is some thought definite 
enough to lay claim to the term "knowledge.n 2 In this view 
c..ognitioa, in, the st.rie~ seQse, is the consummation of all 
the v,~ious kinds of consoiousn_esa: "All ex.perienoe is oogni-
~1ve qua knewn; at least a sarfaee film of know~ngfuetter, 
~kn~wl~dge-claim~ play~ over every inch of its contour. n3 
Kant held that there is some content in immediate ex-
- . - .. 
pe~i.~peet "oognitinm in general, oonsoiousness of the subject 
withoutQ .... any particular d.eterm1nat1on.Q .. which makes possible 
the knowledge ot the understand1ng .. 11 4 An instance of this is 
tound in Kant's view ot beauty as a confused or lower form ot 
knowledge, implyin~.that 11 mere sense-perception is possible 
in the simple awareness of presemtatioh, without identifying 
the obJect in the Ol:"dinary association of appereep.tion which. 
we ~all knowledge. u5 Langley brings out the contrast in 
1 .. Nolting;· CTP, 9-10; see Jones, 
FE, 55 o .. 
~ .. s~e Duee, KGN, 5e7~568; Galln"" 
W~Y, !PR, 258; Amea, Art.(l915), 
264; Hegel, PR, I, 132-1)); · 
$;al.11l~ing, ~ 6J , . 95, 51+; 
Hi ~l£man, IPJ!, 449; :HQ eking, MGHE , 
Q3;_ '!avidson, OIR. 2', 69,. 
3. Hocking, Art.(l906), 
7; see 10. 
!!- .. Macmillan, OOP,.54-
55. 5~ Macmillan. O~P,, 62. 
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aesthetic experienoebetweQn. perception and apprehension, the 
latte:r being of objects ttin their uniqueness and individ.ulity," 
the powers of the pereeiver being "more fully employed" so 
that "other characters ef the object experie~oed are revealea. .. nl 
For Tennant, also, there is no sharp lise between perception and 
oonoeption.2 
A good illustration of general awareness is afforded 
by the man, who walking along a country road, without partic-
ular attention and reflection, has a vidid sense of his sur-
round1ngs9 His knowledge as awareness is of a general f1el4 
of scent, sound, and sight. Apprehension begins when "some-
thing in this field aro~ses particular attention, say an ob-
ject moving," which being of spec-ial interest causes concentra-
tion of onets powers. Af.terward, when other information is 
larQ~ght in, there_. 1s. oompreh~ns1on9 When singularity about the 
object is.noted, explana~io.n is sought.. In this, sensation is 
11 but a partioua1r aspect of the whole unified feeling.n3 Oman 
applies this general concept .of awareness to religious objects.4 
b) No formless given in distinction between given 
and its interpretation 
In h~ony with ~s view of cognition in general awar~ 
ness is the oon.o_ept _that there is no forml.ess or indefinite 
given in the distinction between the given and its interpretation.; 
l.. Langley, Artq{l.939), 90o 
! • S~e Tennant, PT, I., 16.5; Ber-
tooei, E.AG 199-202; Martin, 
EPR, l.68i ~acintoJ3h" Pmc, 312-
:314, 322-328; MeTrM$iJ~t't, SDR, 
90; Bood.in, Art,.(l934), 150. 
3. Oman, NS, 120, 185; 
see l.2l.. 
4o Oman, NB, 142-1.43~ 
5~ Lewis; MWO, 144; see 
Maokay, Art. { 1928) , 
71. 
Definiteness is needed for inference of particular 
me~ning: 
The iDJplioitly predicated relationship com-
prised in the conceptual interpretation of what 
is presented, must be such that further possible 
experience could verify or fail to verify them. 
Without the correlation of concept and qualia, 
no experi!nce could verify or fail to verify 
anything. 
Also, C. I. Lewis makes it clear that ~the given is in, 
not before, experience," that is; that the essence of the 11 given11 
is that it is given, an "identifiable constituent in experienoa.2 
Grote regards reflection as the passage of the mind from immedi-
ate thought to the thought of self and of objects, and on to 
thought which makes a distinction between thought of self and 
of its objects, each conception bringing out the other.3 Impli-
cit in this is the presence of thought in feeling, and he states 
it explicitly: "Immediate thought may be described as the feel-
ing of being ••• the germ of our notion of being • 11 4 He speaks of 
a 11 procees 11 from the immediate to reflection; he recognizes that 
in thought there is impll.ed "distinguishingnees 11 or reflection, 
but in hie use of "implied" and of 11 germ 11 above, he has given 
himself the right to use "immediate thought" rather than mere 
"immediateness." He goes on to speak of immediate knowledge as 
immediate thought plus something like reflection, but lacking 
the distinct judgment of developed refleotion .. 5 This immediate 
knowledge, which is knowledge by acquaintance, he makes the 
1. Lewis, MWO, 144. . · 
2. Lewis, M~O, 53, 66~ 
3. Grote, EP,. II, 146-147. 
4. Grote, EP, II, 148, 149. 
5. Grote, EP, II, 150, 152, 
153. 
ground of all other knowledge, hav,in~ 11 all the el~ments of 
truth 1n it, which the most developed knowledge has, whether 
. . . . 
these elements are intuitions of s~nse· ••• ~f mind • .,.of reason,. 111 
Thus ~e has avoided the pitfall. that woul~ make knowledge in-
explicable, i.e .. how thought can evolve out of mere teel1ng. 
He elaborates this: 
Reflection has to work, not upon a mass of 
intuition simply sensal, but ••• of every kind 
and degree, intellectual and ~at1onal as well 
as sensal. It '\there is-not intuition of these 
latter kinds to begin with, there is not true-
ness in any after knowledge ..... For the activ-
ity of our mind, qua bare activity, is ~he 
source of error; trueness is something given 
to it •••• Trueness is all given t~ us in the 
first instance in immediateness. 
Others join Grote and those mentioned in this declara-
tion that there is no pure perception or sensation) Martin, 
fol' instance, does not oppose the intuitional and the inferen-
tial to each other; both are torms of 'knowledge in a continu-
ous process, similar to the polarity idea of Hooking and 
others.4 In this·, Martin has eXpressed the Hegelian view of 
the unity of the self, in which view, thinking or feeling or 
willing is simply the predominant activity of the united self 
at any one time.. Martin holds that the "I know" of immediate 
expel"ience·is·validated by reflection; that is, we can not go 
be-hind 1Jhe datum as the m1n1muin of knowledge .5 
Williams denies that there is any cognitive content in 
1. Grote, EP, II, 1,56. 4. Vide supra, :32-33, 38' 
2. &rote, EP, II, 156. 51 .. 
3. ·se-e Martin, ClA, 25-26 .. 5. Martin, OA, 42-43. 
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immediate experience •. He argues tha;t "givenness is not know-
ingness •••• Theg:tven is as such mere fact, innocent of self-
knowledge, to be mown, if at all, indirectly, inductively, 
and inconclusively>1 But he aQ.mi ts: 
Everything and anything of which the mind is 
immediately at1are, any mental content is given 
to that mind, in the dual sense that it is an 
ingredient of consciousness and that it can be 
a datum or occasion for interpretation.2 
But if the given did not have cognitive value, ioe. if it 
did not contain the germ of knowledge as well as being a datum 
available for knowledge, there could be no interpretation. The 
untested knowledge, or knowledge-claim, of immediate experience 
differs, of course, from the tested knowledge of reflection. 
Otto holds that there is some content of knowledge in the mind 
before reasoning upon it begins. For him, this knowledge is 
not an inference, but an immediate cognition, more than a 
feeling of 11 more, 11 a particular aspect of the ~ore.3 In this, 
he is in agreement with a large number of thinkers that the 
ultimate basis of all mediate knowledge is immediate knowledge.4 
So what has been said of awareness in general applies to reli-
gious objects: "Religion has never been just faith in an idea 
of God, but faith in God, trust in, including an awareness, an 
apprehension of a reality, God .5 In harmony with the concept 
of the polarity of feeling and knowledge that recognizes 
1. V'11lliams, Art. ( 1933) , 617. 
2. WilliamsJ Art.(l933); 617; 
see 618-o21; Lewis, MWO, 
118. 
3. See Otto, IH, 11, note. 
4. Vide supra; 31-32, 36, 40-
42, 44, 46-47, 50-55; Mar-:-
tin, EPR, 68; Bennett, CVM, 
147-148; Vance, RT 81. 
5. Widgery, Art. ( 1.924 ~ , 483, 
cognitive activity on different levels, Duce sees an explana-
I . 
tion of different levels of religion, the highest level, Chri-s-
tianity, being·a personal 11 I-Thou relation" resulting from God's 
presentation of Himself in Jesus Christ.l 
c) Data of logic, grounds of inference ultimately 
in immediate experience; cognitive oontent in 
intuition and feeling 
An important consideration in reference to the thought 
that there is some cognitiv~ content in general awareness, is 
that logic finds grounds of inference ultimately in immediate 
experience. DeBurgh writes: 
The data, gua_logical data, are already 
propositional in form, and function as grounds 
of inference. Thus immediate experiences, 
perceptual or aesthetic, or moral or religious, 
in so far as they antecede or defy expression 
in judgments, lie beyond the pale ..... But this 
reasoned knowledge is built n~t upon but out 
of the immediate experienoes6 . 
DeBurgh ascribes truth-value to immediate experience as 
1:1e11 as to logioal thinking, as the former is an awareness of 
content, an apprehension of: being, or 11 in Bradley' s language, 
of a • that-what' never a bare 1 that' , 11 with the judgment im-
plicit until the 111 what' has been disengaged and made explio-
it.113 DeBurgh registers a strong protest against reducing such 
experiences as 11 the pre-critical. apprehension ••• the simple 
peasant 1 s awareness of duty,·or of the presence of God, to terms 
1.. See Duce, KGN -567-569. 
2. DeBurgh, Art. { 1926) , 422. 3. DeBurgh, TRP, 422; see 5; Engl.and, VRE, 132, 135. 
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of emotional states.nl In support of this he appeals to the 
almost universal testimony of those who have had these direct 
experiences;.· logical vindication of them does not make them 
true, for if true at all,· they 11ere true in the moment of 
direct awareness.2 
Rejecting with DeBurgh and others the concept of the 
numinous as a distinctive religious faculty, England t-ti th him 
accepts the numinous experi~nce, in that religion takes its 
rise in the emotional life, immediate in the sense not of bare 
feeling but of ''living through our experiences, 11 a kind of 
~implicit reasoning .. 11 3 He describes intuition as the feeling 
of the artist, 11 the impulse to grasp the nature of reality in 
its fullness, to apprehend and appreciate ••• the finer shades 
and deeper significance of things4: 
The intuition of the poet, the philosopher, 
or the religious person, though it may advance 
to positions still further removed from those 
which logical inference could justify, is yet ·· 
of a piece with the non-logical element which 
lies at the center of all knowing processes.5 
For H&ffding the contrast between inmllect and feeling 
is merely a contrast between states where either ideational or 
:feeling elements predominate, as it is impossible to "derive all 
forms of conscious life from a state of pure :f'eeling~n6 Grif-
fiths is of the opinion that Sohleiermaoher did not intend to be 
1 .. DeBurgh..t TRP, 423; see 
Brown, ~a, 127-128. 
2. DeBurgh, Art.(l926), 424; 
see lJ!aokay, Art .. (1928), 8.5. 
3. England, VRE, 72, 29. 
4. England, VRE, 30. 
.5 .. England, VRE, 30; see 
Davidson, OIR, 133; Wat-
s~n, IRE, II, 78-80~ 102 .. 
6. Hbffding, OP, 221-2z2; 
Garnett, GIU, 39; Laird, 
PS, 89-90, 191-192, 213. 
understood as teaching that feeling alorte is the root and oore 
of religion, tha1J is, that there are "no cognitive elements 
present to ~upport the feel1ng .. "1 Rather, what he emphasized 
was the reaction of the whole personality in immediate experi-
ence, where feeling predominates, "and in which the God-con-
sciousness arises.n2 
Buokha.ln, also, teaches that experience is not llpure 
emotion" nor 11 non-mental agitation., 11 3 · Fozt Otto, "to know and 
to understand conceptually are two things •• .,often even mutually 
exclusive and oontrasted.n4 ·Likewise Hooking holds that nthere 
is no suoh thing as feeling apart from idea; ••. that idea is an 
integral part of all feeling; and that it is the whole meaning 
and dest~ny of feeling to terminate in knowledge .. 11 In this he 
sees why 11 a religion of feeling alt<1ays and rightly tends to 
transform itself' into a religion of ideas. 11 .5 Hooking shows the 
connection between feeling and its guiding idea, for when one 
is afraid, whether it 11 leads to t·Tild flight or to simply climb-
ing a tree 11 depends on "the lpresenoe of mind 1 in the feeling.,n 6 
Hooking concludes: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
All positive feeling ••• reaohes its terminus 
in knowledge.. All feeling means to instate s.ome 
experience which is essentially cognitive; it is 
idea-apart-from-its-object tending to become 
idea-in-presence-of-its-object which is •cogni-
zance• or experimental knowledge.? 
Griffiths, GIE, 244. 4. Otto, IH, 139; see 
Griff'i ths, GIE P 24.5; see Olark, Art.(l938), 
247; Bennett SMt 69 6-14. 
74i Wilson, SI, 864-86.5, 5. Hooking, MGHE, 64. 
8.50' 857-8.58. 6. Hooking, MGHE, 69 •. 
Buokham, IW, 84-86. 7. Hocking, MGHE, 67-68. 
d) Non-rational a bearer of knowledge to the 
individual 
Then, in the thought of some content in the immediate 
experience of general awareness, there is the concept that the 
non-rational is a bearer of knowledge to the individual. 
Boutroux referring to Pascal' a statement that ••the heart has 
its own reasons of which reason kno'tfS nothing, 11 denies that 
Pascal meant that the heart has nothing in common with reason, 
and proves it by several quotations. Boutroux finds the ex-
planation in Pascal's belief in two states of reason, the 
norma·l and the depraved: the former " 1 beeoming corrupt has 
corrupted everything.' 11 Pascal taught that the depraved rea-
son "Olaims to understand everything by a mode of reasoning, 
which in reality i~ adapted to abstract things.r«2 Boutroux 
thinks that Pascal must be understood in the light of his 
opponents• conception of reason as geometrical reason, and 
so revised Pascal's famous statement: 11 The heart has its own 
reasons, intelligible to a reason that is both just and com-
plete, but of whioh a purely geometrical reason has no knowl-
edge.113 That is: 
Where a reason that is infatuated with it-
self and is modelled on material things, sees 
only contrariety and incompatibility, the true, 
superior reason, being attached to the heart 
and to divin~ grace, sees continuity, order 
and harmony.LJ. 
Thus, Pascal is just another voice teaching that in 
1. Boutroux, Art.(l916)~ 294-295. 
2. Boutroux, Art.(l916)1 295. 3. Boutroux, Art.(l916), 296. 
4. Boutropx, Art. 
(1916)' 297. 
2ptl 
feeling (hear~) there are cognitive elements, closely related 
to Otto• s position that 11 the non-rational does give knolfledge 
of an intuitive sort, 11 and tnat it is 11 a bearer of knowledge, 
like the rational, to the experient," the difference being that 
the one can be conveyed to others, whereas the other, though 
equally real, remains tor the most part private property.ul 
S~izing upon James 1 s fourth mark of mysticism--the p~ouliar 
. paetio quality of .direot illum+na~ion, and Russell's definition 
of mysticism ( 11 belief in insight as against discursive reason, 
in a way of wisdom, sudden,. penetrative, coeroive 11 ), which is 
confirmed in general py the students of mysticism? Dawkins 
holds that mysticism is an 11 . as.sertion of the knowledge of 
experience as against ideational knowledge," the mystios being 
11 1mpregnable in their ti know1 .u2 
6) Dependence of probability upon cert~tudif"; the 
basis of knowledge in t~ue inward conviction 
Finally, in the consideration of the concept that there 
is some cognitive content in general awareness, particularly of 
the idea that the grounds of inference lie in immediate experi-
ence and that error creeps into knowledge in the act of infer-
ence or judgment, it should be stated that it appears obvious 
in the light of the preceding treatment that probability de-
pends upon certainty, and that the basis of true ltnowledge is 
true inward convictiono Any hypothetical statement is an in-
ference, an inference from the non-hypothetical, some intuitive 
l. Griffiths, GIE, 149~ 2. Dawkins, MEP, 20, 22. 
·- ·--------· -··-·· -------- -~---- -· ···--··· --- ··- ·-·--··- ·-
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c~rtainty or fact or reality .. l It may seem at first sight that 
Maritain goes too far in saying .that "every demonstration rests 
on some previously admitted certainty,n2 but Vance indirectly 
supports him by declaring that the only reason why the skeptical 
doctrine that probability is the guide of life is an impossible 
one is the professed absence of the indispensable basic certi-
tude so essential to any hypothesis, for "Thus the most pressing 
question how are we to live ••• receives no answer •••• With this 
bankrupoy of reason, reasonabl.e action becomes impossible. 03 
But for the basic assumptions, postulates that are not open to 
doubt, there would be no science, no argument and no proof or 
disproof of hypotheses.4 Vance finds in Desoa.rtes 1 s 11 Je pense, 
j 1 existe 7 11 an illustration of this, for "if all else is doubt-
ful, it is at least certain that consciousness states existenoe. 115 
Vance suggests that the same method be applied to other certi-
tudes. This Baillie has done: "The primary certainty of duty 
is the basis of further certitude of faith.n6 One's knowledge 
of God becomes basic to further knoltledge, and certainty of His 
existence leads to other certainties concerning Him.7 
Then, the theory of probability is faced with the problem 
of explaining how certitudes and knowledge can be derived from 
doubts and·ignorance.-8 For even the laws of chance are a source 
of knowledge, just as to be mistaken implies that one knows at 
l. Wil.son, SI, II, 536; 
see J.,ewis, AKV, 186 •. 
2. Mari tain, IP , 181. 
3. Vance, RT, 4,5. 
4. Brown, PO, 206-207; 
Murphy, ·UR, 25-26. 
5. Vance, RT, 72. 
6. Bai11ie..z IR, 346. 
7. Brown, YO, 211. 
8. See Balfour, TH, ~: 
179. 
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least one case of being in error, and what it is to be right .. 
It it be answered that 11 it is only probable that one is mis-
takeli, and only probable that 1 t is only probable," with Rynin . 
onewonde:rs: 11 whether it is really more probable that it is 
probable that it is probable ••• to the end of time and patience" 
rather than 11 perhaps at least once one observed as oocuring 
what one stated t11as occurring. ttl 
Thus, certitude is as basic to probability as permanence 
is to ohange.2 Mental as well as physical progress depends 
upon having "one foot on solid g:r;oound 11 while the other is sus-
pended .. But it does seem' that in our uncertain, chaotic age, 
men are trying to .make progress with 11 both feet in. the air." 
The walker, however, is the beet illustration of the possibil-
ity of tentativeness-and certitude existing side by side, and 
of probability resting upon certitude. 
7) Denial of the merely hypothetical eharacter of 
all empirical statements 
a) 11 Hypothesis 11 meaningful 
Denial of the merely hypothetical character of all em-
pirical sta'tements--another element in the general affirmation 
of certainty--in the first plaee renders 11hypothesis 11 meaning-
ful. Some hold the certainty of an epistemically basic proposi-
tion, i.e~ one which is foundational for the analysis of kn~rl­
edge, fulfilling the ~our conditions: 11 1) It is (in Russell's 
sense) a pure perceptive proposition; 2) it designates uniquely 
1. Rynin, Art. (1947), 594; 
see 596-597. · 
2. See Bennett, OVM, 
85-86. 
a single momentary occurrence; 3) it is epistemically indubi-
table, and 4) it is objectively certain. 11 1 Ryle has shO'T·m that 
in neither of the usual senses of "hypothetical" is it the case 
that all singular and general propositions of science and of 
ordinary experience are mere hypotheses, as in one sense of the 
word some have been ~stablished. He has detected the contradic-
tion in describing a proposition as hypothetical (conjectural> 
and at the same time established: 
Some general propositions are established to 
be the explanations of others, already known to 
be true. These are called 1 laws' and not 'hy-
potheses'. And some non-general propositions 
are known to be true. These are called 2matters-
of-faot11 or 1 :t'acts 1 , and not hypotheses. 
MacDonald agrees-with Ryle that if every empirical propb-
sition or causal law is hypothetical then the word 11 hypothesis 11 
has become useless.3 In such broad usage 11 all. cows are black" 
at midnight. If a proposition expresses a law, then it oan not 
express the hrpothesis that there might b~ such a law.4 To oall 
the formulation of what is given in immediate experience 11 hypoth-
esis11 is, as Lewis declares, to disregard the meaning of words.5 
b) Validity of distinction be~reen ground and 
content 
In the second place, the denial of the merely hypotheti-
cal character of all empirical statements gives validity to the 
distinction between ground and content of knowledge. That is, 
1. Hinshaw, Art.(1.949), 
176-177. 
2. Ryle, Art.(l937), 36. 
3. MacDonald, Art.(l937), 31. 
4. MacDonald, Art.(l937)j 34. 
5. LewisA.AKV, 182; see ones, 
FE, 6_,. 
- ---·-;-----.- -,----:o-· ····-······ 
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whea 8hypothes1s" has meaning there oan be a distinction be-
twee~ the kaowledge which prompts, directs, and controls ex-
periment amd the knowledge resulting from experiment; an issue 
is defined and tested.l 
To illus'brate, Staee takes the J)ropositiom, 11 Th1s key is 
made· ot iron •11 To call that. only a probable propos! tion is to 
. hold that thEU"e must always be sQlne doubt about 1 ts truth.. And 
t~hat .Stace tfan:is ·to ~now is just what are the doubts. He exam-
ines the position of, Cla:rnap Gl\l the proposition in question and 
shows that Oarnap is ambiguous on the kinds of test and the 
infinite number of kinds of 'best to get complete ver1f1eation. 
The 9:et.1ning characteristics ot iros are n.ot infinite in number; 
all that is needed is ~o verify them, and this can be don.e. 
Thinking, however, that· Garaap may mean that a single test ot 
the defining oharacte~is.tics, as being attracted by a magnet, 
and that ·tem thottsand.tests would give only probability, Stace 
thinks that Garnap has been misled by a~ apparent motive of 
saientists in the repeti tio.n of tests, the real motive being 
not to add weight to the probability ef the conclusion, but to 
be sure that h~ has sat1s:f'aotor1ly established 'tlhe inductive 
premises. A single case ean prove an inductive ooncl.t~slon 
with oer1Ja1nty.2 Tb;~s, 11 hypothesis 11 and 11 knowledge 11 are not 
identical: "No. theory whieh p·rofesses to be knowl.edge. ean hope 
tG stand 1t.·its truth we>uld·rend.er knowledge itself an 
1. See .Staee, A:rt. (1947), :32; 
Bl'own., PO, 205. 
2. Staoe, Art.(l947), 31-
32; see 29-30. 
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impossibility~ nl In line w1 th this, Le'tds is or1 tical of 
Dewey's preoccupation with the forward-looking function ot 
knowledge to the neglect of the backward look--to the ground 
or premises--in which knowledge appears to be identified with 
11 foresight, 11 when actually 11 the only assured foresight will 
be hinds1ght~"2 That ie, knowing should not be made synony-
mous With finding out, for this contuses the ground and the 
content of knowledge~ 
o) Broad use of 6 fa1th11 
Then the denial of the merely hypothetical character 
of all empirical statements is a recognition of the broad use 
of faith, and not its restriction to its hypothetical phase.~ 
Declaring that faith excludes doubt, and denying that faith is 
hypothetical merely, DeBurgh writes: 11 Its proper object is the 
unproven and the dubitable. This does not mean that doubt is 
present along with the assurance, for the assent of faith ex-
cludes doubt.u4 Of course the latter is only true at a cer-
tain stage in the development of faith.5 
Faith presents a puzzling union of certainty 
and uncerta-inty. On the one hand, it is a state 
of assurance that seems to the believer self-suf-
ficient. On the other, it always in some sense, 
goes beyond the evidence, and as if aware of this 
weakness, seekg to provide itself with rational justification.· 
Sir Henry Jones declares that the religious conscious-
ness will 11 revolt against the notion that its faith is just 
1. Scott, Art .. (1920) , 125; 
see Bennett, OVM~ 69-70. 
2. Lewis, Art.\l930J, 17. 
3. Vide supra, 128-138. 
4. DeBurgh, Art.(l924), lB. 
5o Vide supra, 1284 
6. Bennett, DRK', 15. 
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an hypothesis," and that hypotheses 11 have by no means proven 
themselves, as religious faith has done, to be of all forces, 
the strongest in man• s history4 n.l 
d) 11 Truth11 and "error11 intelligible 
Finally, the denial of the merely hypothetical character 
of all empirical statements makes 11 truth11 and "error" intelli-
gible. At least seven types of answers to the old questiont 
11 What is truth'? 11 are being given today. Suffice it to say that 
the implicit and explicit avowal of immediate experience and 
of the validity of empirical statements in the broader answers 
make 11 truth11 and 11 error11 intelligible.. So it would seem that 
probability has not replaced truth. To say that "no one ever 
correctly and knowingly asserted that snow was white ..... or that 
he was attending a meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association11 seems to be flying into the teeth of truth and 
rationality.2 It is the viewpoint of this dissertation that 
"truthll (as well as 11 verification" and 0hypothes1s 11 ) has mean-
ing. 
8) Summary 
While on the basis of a strict interpretation of 0 immed-
1atell it seems reasonable (as will be argued later) to deny 
the possibility of logical certainty concerning the existence 
o,f physical objects; and of other human minds, yet in the light 
ot the above general affirmations of certainty in contrast to 
1. Jones, FE, 64 .. .2. Rynin, Art. (1947), 593. 
the denials, it seems ~qually reasonable not to deny the 
possibility of any oer~ainty. The narrowing of the gap be-
tween diverse metaphysical and epistemological views seems 
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to have some significance for the assertion of some certitude. 
In this somettlhat lengthy affirmation of certitude on general 
grounds, a broad and solid foundation has been laid for suoh 
an :affirmation concerning distinctive religious expel'ience .. 
b .. On particular grounds 
1) The Kantian foundaticm for certitude in· religious 
experience 
a) The strangeness of this fact.--The affirmation 
of certitude in religious experience finds a secure foundation 
in Kantian doctrine in spite of the strangeness of this fact. 
The very one who had limited. knowledge to the physical realm, 
and had regarded ~od as a Noumenon laid the foundation for 
certitude concerning God and other spiritual realities in his 
first Gritique. It was Hegel•s keen insight that perceived 
that the very restriction of knowledge to sense-experience 
s1gsified a crossing of the boundary, 11 tor the subject that 
sets up these limits, by that very aot, admits that it is not 
enclosed in these boundaries .... and is thus in ••• absolute knowl-
edge.ttl Kant explicitly aimed at certainty: 
Sie 1st vom Skepticismus ~nzlich un~el'-0 
sohieden, einem Grundsatze einer kunftmassig-
en und scientifisohen Unwissenheit, welc~er 
die ~rundlagen all.er Erkenntniss untergrabt, 
le Maier, HCK, 38. 
-- --
--
----- ---------
·---- ------------- ·- ---- -----· 
um, wo m~glich, ~berall kfine zuverllssigkeit 
und Sicherkeit derselben ubrig zu lassen.l 
·' 
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Then, while Kant declared in his foundational pronounce-
, . 
ment that all knowledge begins with experience, and while he 
made it clear that he meant sense-experience, he immediately 
acknowledges that it does not follow that all arises out of 
(sense) experience,2 thus introducing immediate apprehension, 
an ~ ~riori element that arises on the occasion of experience. 
Furthermore, and rather inconsistently, he departed from:·; his 
fundamental empirical principle and his almost constant use of 
"experienoen to include moral and aesthetic experience in his 
. . 
second and third Critigues. In the former he deela!'es: "Die 
Moral kann ihre Grundslstze 1nsgesammt auoh in concreto, zusammtr. 
H den praktisQhen J"olgen, wenigstens in moglichen Erfahrungen 
geben. 113 He may not have seen at the time the far-reaching 
consequences of his departure--his rational endorsement of the 
possibility of knowledge th-l:'ough religious experience. At 
least, in the first Critique he never fitted this key into the 
locked door of his limitation of kno<t1ledge to physical. obj acts, 
for there God remains one of the unknown and unknowable things-
in-themselves.4 But unoonsoiousl~, perhaps~ he pointed to the 
door for others to enter~ for his third Oritique influenced 
many philosophers, such as Schel~ing, Hegel, and Sohleiermaoher. 
1. Kant, KrV, A 424; see B 35. · 
2. Kant, KrV, Einteilung, A 1. 
3. Kant, KrV, B 453o 
4. See Kant, KrV, B 
778, 781. 
b) Kant's discontent with his moral argument, 
and new oonoeption of .God as a Person 
immediately revealed in the soul of man 
1) Implioi t in his first Ori tigue 
Then the Kantian foundation for certainty in religious 
experience is seen in Kant's discontent with his moral argu .... 
ment, and new ooooeption of God as a person immediately re-
vealed in the soul of man, a concept which is implicit in 
part in the first Critique,. fpr the following are facts ot 
personality; a tree Being at.the end of the regress of cause 
and effect, eternal duration (utterly incomprehensible apart 
from an eternal P~rson to expe;,;oience it, as Kant would agree 
that intangible time has.no motion of its own to come out of 
an inexhaustible past and to pass into an inexhaustible tu ... 
ture), and morality, wh+ch according to Kant, demands ape~ 
sonal Author and Ruler of the universe, respect for moral law 
being in the last analysis respect dUe personality. 
' ' 
11) EXplicit in Kant's Opus Postum~m 
Then Xant•s discontent with his moral argument~ and 
his new conoept!on of God as a Person immediately revealed in 
the soul of man is explicit in Kant's Opus Postumumq After 
Kant's death fragments of his work were found, and were pub-
lished by Reioke in the "Altpreussische Monatssohri:f't 11 (1882-
1884)o But in 1920, Adiokes published a large number of these 
fragments. His dating of the twelve main sections 'is important, 
as it is seen that the most of the seations belong to the 
period between 1797 and the early months of 1800, and that 
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the first and seventh sections were writ-ten between December 
1800 and Kant's death in 1804. Another and later publication, 
that of Buchenau, in two volumes, is fuller and more accurate 
in the eyes of some.l These fragments indicate a real change 
in Kant's teachings.2 It is significant that the use of 11Pe:r\-
son" and "Personality" in reference to God is rare in Kant's 
earlier writings, although frequent in the Opus Postumttm.3 
While Kant retains his oonaept of God as idea or thought, and 
merely an idea in reference to theoretiaal arguments for God's 
existence, yet Kant advances beyond this theoretical view and 
beyond his moral argument to a view of the immanence of God. 
Webb gives a possible explanation for this ahange: 
Encouraged perhapsby the open immanentism 
of his younger contemporaries, he was prepared 
to repudiate more outspokenly the deism which 
had been so promin~nt in his youth •••• But just 
because he felt less haunted by this kind of 
deism, he could.now more fully than before reo .... 
ognize in the Moral Law itself ••• His Personal-
ity immediately 4evealed to the soul as the 
supreme reality. 
There are passages that might be quoted, but the climatic 
theistic empirical reference seems to be the following: "Daher 
nur 1st ein Gott in mir, um mich, und ~ber mir. 'Gott kann nur 
l. Bee Smith, OCPR, 609-610, 636-
637; .Brightman, Art. (1937)3, 
212f Collins, Art.(l943), 251, 
255, 214. . 
2. See Webb, KPR, 178-179; Smith, 
OCPR, 609. 
_3. See Buchenau, KOP, , II, 
49, 52~ 61, o2, 112. 
4. Webb, KPR 201; see 
192-193; Baillie, OKG, 
131; Adieke~ KOP,778; 
MacKinnon, ~DR, 42. 
·""···"' .., .... 
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in uns gesuoht werd·ea. t nl 
2) The deeirab~lity of having certitude 
a) The urgent -call f.or stress on certitude 
Leaving the Kantian founda1iion for certitude in religious 
exper-1enee, the second consideration on particu1al' g:r1ounds is 
th.e desirability of having eertitude,first because of the urgent 
call tor stress. o.n eerti tude today. Some one has aptly described 
the situation in the pathetic words of an uncertain, confused 
soul: 
I wish my room had a floor, 
I don't care so much for a door, 
But this floating around 
Without touching the ground 
Is g,etting to be quite a bore. 
, Shimer r&f·erring to the lose of oertalnties, wri tee: 
11 The empty house is, however, haunted by a thousand devils, 
damning some men to desptir and suicide, others to sensuality 
and crime, and others to an uncreative 1ndifference. 11 2 '!'his 
is in strikiRg contrast to the condition a few years ago, when 
"men knew why they lived and therefore how to live.u3 And 
while men are "wondering if there be not some unguessed balm 
of healing·, some transcendent· word of liberation in the dim 
and unfamiliar depth of mystical religion," psychiatrists and 
psyohoanalysts are doing a thriving business.4 
1. Buchenaul KOP, II~ 310; 
see I, l.q..4, 1.50, .L.I, 55, 
62, 108, 118, 120-121; 
Adiokes, KOP, 819; see 
824. I 
2. Shimer, CC, 29. 
3. Bh1mer1 CC! 29; Bosley, QRC, 1; H.orvo~ n Macintosh, RR, 
277-279; Mu~hy, UR, 5-10. 
4. Bosley, QRC, 4; see Lipp-
man in Lewis, GO, 9-11; Au-
brey. PTT, ~7, 120, 126. 
/ 
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b) The impossibility of living by uncertainties 
Then men can not live by uncertainties alone.. Even 
Dewey,who thinks that certainty in any realm is undesirable, 
has his own certainties.underlying his program of action: 
Dewey recommends a philosophy 'willing to 
abandon its supposed task of knowing ultimate 
reality and to devote itself to a proximate 
human office.' This can never happen, for 
philosophy can not perform the second func-
tion without the first# Men are like tigers 
in this respect, which is to the credit of 
both; they can1 t enjoy food until they can 
see their 1-1ay out of the trap.l 
It might not be merely desirable, but highly important 
to know the exact. time of the departure of one's train, a.nd to 
be certain that one' a wat-ch was correct at the time. Although 
being thus certain is a complicated process, (requiring refer-
ence to "Standard Time" and this, in turn, requiring reference 
to an observatory, where final appeal is made to the skies to 
determine the exact time), it is a process that can be carried 
to a satisfactory conclusion. 
3) The right of being psychologically certain 
a) The d9sire for certainty an innate possession 
of the race 
Man has a right to be certain. as, first of all, the 
desire for certainty is an innate possession of the race. 
liEvery human being desires certainty.n2 This, rather than the 
fact that 11 the Western intellect has traveled for the past two 
1. Hocking, Art.(l930), 
237; see Dewey, QC, 47. 
2. Brightman, RV, 114o 
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millenia on three great truthward roads 11 --philosophy, theology, 
and science, each guaranteeing certainty 11 to him who would ac-
cept its discipline," may be 11 the clue to our refusal to accept 
as final the disintegration of the bases of certaintyl; think-
ers of our day 11 are anxiously endeavoring to attain it in one 
way or another11 2t 
The uncertainties and increasing abstractions 
of pre-war German Liberalism was the seeding 
ground for the dogmatic anti-intellectualist creed 
of Nazism. The quest for certainty is an impera-
tive demand of human natureo When ideas betray 
_their inability to give intellectual security, the 
average man is liable to forsake those ideas which 
fail him.o •• No more startling example exists than 
our own generation with its anti-liberal revolt 
ot the masses,.3 
Bosley sees a common movement in modernism and Neo-Thom-
ism in re-assigning certainty to Christian theology .. 4 What he 
says about Neo-Thomism would be taken for granted, but what he 
says about modernism might need support, such as Aubrey'·s state-
ment of its purpose: 
1 To lay hold on the vital insights of our 
Christian tradition and to make them intelli-
gible to the modern mind 1 ..... Modernism is com-
mitted to the conviction that certainty (cer-
tain truths) sufficient for the direction of 
personal and social life is to be found in 
traditional Christian thought and practices.5 
b) The general reliability of experience 
In God and Ourselves, by Edwin Lewis, is a chapter w1 th 
the significant title, "The Right t·o .be Certain," in which 
1. Bosley, QRO, 10. 
2. Bosley, QRC, 17. 
3. Meadowcroft, PS, 12. 
4. Bosley, QRO, 26-27. 
5. Aubrey, PTT, 24. 
faith in the reliability of experience is viewed as an indis-
pensable condition of arriving at truth. Lewis applies it to 
religious truth: "We exercise it at one point, then why not at 
another ..... The man 't'17ho has met God in· experience can always 
say, 'I have known .. tnl Charles A. Bennett is in agreement: 11 The 
mystic seeks the one God .... and says he has found Him .. He has 
a right to his certainty. 11 2 The mystic's claim to know too 
much does not rule him out as an untrustworthy witness, for 
here as in sense-experie-nce the mind can correct its own mis-
takes, as Aristotle saw 11 in detecting a golden thread of re-
liable truth running through this world of illusion. 11 3 Man 
has thus 11 a chartered right to oerta~nty as to God ••• the justi-
fication of whiCh is an important part of the main business of 
philosophy. 114 When one sees philosophers 11 playing blind-man's 
bluff .... keenly excited at not kno"t-ting where they are ,n5 h~ is 
tempted to ask, 11 Why can1 t philosophers be people? 11 Lewis 
declares: 11 Great names to·the contrary .... probability is not 
the final resting place of the human mind, for it does not 
represent the limit of his aohievement. 11 6 
A Protestant, especially, has the right to be certain, 
Macintosh sets the record straight on the significance of the 
Reformation; it is not that men are given the right to think 
1. Lewis, GO, 18. 
2. Bennett, PSM, 109. 
3. Ormond, OP, 574-575• see 
Dotterer, Art9(1938~, 610. 
4 .. Ormond, OP, 17 .. 
5. Sheen, GI, 5; see 
Hooking, MGHE, viii. 
6. Lewis, GO, 19-25. 
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as they please,. Sane men thinlt 11 by it3t!l'nt1o~ according to 
fact." The pr1noiple_intrQd~9ed by th~_Reformation ~~that 
tru_th 0is made the inwar~ _possessior;t or .t_he believing mind by 
the convincing power of the Holy Spirit," and that, "unless 
Christ attests Himself to the soul, •• ~ the. Christian re,ligion 
cannot begin to live~nl 
c) Some absolutes J.~ft in an age of llnaertainty 
In an age of relativity and unoenta~n_ty, there are 
stili some absolutes, such as absolut,e values, un1 versally 
and eternally valid for persons, and_ "an existential reality 
so divine in quality and function as to be a w~rthy object 
of religious trust and worship."2 The astronomer.seems cer-
tain of the movement of certain planets, being able to predict 
the exact time of their appearance in a certain locality. 
The chemist seems certain of ~hat he will get when he puts 
H2 and 0 together. The customer is certain that there are 
sixteen ounces in a pound, and sometime~ makes certain that 
he gets it by a comPlaint to the Bureau of Weights and Mea~ures 
which has absolute, fixed standards~ The farmer is certain 
that seed corn will not p~oduce a wheat crop. The moralist is 
certain that "whatsoever a man (o~ a nation) soweth" 111 mora+ 
matters 11 that shall he (qr_it) also reap. 11 
Dr. Brightman offers a r,eas~m for the "general assault 
in the intellectual world against everything that pretends to 
2, Kaqintosh, ~~' vii. 
. " 
2?6 
ultimateness or finality"; it is an "overemphasis on the first 
half of the apostolic injunction, 1Prove all thingst hold fast 
that lfhioh is good,. 111 1 And Brightman names obligation as an 
absolute, approving of Kant 1 e "certainty of la"Ct in the moral 
life.n2 Dean Inge contends for absolute truth, as 11 without 
an absolute standard. there could be no relativismn and 11 There 
are certain convictions about the universe which a man can 
hardly doubt unless he is defending a thesis.u3 In the apos-
tolic injunction above may be seen the true.scientific spirit, 
tentativeness ("prove all things 11 ) an<.l certitude on some things 
--the things that have stood the test ( 11 hold fast that which 
is good 11 ),·-a combination that makes for growth and progress, 
illustrated by the progress made possible in walking when one 
foot is firmly on solid ground while the other foot is raised 
tentatively in the air. 4 . That certitude is consistent with 
growth and progress will be seen also in the next point. 
4) The reasonableness of being certain 
a) Unshakable certitude versus complete knowledge 
The reasonableness of being certain is seen, in the 
first place, in the distinction bet1-1eeti unshakable certitude 
and complete knowledge. Confusion exists in some minds between 
certitude of one fact and perfect knowledge of all facts. In 
a chapter on the necessity of faith, Trueblood quotes Hume and 
Saint Paul~ 
1. Brightman, RV, 38. 
2. Brightman, RV, 48;· see 
Murphy, UR, 138-1394 
). Inge, in Muirhead, 
BOP, 197-198. 
4. Vide supra, 262. 
•It musu ee~tainly be allowed that nature 
has kept us at a great distance from her se-
crets, and has afforded us only the knowledge 
of a few superficial qualities and objects.• 
' I know in part • ' l, · · 
2?7 
It is significant that these men so far apart in episte-. 
moleg!cal beliefs use not "believe" nor "have an opinion" but 
"know" and· 11 knowledge," both ill:lplying that 1-1e know some things. 
"Men never claim to know the whole, but they do claim to know 
things, other persons, value and even God.u2 And Trueblood 
goes beyond mere certitude: "There is good evidence that .!'!! 
·'· 
reall¥ do have some knowledge.u3 Trueblood's narrow view of 
faith makes him reluctant to say that men may know beyond a 
shadow of doubt. One oan grant with him, however, that one 
who is more certain of God than of himself should not be said 
to have 11 absolute 11 certainty as that is a term for God rather 
than for man. But who can deny to a man the right of being 
"unshakable" in his certitude about .!.Q:!!!! things? The scientist 
and agnostic George John Romanes "could not ignore the fact 
that millions of persons had claimed and continue to claim gen-
uine fellowship with the living God," with the result that he 
became a believe!', a 1' convinced theist .u Why? Eeoause he 'tfas 
an agnostic of the open-minded tn>e who say, 11 We do not know," 
rather than the dogmatic type who ·say, "We ~ not know4 n4 
This scientist and one time agnoetio muet have become convinced 
that one oan beoome acquainted with God even though doomed by 
1. Trueblood, LB, 51. 
2. TX~ueblood, LB , .51·. 
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his finitude to remain in imperfect or incomplete knowledge of 
Him.l 
Using the expression of the Apostle Paul, "the depth of 
the riches of the wisdom and kno'tfledge of God, 11 Pringle-Pattison 
writes: 
t Inaccessible' carries us back to the barren 
abstraction of the·substance, hidden behind its 
qu.ali ties o 'Inexhaustible' implles no such un-
meaning dualism; it suggests a self-revealing 
Palter, whose manifestation is l1mi ted only by 
the capacity of the reoipiento2 
That the recipient can experience better than he can 
express is seen in the apostle's phrase "unlawful to utter." 
But this same one, the very one who is quoted so frequently as 
saying nwe kno11 in part, 11 also said, 11 I 19:!2.!! whom I have be-
lievea.u3 The writer ventures to suggest that it might have 
been difficult to convince the apostle that he had not seen the 
glorified Ohrist or that 1 t was only a highly. probable event. 
Edwin Lewis declares that Lippman is right when he says 
that a religion that is not. completely certain is_ in process 
of disintegration: 
Brightman takes issue with him but not success-
full,- because of ·his entirely wrong· assumption 
that complete certainty requires complete proof~ 
All that complete ·certainty requires· is sufficient 
proof •• o.Statements made about God are not to be 
put on the same level as the indubitable certain1ty 
of the :f'aot of God as4yielded by the process of re~1g1ous experience. · 
1. See Wieman, BESM, 24; 
Brown, PO, 24-28o 
2. Pringle-Pattison~ TIGl 166; 
see Martin, OA, ~5, 6;o 
3e II Tim. 1:12 (under-
searing the writer's). 
4 .. Le.wis, GC, 24-25; see 
Mariiin, <'A, 45. 
279 
b) elerti!tud~ for self versus proof for others 
Then, the reasonableness of being certain is seen in 
the consideration of certainty tor self versus proof for 
others. The mystic Rtttus Jenes is doubtless oorreot in his 
thought 1';hat: "No subjective experience, hot-tever momentous 
and ·Bignificant ••• for the person who has it, can settle for 
everybody else the questiont Is there in the universe a God 
t1ho is personal and all loving? nl 
It is a personal matter~ As Trueblood says: "If a man 
were to deny that there,is salt upon the table, you could not 
reduce him to an absurdity~u2 The man who has tasted the salt, 
on the other hand, will not be disturbed in his own certainty 
by the uncertainty or the unbelief of the one whom he is un-
able to oonvinoeo3 
'One inner fort there is,' wrote Francis 
Thompson, •whose key only God holds, 'tfhose 
.gates open only to his nod, whose floor he 
alone can tread, when God takes possession 
of that inner fort, the soul knows and there 
is nothing more to be saia.' 'The God who 
answers, let Him be God.' 
After all, "the preof of the pudding is the eating .. 11 
W1 th the beet formal proof in the tforld hanging limp, the one 
who is eel'tain but has difficulty in making another feel a 
like oertitude,has one recourse; he ean say, "Taste (experience) 
and see (find out fol' yourself) that the Lord is good." It is 
a self-validating, not another-convincing experience. 
1 .. Jones, SNR, xxix .. 
2. Trueb~ood, LB, 36. 
:;. See Lewis, GO, 27. 
4. Lewis, GO, 27-28o 
o) ·Immediate experience of God psychologically 
more compelling than the facts of science 
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In the third place the reasonableness of being certain 
is seen in the viel'l that the immediate experience of God is 
psychologically more compelling than certitude concerning the 
facts of science. ·strictly speaking, there is no direct ex-
pe:t-ienoe of that which is external.l It is true that some, 
with referanoe to physioa_J. things, talk of a. lfdireot relation 11 2 
(realists), 11 direct knowledge 113 (natural realists), 11 direct 
peroeptionn4 (neo-realists), 11 direct presentation", 11 direct 
acquaintance", and "no~~inferential awareness"5 (oritioal 
realism), "direct apprehension11 6 (Dennes), and "direct cogni-
tive oontaotn7 (Adams); but even in the context of such ex-
pressiona,is often the recognition of a process of mediation 
or of media between the soul (the real experiencer) and the 
external object, suoh as sense organs and the nervous system.8 
Even when the body is in direct contact with the object, it 
is acknowledged that the mind does not 11 press its nose up 
· against the material object. 11 9 In the illustration of Russell, 
we do not directly experience the table, but only the perception 
1. Vide suprap 210-216; see 7 .. Adams, Arto(l928), 192. 
Rashdall, R, 16-17. 8. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 
2. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 112, 124-126, 211; Meyer, 
201-202. PST, 313-315. 
3. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 124. 9. Pringle-Pattison, 'fiG, 
4. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 126. 124; see Knudsoni PP, 
s.. Macintosh, RO, 201, 205-206. 102; Duoe, KGN, 27, 
o. Dennes, Art.(l928), 110. 161. 
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of its sense-data.l 11 The world with which we come in contact is 
merely a state of our own or anybody1 s oonsoiousness."2 0., I. 
Le"&tis states the same fact in another way: 11 The world of experi-
ence is not given in experience; it is constructed by thought 
from the data of sense., 11 3 In the relation bet1-reen the perceiver 
and the perceived, there is 11 a process which is compl.icated ••• 
which involves many changes": 
Experience is no longer the immediate appre-
hension of faot; it is the transmission of a 
message conveyed from the object to th4 perciP-
ient by relays of material messengers. 
Balfour declares that the progress pf science has made 
the process more complicated, and that science teaches us that 
11 the physical causes of perception are inferred but not per= 
oeived, 11 and that "the real material world has been driven.9. 
further and further into the realm of the unseen. 11 5 
Thus, there is no direct acquaintance with external 
objects. We have immediate knowledge of the presentation, but 
not of the object itself.6 Hartshorne restricts immediate 
knowledge to internal activity.? Russell grants some direot 
acquaintance 't'rith the "I 11 , while reJecting all such acquaint-
ance with an external object: 
1. Firth, Art.(l949) 439; 
vide supra, 215; Lovejoy, 
Art.,(l932), 340-341; 
Strong, Art .. ( 1932), 680, 
686; Dawkins, MEP, 63., 
2., Rashda11, PR 49. 
3. Lewis, MWO, Z9• see Inge 
in Muirhead4 CBP, 196; Duce, KGN, 93. 
4. Balfour, TH, 158. 
5., Balfour, TH, 158; 
162., 
6., See Lewis, MWO, 292o 
7o See Hartshorne, 
MVG, 183. 
There is no state of mind in which we are 
directly aware of the table; all our knowledge 
of the table is really knowledge of truths •••• 
We know by descriptionol 
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In contrast to this, much evidence has already been 
presented that distinctive religious experience is unmediated 
(i.e.· non-inferred, intuitive or. self-evident, and in the 
present), in a degree not true of physical objects, and that 
consequently the kno111ledge resulting is by acquaintance rather 
. . 
than by description, i.E9 •.• of God.rath&r.than about Goa.2 
Martineau, speaking of ~evelatiori, declares that God comes 
11 close to the soul 11 : 
It must be immediate, living God with living 
man, Spirit present .with spirit; knowing Him, 
indeed, but rather. 1 being kno\tn of Hint ..... The 
disclosure must be self-disclosure; the evidence 
self-evidence; the apprehension, as we ~ay, in-
tuitive; something given. and no~ found• 
Implied in this, and due particularly to the fact that 
religious experience is basically feeling and that there is 
cognitive value in feeling (the polarity of feeling and thought),4 
.. is the evidence that the knowledge of God is more 11 coercive 115 
than the knowledge of things and of other minds. This goes 
beyond the position .of Knudson and others.6 For instance, 
Trueblood, at one stage in his thought, placed the knowledge 
of the external world and of God upon the same basis--that of 
faith. But in vie"t-7 of what has already been said and will be 
1. Russell, PP, 78, 74-75. 
2. Vide supra, 202-218, 
226-231, 248-252, 255-
260 26.5-266. 
3. Martineau, SAR, 305. 
4. Vide supra)_ 241, 245-
247, 251-2oo.· 
5. Vide supra, 260 (see· 
· Russell). 
6. Vide supra, 229-231. 
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. said, it is questionable "":1hether 11 the bird in the tree,u (the 
perception of nhich is· lias much in my mind as my perception 
of God 11 ) can come so near to man t a spirit as can God .1 For 
Bradley! "There is nothing more real than what comes in reli-
gion •• ~ .,The man 'tfho demands a reality more solid knows not 
'tthat he seeks • 112 Pringle-Pattison and others agree 1111i th this .3 
In fact,.theologians in general take a·stronger stand: "In the 
common opinion of theologians there. :is .. a greater certitude in 
Divine faith than in any human soience. 11 4 Griffiths, speaking 
of the Absolute who is not a notion but an experience, a Real-
ity in which we live and move and have our being, declares:. 
He is·more immediate than perceptive ex. 
perience. I experience God more intimately 
indeed 't<Yhen I am kno't..rn of Him than when I 
know Him. Being known is the only perfect 
way of knowingo5 · 
Martineau makes a distinction between the immanence of 
God in the energies of nature and in the authority of con-
soience.6 Wiley makes somewhat of the same distinction between 
the metaphysical immanence of God not only in nature but in man 
in general, and God 1 s ethical immanence in men not separated 
from Him by sin .. 7 ·It is this latter idea that is being used 
in this dissertation in reference to the mystical experience .. 
1 .. 
2. 
3. 
Sheen gives the general view of religious experience: 
Trueblood, LB, 204; see 
203. 
Bradley, AR, 499. . 
Pringle-Pattison, TIGi 
252; McTaggart, SDR, ~4-
86; Bowne, THE, 26-27. 
4. The Catholic Encyclopedia, 
special ed. 1 (1908), III,S39. 5. Griffiths, ~IE, 213; see 
Martineau, SAR, 305 .. 
6. See Martineau, SAR, 307.. · 
7. See loJ'iley, OT, II, 276-277. 
A certain experience of God in th.e heart 
of man, thanks to which God is attained with-
out a reasoning process and with a certitude 
stronger than that attaching to scientific 
truth •••• Those who have those experiences 
cannot be moved from them by logic, or sci-
ence o;r:o persuasion.l . . 
284 
Sheen implies that Professor Alexander has made this 
immobility reasonable by oal~ing religious experience an 
11 1nstinct," which like our appetite for food and drink, does 
not 11 make its objectn but 11 diseovers it.n2 
Trueblood advances beyond his position that religious 
experience is as certain as sense-experience by asserting that 
its- "evidence of objectivity is even better than in natural 
science," and by his use of Newton and Pascal as examples, 
-the former being more certain of his 11inward oonversion 11 than 
that .he had hands and feet, and the latter writing 6 FIRE11 as. 
descriptive of 11 hi_s life-shaking exp-erience~ n3 Descartes 
bases certitude upon subjective ex.peri.enoe, which as immedi-
ate, gave more certitude than the experience of ex~ernal things. 
He was thus more certain of God than of his O"N'n existence. 4. 
This was not merely on the grounds of discursive reasoning: 
"In spite of the syllogistic form 'tthich Descartes gave .... this 
proof is rath~r intuitive ••• an immediate apprehension.".? 
Baillie sees in the mystics' conviction that God is revealed 
to man's 11 t1:ioughts" (i.e. that through them n"Vte can get closer 
1. Sheen, GI, 25; see 
James, PU, 307-308. 
2. Sheen, GI, 25; see 
Alexander, ST», II, 
352, 374, 382, 385. 
3. Trueblood, LB, 214, 201. 
4. See Descartes, MPP, 54-
55-. 5. Levy-Bruhl, in Descartes, 
:MPP, xviii Q 
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to God than we oan get to the things of sense by seeing and 
touching and tasting them 11 ) , the Platonic vision, God being 
"visible to the mind alone.- 11 1 Gildea writes in a similar 
strain: "Now we never stand in the presence of a table or a 
door; lfe stand in the presence only of a person. n2 Of course, 
as the mystics stress, only the pure in heart oan stand in the 
presence of the Lord.3 
d) Immediat.e experience of God psychologically 
more coercive than the facts of psychology 
Then, the immediate experience of God is psychologically 
more ooerc~ve than the facts of psychology. Without holding 
a brief for the isolation of human minds (for the knowledge of 
self depends upon knowledge of the not-self, the will, for 
instance, needing the clash wi~h other wills in order to come 
to consciousness of its reality and claims),4 one can reason-
ably 1nfer that man has no direct experience of another human . 
person. Those who are investigating telepathy often describe 
it in terms of.· mediation • .5 And while Boodin holds that 11 inter-
subjective continuities" are 11felt 11 and 11 felt to be different 
from physical continuit1est 11 yet when he talks of sending a 
mental impulse along with the voice over an eleot.rical wire, 
he is still using the language o~ mediation while contending 
for 11 the immediate character flf sociaJ. companionship.n6 He 
1. Baillie, IR, 22?; see 
Buokham, MML 123 144. 
2. Gildea, Art.(1890~~ .50. 
3. Baillie, IR, 228; Heb. 
12:14. 
4~ See Kant~ KrV, A 3.5?-3.59; 
Boodin, .KU, 19lt-19.5 • 
5. See Tyrrell, Art.(l94?), 
329. 
6. Boodin, RU, 19.5-196. 
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adds that his theory doe.s not support 8. telepathic hypothesis 
except as social experience indicates it, and that "our social 
continuities become no less mediated by 8. nervous system, end 
organs and an intervening physical world than before. ttl 
Ward, also, speaking of a ttrapport 8 betto1een spirits, 
grants physical mediation~2 Likewise Lossky, who holds that 
independent selves arein flepistemological co8rdination, 11 main-
tains that the intuitive theory does not imply that one can 
"contemplate his neighbor•s life without seeing his face or 
hearing his voice, or perceiving any of hie physical manifesta-
tions.113 ·Bennett, who appears at first to teach direct communi-
cation of human minds, later introduces the media of sensation 
and·the medium of 11 an umpire above finite ideas," and 11 Absolute 
Knolfer. n4 Hooking, while not car~ful in his use of n immediate 11 
and 11 direct, 11 teaches that while human souls are in real commu-
nication., they ".cannot touch each other, cannot. experience each 
other~ 11.5 : Sorlay may be allotfed to give the conclusion to this 
point: 1iTherefore, can no mind directly perceive another. n6 
If', as it appears·· there is no direct eXperience by man 
of other 11uman minds, there is no strict 11aoquaintanoe11 with 
them. 7 ·. So that while some argue that. 't7e can be .!.!! certain of 
God as of human beings, making it a matter of inference in both 
' ' .·. I 
oases, 8 others declare that 1'78 oan be.~ certain of God, as 
1. Boodin, RU, 197-198. 
2. \'lard, EP, 354. 
3. Los sky, Art., ( 1948) , 
152; see _1.50, 1.59 .. 
4. Bennett, OVM, 127. 
4. Hooking, MGHE, 245; 
see 242-2431 246. 5. Gorley, MVI~, 265. 
· 6. Sorley, MVIG, 265~ . 
Russell, PP 76-77 .. 
7. Rashdall, PR, 110-111. 
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we can become acquainted with Him through immediate experience. 
Evidence will be presented that they are correct in this be-
lief. But a preliminary consideration is necessary firstq 
.5) The psychology of being certain: conditioning 
.a) Introduction 
As already indicated, there are psychological or con-
ditioning factors preceding immediate religious experience.l 
The psychologist distinguishesbetween what is immediate, the 
·.given, and that which explains it, Psychologically, if not 
causally, all perception (except perhaps initial perception) 
is conditioned by apperception; experience can be anticipated.2 
_Royce calls attention to the aneient doetrine that the object 
of thought 11 is already defined· even before' ~re undertake to 
know it .. 11 3 For the effects found in immediate religious ex-
perience there are muses--human all.d divine: . 11 The 1 1mmediacy1 
. . ' . . 
of the mystic has its external relationsH .. some part of the 
meaning of this experience is.to be.discovered in its exter-
nal career. n4 
Functional psychology looks.for these eonditions, the 
noriginal moving impulses which give vitality to any form of 
experience.n5 Religious perception like all perception is in 
a complex.6 The expression 11 right religious adjustment 11 sug-
gests the divine_ side. of the conditioning process: 
1 .. Vide supra., 190-191 .. · · 
2~ See Kant, KrV, B· 137; 
Coe, POR, 157; Macin-
tosh, TES, 31-33, 107; 
Brightman, Art.(l918), 
71-76 .. 
3 .. Royce, WI, I, 34~-346, 
4. Hgcking, MGHE, 3:55; see 
Hoffding, TPOR, 96, 162. 
5. Ames, Art.(l915), 2.52. 
6., See Martin, EPR, 74; 
Macintosh, RR, 337-338. 
It is the divine as revealed to the indi-
vidual that has rightful authority over the 
individual rather than the mere outcome of. 
some other individual's having been inspired 
by a religious experience of J::iis own ••• .,In 
' religion as in logio and morals, the ultimate 
authority is objective l'ITi thout being purely 
external, and internal "fd thout being purely 
subJective., We are not obliged to infer, to 
decide, or to respond religiously, save as 
our reason, our own conscience, or our own 
religious ne.ture find "tqhat appeals to it as 
logical, or right, or divine •.. But ••• we ought 
not to feel free to 1nter, to decide or to 
respond religiously Just as we please, with-
out regard to logic, or moral principle, or 
revelation.l 
b) Oondi ti oning by.: 
(i) Christian community 
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As people in general are conditioned in their thinking 
at first by their intellectual environment, so the Christian. 
is at first conditioned in hisbeliefs by theChristian commu-
nity.2 As a member ~f society, he is to some extent a product 
of society • .3 The· mystic accepts the idea of God as held by 
his.generation or "social milieu. 114 Traditional ideas usually 
· 
11 evoke 11 religious ·experience. This shows the value of tradi-
tion in its relation to the Scriptures and to the church; .its 
ideas 11 ready made, have only to be translated into experience. 11 
But this is not necessarily a restriction, an imposition, 
against which H2>ffding "toJarns ,5 any more than the laboratory 
manual is an element of bondage to the experimenter who is 
1. Macintosh, TES; 110-111. 
2 .• See Pratt, PRB, 199; Rall, 
FT, 76; Hickman1 IPR~ 476-477; Ames, Art.\1915J, 
256; Rashdall, PR, 109. 
3. See Ames, Art.(l9l5), 
253. 
4. Ames, Art.(l915), 254. 
5. H~ffding, TPOR, 99. 
289 
guided by it. There should be criteria of Christian experi-
ence. 11 Distinctively Christian religiousness is determined 
(in part) by distinctive Christian doctrine; Christianity 
is neither a doctrine nor a life, but a life colored by doc-
trine.111 And as implied by Tennant and Aubrey, experience 
and doctrine aot and react upon each other.2 
(ii) Bible.--The Bible is a conditioner of im-
mediate religious experience. Sometimes it works directly, 
and sometimes indirectly (as through the Christian community). 
11 From the ideali.stio point of view all knowledge may be looked 
upon as a partial communication to the human soul of the 
thoughts ••• of the divine M1nd. 113 Not even an atheist, however, 
should talk about 11 the unassisted human intellect. 114 It is 
just as possible to make discoveries "t-7ithin the sphere of the 
inner life as within that of the outer.S And it is only nat-
ural that the one who desires to make.them should follow the 
instructions of the "Laboratory Manual," the Christian Scrip-
tures, and be conditioned by them, for there is uniformity in. 
the Christian life, the operation of cause and effect, and 
stimuli and response~ If God is to be known, He must reveal 
Himself; the record of this self-disclosure, in turn, becomes 
the conditioner of God's revelation in other lives: 
1. Tennant, PT, I, 327. 4. See Inge, Art.(l948), 
2. See Tennant, PT, I, 327; .· .46; Rashdall, PR, 141, 
Aubrey, Art.(l930), 562, . 138; Bradsha"t-tTHPFF, 
567. 27; Balfour, , 274; 
3. Rashdall, PR, 141.' ~iffiths, GIE, 16. 
5. o~fding, TPOR, 101. 
Apart from revelation, reason cannot sat is- · 
factorily account for the content of religious 
exPerience. Reason does not constitute, pro-
duce, or create re.ali ty ..... It rather guides, 
relates, interprets and evaluates ~rhat is given 
in consciousness.l 
So the Bible,,both the record· and the source of rev-
elation, 11 mediates the Christian eXperience of God."2 
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·(iii) Imagination and will.--Imagination and will 
are conditioning factors in immediate religious experience. 
. . . . . 
11 A very considera.ble number. of exPerimental psychologists 
doubt that there .ls any 1 imageless thought.tn3 It is hel.d 
that there is no ideal 11 that ha.s not been fashioned by the 
imagination out of the data of actual experience," and. that 
11 the mind can no more create ideals ~ nihilo than it can 
create reality. 11 4 Montague sees the material of imagination 
in stored-up traces of past memory inheritance, and calls 
.attention to the power of imagination in the solution of 
problems: 
The chief difference betw:een the mystic and 
the ordinary man may consist in this: that in 
the ordinary man, so long as he is a'tiTake, the 
power of. imagination is weaker .tha.n the sense 
of perceptual reality, while in the mystic the 
reverse is true.5 . 
Kroner makes imagination the tool of: faith in the 
approach to God. He thinks that Kant made a mistake in as-
suming that faith 11 can renounce imagination without losing 1 ts 
character 11 and that 11 reason oan establish a rational faith": , 
1. Schiller, Art. ( 193ffi) , 
1.6; see Horton, TSS, . 
. 16-18; Tillioh, IH, 
34; Baillie, OKG1 112; Hooking, MGHE, 2G9. 
2. Macintosh, TES, 109-110; 
see Otto, IH: .. , 106 • 
3.. Ames, Art .. ( 1915) , 253 • 
4 .. England, KCG, 1.82. 
5. Montague, WK, 56; see 55. 
The content of faith is not only supersensu-
ous, it is superrational too~ And this ••• in-
gredient in.the content of faith is furnished 
by imagination.. A purely rational faith iS no . 
real faith ..... Imagination, not reason, is priv-
ileged to receive the Word of God; it 1s the 
proper region of the mind in which the Holy can 
appear ..... The idea of God is not a true concept; 
it is a holy image.l · 
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As faith is a voluntary aotivity,2 imagination is a 
tool of the will; thus will is also a factor in the condition-
ing process. 
(iv) Feeling .. --Feeling is also a conditioner 
of immediate religious experience.. Feeling plays upon the 
material received·directly from the community and indirectly 
from the Bible,. and is.olothed in the garments of the imagin-
ation. Feeling, especially as love, awe, and humility, is 
preparatory to the activity of fai~h.) 
(v) Faith~--;Finally, one .. ie conditioned by 
faith for the immediate· experiencing of ·~God. 4 A child grows 
up in a religious home, church and community; he inherits be-
liefs. 11 It is not Christian experience that creates faith 
. . . 
but rather faith that creates Christian experie~oe .. 11 .5 Baillie 
says: 11 We can have'no religious experience prior to and inde-
pendently of religious fai th.n6 Baillie goes on to reverse 
faith and experience which is simply a recognition that the 
faith of the reader of the B1bl.e is based upon the religious 
1 .. Kroner, PF, 133-142. 
2. Vide supra, 191-192. 
3. See Kroner, PF, 2• Mc-
Creary, Art. ( 1948~, 81. 
4. Vide supra, 190-191. 
5. Knudson, PTE.· 163. 
€5 .. Baillie_,_ IR"- Z3l; see 
Rall , F'J.' , 5 q. .. 
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experience of others--the writers of the Bible as well as the 
readers of the Bible.. But the revelation experience o.f the 
writers of the Bible is in turn ultimately conditioned by 
faith, faith in the form of an intuitive belief in God or a 
belief in a primitive revelation.. Knudson vie"t-tS revelation 
and faith as correlative terms: "There can be no true faith 
without revelation and no true revelation "1i thout' ·faith~ •••. 
The true starting point of theology is to be found in revela-
tion.111 Thus, "Religion lives not by sight but by insight 11 ; 
for through insight man 11 comes into touoh .... with the Unseen 
God., 11 2 Temple, also, traces faith behind tradition: 11 In the 
totality of religious history, tradition and belief depend on 
experience. 11 3 This is a reasonable attitude: 
When we rely on authority, we are, in most 
oases:f doing the most reasonable thing we can 
do. t is far more reasonable for me to rely 
on the opinion of Mr. Millikan in regard to 
cosmic rays than it is to rely on my4own un-aided and highly amateurish efforts. 
Edwin Lewis explicitly applies this to faith in the 
testimony of God: 11 But the experience cannot be known until 
the revelation is accepted. 11 5 The revelation is accepted by 
faith. Lewis has made clear here that faith in one of its 
aspects precedes the mystical experience.6 On the broad plat-
form previously laid down, there is room for faith after the 
1. Knudson, PTR, 165-166. 
2., Baillie, IR, 232; 
Pennoch, OCG, 27. 
3. Temp1e, NMG, 336 .. 
4. Trueblood, LB, 72. 
5. Lewis, FD, 14; see 
Rall, FT, 54. 
6. Vide supra, 284. 
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exPerience, for there is a post-hypothetical faith as well 
as a hypothetical or conditioning. faith .. l The mystic can still 
trust in God, even though he no longer doubts the existence of 
God.2 The immediacy advocated is a mediated immediacy, as hae 
been 1mplied,3 and will be explicitly stated shortly. 
6) The experience of being certain: human-divine 
interaction 
a) Necessity.--It is necessary that religious 
experience be immediate. To Hegel religion meant 11 dass nicht 
nur wir in der Beziehung zu Gott stehen, sondern auch Gott in 
der Beziehung zu uns stehe. 11 4 He taught that if the relation 
were real, the knowledge will be real, and that there is no 
~ priori reason for denying contact with God. In fact' 11If a 
man does not know God, it is not God's fault, but man 1 s own. 11 5 
To be understood, religion must be experienced: 
No merely external historical knowledge of 
religion suffices •••• No amount.of familiarity 
with the convictions which have been held about 
God can6fill the place of personal expe~ience of Godo 
Behind the theistic proofs, Hegel saw immediate con-
sciousness of God, certainty of His existence.? Today, many 
see the necessity for the same background: 
If a trtith about God is communicated to us, 
from whatever" source, it can carry justifiable 
1. Vide supra, 128~ 262-263. 
2. Bennett , DRK , · ltl-19. 
3. Vide supra, 28~289. . 
4. Hegel, JUB, xiv, 46. 
s. Schilling, ERH, 160; see 
Hegel, JUB, xiv, 49, 55. 
6. Schilling, ERH, 49; 
see Hegel, JUB, xii, 
8-9, 558 .. 
7. See Schilling, ERH 
35-36; DeBurgh, TP~, 
138-139. 
conviction only as it is corroborated by the 
immediate knowledge of God as He is revealed 
to us within.l · 
In criticism of the so-called inferential method of 
ltno'tdng God, Procter declares: 
Either God is directly given to us in ac-
quaintance or else we find ourselves with an 
impassable gulf between thought and existence 
•••• W'e have to _conclude that, either, the God 
known in the end is not other than that which 
is given us in acquaintance from 't4hich we 
start, or else none of these proofs is valid.2 
Procter sees no explanation for religion's "obstinate 
hold upon mankind~apart from its continual refreshment from 
immediate experiences of God by man: 11 But tradition explains. 
nothing. One cannot dispose of questions by perpetually-re-
ferring them to the preceding genera.tion. 11:3 In similar vein 
James writes: "Churches when once established live at second-
·hand upon tradition, but the founders of every church owed 
their power to the fact of their direct personal communion 
with the divine."4 
b) Awareness: a mediated immediacy 
The experience of being certain is an awareness of God, 
a mediated immediacy. Hegel suggests this phrase: 
Religious knowledge is essentially a medi-
ated knowledge, but all the same it is not 
admissible to look in a one-sided way upon 
mere mediated knowledge as being real and true.S 
For Hegel, religious knowledge was not 11 mere mediated 
1. Garnett~ GIU, 89; see 
Leuba, ~RM, :304;_ Hook-
ing, MGHE, 356-l¥55 i 
Procter, FKR, 13-1~. 
2. Procter, FKR, 14. 
:3. Procter, FKR, 64; 
see 6:3. 
4. James, VRE, :30. 
5. Hegel, PR, 164o 
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knowledge11 for he believed in revelation, a knowledge received 
directly from God.. He asserts that if 11 God 11 and "I 11 were One, · 
"there would be immediate religion free from any mediation.ul 
If they were one, there would, of course, be no relation, no 
i~teraotion~ But on the other hand, revelation for Hegel is 
an eternal event, . eternally repeated2: 
For Hegel, the main evidence of the truth 
of Ohristiani ty, therefore 1 is .... the Spirit himself bearing witness wi~h my spirit ••• a 
direct and eternally possible cDntact between 
man and God, spirit and Spirit.j 
That is, 11God is, and gives Himself to men by coming 
. into a relation with them .. n4 Hegel uses the term 11 immadiate 11 
for the knowledge derived from this contact, and calls for the 
synthesis of the anti theses between the ttfo kinds of kno1-1ledge, 
for apart they are 11 one-sided abstractions."-' 
In an article largely Hegelian in tone, Dr. Brightman 
notes that the human spirit seemingly is dissatisfied both 
with and without immediacy, and decides that it is not an 
11 eithel'-or11 opposition but a 11 both-and 11 synthesis.. He declares 
that the mystic 1 s claim to direct knowledge of God can not be> 
made apart from mediation before and after the immediate ex-
perience: 
But the moment when all relations cease, 
when there is no longer like or unlike, mora 
or less, quality or quantity, is the moment 
when immediacy becomes nothingness, and all 
conscience is annihilated ..... No present 
1. Hegel, PR, II, 166. 
2. See Hegel, JUB, xiv, 35. 
3. Schilling, ERH, 123; see 
Hegel, PR, II, 200., 
4., Hegel, PR, II, 192=193. 
5G Hegel, PR, II, 160-161, 
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moment of intuition or revelation or sense 
or passion has spiritual meaning by itself 
alone •••• If 't'ITS are to be empirical ••• we must 
go beyond empirical immediacy •••• Examine the 
immediacy which is to escape the claims of 
reason, and it turns out to contain reason 
in disguise.l 
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But immediacy itself may be said to contain reason in 
disguise in the sense of_reason being implicit in feeling and 
intuition as has been noted.2 Brightman practically recog-
nizes this: 
Not only is the immediate the necessary 
starting point of all thought and the point 
at which all eventual empirical verification 
occurs; it seems also to be the point at 
which objective reality is revealed, free 
from all distortions. In the conviction that 
immediacy is the truth about the real many 
types of individuals agree.3 · 
That the immediate is free from error is quite gene~ 
ally agreed.4 Brightman does not deny that there is an ex-
perience of immediacy in any sense, but only that there is 
any 11 absolutely simple and i~olated present. 11 5 Conditioning 
of the immediate experience of God has not only been admitted 
in this dissertation; it has been stressed. Immediacy, thus, 
has not been used in the sense of being out of relations. 
Concerning immediacy in the sense of that which is present.in 
consciousness in the 11 spec1ous-present 11 ·(which Brightman ac-
cepts), the claim has not been made that the human spirit can 
1. Brightman, Art .. (1934), 
90, 97; see 87, 95. 
2. Vide supra 213 216-
218' 241-243, 245-260. 
3 .. Brightman, Art. (1934), 89; 
see 92. 
4. Vide supr~ 212-214; see 
Lovejoy, .11J), 23. 
5. Brightman, Art.(l934), 90. 
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n apprehend in a single grasp all the meaning of God. ul l.f1 th 
Brightman the· 't.rri ter agrees also ~hat while theoretically 
there may be an active and a passive aspect of the self in 
immediacy, actually there is ·no $Uch.div1sion of the self, 
i$e. that the 11 actual, indivisible whole of present conscious-
ness is all equally present, eque.lly direct and immediate. n2 
But "t-71 th many others the t'lriter holds ~hat there is some cog-
nitive content in the immediaue expe~ience of God, and that 
11God and the soul are br.ought to a~ mystica of "t-Till and 
of love in a personal relationship closer than that between 
persons and things or between human persons. Consequently, 
'f.lhereas Brightman thinks that it takes more faith to accept 
the presence of God as a reality than it does the prese~ce of 
a human being, the writer thinks.it requires less faith; there 
is general agreement that the mystic claims more certitude 
concerning God than concerning anything else or anybody else . 3 
But the significant fact is that while D~. ~r1ghtman does not 
use the exp:eession "mediated immediacy" in his article on 
immediacy, he does declare that "every actual experience is 
both immediate and mediate. 114 
Bennett viel'rs ·the mystical experience a.s a coming into 
the immediate presence of God. consequent upon taking certain 
preparatory steps toward God. 
1. Brightman, Art.(l934), 91; 
vide supra, 276-278. 
2. Brightman, Art.(l934), 93; 
vide supra, 241, 244-246, 
2,54-2,58. 
It is a mediated immediacy also 
3. Vide supra, 280-287. 
4. Brightman, Art. 
(1934)' 90. 
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because the mystic does not deny idea but only regards it as 
insufficient.. 8Mediate 11 implies 11 immediate, 11 for something 
has to be mediated.,l 
While Ritschl was antagonistic to mysticism, rejecting 
the traditional ideas of immediacy, he implied that there is 
an immediate relation to God in his teaching on adoption--a 
relationship as close as 11 between the head and the members of 
a family. 112 On the other hand, mediation is suggested in 
Ritschl1 s regarding of history as essential to Christianity, 
and in his making history and metaphysics criteria of religious 
truthe3 
Duoe holds esse~tially the same position, i.e. that in 
the s.trictest sense knowledge is immediacy plus rational under-
standing. He agrees ~ith the Neo-Thomists' insistence on the 
latter, but differs with them in seeing an awareness of God 
prior to true knowledge$ Knowledge becomes true kno't'Tledge when 
there is reflection upon the experience' of 11 the Presence. n4 
It is freely acknowledged that the experience is conditioned,5 
but it is contended that this does not mitigate against its 
immediateness.' That the .mystic gets some of the what of his 
experience ·from· tra.di tion and. other instruction, does not 
invalidate the that of his experience. Knowing God and knowing 
l. See Bennett, CVM4 v, vi, 10, 47, 52-5 , 
145. 
2. Brightman, CRT, 19; 
see 20. 
3 .. 
4. 
5~ 
See Brightman, CRT, 
32, 49. . 
See Duce, KGN, 532 '· 
536. 
Vide supra, 288-293. 
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about God are two distinct facts; certainty of God's existence 
and an exhaustive knowledge of His nature are not the same. 
One must d'istinguish the "immediate certainty contained in re-
ligious feeling from arguments dral'm from the· feeling, nl as 
well as from prior knmdedge: 
For though we trace the.ideas of. the mystic 
to some social tradition that he imbib~d, the 
tradition as a whole remains to be accounted 
for. The religious belief.' of humanity taken 
in its grand totality cannot be aproduct of 
external.suggestion •••• It is clearly not the 
result of critical or analytical reflection. 
It has·been ~volved somehow from within the 
mind of m~Jl. . ·. . ·· 
Now that u somehow" must be immediate ex:perience, for 
nothing can be evolved that is not first ·involved; ideas·, even 
the ideas of dreams and hallucinations, have their objective 
causes, even though they are out of proper relation. Naturally 
then' the mystic 11 ifill not admit that his certainty of spiritual 
things is self-produced. 113. Macintosh sees the explanation of 
theidea of God in the sum total of the religious experiments 
that have been conducted through the ages, from 't'rhich there 
·has come some general conclusions concerning God~4 Martin ques-
tions the scientific character of the .religious perception ad..:. 
vocated by Macintosh on the ground that it is 11 colored by peJ:~­
sonal commitments to certain ideals chiefly associated with a 
certain religious tradition, 115 but what scientist is objective 
1. Coe, Art.(l908), 369. 
2. Coe, Art.(l908), 372; 
vide supra, 293-294.. · 
3. Coe, Art.(l908), 372. 
4. See Macintosh, TES, 
242; Martin, EPR, 75-
76. 
··5. Martin, EPR, 276. 
and disinterested to the point of having no oommi tments., "chief-
ly associated with a certain" . scienti-fic tradition, his percep-
tion not being pre-ceded by apperception? Is not the scientist 
also 11 governed by his expectations"? And neither religious nor 
scientific commitments need be blind and ir:t?ational~l The 
scientist 11 must first .be as unoriginal" as the mystic. That 
is, both must find out what has been done by others in the field 
and conform the details of the experiment to the knowledge thus 
·gained.. Coe grant'S' that the 11 oonvert" to Christ 11 does not 
oome into his fellowship with God by inferring from the phenom-
enon of oE>nvers1on to a personal cause of it, 11 and that conver-
sion makes the things he has been told 11 real11 to him, for now 
he has acquaintance where·before he had "knowledge about them .. 112 
Thus, 11 It is no discredit to inward mystical religion to show 
that social suggestion ..... has played a great part," for the 
mystic, like any one else, is 11 partly a product of the social 
and intellectual environment. 113 In the sane mystic's depend-
eneeupon the Ohristian Scriptures and his connection with the 
experience of the race, Jones sees evidence that the m.ediated 
immediacy of the mystic is simply Christianity alive and vocal 
in personal experienoe .. 4 
God is the object of experience in the mediated immedi-
acy of love. Wieman, asking whether God is an object that ' 
1. See Ooe, POR, 173; 
Hooking, MGHE, 479; 
Murphy, UR, 105-108. 
2. Ooe, .POR, 17:3-174. 
3. Jones, SMR, xxxiii-xxxiv; 
see Rashdall, PR, 112-113, 
118 .. 
4. Jones, SMR, xxxv; see xv-
xvii, xxii. 
enters into our immediate awareness or is an object of specu-
lation, answers that He flis not a logioo-mathematical entity," 
but rather an object of acquaintance and immediate experience 
akin to that of love and beauty.l As all men are certain of 
the unseen air, and as many are.sure of intangible love, truth,. 
and justice, 11 so others are sure of God. 11 2 Knowledge of love 
is like the knowledge of one1 s own soul. Knowledge of both 
self and the God of love is an immediate intuition, expressed 
in terms of activity.3 Duce reacts against the Neo-Thomists• 
limitation of knowledge, holding that there are types of cog-
nition irreducible to sense-knowledge (as for instance, knowl-
edge of self), and that reality is immediately presented in 
value experienoes.4 Neo-Thomistic sensory empiricism is a 
practical denial of all religious experience, .as it precludes 
any investigation of the claims of immediate awareness of God, 
denies to religion immanence, and substitutes rationalism ~nd 
externalism. Duoe is alert to the significance of this for 
~alief in revelation; this immediate experience is reduced to 
an abstract dogma, while religious experience in general loses 
the dynamic element so essential to certitude and life trans-
formation.5 While God can not be 1~ sensed 11 , He can be flper--. 
oei ved 11 ; for though He is the Other (in the sense of different}, 
He is also 1mmanent.6 Those who desire to make a personal 
1. Wieman, REBM, 27, 29, 204; 4. See Duce, KGN, 495-
2. see Mart~ne EPR, 91. 
497; Macintosh, PRK, 
Rall FT 5 .. 33. 
3. See darrl.gou-Lagrange, ADC, 5 .. See Duce, XGN, 207' 
I, 175; Duce, KGN, 390-391. 
6. 
321-322' 497. 
518-520 .. See Duce, KGN, 
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verification of facts, do not need to rest content t-voi th second-
hand knO't'lledge of God. 1 Garrigou-Lagrange, following Aquinas, 
uses language that implies this spiritual perception of God in 
direct awareness of Him: 
. Finalement ella montre comment, par la 
prateque dee vertue et, la docilite au Saint-
Esprit l 1 ame arrive non plus seulement, a 
croire lea mysteries reveles' mais a lee. 
go~ter ••• a vivre dane une union pour ainei 
dire ~~ntinuelle avec le Sainte Trini te' qui 
habite en nous.2 · · 
He goes on to speak of infused kno"(oorledge or acquaintance, 
' , 
11 qui est. comma le prelude de la vision beatifique, 11 and of the 
11 th1rd purification11 or "third conversion, 11 deecri'Qed in the 
words of Saint Johp. of the Crose as. 11 an inflo"t..ring of God into 
the soul, 1..rhich purges it from 1 te ignorancee and imperfections 
and fills it with perfect love.3 
Viewing the final and all-inclusive function of religion 
as communion "(ooJith God, and reacting against "over-intellectual-
ized accounts of religious experience and philosophical doc-
trines of God, 11 1-1hioh are 11 bought with a price, 11 · Boodin urges 
-. 
the substitution of .the. God of intimate per·aonal .relations for 
the abstract and remote· God. 4 ~'lith. the G~d ·of simpler souls . 
nmen can enter into 1 rappa.rt, 1 11 become aware of as one expE;'ri-
ences sunshine or bea:uty, and be sure of, just as 11 those. 't-thO. -. 
experience color.andbeauty do not doubt the reality of them0 5: 
1 .. See Duce, KGN, 518-520. 
2. Garrigou-Lagrange, POd, 4. 
3. Ga.rrigou-Lagrange, T'\'1, 11, 
13' 55, 83' 98. · .. 
4. See Martin, EPR, 54~'··· · 
5 • . Boodin, in Macintosh, 
RR, 479. . 
Religious experience.~.presents an immediate 
aspect of awareness and a mediate aspect of 1n-
terpretat1onQ The immediate experience of real-
ity in rel1g1o~ is a unique fact, as the exper1-
.ence of music. 
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The immediate aspect of awareness, he describes as "1m-
. mediate luminos1 ty, 112 "tfhich, though in need of interpretation 
and verification, does not find its reality in them~ Buokham 
is in agreement with this: 
But the interpretation lies so close to the 
experience and arises so directly from it that 
it validates rather than depletes it. It is 
true also that the experience needs to be awak-
ened by contact with those in whom it has be-
come regnant; but that does not disqualify it 
•••• Arguments are after-thoughts ••• and are 
wholly ·insufficient to account for the certi-
tude with which the soul recognizes: Thou art! 
and I am directly related to Thee .. j 
Buckham illustroates his meaning by reference to the sky 
in the marginal area of conseiousness as an object of general 
awareness when the mind is dwelling on thoughts which are not 
11 sky-born~ 11 but which "by an act of transfer of attention becomes 
vitally real by being brought within the focus of consciousness." 
Thus Godmay become 11 the Center of awareness, an Object of ex-
perience of the most vivid and absorbing character. 114 Buckham 
seeks to banish the remoteness of the mystical experience of 
"the immediate sense of Supreme Reality" by giving a modern illus-
tration, that of Charles G. Finney, "when he sat alone in his 
office and felt the love of God roll over him in wa.ves.n.5 Thus, 
there may be certainty of the 11 larger life encircling our o'tm" 
1. Boodin, in Macintosh, 
RR, 479 .. 
2. Martin, EPR, 53. 
3. Buckham, IW 412. · 4 .. Buokham, Iw: l64-i6.5 .. 
5. Buokham, MML, 52 .. 
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in the feeling of awareness which has either a direct or indi-
rect reference towards the religious Object 11 in cognition and 
endeavor."l The God l1Tho for some is at the f_arther end of a 
chain of reasoning, is for the mystic an Object of 11 immediate 
intuition," Absolute Reality reached directly by the intuitive 
11 leap, 11 which gives 11 first-hand conviction that God is neR.r at 
hand and directly operating"n2 
DeBurgh stands opposed to the Nee-Thomistic view of medi-
ated knowledge, particularly that of symbols and analogy: 
And is not the real uresence of the divine 
Spirit exhibited, veritably and not simply by 
analogy ••• in the experience of the individual 
soul of the mutual love of God and man?3 
Baillie speaks of the mediated knowledge of God that he 
had as a boy, and points to the concept of history as "something 
that happens in the present" as an explanation of the apparent 
contradiction in the expression "mediated immediacyn: 
In Christ we know God not by argument but by 
personal aoquaintanceo In Christ God comes to 
us directly. We must not understand our Lord 1 s 
mediatorship in such a way ~s to forget the words, 
'I and the Father are one. 1 4 
o) Not an inference but a unique personal encounter: 
11 oontact, 11 revelation, confrontation and com-
presence 
Then the experience of being certain is not an inferenceS 
1. Pratt, PRB, 43, 295, 297; 
Laird, PS, 89. 
2. Macintosh, PRK, 178; see 
Hooking, MGHE, 179; Pringle-
Pattison, TIG 1 301-302; Rall, SM, 63-o4. 
3. DeBurgh, FMR, 178-179. 
4. Baillie, OKG, 196-197; 
see.l83; Hooking, MGHE, 
357-360; Bixler, Art. 
( 1935)' 301-303" 5. See Brightman, Art. 
(1934), 92. 
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but a unique personal encount.er that is vaJ:"iously described as 
a contact, revelation, .confrontation, and compresenoe. 
In a protest against .. scholastic intellectualism l-ri th its 
me:rely inferred God, Baillie agrees with DeBurgh that, til we can 
no more prove God's existenoe'n than we can prove the existence 
of our fellow men as 11 our knowledge of the one as of the other 
is founded on the experience of their presence.nl It is not 
that Baillie would disp~nse with all inference on the subject, 
but rather that he is giving a place to non-inferential elements, 
such as the Kantian ~priori,. an intuition respecting society 
and God·. 2 He quotes Sir Arthur Eddington in a Slotarthmore 
lecture: 
In the case of.our human friends we take their 
existence for granted;not oaring whether it is 
proven ornot. Our relationship is such that we 
could read philosophical arguments designed to 
prove the non-existence of each other, and perhaps 
even to be convinced by them and then laugh togeth-
er over so odd·. a conclusion,) · 
Eddington applies this to the relation between man and 
God, Baillie adds that God can be present to man as man can not 
be, as man is present but God is omnipresent~ 11 0ontaot 11 is a 
word that is often used for this personal encounter~ Windelband 
uses it to describe revelation as held by Nee-Platonism ( 11 souroe 
of later myst1cisni 11 ) as a.n 11.immediate illumination of the indi-
vidual by the deity, •• in immediate contact (b... f.,{) 1>1i th the deity 
1. Baillie, OKG 226; see De-
BurghJ. TRP, i69; Griffiths, 
GIE ti-10, 23; Pringle-
Pattison, IG, 246-247; 131-
·143. 
2~ See Baillie, OKG, 
213. 
3. Baillie, OKG, 227. 
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itself."l Farmer uses a similar expression-- 11 the compelling 
touch of God, 11 illustrating the ineffability of the eXPerience 
by the tlifficulty of describing light and color to one who has 
known nothing but darkness, for lithe most that can be done is 
to get such an one out of darkness into the light. 11 2 James 
made it clear that what religion reports is a fact of experi-
ence--the presence of God in relations of give and take, 1111 re-
lations that are actual. 11 .His personal belief was 11 that the 
evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experience."' 
And James uses the word that Farmer used for this approach of 
God to the human spiri t-- 11 touch11 : 
But just as our primary wide-a't-rake conscious-
ness throws open our senses to the touch of things 
material so it is logically conceivable ·that if 
there be higher spiritual agencies that oan direct-
.ly touch us, the psychological condition of their 
doing so might be our possession of a subconscious 
region which alone should yield access to them, 
The hubbub of the waking life might close a door 
which in4the dreamy Subliminal might remain ajar or open. 
For James, then, it is a psyoholog1oal fact that the sub-
conscious and non-rational holds 11 primacy in the religious 
realm."-' James describes this contact in personal terms: "W~ 
and God have business with each other. 11 6 In illustration, James 
quotes James Russell Lowell: 111 ! never before so clearly felt. 
the Spi.r.it of God 1ft me and around me. The whole room seemed 
1. l't1ndelband, liP,· 227; see 3- JAmes, VRE, 4.54-4.5.5; Bergson, in Moore TRE . PIU, 109. 
14.5; B%'1ghtman, Pit:;t, 4§.3; 4. James, VBE, 242· see 
' 
. . . England , VRE , 27 • 477, .511. 
2. Farmer, TBG 41• see 40; 5. James, VRE, 74; see 
l'lalsh, Art. { 1914) , 5 00 • Moore, · TRE , 26. 
6. James, VRE, 517; see 
.516; 58. 
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to me full of God .. 1111 It should be kept in mind that for James, 
as for many others, feeling or immediate experience is cognitive.2 
In answer to the criticism of Moore concerning the "assumption" 
of James "that rel:igious experience in .the sense of immediate 
feeling is the essential and originative aspect.of religion," 
it may be replied that the religious experience of the founders 
of religion antedate all the great religions of the world, and 
that if it be agreed that these founders had a revelation ex-
perience, it must be conceded that immediate religious experi-
ence lies at the basis of the great religions ,,3 
What has been said of this it contact" with. God tends to 
justify Macintosh in his reaction against an extreme epistemo-
logical ~ualism that holds 11 that .all man can or ever does ex-
perience or know is just• his own experience," if this is inter-. 
preted a.s a denial of a direct 11 contact 11 with God. An· epistemo.;.. 
logical dualist can retain his belief in the /interaction of 
relatively independent persons~ and accept the witness of thou-
sands who through the ages have testified· that they have 11 met 11 
God, without calling the expE)rience a miracle. 4 '.Phe writer is 
empirical enough to accept the.testimony of experience even in 
the absence of any·satisfactory explanation of it; he would 
hold with Macintosh: 
In religious experience at its best, divine 
reality .... is presented with sufficient immedi-
acy to make possible forman agenuine acquain--
tance with (experimental knowledge of) that 
1. James, VRE,. 66. 
2. See Moore, TRE, 3.5, 37. 
3 .. See Moore, TRE, 73-74. 
4 .. Macintosh, PRK, 326. 
.'.i• 
divine reality.· •• reveaJ.ed .1 
Revelation is a unique personal encounter that has to 
be experienced in order to be understood. It is not. absurd as 
the neo-supei"naturalists would have us beJ.ieve. With s.ll his 
. . . . . 
stress on reason, Hegel believed in revelation, viewing it as 
a disclosure of a Person to a person: 
We have immediate knowlGdge of God it is 
said; this is a ~evelation 1n us. This is a 
great principle 1 ~hioh it is essential·we 
should.hold fas'ti. 
DeBurgh, having noted the failure of the familiar 11 proofs, 61 
concludes, 11 If Godbe known in religious expei"ience, it must.be 
by His own shO"tfing~ n3 
Another term that is being used for this immediate per-
sonal and oognitive experience of God is 11 confrontat1on .. 11 
Baillie. sees a gain from· the Cartesian revolution in the recog-
nition of God as. a 11 Reality 'l-7ho more directly confronts us than 
do the things of sense, 11 a consequence beingthat 11 our certainty 
of Him became prior.to the certainties. of science rather than 
dependence upon them.n4. He· declares that 11 the great fact for 
which all religion stands is the confrontation of the human soul 
. . 
with the transcendent.holi.ness of God.u.5 Guarding.the 11 subJect-
hood11 of God while speaking of Him as· an object, Baillie says: 
From the beginning God meets·. us, not as one 
among the many objects of Our knol'tledge, but as 
another Knower by whom both they and we ourselves 
1. Macintosh, PRK, 175; 
see 181. .· . 
2.. Hegel,. PR . II ,. l6l.J- · .. 
165; see f, 262-263. 
. . 
3 •. DeBurgh, TRP, 40; see Grif-
fiths, GIE, 288-289; Bixler, 
in Macintosh, RR, 82.. · 
4. Baillie, OKG, 151. 
5., Baillie, OKG, 3; see 28, 42. 
are known •••• He confronts us not as an It nor 
as an inference from all possible Its but 
from the. very.beginning, as a Thou. He is not 
something we find ourselves speaking about, 
but Some One we find speaking to us, and whom 
we then, in our turn, find ourselves speaking 
··: to.l · 
This personal relation is also expressed by the term 
"compresence. 11 Buck:ham, with others, vi ewe a paradox not as a 
contradiction but as something to be resolved as in the Hegelian 
dialectic, with a positive and a negative pOle, mutually neces-
sary, the.poles finding 11 contrapletion11 ( 11 mutual f\1lfillment 11 ) 
in the synthesis. One form sf this is 11 compresenoe,tt in which 
•• the relationship is wholly personal and conscious, character-
ized by an awareness that takes these forms: Self-as-subject-
object, self-other,· self-Supreme Other .. P The result is "the 
paradox of an alternate positing of God-consciousness and self-
consciousness, the two moving toward that synthesis which con-
stitutes the beatific vision.n2 
Thus God's relation to man is different f~om His relation 
to stonea7 -Hia creations but not partakers of His nature; God 
lS !lUm~rioally. b?t not qualitatively, "Wholly Other," than man.J 
11 God is at once ·present with us in all our spiritual endeavor, 
and yet infinitely transcends our highest aohievement .. 114 
As God confronts man it seems that in some sense He aP-
pears on both sides of the relationship, for: 
1. Baillie, OKG, 220. 
2. Buckham, Art. (1936), 182-
183, 187, 189. 
3. See Baillie, OKGJ. 23?, 228; 
II Peter 1:3-4; uoffin and 
Wieman, in Kepler, CRT ·176-
179, 200j Leon, Art. (1933), · 
80. 
4. Watson, IRE, IIt 249; 
see Wilson, SI,It:: ·.:655; 
BrightmanJ. PAR, ·28.1 29; 
RV, 137; ~arr1gou-~a­
Grange, ADO, 165-167; 
SheenL PR, 123; !emple, 
NMG, G46, 277, 284-285. 
Not only does He call me in His grace, but 
also by His grace, brings the response to 
birth within my soul~ ·His Holy Spirit is the 
real author and originator, not only of ~is 
address to me, but of my address to Him. 
3l.O 
Baillie advances beyond this to the thought that one of 
these subjects is Personality Itself, and that the relation of 
two good men can not be as close as the relation of a good man 
to Goodness and Love: 11Dista.nt though God be in His transcend-
ence, He may yet be nearer- to me than my best friend. 11 2 The 
relation between a particualr and its general is different from 
the relation between partioualrs. Finite limitations can be 
overcome in the knowledge of God without going into e~istemo­
logical monism.3 
Thus, while the relation between God and man is unique 
and non-physical, it is real. God is pure Spirit; and man, 
the real ego, is also spirit. To the t-7ri ter the most adequate 
philosophical explanation of the relation between persons seems 
to be interaction. It would. seem that in general and special 
disclosures of Himself God has initiated the action, and that 
man reacts to this spiritual stimulus. Among many other exper-
iences that man may have_ in co-operating with God (one phase 
of interaction on the personal plane} is 11 conversion," the 
incoming of God, of spiritual life and pot-ter, into the human 
soul.4 Although in the subjective experience of man's conver-
sion God is an objective reality in the sense of independent 
1. Baillie, OKG, 220~ 
2. Baillie, OKG, 238-239. 
3. See Bertocc1, EAG, 77. 
4. See Brightman, PR, 422. 
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existence, He is not so in the sense of a physical object. 
Lovejoy concludes that 11 sinoe our knowing is characteristi• 
cally concerned with beyonds, we know by faith. 11 1 He does 
not call God a 11 beyond 11.; ·in fact he seems not to refer to God 
at all in his work, Revolt Against Dualism. But what he says 
of externals does not mitigate against the kind of. direct 
knowledge ofGod upheld in this dissertation, i .. e .. as some 
cognitive content in direo1i awareness .. 2 For the present writer 
does not assert the externality of God in exactly any one of 
the senses mentioned by Lovejoy.. Of couree, God is 11 beyond 11 
the idea of God; every object of thought may be said to be 
beyond thought in the sense, at.least, of non-identity.. But 
who is to draw the line beyond which an omnipresent God can 
not pass in His approach to a human spirit? Who would desire 
to go against the testimony of multitudes and deny that God 
can even make apersonal 11 contact 11 with the human spirit,.ae 
long as no claim is laid to an overlapping of perso~alities? 
Certainly a theist 1:-1ould not be expected to protest the near-
ness of God to a human soul. Of course, as infinite and tran-
scendent, God is 11 beyond 11 the complete comprehension of man. 
So while one may have certitude concerning God's existence 
(and some knowledge of Rim as revealed. in the photographic 
flash of the.mystioal moment) one still has need of the exer-
cise of his faith.3 
· . 1. Lovejoy, RD, 318. 
2. See .Lovejoy, RD, 25. 
3. See Brightman, Art. 
(1934), 91-92; vide 
eupra, 217. 
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While God is an objective reality, the direct. awareness 
of Him is a subjective experience in a sense different from 
that of the experiencing of a physical object. Whatever ob-
jective factors may have been present in the conversion of 
Saul of Tarsus, the features he later emphasized were subjec-
tive ones, as the following indicates: 11 For God ••• hath shined 
in our hearts to give the light of the knO't1ledge of the glory 
of God in the face of Jesus Christ. 11 1 In this sense all Chris-
tian experience is internal. 
Now the interaction between God and man differs from 
that between man and man. God, having no body and being an 
omnipresent spirit, finds no intervening body between Himself 
and the human spirit. Nor is space a b~rrier, Bowne, speak-
ing of interaction between persons makes it clear that if it 
t-lere 11 equally direct and immediate in all: oases, there would 
be no ground for the distinction of present and absent. 11 He 
adds that while space appears to us as a limitation, that 
omnipresence is a negation of this limitation: 
Immediate action means presence; immediate 
action which extends to all things means omni-
presence,; God .... therefore, as immanent in all 
things, is omnipresent~ If then, he willa to 
act upon anything; he has not to cross any dis-
tance, long or short, to re~oh it, and he is 
not compelled to use·media • 
. The writer ao.oepts omnipresence rather than "semipreaenoe ;1 
1. II Cor. 4:6; see Gal. 
1:164· Brightman, Art. (19:3 ), 99-100. 
2. Bowne, THE, 180; see Inge, 
Art.(1948), 4:3-44; Harts-
horne, MVG, .79. 
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finding no justification for the limitation of God's presence 
to physical nature, holding with Miley and other theologians 
that God 1 a kno"7ledge and power are .operative in all realms of 
existence, and that omnipresence finds its reality in personal 
agency:. 
· In the plenitude and perfection of these 
attributes (9mn1science and omnipotenc~ God 
is omnipresent in the truest, deepest sense 
of the term.l 
This excludes spatial ;raepresentation, Rnd gives omni-
presence its full meaning in personal, dynamic terms,2 while 
at the same time preserving transcendence intact. This is not 
outmoded·thought. This balancing to transcendence and imma ... 
nenoe, being just to both, is achieved by modern theistic 
theologians and philosophers, conservative and speculative: 
The longer I live the surer I am that in 
quite a few segments of life the truth is to 
be apprehended not so much be an eithe~or­
approach, as by grasping firmly two opposite 
poles of thoyght and holding both in balance 
and tension.j . 
Wiley, implicitly agreeing with Miley, and speaking of 
· speculative theism as represented by Parker, James, and Mar-
tineau (particularly of their insistence on the distinctness 
of God from the 't'lorldl, 't-tri tea: 
Theodore Parker says, 1 If God be infinite, 
then he must be immanent, perfectly and total-
ly present in nature and spirit. Thus there 
1. Miley, ST, I, 219; see 218; 
see Macintosh, TES, 186-187. 
2. See Striokland, FCB, 179-
186. 
3. Harner, Art.(1950), 
200; see Matthe~fS, 
GOE., 132; Buckham, 
Art.(l935), 312-313. 
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i.s no point of space and no atom of soul but 
God is there. And yet finite matter and 
finite spirit do not eXhaust God.'l 
Parker, thus, in using the strongest language for im-
manence has not identified finite matter and finite spirit 
with God. To Loomer, 11God is as much transcendent as man c~n 
endure," and as immanent 11 as man can gaze upon and not be 
blinded. 112 But to substitute 11 semipresenoe 11 for omnipresence 
is not only to deny to God free access (still in personal 
terms) to all parts and to all persons of His universe, but 
also to rob theology of one of its most practical teachings--
the most significant aspect of the doctrine of omnipresence--
the presence of every person before God, in whom "we live, 
and move, and have our being, 11 and from whom no person can 
flee.3 
Where is God? Wherever Cosmic Mind, Personal Energy, 
Reprover, Friend, or .Judge is at work.4 Neither human nor 
divine nersonality oan be separated from their respective 
. . 
activities. God is Personal Activity. Both God and man {as 
well as things) are ultimately what tliey do.5 If God 1 s ac-
tivity can be found in sin, i.e. in its knowledge, condemna-
tion, restraint, and punishment, God is there. If Hie activ-
ity can be discovered operating upon the human spirit, God 
is there. This is why Edwin Lewis can make the main argument 
1. Wiley, CT, I 1 280~ see 344-347. 2. Loom~r, Art .. \1949J, 194. 
3. Acts -17: 28; see Psa .. 139: 7; 
Wiley, CT, I, 346; Macintosh, 
TES, J.86. 
4. See Day, GIU 47; 
Brightman, PAR, 28-29. 
,5. Vide supra, 3:3-34; see 
Buokham, Art.(l935), 
312; Smuts, HE, 41,.52; 
Strickland, FOB, 173. 
of a book (God and Ourselves) the reality~adequacy, and avail-
ability of God, and why Macintosh can hold that ~.mong the 
mystics• subjective certitudes that ca.ri be verified is the 
certitude of the 11 enstence, accessibility-and sufficiency of 
God. 11 1 This is t"1hy the religionist can join with the poet in 
declaring that God is closer than breathing and nearer than 
hands and feet .. 2 Such "sympathetic rapport" as exists between 
God and a kindred spirit "needs no go-betl-1een. 11 3 
·d) . Not pantheism.--This viett of the omnipresence 
of God in reference to the immediate experience of God, as 
furnishing more certitude for His existence than is possessed. 
for the existence of things and of other minds, is not pan-
theism. For t'IThile 11 omn1 11 and 11pan 11 both mean 11 all,u there is 
·a vast difference between 11all-presenoe 11 and "all-theism~ II 
nomni 11 connotes some kind of extension, whereas 11 pa.n 11 suggests 
identity. Monism is usually of an impersonal type. "Pantheism 
is the conception that the basic reality of the universe is an 
all-pervading impersonal Divine Life. 11 4 It is similar to the-
ism in its belief in immanence to the full degree: . 
Theism shares with the cosmic form of pan-
theism the conception of the immapence of God 
in physical nature and !n humanity, and the 
conviction that human life and the Divine Life 
stand in intimate relation to each other .. 5 
While all pantheism is not impersonal, a.stress on 
1. Macintosh, RC, 225~ 
2. See Ward, EP, 335 .. 
3 .. Walsh, Art.(l914), 494; 
see Temple, NMG, 354 .. 
4. Lyman, MTR, 242 (under-
scoring the present writer's). 
5 .. Lyman, MTR, 249 (under- . 
scoring the present ttri ter• s). 
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personality and its activity and freedom,l with due recogni-
tion of the claims of transcendence, 't.Yill safeguard against 
. ' pantheism: 11 Dieuo~.est-il immanent ou transcendant? L1 un et 
l 1 autre, doit-on dire." LeRoy goes on to find the reconcilia.-
tion of these extremes in a dynamic view of God's presence .in 
immedia.te religious experience: 11 Dieu nous est plus interieur 
que nous-m~mes .. «4 Aubrey joins the two aspects thus: "Because 
He is immanent, we can find Him; because He is also transcend-
ent, we can trust Him.n3 
Interpersonal psyChology with its view of persona.lities 
interacting, regards religion as a 11 persona.l co-operation 't-71 th 
.. 
a trusted Creator of values, 11 and holds that "psychology in 
company with every other science must assume an objective real-
ity related to subjective experience. 11 4 Qne of this group, 
Dr. Moreno, has joined forces with the philosophers and theo-
logians who contend for an immediate experience of God. As a 
theist, and holding, thus, transcendence (God the Father--
authority and revelation--separate in thought and deed from 
all other beings), Moreno stresses immanence-- 11His immediate 
presence ••• in every detail of ex:perience. 11 5 
Leuba thinks that the great central doctrine of mysti-
cism is 11 l'union de l'~me avec Dieu. 11 6 But, 11 cette extravagant 
identification de 1'indiv1duel avec la divinite 11 7 is not the 
1 .. Strickland, FOB, 186. 
2. LeRoy, Art. (1907), 512; 
see Und·erhill, MS, 40, 
55~.56, 60; Temple, NMG, 
246, 277-
3. Aubrey, PTT, 205. 
4. Johnson, PR, 30-31, 47. 
5. Moreno~ PG, xi; see 161-
162, ltl5, 190. 
6o Leuba, Art.(l902), 7p 
7. Leuba4 Art.(l902), 7; see 4 1. 
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central emphasis of mysticism. That the central doctrine of 
mysticism is belief in the unmediated experience of God is the 
't-7i tness of the following, some of whom are either mystics or 
authorities on mysticism: Baillie, Bennett, Brightman, Brm-rn·, 
Coe, (Rufus) Jones,Knudson. Macintosh, Montmorand, Moore, 
Otto, Rall, Underhill, and l'lindelband. For instance, Baillie 
declares: 11 The central contention for which mysticism stands 
is certainly that of the direct.and ultimate nature of God 1 s 
presence in our souls.nl. Rufus Jones defines mysticism as 
llthat type of religion which puts the.emphasie on immediate 
awareness ••• direc~ and imme~iate consciousness of divine Pres-
ence.112 According to Jones, this position is found in some 
degree in all forms of religion, for "first-hand ex:periences 
of a Divine and Higher Presence ~re as old as human personality11 :3 
The fundamentally significant thing which 
stands out in early Quakerism was the convic-
tion which these founders of it felt that they 
had actually discovered the living God,.9 •• From 
end to end ofthe Protestant world these •inner 
experiences' constitute the only argument actu-
ally relied upon for a·belief in a. God in !f-
fective and intelligent relation with men. ·· 
And Herman speaks as a theist when she sh~Ts how timely 
the subject is: 
Once more the spectacle of a tragically · ·· -
successful materialistic civilization dying in 
blood and fire is shattering the delusio~s_ of 
. a shallot-7 and complacent optimism and driving 
us back upon the deeps of the soul wher~ God · 
speaks His Creative and Redeeming Word. 
1. Baillie, IR, 22?. 
2. Jones, SMR, xv. 
3. Jones, SMR, xv-xvi. 
4 .. Jones, in Leuba,. 
PRM, 303-30!J.. 
;. Herman, MVM, 4. · 
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Even the 11 union 11 held by the mystics is not essentially 
and always pantheistic.l Speaking f St~ Theresa, Reinhardt 
't-1rites: "At the acme of contempl.ati n 'tfhich is called union 
mystica, the- union of the human 't1il with the divine will takes 
plaoe ..... There is no union of eubst nee or nature. 112 Boutroux 
seizes upon love as the explanation of this perfect union: 
"Love alone has this virtue of unit ng persons 't.Yi thout absorb-
ing one in the oth~r, but ·on the.co trary, increasing their 
reality arid the consciousness of th mselves as persons. 113 
But although two become one n the. union of marriage, 
wills and personalities are as the records of divorce 
courts indicate. The union a does not obliterate state 
lines. Although the mystical'St~ P ul declared that Christ 
indwelt him, the boundaries of pers nality are still clearly 
marked in his use of 11 I 11 and 11 Chris • 114 To speak of the per-
sonal relationship between God and an as interactionS is to 
deny their identity, for to have an inter-action, there must 
be at least two actions or actors. ·In fact, to speak merely 
of a personal relation bet"tteen God nd m_an is to implioi tly 
deny pantheism: 11 The mystical exper ence of Christ is a direct 
personal relation to Christ$n6 
1. See Reinhardt, Art.(l931), 
106-107, 115. . . 
2. Reinhardt, Art.(1931), 118; 
see James, VRE 425-426. · 
3. Boutroux, Art. (1908), 185; 
see Ames, Art. (1915), 258; . 
Underhill, MS, 35, 40; Hock-
ing, MGHE, xviii; England, . 
VRE, 149; Bennett, CVM, 136-
137; Duce, KGN~_369i Bixler, 
in Macintosh, .I:U'!., 8~+, 59-62. 
son goes on to describe 
4. Gal. 2:20; see 
Baillie, OKG, 234-
237. 
5;. ·Vide supra, 292- · 
294.. . 
6. Knudson, VRE, 220. 
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this relation as "the actual presel'l:ce of God in human life. 111 
The addition of the phrase, 11 1n itheplenitude and perfection 
of His attributes, 11 will safegua:rd this statement from the 
charge of pantheism: 
d-od enters my experien·oe obj actively, but 
His entranceis not arrested at the outer court .. 
He penetrates to the Holy of Holies; yet He 
never takes .possession of it~ He illumines it, 
and cleanses it, but leav .. es me in charge all · 
the time •••• The self cannot exist in isolation.2 
' ' 
·This is not monism: for the rea.son,.a.lso, that the Object 
is also Subject, the transcendent Knower, kno-c11ing the human 
' ; 
knol!rer; the latter has the "at11ar~ness of. being knol'm. n3 Both 
' ' 
' ' b. 
transcendence and persona.li ty are maintained in this v.iew •. 
Coe thinks that 11 the most b~:l;'flihg item of experience is the 
fact that persons are present to; one another and have experi-
1 
' ·, 
ences in common.. This reminds one of St. Paul's statement-: 
11 The Spirit itself beareth witrie~s with our spirit, 115 the 
human and divine spiritssharing;a.n experience in common. In 
the. words of Coe: 
My self-consciousness is social oonscious-
ness •••• This intermingling of media~y and im-
mediacy .... may be paradoXical, but .if so, the 
paradox is in reality itself .. ~ •• •Hol-1. do I knO't•1 
that other minds exist?' has led many a thinker 
into a trap by i.ts assumption that we can kngw 
one's self without.reference to other minds.· 
1 •. Knudson, VRE . 229; see 231. : 
2. Griffiths, GfE, 226; see 206;J 
Buckham, Art. (1942), 410; . 
Underhi~l, MS, 60; SchillirigJ· 
ERH, 34, Hegel, JUB, xii, 20b~ 
3. Griffiths, GIE, 212; see 208; · 
Martineau, SAR, 305. 
4. See Martineau, SAR, 
307-308. 
5 • . Rom .. 8:16. . 
6. Coe, POR, 252, 254; 
see Norberg, VCE, 
80. 
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. .· - . 
Knudson appears to create an artificialmediation, for 
thinking does not stand betl'leen the ·self and its object of 
thought.l The writer separates neither the divine Self nor 
the human s.elf from their respective acti vi t~es, holding "'i th 
Hegel that the indivisible self is expressed by various modes, 
such as thinking, feeling, and willing.2 
e) Conscious religious experience: an incontro-
vertible fact 
Finally, conscious religious experience is an incon-
. trovertable fact. 11 Fact 11 is used here not only as 9: true ·· -· 
proposition, but also as a matter of fact, an existing state 
of affairs on which rests the "perfect knO't-Tledge "to7hich cannot 
be refuted or weakened by any future experience, 11 and lthioh 
is 11 innocent of error,. 11 3 By 11 conscious experience" is 'meant 
the subjective state of affairs that.gives as much certitude 
as the Cartesian basic·certitude--consciousness itself which 
is beyond the reach of doubt, that impregnable stronghold at 
the center of man's being: 
To say thato•othe mystic is absolutely 
certain of the existence of God l-10Uld be 
an absurd understatement •••• But to the 
mystic God becomes. the. most real and the 
most immediately known of all beings. 1 ! 
am as certain as that I live,' says Eckhart, 
'that nothing is so near me as Goa4 God is nearer to me than I ·am to myself.' 
1. See Knudson, Art. (1935), 
449; vide supra, 242':"245 .• 
2. Vide supra, 254. ·. 
3. Vide supra, 212, ?14~ 219. 
4. Pratt, PRB, 172-173; 
see Temple, in Muir-
head, CBP, 413. 
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11If our faith is to ·rest on a foundation that cannot 
be shaken we must dig deeper and find our evidence in first-
hand religious experience. 11 1 Speaking from the v~ntage point 
of such experience, a mystic can anst-rer the question: But can 
I thus experience and know God? . . II For as von Hugel declares: 
11 The question is, in. the· first instance, .!!QJ! whether I~' 
but whether I do.n2 
- --
Speaking of the certainty of faith due to the conscious-
ness of God, and as having more content than that of a mere 
idea, Hegel declared: 
This content is .at once independent and Rt 
the same time inseparable from me •• ., .Certainty 
is this immediate relation between the content 
and myself. If I desire to express such cer-
tainty in a forcible manner, I say, 1 I am as 
certain of this as of my own existenoe •• q.Both 
the. certainty of this external Being and the 
cer.tainty of myself are one certainty, and I 
could do aT4ay with my own Being; I should have 
no knowledge of m~self if I were to do away · 
with that Being.•:!:' 
. After the death of Pascal, a scribbled Pheet of paper 
't.Yas found se't1ed in the lining of his coat. On' 1 t was· a diagram 
of a erose t-11 th the foll01:11T1ng 't-t.ords: 
The year of Grace, 16,54. 'f.· .From about ha.lf-
paet ten in the evening until about half-past 
twelve. FIRE. God of Abraham, God of Isaac, 
God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and · 
scholars •. Certitude, Cet>titude, Feeling, Joy, 
Peace, God of Jesus Ohriet •••• Forgetfulness of 
the W'orld arid of everyt,lting b~t God •••• Joy, 
Joy, Joy, Teare of Joy. 
1. Browna PO, 187. 
2. von Hugel, EPR, 52. · 
3. Hegel,. PR, I, llo-117; 
see 161. · 
4. Pascal, in BrR.dshaw, 
PFF, 129-130; vide 
supra, 281. 
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Millions have had similar experiences~· To explain them 
as hallucinations is to deny the_exi~tenoe.of God, the God of 
. religion.l In a scientific examination of those. t·rho reported 
that· they had an immediate experience of God, Pennock found 
. . - ' 
that such an experience 11 ocours under the most diverse condi-
tions and oiroumstanoes, 11 and that neither ntental nor physical 
oondi tions sho't-7ed any constancy .. 2 11 Let the mysti o, then, be 
certain o:f.his. 1 the truth, 111 ·is .the admonition of Hooking and 
others: "Any myst'-o 't-7ho in his main point a.dmi ts that he may 
be mistaken does thereby stamp." .himself as fraudulent. n3 
Such certitude is not orily 11 unshaka.ble" .and "imperturb-
able"; it is a1so 11 unohallengeable. 11 4 For as internal, the 
experience may be incapable of being ·Proved to others, ·but. by 
the same token it can not be disproved •. No one oan dislodge 
the experiient·", from his position, for there is no fulcrum on 
which the llorow-bar11 of denial can be rested: uThe mystic so 
' 
long·as he merely reports a positive revelation, cannot be 
refuted. 11 .5 This 11 pos1 ti ve revelation" is ~rhat matters. The 
actual presence of God in human life, i.e. "actual contact 
with the real is more fundamental than our rational interpre-
tation of it.,u6 Ferrel notes that themystiofll experience with 
i t.s oertainty--11 God can be experienced 11 --while central to 
See Pennock, CCG, 46. 
Pennock, CCG 6.5 .. 
Hooking, MGHE, 4.5.4; see . 
44; Pratt, PRB, 1.55, 163-
164; Trueblood,. LB , 196-
198, 200-203; Ames, Art. 
(191.5), 264. 
.4. See BrO't.Yn, PC, 181-
182; von H{igel, EPR, 
69o . · . 
5. Russell, KEW,·· 63-64; 
see Beck, CPR, 301. · 
t;. 'Brightman, PR, 433. 
Christianity is a special emphasis of historic 1-!ethotl.ism: 
Wi.thin i.ts more devout· circles particularly, 
even now, 1 exp~rience 1 comes close to being the 
final standard of truth.. A thoughtful and l!rell-
trained young Methodist, for instance, 't·Yhen 
. asked what in his ~7idesprea.d observatio,n '{-las the 
rook bottom truth with most Methodists replied 
like this; 1Brother, wnen an honest-to-.goodness 
Methodist tells you that he has had an experi-
ence, you don't argue with him.' I venture to 
suggest, ho'tnrever, that the reason that the heart 
of Methodism is as s.ound as it is; is1 due mainly to i te historic stress on experience.· 
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This experience is a direct personal confrontation. 2 
While one may not .be able to explain this experience to others 
eo as to convince them, there is no doubting that it is self-
convincing. 11 A .vivid sense of reaiity pervades· authoritative 
religious testimonies. 11 3 This ia particularly true concerning 
testimonies to Christian· Perfection, ·for which experience· 
Ferra in the context of the above reference has high praise. 
For there is a distinctness of vision, a directness of knowl-
edge and a demonstration of spiritual realities and v"'.lues in 
. . 
the Baptism of the· Holy Ghost that is to1ell-high indescribable; 
it has to be experienced in order to be understood. In it, as 
well. as in the initial experience of salvation, through God's 
working directly upon the soul:. 
The self .is a"t-tare of the supreme principle 
of religion in another form. Instead of being 
known as in an act of knowledge ..... the redeemed 
soul knows itself !fa 'being loved .... the object 
of redeeming love$· . . 
I . 
1.· Ferre in Ahderson, MET, 116. 
2 •. Ferrd in Anders~n, l.rn!T , 123. 
3. Johnson, PR, 24. 
4 .. Griffiths, GIE, 293 .. 
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No wonder, then, that Tillich in speaking of the power 
of mysticism as lying 11 in the will to place individual person-
ality in its essence immediately before the presence of God, 11 
declares that its influence has been world-wide with the result 
that 11 an atmosphere 'tfas created in 't<Yhich immediR.te oerti tude 
attached to a mystical concept of God, 11 dispelled material-
istic and atheistic views.l 
There is no getting around a fact of experience. A 
professor when told that a certain fish had been caught, de-
clared that there was no such fish. A few dR.ys later, he was 
the recipient of the fish. This was his comment: 11 The theory 
of a life-time kicked to death by a fact • 11 Negative testimony 
on the other hand, is valueless. The crowning validation of 
religious experience to the experient himself 'is the 11 Witness 
of the. Spirit": 11 The Spirit beareth 'to7i tness with our spirit 
that 't"1e are the children of God. 112 Here is internal inter-
action, the co-operative relation of two spirits, their union 
without loss of identity to either, and their uniting in tes-
tifying to an immediate experience and in an immediate exper-
ience. This dual testimony makes for unshakable certitude. 
''Then the sun has risen on the horizon, one does not grope in 
darkness, candle in hand, looking for day; the presence of the 
sun on the horizon is all the proof one needs that day has 
come. This is a weak illustration, however, of the certitude 
l. Tillich, RS, 125, 127-
128. 
2. Rom. 8:16. 
that is greater than that furnished by the facts of science 
and of psychology, the certitude concerning God's existence 
32.5 
that is due to human-divine interaction, that results from 
the subJective experience of awareness, a mediated immediacy, 
in which God is not an inference,, but a Presence in a unique 
personal encounter, variously described as a contact, revela-
tion, confrontation, and compresence9 
', i 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CORRELATION OF CERTAINTY AND CERTITUDE: 
THE POSSIBILITY OF A R.ATIONAI..~EMPIRIOAL THEOLOGY 
I. A synoptic view 
l. Introduction 
It has been shown that by themselves the theoretical 
"proofs," the moral argument and the experiential approach 
did not establish logical certainty concerning the existence 
of God. Certainty depending upon formal arguments proved 
defective because in them reason, faith and experience were 
not used as whole entities. In the theoretical argument, it 
is the intellect that is primarily at work; in the moral a~ 
gument there is an undue stress upon faith and the will (the 
will to believe); in the experimental argument, the emphasis 
is upon the feelings, although they are viewed as with cogni-
tive content. In none is whole personality truly represented. 
It is psychological rather than logical certainty that is 
found in the practical and the experiential approaches. Had 
the practical reason o.f Kant been practical enough, that is, 
had it been applied to distinctive religious experience, the 
full truth that lies in the synthesis of the extremes of 
theoretical and practical, as commonly used, would have been 
reached. As it is, it took the experimental, the truly prac-
tical, to furnish the theoretical with its complement. With 
its unshakable certitude, the experimental argument will 
--~----· --~~_..:.___-..._.. ___ __:... _________________ .;._ __ -~--_---~------------· --=---
provide a good starting point or base of operations for a 
return over the ground traversed, in order to pick up the 
partial elements and to weld them into a synoptic view and 
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a correlation of certainty and certitude llhiah will furnish 
an adequate certainty for the individual and for a rational-
empirical theology. This is relevant to the problem of this 
dissertation which is: In the light of Kant's thought, is 
there any justifiable religious certainty (particularly of 
God 1 s existence), and if so, to what degree? This involves 
the subordinate problem: Oan certitude and logical certa~nty 
be correlated so that an empirical theology is made possible? 
Kant's importance, in part, lies in his attempted 
mediation b~tween rationalism and emp1r1oism,1 "'"a~d his insist-
ence that "whatever the human ·spirit.o.requires in order to 
get ahead with the solution of its problems" must be granted 
it.2 According to Roger Bacon, knowledge may be secured in 
three ways: by authority, by reason, and by experience.3 If 
intuition were placed in one or more of these three ways, 4 
they l-Jould correspond to the pathways to certainty suggested 
by William A. Brown,5 and to the types of certainty of this 
dissertation.;..-theoretioal (reason), practical (faith, includ-
ing reliance on authority), and experiential (experienoe)9 
To the writer as well as to Bacon and others, knowledge or 
certainty is a matter of the whole personality, to be won by 
1. Vide supra, 8-9. 
2. Brotherston, Art. (1935), 189. 
3. See McKeon, SMP, I, 3. 
4. Vide supra, 32, 116-
120, 254-256. 5. Vide supra, 3. 
the individual himself: 
But authority is insufficient without reason; 
and reason is not tranquil in the possession of 
truth if its data are not confirmed by experi-
ence. Experience is therefore the one source of 
certitude. But experience is of two sorts ex-
ternal and internal •••• The myst~cal knowledge of 
these internal experiences is of the same type 
and efficacy as experimental knowledge, for the 
doctrine of t~e unity of knowledge is a fundamen-
tal doctrine. 
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Hegel's stress was upon a united and whole personality.2 
With all his philosophic~l rationalism, he favored an intuit~ve 
knowledge ·of God, although opposed to the subjectivism that 
would make immediate knowledge self-justifying\ 
There is in Hegel little trace either of the 
empiricism which uncritically accepts the psy-
chological facts of religion as in themselves 
complete, or of the rationalism which relies on 
thought apart f;r:'om experience. "j"The rational 
must be based on the empirical. 
In his plea for harmony betl1een the empirical and the 
rational (a harmony that included authoritative and historical 
elements), Hegel saw that "the individual must approach divine 
.truth for himself, must· knol..r God in his mm inner experience.••4 
But while 11 quite apart from speculative thought" one may have 
"imperturbable certituden of God, the theoretical arguments 
serve 11 to bring the stages of man1 s elevation to God to clear 
consciousness, 11 to reveal 11 the objective truth in the subj eo-
ti ve Vorstellung ___ of God', 11 and to rr chart for thought the course 
1. Bacon in McKeon, 
SMP, I, 3-4; vide 
supra, 68-69. 
2. Vide supra, 254 .• 
3. Schilling, ERH, 101-102; 
see 97. 
4. Schilling, ERH, 120-121; 
see Hegel, JOB, XIV. 
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followea by the human spirit in its rise to God.nl 
It is the belief of many that all direct experience is 
an intuitive grasp of objects as wholes, and that complexity 
is revealed by reflection later on. Ormond illustrates it by 
the feeling of homesickness--a reaction of the whole self, 
emotion being 11 a feeling-idea that calls forth a feeling re;.. 
action of the sel:t' as a whole~"2 Langley illustrates it by 
aesthetic experience in which apprehension is of the objects 
in their uniqueness and individuality, and differing from the 
direct experience of perception in a fuller use of the pe~ 
oeiver1 s potofers~3 Hooking illustrates it by man's intuitive 
grasp of space (not little by little, but as a whole), and by 
his introduction to other persons (not by piece-meal, but all 
at onoe, the first impression containing a whole idea).4 In 
fact, "Any first idea of any dawning oortsoiousness ••• must be 
at the same time idea-of-the-whole$ 11 .5 Sometimes, as with the 
mystic, there is difficulty in giving exact expression to the 
.feeling-idea, but for Hooking there are unfinished ideas, so 
that it is not "deeper than ide,a ·is feeling, 11 but "deeper,· than 
idea is Idea. 11 6 'rhis intuitive and mystical grasp of the " ·., 
whole,7 however, needs to be supplemented by the reference of 
it to the whole of experience. , Of course, this makes for 
1. Schilling, ERH, 161-162; 
see Hegel JOB, XIV, .5.5-
.56; XII, 69; vide supra, 
90-91 .. 
2. Ormond, OP, 399. 
3. See Langley, Art. (1939), 
89-90. 
4. See Hooking, MGHE, 95. 
5., Hooking, MGHE, 97. 
6. Hooking, MGHE, 107-108; 
see 128-129o 
7. For a somewhat similar 
view, see Smuts, HE, 21. 
-- -.·:: ... ,--
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coherence_, of which more .will be said later. But the view of 
God to be brought into a broad synoptic view is of itself a 
synoptic view, an intuitive grasp of the ~fuole. 
2. Part experience made whole 
I~ this synoptic vlew, the first step to"t"7ards the oar-
relation of certainty and certitude concerning God is making 
part experience whole experience. This is a denial of two 
extremes: l) that experience is self-sufficient, and 2) that 
empiricism is self-refuting~ The former, with its denial of 
any reference beyond the experient; is a narrow view. 11 We 
shall find that ~ experience, at any rate, seems to depend 
in many ways upon extra-experiential oonstitution. 111 The sec-
ond extreme is found in Russell's criticism of empirioismt 
·"However 1 t may be formulated, it must involve~ general 
:proposition about the dependence of knowledge upon exnerience. 112 
This is a just criticism of a narrow empiricism but not of the 
empiricism upheld in this dissertation.3 Experience must re-
ceive. a broader meaning than assigned to it by Kant in his 
C~itigues, or by the positivists; it should ndenom1nate the 
consciousness of all objects whatsoeve:t". 11 4 Kant belatedly 
seemed to have recognized this detect:in his Orit1gues.5 
c. I. Leltis sees a common fault in rationalls·m and 
pure empiricism in treating knowledge in such a way as to 
1. Boodin, Err, 16; see 15. 
2. Russell, IMT, 207; see 
24 113, 170 322. 
3. Vide supra, i99-202. 
4. Baillie~ in Muir-
head, CBP, 16. 
5. Vide supra, 70. 
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make the existence of other minds irrelevant: 11 0ur truth is 
sooial. 11 1 This is the significance of the theistic arguments. 
As convictions arising out of distinctive immediate religious 
experience, they pass from the subjective to the objective 
sphere, are shared, and become, thus, public property. And 
when there is mutual sharing of_suoh convictions, certitude 
tends to become logical certainty. In faot, it is to be 
seriously questioned whether there is a doubt of any kind, 
psychologioal or logical, in the m~nd of one who has had a 
tooth extracted without an anaesthetic, and who has also 
heard the testimony of many .reliable witnesses on the pain-
fulness of the experience. In the same t..ray·~ although much 
more pleasant, religious experience is a universal ex.peri-
enoe, the "result of intersubj.eotive intercoursev •• experi-
ence with a capital E, the common empirical knowledge of the 
raoe, 11 in the sense of being accessible to all.2 In this 
. . 
sense religious experience is truly scientific, for as Mead 
taught1 11 Soience starts with the private experience of an 
individual, but it never operates in a mind or an experience 
that is not soaial.u:3 This extension of experience beyond the 
individual corrects possible errors in the report of one ex-
perience, the real being 11 that which, sooner or later, infor-
mation and reasoning would finally result in, and which is 
therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. 114 . In 
1. ~ewis, MWO, 25~ 
2. f1de 1 . supra, 201; 
see 221. 
3. Werkmeister HPI, 536. 
4. Peirce, in Werkmeister, 
· HPI, 177. _ 
the same connection Peirce declares that·the c.ommunity will 
continue·to reaffirm the real .. This has been done concerning 
the Divine Reality, for there is a· 11 cloud of wi tnesses 11 with 
an unshakable. convictiqn that they have been in God1 s presence. 
.. . 
Mystics from many parts of the world, from. many periods, and 
' . 
from many religious viewpoints bear solid and coherent witness 
to this experience: 
I have studied their testimonies for many 
years, and they are far too cogent, and far 
too similar to each other, to leave any room 
for doubt that they are what they claim to be. 
Their descriptions. are often indistinct; how 
should they not be? •••• He (the mystic) is at-
tempting to describe what language was never 
meant·to express .. But he knows that the vi-
sion was authentic.l 
. . ; 
Here is a tes,timony to the authenticity of the mystical 
experience by o~e who,'is both an investigator of the phenomenon 
and a mystic himself; here, also, is the correlation of psycho-
logical and logical certainty in one individual, subjective and 
ob~ective factors being in organic union as 11 co~perant members 
' . 
of one whole," and the experience of the individual being a 
part of universal experience~2 It seems reasonable, therefore, 
to hold that with the certitude arising from an immediate con-
tact with God one has 11 the first indispensable note of a cri-
.' ~ . 
terion of truth," which confirmed by the second indispensable 
note--the testimony of others to a like experience--would be 
a well-founded and justifiable certitude: 
1. Inge, Art .. ( 1948), 47 .. 2. See Ward, NA, II, 152-
153; vide supra, 238-24?. 
Two singularly contradictory arguments have 
been made against intuition, first to prove it 
to be mere untrustworthy subjectivism, and sec-
ond, to show that it is only a swift process of 
sound ratiocination 1 unconscious of its movement 
and at'lare only of i'ts results. If either of 
these can be proven, it renders the other void. 
In answer to the first of these objections the 
mystic virtually replies: 'I know the truth of 
the spiritual world with a conclusive sense of 
conviotion, as I kno'tf mys.elf ...... Moreover the 
oonviction is not mine alone; my fellow believer 
has the
1
same sense of oertainty and assures me 
of it .. ' 
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Thus, in making part experienoe whole experience, there 
is an extension of individual experienoe into race experienoe, 
and an objectivity that makes for a degree of logical oertainty. 
·3. Part reason and part faith made whole 
The seoond step towards the correlation of oertainty 
and certitude conoerning God is the making whole of reason 
and faitho Reference has been made to the confusion and 
damage caused by narrow views of them, and to the latent 
danger of hypocrisy and atheism lurking in the moral argument. 2 
Both faith and reason have been at fault., At times, the for-
mer has been either credulous or unduly cautious; the latter 
has often been self-suffioient, although its pathetic helpless-
ness, unaided by faith and by Reason (divine) has been seen 
time and again .. 3 As thus used, it is just "one competitor 
among others of an unqualified primaoy in human concerns 11 with 
11 no special sanoti ty about it,. and is quite as much in need of 
1. Buckham, MML, 120; see 
Vance, RT, 233; Tennant, 
PT I, 291; Bro't'ln PC 
204; vide supra, ~3-64, 
199-202. 
2. Vide supra, 6-8~ 6~~ 
95, 129-135, 13~-1~, 
155-156, 195-196~ 
3. Vide supra, 46, 49, 
6o, 69, 85-90. 
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criticism as the rest!~ Both reason and faith have been 
hostile to each other, and both have been guilty of going 
blindly by the greatest .evidence of all for the existence of 
God--personal acquaintance with Him~ Neither faith nor rea-
son is complete apart from the other, nor apart from the uni-
fication of personality and life. Both must stay in each 
other's presenc·e until reason becomes a believing reason and 
faith becomes a reasonable faith. Nor is this sufficient; 
they must come into the Presence of Reason, for faith can 
never be perfected apart from the presence of God, and reason 
can never become fully reasonable until it listens_ to Reason. 
Apart from that, the best that can be looked for is 11 an un-
reasonable rat1onality11 as well as an unreasonable fa1th,2 
and a ·continuation of the present state of perplexity and un-
ee-rtainty. 
A proposal has been made for recovery from the evils 
brought on by this uncertainty, namely that faith "supplement 
the inadequacies and correct the mistakes· of a· too narrowly 
conceived reason," and.that reason stop both judging t:~nd sub-
stantiating faith, stepping aside to allow faith ·to do its 
healing work.3 But if reason steps aside 1t will be because 
reason itself counsels it, and it will but perpetuate the use 
of reason in a narrow sen se~ Pienoe Murphy ~ightly concludes: 
"While, ·therefore, we shall welcome any aid that faith oan 
bring· to reason' we shall have to ask that faith to .identify 
1. Murphy, UR, 13. 
2. Mttrpby, UR, 13. 3. Murphy, UR, 10. 
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itself and present its oredentials."l 
A better way out of the difficulty--one at which Kant 
hinted but which was not carried out by him--is for reason and 
faith to respect the just claims of each other, to respond to 
the voioe of Reason, to come into His presenoe, to reoeive His 
instructions, and to return as partners, fully-equipped, ma-
tured and whole persoQalities, to work upon the whole of ex-
perience, unifying and making coherent the whole of life. 
Then the theistic arguments with new significance will take 
their Place in the total scheme of things.. The individual, 
having found evidence of the activity of God in his own lite, 
and having tak~n his cue from the traditional theistic argu-
ments, can with better success find evidences of God1 s activity 
in the world as well as in the lives of others, i .. e. in the 
~ p~sical, moral and religious realms. 
4. True rationalism and true ,empiricism joined 
The thi~d step towards the correlation of certainty 
and certitude concerning God is the joining of true rational-
ism and true empiricism. This Kant attempted without suoeess 
in his critical rationalism, because nearly to the end of life 
he remained a rationalist in the narrow sense. 2 Hegel suooeded 
better; his concept of the rational as the whole is the cue 
for the ideal being upheld at this point. 
The descriptive word 11 true 11 in reference to rationalism 
and empiricism suggests that apart from their union they are 
1. Murphy, UR, 12. 2~ Vi~e supra, 1, 8-9, 123-125. 
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either false or inadequate. The rationalism of Kant's day and 
later, especially as used by the opponents of Christianity, 
consisted in the deification and narrow use of reason.l Kant 
and the proponents of Christianity, including the framers of 
the traditional theistic arguments, were not empirical enough, 
and consequently, used a curtailed reason.2 The advance of 
science and the increasing popularity of the empirical method 
has greatly modified the old rationalism.3 
Empiricism also has been modified since Kant's day, 
but today there are diverse meanings given to it. Bertrand 
Russell, a recognized leader of empiricism,4 the heart of 
whose philosophy is the principle of acquaintance, declares 
that empir.l:ci·s;tshave a common emphasis upon perceptive prem-
ises.5 That is in contrast to the acceptance of the authority 
oflan astronomer that there will be an eclipse, a belief that 
there is an eclipse, based on personal seeing of it, is a per-
ceptive premise. But Russell contrasts social and individual 
empiricism: 
·are 
l. 
2. 
3 .. 
What astronomers call an eclipse is a public 
event1 whereas what I am seeing may be due to a defecu in my eye or my telescope. While, there-
fore, the belief, 'There is an eclipse• may a-
rise in me without conscious inference, this be-
lief goes beyond the mere expression of what I 
see.6 
According to Dewey, Russell holds that propositions 
the subject-matter of inquiry, while Dewey and other 
Vide supra, 5. 4. See SellArs, Art. (1949), 
Vide supra, 6-11. 496. 
Vide supra, 197-199. 5. See RussellT IMTS 168. 6. Russell, IM , 16 • 
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thorough-going empiricists declare that it is not propositions 
but things and events. But Russell denies that he holds prop-
osi tiona as the ultimate subject-matter, since, 11My problem 
has been throughout, the relation between events and the proP-
ositions that they .cause men to assert.ul 
Dewey, following James, holds that truth gives .satis-
faction, as in the case when the idea as a working hypothesis 
11 is applied to prior existences in suoh a way as to fulfil:. 
what it intends.n2 In the language of Russell, it is a social 
experience. For speaking favorably of the doctrine of James 
11 that a belief is true when. it satisfies both personal needs 
and the requirements of objective things,~ Dewey goes on to 
say of pragmatism: 
Her only test of probable truth is what works 
best in the way of leading us, what fits every 
part of life best, and combines with the collec-
·~ivity of experience's demands, nothing being 
omittea.3 
Wieman's idea o~ religious empiriois)n is revealed in 
' . 
the statement of purpose in one of his books: "To .show that 
: ,-
religious expe~ience is an experience of an obj eot, hO'tfever 
undefined, which is as truly external to the individual as 
any tree or stone which he may exper~ence.4 
In the view of Martin, 11 empirical 11 means·, in short, 
1. Russell·, IM'f, 402-403. 
2. Dewey, Art.(l908), 94; 
see 85; see Moore, 'fRE, 
56. 
3. Dewey, Art" (1908), 96; 
see 8o-87;~Martin, EPR, 
119; W~rd, NA, II, 26~ 
265; E!., 333-334. 
4. newey, RESM, 5; see 
Brotherston, Art.(l943), 
14-21. 
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"to be •realistic• or •tough-minded,' to take full account 
of all the relevant data and to blink none of the significant 
facts .. "l 
Tennant, giving the usual View of empiricism as opposed 
to rationalism and its claims to knowledge independent of 
sensory ex.perienoe, sums it up by saying "that epistemology 
in order. to .be a science of knowledge must set out tram actual, 
observable faot-data, and seek, in the first instance, their 
actual preconditians.n2 
J. E. Boadin, a self-styled 11 pragmatio realist", stress-
ing the ttill and declaring that "the intuitive certitude of 
instinctive religious feeling must be oorrected in the light 
o-f further experience, 11 espouses the empiricism of James and 
Detr1ey, in that, 11 the test of the truth of a hypothesis is in 
its tforking. n3 
E. B. Brightman's empiricism is implicitly affirmed by 
Pringle-Pattison who observaa that the personal idealists 
llwere the forerunners and in some eases the pioneers of prag... 
mat1sm.n4 Martints appraisal of Brightman's position in~ 
description of a valid religious philosophy as udefinitely 
empiri~ in character," is borne out by Brightman: 
Our experience consists in our entire con-
scious life. Religion is one phase of experi-
ence. Philosophy of religion is the experience 
l. Martin EPR, 110. 
2. Tennant, PT, I,. 2:,..9; 
see Lamprecht, Art. 
(194o)' 71. . .. 
3. Boodin, FtT~, 317; see RU, 
175-177. 
4. Pringle-Pattison, TIG, 225; 
see Brightman, P~, 322. 
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of interpreting these experiences which we 
call religious and of relating them to other 
experiences as well as to our concept of ex-
perience as a whole.l 
Ayer describes himself as an empi~ioist, but his empi~ 
" 
1oism is extreme and positivistic; tor he rejects metaphysics, 
and thinks that he has destroyed the 11 toundations of rational-
1sm.112 Ormond's vi elf that there can be no rational! ty apart 
trom experience, and 11 that what we call the voice of reason 
is only the voice of experience as a whole, 11 is a better rep.. 
resentation of empiricism. While advising that rationalism 
give up its aloofness from experience on the ground that 
"there can be no other reliable method than that which is 
experimental in 1 ts data and procedure," he values metaphyai os 
as 11 an interpretation of experience, t"'i th a view of reaching 
its full significance .. uJ 
A conspicuous evidence of the disagreement on the mean-
""""' -ing of 11 empirical" is seen 1n the so-called 11 controversy" be-
tween S. P. Lamprecht and P :; ::A:. Bertoooi. Lamprecht is re-
luctant to grant Brightman, Bertocoi, and Tennant the use of 
"empirioal11 as descriptive of their methods in connection with 
their arguments for the existence of God. Lamprecht is partie- ~ 
ularly critical of Bertocq1 (who 11 professes 'to be empirical 
1n method--at least up to a certain stage 111 ), as one is not 
empirical just because 11 he does not make assumptions in con-
tradiction of the facts," or because he "makes no greater 
1. Brightman, PR, l; see 9, 
415; PG, 160; Martin, 
EPR, 29. 
2. Ayer, LTL, 89,. 92~~. 
3. Ormond, CP, 564, 573. 
...... .c 
! ./ 
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assumptions beyond the facts--well, than to affirm God who is 
of the nature requisite to support the liberal theology"l: 
When one begins to assume even the minimum 
requisite to make experience intelligible,,one 
is assuming what will make experience intelli-
gible to some one who wants more than experi-
ence furn!shes:--And that I submit, is not em-
piricism properly at all.2 
But this is withholding from the empiricist the use of 
reasont at leastt of whole reason, and is a continuation of 
the dispute between the old types of rationalism and empiri-
cism--reason versus experience--which makes knowledge accord-
ing to either method impossible. Lamprecht is against the 
empiricist going 11 beyond experience to something else on t-lhich 
experience depends," and appealing 11 to something beyond experi-
ence to 'explain experience~ r n3 It 't'l7ould be as unjust to deny 
to empiricism postulate~ or axioms for deductive inference (as 
Lamprecht does deny), as it would be unjust to deny to ration-
alism the use of experience. Induction and deduction, if they 
proceed at all, must proceed together. 
Bertocc1 evidently saw this flaw in Lamprecht's criti-
cism, for he replied that the facts must be reasonably inter-
preted, and that 11 there is no other more reasonable and econom-
ical hypothesisll than the one 11llhich interpreting ~ avail-
able data, goes beyond them without oontradioting experience."4 
As to his commitments, Bertocci replied that the only one he 
1. Lamprecht, Art.(l939), 74. 
2. Lamprecht, Art.(1939), 74. 
3. Lamprecht, Art.(l939),.76. 
4. Bertocoi, Art.(l939), 
-264; see Brotherston; 
Art. ( 1933) , 4.51. 
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thought he had was the purpose 0 to organize the data of experi-
ence as coherently as possible.ul He adds that the empirical 
philosopher must have postulates, at least, "the faith that 
he can succe'ed in organizing every aspect of experience." For 
Bertocci, empiricism is 11 a method in whioh all methode and hy-
potheses are to be referred to experience for explanation and 
testing. 11 2 
Enough evidence concerning the confusion over the cor-
rect use of 11 empirical" has been presented to indicate the 
desirability of closer relations between rationalism and em-
piricism. Dr. Brightman, among others, has 'tforked to this end: 
A radical change has dominated the decade 
for me, a change from emphasis on the ration-
alistic and ~ priori factors in religious 
knowledge to emphasis on the empirical. Pre-
viously the word empiricism was connected in 
my mind with a narrow emphasis on sensation 
alone •••• Now pragmatism seems to me not so 
much false as incompletely empirical. No em-
piricism seems to me to be •truly radical' 
which minimizes the pervasive fact that all' 
experience comes in, of, and for a person or 
omits any accessible personal exper1ence.3 . 
That is, Brightman realized that "reason and experience 
are not to be dichotomized," as reason is a part and function 
of experience, which is 11 a movement toward rational totality. 114 
William A. Brown approaches this rational whole by a 
different path. He objects to all theoretical theistic argu-
ments because they separate what belong together, omitting 
1~ Bertocci, Art.(l939), 265; 
see EAG 10. 
2. Bertoccl 1 Art.(1939)~ 266; 
see Prat~, Art.(l939J,269; 
Martin, EPR, 38j Hartshorne, 
MVG, 73-74. 
3. Brightman, Art.(l939)2, 
276. l 
4. Brightman, Art. (1937) , 
15~155; see ~artin, 
EPR, 37. 
11 the most significant part of their data"--evidence of the 
Christian revelation ana experience; he finds the synthesis 
of the methods of specul~tion an authority in Christian ex-
perience, t>rhich is 11 the only conclusive reason for belief in 
the Christian God~"l The writer has already expressed his 
conviction that the rational is the whole and that a ration-
alism which does not consider the whole of experience by the 
whole reason of a whole personality (intellect, sensibility 
and will) is not a true rationalism, and that an empiricism 
which does not include faith and reason as parts of exnerl-
ence is not a true empiricism. This means the wed~ook· of. 
rationalism and empiricism. 
The connecting link between them is mysticism. The 
true mystic insists that his intuitions should b~ tested by 
other experie~ce; he is a pragmatical empiricist as will be 
shown later. Aubrey notes that the mystic meets the natural-
. 1st's demand that intuitive apprehension should not be re-
garded as assured knowledge until it is verified by observa-
tion and reason. On the other hand: 
The naturalist's demand for such verifica-
tion implies that the intuition has proposi-
tional content-~or there would be nothing2to verify--which is the mystic's insistence~ 
5~ The correlation, thus, of certainty and certitude: 
Kant• s Wiesen 
In the synoptic view which sees together reason, faith 
lo Brown, CTO, 125, 127. 2o Aubrey, PTT~20l-202; 
von H'iigel, .l!i.t'R, lLi-16. 
and experience as wholes, and a true rationalism and a true 
~mpiricism as one organic unit reaches its culmination in the 
correlation, also; of certainty and certitude. A significant 
step in this direction was taken when it was shown that in 
the concept of a whole faith there is room for both the dis-
tinction between faith and knowledge ~nd for their joint activ-
ity without loss of identity in the case of a successful ex-
periment.l Another such step was taken when reason and faith 
were joined in partnership. Its effects are first manifest 
in individual experience: 
Making it possible for a person to obtain 
an experience of contact with Something which 
can be intellectualized by him as representing 
the real Presence of. the divine redemptive Re-
ality is a far superior way of imparting the 
highest type of ·certainty, the synthesis of 
'objective certaintyt and •subjective certitude.•2 
~lliile Kant rightly contr~sted belief and knowledge, he 
also taught that opinion can become knowledge when objective 
evidence is supplied.) Furthermore, for Kant the culmination 
of the steps of Meinung (theoretical opinion), Glauben (moral 
or practical belief), and Ueberzeugung (subjective sufficiency 
of evidence for one's self), is Wiesen ("die, objective Gewiss-
heit ••• f~r Jedermann"). Here is certainty that is both ~y­
ehologioal and logical, a certainty that combines subjective 
and objective evidence, and a synthesis of the inadequate 
logical certainty of the first chapter of this dissertation, 
1. Vide supra~ 35, 148. 
2. Tennant, PT, I, 188. 
3. Vide supra, 148. 
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the partial certitude of the second chapter, the unshakable 
certitude of the third chapter, plus the logical certainty 
that is acquired when individual experience merges into race 
Experienee,l when the correlation of certainty and certitude 
is perfected by authority1 -the living or recorded testimony 
(including the Christian Scriptures) of a multitude of others 
who have experienced God. 
While this may be described in general terms as 11 man' s 
consciousness of a reliable relationship, stated in terms o:f' 
belief', between himself and the world, 11 2 it is a stronger 
putting of the case for religious certainty because o:f' the 
broader and stronger meaning given 11 belief1!; and thus, it 
goes beyonq Bosley's psychological and methodological certain-
ty, for it includes also the certainty of logic and of con-
clusion, i.e. of belief as well as of attitude, and the ac-
ceptance of authority, the testimony to the eXperience of 
others as well as that of one's own.3 
This correlation of overwhelming certitude and strong 
logical certainty also goes ·'beyond the certainty found in 
Montague's federation of epistemological methods with its 
ndomains" o:f' authoritarianism, mysticism, rationalism, empir-
icism, pragmatism and skepticism,4for it has no place for 
skepticism. For while the writer would not use a term that 
has reference to the super-:f'inite as 11 absolute 11 to describe 
1. Vide supra, 200. 
2. Vide supra, 3. 
3• Vide supra, 3-4; see 
Bosley, QRO 37. 
4. Montague, WK, 225-231. 
this religious certainty he would choose terms that exclude 
doubt (for doubt and kriowledge,.in their tull sense, are con-
tradictory terms) 1 such as "unshakable" or "imperturbable." 
These terms are consistent with the open-mindedness of Bosley's 
11 tentativenese, 11 but not l'7ith skepticism. The position upheld 
is nearer that of Brown, tl7ith hie personal, common life and 
scientific approach, as there are persons to be loved a.nd 
promisee to be trusted--divine and human; and the conviction 
that God exists is primarily a personal affair, to be worked 
for and won by the individual for himself. Brown approaches 
the certainty of God by four paths--authority, reason, intui-
tion, and experiment. The certainty attained is the unshakable 
certitude of personal experience plus the adequate certainty 
coming through wider experience, acquaintance with race Expe~ 
ience 11 that gives continuity to my experience and unity tomy 
thought. 11 2 Brown relates authority and intuition, finding 
their completion in the relation; authority points to intuition, 
and it points back to author1 ty: 
Authority adds to the_ witness of intuition 
tl-70 element e ••• universality and permanence. tfe 
trust our judgments concerning truth and beauty 
in part because they are shared by oth,er pe1;sone. 
t'Te trust them still more because they last.'"' 
He implicitly agrees l.Yith Murphy that there is no incom-
patibility between the religious experiment and the strictly 
scientific experiment, for in both the passive side is revealed 
1. Blanshard, NT, I, 486-487. 3o Brown, PC, 148~ 
2. Vide supra, 3 ... 
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in reliance upon authority (testimony of others), and the active 
side is revealed in participation in the test. Thus no experient 
oan take an attitude of complete detachment and freedom from 
antecedent commitments. The true scientific spirit would be re-
vealed by not blindly making such commitments and by not being 
cold toward relevant information concerning them.l 
Thus a synoptic view takes in the correlation of certainty 
and certitude. 
II. A valid belief! verification 
1. Its meaning and possibility 
In connection with the correlation·of cert~inty and cer-
titude grasped in synoptic vision, a valid belief is acquired 
through verification of the religious hypothesis, the first con-
sideration of which is the meaning and possibility of such veri-
fication. Broadly.~speaking, reasoning itself is a. process of 
verifioation.2 Verification marks the limits of knowledge. In 
1 ts simplest form, it 11 occurs t~Jhen I first expect an event and 
. 
then perceive it.n3 Verifieation, then, is the judging as true 
of some hypothesis, the function of which is 11 to afford a stand-
ard by tfhich success or failure can be judged • 11 4 
This implies that verification in general is possible. 
Ayer holds that a sentence is "factually significant" to one 
when he knows how to verify it as a proposition, that is, 11 if 
1. See Brown, PC, 97; 
Murphy, UR, 105-108. 
2. See Brotm, PC, 153. 
3. Russell, IMT, J87; 
vide supra, 189, 193. 
4. Brown, PC, 204-205. 
he knot-7S what observations t.rould lead him under certain con-
ditions, to accept the proposition as being true or reject it 
as being false .. "l He distinguishes strong and weak senses of 
"verifiable," the former capable of being "conclusively estab-
lished in experience, 11 and declares that the ~;ustificat1on of 
scientific procedure is 11 the success of the predictions to 
"t-7hich it gives rise.n2 Proposi tiona that do not "-'10rk should 
be abandoned, for 11 a proposition whose validity we are resolved 
to maintain in the face of any experience is not a hypothesis 
at all but a def'ini tion.•t:3 Flewelling is implicitly prA.gmatic 
l'then he declares: "So some loyalties, some loves, some ideals, 
some aspirations, some moralities, some visions of' time, eter-
nity, freedom, God are necessary to the normal ana highest 
functioning of life .... 11 These, he adds, we take on faith, the 
only justification needed being the justification of results.4 
In calling attention to the vast amount of knowledge 
the.t has been won by science, Ducasse implies the possibility 
of verification, and he explicitly declares that .the knowledge 
and progress of science are due to 11 the method of' Hypothesis--
Deduction--Verification,11 whereas philosophy 11 too often has 
sought consistency amonghypotheses rather than empirical VePi-
ficatian-.- n5 \ : Carnap agrees with Ducasse that facts are true 
propos1tions.6 
~(hat has been said concerning the making whole of 
1. Ayer, LTL, 20. 
2. Ayer, LTL, 22 1 48. 3. Ayer, LTL, 13~135; 
vide supra, 140, 143, 144. 
4. Flewelling,' RF, 3D-3l. 5. Ducasse, Art.(l935), 121, 
122; see 123-126. 
6. See Carnap, MN, 28. 
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experience (including intuition), faith,(including authority)~ 
and reason (including Reason), and the rational-empirical con-
cept has had a bearing on the meaning and possibility of the 
verification of the religious hypothesis. For such a ~osition 
has been taken on experience(particularly immediate religious 
experience), reason (especially in the presence of Reason), and 
faith (pre-hypothetical, hypothetical and post-hypothetical) as 
not to ~le out before hand the possibility of suoh verification 
(and therefore of certainty), but rather, to render it a defen-
sible position. The writer is in agreement with Brown that to 
- s....__u-se "hypothesis" in reference to God does not mean 11 that "t-re have 
no certain knowledge of God, or even that we know Him only in 
pa.rt, 11 as hypotheses 11 def1ne ••• the range of the better possible 
knowledge which it is our aim by progressive experiment to trans-
late into certainty."l There is a place here for tentativeness, 
in the sense of readiness to receive new evidence, but not in 
the sense of unoertaintyo One personal contact with God is suf-
ficient for permanent certitude of His existence, although not 
for full knowledge of His nature. 2 This makes possible progres-
sive revision of the religious hypothesis without lose of certi-
tude, and gives meaning to the declaration that verification is 
carried on by the entire human raoe and is not complete until 
the last man has made his report.3 The religious hypothesis 
built up through the ages lays down the conditions of a 
1. Brown, PO, 211; 
DeBurgh, TRP, 10. 
2. Vide supra, 261-262. 
3Q See Brown, BC, 205; 
von Hugel, EPR, 
James, 'l-1B, 107. 
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successful experiment and predicts the results.l A postulate 
is not the end of knowledge but its beginning. \'Taterhouse 
likens religious knowledge to aesthetic and ethical knowledge 
in that they all involve valuation; he declares that a religious 
judgment can be as valid as 11 our knowledge that the sunset is 
beautiful," and that the inference which has an 11 intuitive 
sense of certainty behind it 11 is "more convincing than a purely 
reasoned inference.u2 
Sheen, although an advocate of the rationalistic 11 demon-
stration11 of God, has to concede that the validity of the empir-
ical approach of religious experit:mce 11 passes almost unquestioned, 11 
and that 11 its general acceptance has been taken as one of. the 
most striking phenomena in modern thought. 11 3 Yet he appears to 
be shocked that religious experience has been made the foundation 
for postulating the idea of Godo He quotes some great author-
' 1 ties (H. G.. W'ell s, Alfred Ho ernle, L. Po Jacks, and Bradley) : 
11
•. The man lfho demands a reality more solid than religious con-
sciousness knows not what he seeks.an4 Another one of these 
quotations is: 1111 'Modern religion bases its kno,7ledge of God 
entirely upon experience; it has encountered God. It does not 
argue about God. It relates.•n5 Here, particularly in the 
word "entirely" Sheen.does seem to find ev1dence of an extreme 
. ' 
1 .. Vide supra, 135, 1.52-155; 
Ayer 1 LTL~ 139; Benjam.in, Art. \19391, .519-52.5. 
2. Waterhouse, Art.(l944), 
84, 80; see 81-82; see 
DeBurgh, Arto(l926), 106-
107 •. 
3. Sheen, GI 24; see Ben-jamin, Art.(l939), 517; 
vide supra, 197-202. 
4. Sheen, GI, 24· see 
Bradley, AR, 449. 
5Q Sheen, GI, 24-2.5; Wells, 
GIK, 24. 
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religious empiricism, one that is uncritical in its reliance 
upon religious experience. 
2. Its need 
a. By the one who has had direct contact with God 
In one sense, the belief in the existence of God held 
by the one who has had direct contact with God needs no verifi-
cation. Hie certitude is compelling and complete. Hie immedi-
ate experience is self-validating. As ultimate, there is 
nothing behind or below it to whiCh appeal can be made. ·Reason 
finds in it its strongest evidence, its last- court of appeal. 
11 The pre-condition of inference is a gr~und that is not in-
ferred.111 For Bradley and many others immediate experience is 
self-valida.ting.2 Whitehead appeals to it 11 in order to expand 
the field of thought ••• and for criticizing and verifying its 
conclusions. 113 For De1-1ey, also, immediate experience "furnishes 
the means of testing the results of reflection. 114 ~1hile Bradley,· 
De1-1ey, and Whitehead differ in some details on this matter, they 
all make immediate experience the ultimate appeal. This general 
truth may be applied to. mysti.oa.l experiences: 
To the mystic himself, the experience is evi~,.­
dance enough. It lights his lamp and girds his 
loins for action; it banishes doubt and despair, 
as the sunrise banishes darkness. He no more 
1·1ants arguments now to prove God 1 s existence· than 
the artist longs for arguments to prove the real-
ity of beauty gr the lover does to prove the 
,.,orth of love .. ' · 
1 .. 'VTaterhouse, Art. (19!14), 79. 
2. See Mack, AIE, 15, 26; 
Vance, RT, 233 9 
3. Mack, AIE, 27. 
4. Mack, AIE, 52 .. 
5. Jones, SMR, xxvii-xxix; 
see Farmer, TBG, 37; 
Le"tori s, AKV, 254. 
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The impelling pmter in this experience is the author! ta-
tive note in it as well as the feeling of satisfaction and har-
mony produced by it. It is the thesis of R. H. Stracnan in his 
book, The Authority of Christian Exoerience, that "the seeds of 
authority and certitude are planted already in the individual 
experience itself," and that, consequently, 11 1n such soil alone 
a religious authority which is really authoritative can grow"; 
he explicitly calls the apprehension of God 11 1n our own experi-
ence" the "ultimate author! ty·· in rel1g1on. 11 l 
James associated the authority of the experience with 
its 11 noet1o 11 qual1ty.2 Bennett has sho111n that there is enough 
cognitive content in the mystical experience to identify God, 
that the immediate is not exhausted in the mere 11 that, 11 and can 
not be,,as character can not be actually separated from exist-
ence; furthermore, if it could be, 11 med1a.te" and "immediate" 
are rendered unintelligible. So what the mystic experiences is 
not a meaningless, but a certain fact; tiis personal contact 
with God is like one meeting a man who has been described to 
him before$ The mystio thus seeks a definite Person. His ex-
perience is both mediate and immediate. It is mediate in that 
he goes from idea to experience; it is immediate in that God 
appears to h1m.3 Mystics unite in testifying that they have 
had an "intellectual apprehension of God's presence. 114 Reason 
1. Strachan, ACE, 16, 20· . 
see Galloway, TPR, 264-. _ 
265 .. 
2. See James, VRE, 380-381. 
3. See Bennett, OVM, 43, 
148-152; BuckhamA HG, 
6; vide supra, 2~7- · 
325. 
4. DeBurgh, TRP, 121. 
352 
adequately viewed must include intuition; the logical processes 
or discursive reason simply bring out "the implications present 
from the outset. nl Leuba agrees 't'Ti th James that what 11 has not 
been mentally elaborated is invulnerable" and notes that agree-
ment of James, Hooking, and the mystic philosophers in general 
on the meaningful nature of immediate experience prior to its 
rational interpretationJ~ Mrs. Dawkins maintains the thesis 
that mysticism cannot be understood except as a cognitive 
achievement, and that 11 no cognitive process, no thinking can 
be under~tood except as.Ha part of the mystical achievement .. 11 3 
That is, thinking is from part to whole but it requires an in-
tuitive vision of the whole for a start; knowing the goal, true 
kno1'1ledge is possible for us. Consequently, "Oorhile the mystic 
blinded by the 11 full sunlight" cannot see the parts distinctly, 
yet he 11 knol'ts ••. immediately, and that in a way toJe must acknowl-
edge to be universal, understandable, vastly significant. 11 4 
Now, it is this cognitive faotor that 11 determines ••• the 
quality of validity," and that in one sense renders immediate 
religious experience self-validating.5 
b. By others 
But while immediate religious experience is self-vali-
dating, it is not "others- convincing 11 ; t'lfhile the mystical ex-
perience is coercive proof to the experient, it is not so to 
1. DeBurgh, FMR, 35-36. 
?. Leuba, PRM, 308; see 
... ' 314; Le"toris, AKV, 409; 
Russell, ML, 9; Rall, 
SM, 100; vide supra, 
3. Dawkins, MEP, 27. 
4. Dawkins, MEP~ 82, 83; 
see Lewis, AAV ~86. 
5. DeBurgh, Art.(i926), 
105 .. 
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others, and so stands in need of verification. I The mystic's 
certitude must be supplemented by logical certainty, for while 
his experience is direct and unchallengeable, 11 it is only by 
means of Thought and trust in Thought that this experience can 
be extended, communicated, utilizea.nl Bennett, following von 
H&gel and Hooking, is dissatisfied with the conc1usion of James 
that the mystids experience is authoritative only for the mystic. 
In evaluating this experience, Bennett considers the motiv,e of 
the mystic, which is not to write a new theology, but to com-
mune with God.as an Object of love, and supports Hocking in his 
idea of the community of knowledge or of minds, the necessity 
of a common object known as common. 2 But this means a similar 
subjective experience; it becomes authoritative by becoming 
personal. Thus, contrary to the implication of Waterhouse, 
the mystic's "inviolate position" is not secured at a price to 
the mystic, but to the one to whom it means nothing, for it 
can mean something to such a one--it' he will 11 taste and see. 11 
For as Waterhouse himself declares, 11 there can be no dispute 
about tastes. 11 3 And as Tillich observes, "religious truth is 
existential truth and to that extent it cannot be separated 
from practice"; it is 11 acted--1n accord with the Gospel of 
John. 114 
The need of verification of religious belief can be 
1. von H~gel, EPR, 71-72; 
see DeBurgh, TPR, 121. 
2. See Bennett, OVM, iv, 
12-15, 9l-9b; C. I. 
Let11is , J.il'VO , 116 . 
3. Waterhouse, Art. 
(1944)' 79. 
4. Tillich, RS, 18. 
briefly stated: any hypothesis can be known to be true on~y 
because it works; this is true of the religious hypothesis 
: , .. , , ... 
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in that it deals with an Object that is nublio (in the sense 
M • ' 
of acoessib~e .to all)! .but pri,vate in the·. subjective·· sen.se~ 
Therefo_I:".e, the reli_gious hypothesis, basioally and ultj,.mately, 
oan be known to be true only because it works in personal 
immediate experienoeol 
3. Its tests 
a. Pragmatic 
Verifioation of the belief in God may be tound first in 
the pragmatio test. The names of James and Dewey are generally 
assooiated with this test. Viewing truth as correspondence of 
idea and faot, they hold that this means 11 the guiding or lead-
ing power of ideas by whieh we dip into the particulars of ex-
perience again," so that when the idea "corresponds with the 
things it means_ to square with, 11 1 t is verified. 2 It is the 
"laboratory habit of mi:nd~; that whioh works is true.3 Ques-
tions concerning the meaning of given·objeots are put to them, 
as it were, and the answers are fonnd in the effects produoed 
by the objeots~ To the objection that all that works is not 
true, James and Dewey would answer that the test is found in 
the 11 sooial and eventual rather than individ1,lal and immediate. 114 
Misunderstanding over-their use of 11 satisfaction115 is doubtless 
due to an ambiguity of statement, for it seems to be their 
1. Vide supra, 143. 
2. Dewey, Art.(l908)~ 85. 
3. See Dewey, Art.(l~08), 
86-87; James, PRA, 123. 
4. Moore, TRE, 56. 
5. See Dewey4 Art. (1908), 9. 
3.5.5 
purpose to convey the idea of a cognitive satisfaction 11 that 
develops when there is good reason to believe that we are ac-
tually finding out what the inquiry set out to discover," i.e .. 
when 11 the ·ideas employed have vindicated their usefulness in 
the discovery of factual truth .. nl For Nolting, likewise, 
validity means a "rational justifioation as a. basis of aotion. 11 2 
The significant faet is that James set this path over against 
the theore~1oal as an approach to ~oa.3 Belief in ~od has 
already beenpartiaFlly justified by this test.4 
Macintosh also applies this test to the religious hy-
pothesis. He declares that mysticism and pragmatism oan be 
mutually helpful: 
If religious pragmatism oan add to its method 
ot testing religious hypotheses ••. an immediate 
experience of the- divin'e·~ .. it· will have taken the 
longest possible step tq~~a~d becoming truly scien-
tific. On the othel'" hand'-; if. r-eligious mysticism 
will but oqnsent to have its subjective certitudes 
tested by being aoted upon as working hypotheses 
in praotioal r~lation and _everyday life, it will 
have ceased to be unduly dogmatic, and ,fill have ~own its will~ngness to become truly soientifio.5 
When intuit1ona11sm and pragmatism are thus combined, 
truth will be 11 an entity or correspondence of idea with reality 
~ .. ~ . 
••• whose sufficiency for all valid purposes ••• is guaranteed by 
the confirmation of immediate ex:perience.n6 
The self-discipline, the preparation th~ mystic makes 
1. Murphy, UR 88. 
2. Nolting; CTP4 141. 3. James, VRE, 48; see 
Bosanquet, VDI. 25• 
Buokham, Art.(l935r, 
311. 
4. Vide supra, 135-144.t 1.52-1~. 
5. Macintosh, RC, 232-G33. 
6. Macintosh, PRK, 304-305. 
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for coming into the presence of &od has pragmatic value, of 
itself as well as cuiminating in higher moral and spi~itttal 
living.l ·In this there is a mingling of idealistic elements, 
for there is a stress on the inner life. The mystic begins 
11 his search for truth and reality from wi thin~a; 
It is important to remember that mysticism 
is not merely in its very nature the timeless 
religion of inward experience, the perennial 
witness to the authority of the spirit, the 
reality of the soul's contact with God. His-
torically~ also, it st~ds for freedom and in-
wardness.;; 
!he mystic does·not search for trbth for its own sake.1~ 
First of all he wants to find God and commune with Him. His 
11 h1gh degree of oerti tude of the reality, aooessibili ty, and 
sufficiency of God" tends to make religion strongly dynamic in 
everyday life; nit is.the finished mystic who best knows the 
need of active life and its mediation~lf.5 He is individual and 
contemplative on the one hand and practical and altruistic on 
the other., To some, hol'iever, the essence of mysticism is riot 
oontempl~tion but ·aotion. st. Paul, St. ·Theresa,· st. Cathe-
rene of Siena·, st·. Francis, and Joan of Arc are examples of 
this and of the statement that Christian mysticism can be 
traced to Christ and the Hebrelf prophets as the source of this 
inspiration to aotivity.6 
But two things must be kept in mind here: the first is 
1. See Ral1, SM, 59-60. 
2. Rall, SM, 94; Buo~am, 
MML 171. 
3. Hartshorne, MVM, 261. 
4. See Rall, SM~ 6~65, 70. 
5 • Hooking, MGH.I!i xix. 
6. See Moore, TRE, 46. 
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that the secret ot this dJnamio lite is the consciousness ot 
God's presence; the second is that the greatest service the 
mystic performs is to point out to others the way to God. 
Mystici.sm is normal tfhen 1 t stresses the experience of God 
11 as a Personal Presence, and avoids all speculation which 
does not flow out of and return to this experience 11 entering 
11 into service of some kind."l 
!fhis sense of "Personal Presence" has made men 11 eottra-
geous '-n the face of perseeut1on, 11 has sensitized 11 their con-
sciences to. social wrong, 11 and 11has suffused their entire 
lives with Joy. 112 ~his dynamic force in the man suffused in 
divine love manifests itself as 11 a tremendous creative energy 
making h'-m ready to place his life at the service of the 
world's need. 11 3 Underhill speaks ot the great satisfaction 
~f the mystic as coming from. being a creative artist whose 
business it is now recognized to be to enlighten rather than 
to delight. In reference to the affinity ot Eueken's thought 
with mysticism, Underhill says~ 11 there is in reality no essen-
tial connection betwe:en retirement tram the world and the mystic 
view of real1ty.4 
Not the least of the opntributions.that mysticism has 
made is its spiritualizing.of worship. Seeing-in normal mys-
ticism a ~erging into Christianity, Buekham writes: 
l. Buokham, MML, 153-154. 
2, ~rueblood, LB 212. 
:;. !ennar:tt, PT, f, 144~ 
4. Underhill, Art.(l913), 
422; see o29-630. 
As R. c. Moberly has finely said: 'Had Chris-
tians only understood and lived up to their re-
ligion, they would all have been mystios:~ •.• 
Something is wanting in our worship today •••• 
The o.elestial fire the divine breath, the in-
visible presence, the Holy Spi~it, call it what 
you wi~l, it is the one reality without which 
worship is a desert waste and with which it is 
a fauntain of life.l 
3.58 
Pennoch plaoes mysticism alongside of religious institu-
tions in keeping religions alive through the co~rse of history~ 
In faot, it see~s unlikely that religious 
institutions would continue indefinitely to re-
tain their hold upon men unless along with them 
went personal eXPeriences more or less mystical 
in their nature.z 
'fhe mysticism ~f Euoken is seen in Underhill's pointing 
out of the four stages of 4is thought: break with the merely 
natural life, recognition of an autonomous spiritual life, its 
personal appropriation, and the organization of human life and 
civili&ation tor the benefit Of the spiritual life.3 This re-
minds one of one branch of mysticism--Quakerism.-which through-
out its history has been characterized by practical activity, 
particularly reform and benevolence. ~:Meeting the empirioal 
test of Reinhold Niebuhr, mysticism. qualifies as a good: "That 
is good which not only fulfills our vital capaoities in terms 
of harmony with one another but whioh fulfills ·our vital capa-
cities in terms of all people."4 Windelband sees the value of 
mysticism as part of the two main impulses of our age--na 
yearning towards an ultimate unity and a d~eper spiritualization 
1. Buckham, ~1Lt 247-248, 
210; see Moberly, AP, · · 
316. 
2. Pennoch, COG, 33. 
3. Underhill, Art.(l913), 
423. 
4. Niebuhr in Kepler, CRT, 
52; see Aubrey, PTT,201. 
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of our world-viel<t. ul Recognizing the peculiar significance 
of rapt experiences and sudden conversions, DeBurgh sees their 
real value in their being "moments in a coherent course of 
life," as here is "to be found the verification~: 
We find 1) that God does reveal himself to his 
worshippers on rare and transitory occasions, but 
is known as an abiding presence that i'nforms the 
most varied situations and occurences of life, ii) 
imparts to them a significance and a harmony inex-
plicable save in the assumption of divine provi-
dence. We find iii) that the effects of this ex-
perience·upon his life and character are recog-
nized by his fellow men.2 
Finally, on the pragmatic test, it may be noted that 
tests made by Sinclair on college students revealed a peculiar 
inspiration present in those who were mystics: 
They respond to hints and promptings from 
those about them .... more used to appreciative 
understanding and perhaps more socially-minded, 
they go at problems with a positive mental set. 
Their attitude toward religion is sympathetic; 
and their continued participation in religious 
activities implies a striving for that which 
is ethically and morally right •••• From their 
confessions 'it is evident that the experiences 
themselves are
3
satisfying, uplifting, and 
strengthening. · 
b) Logical 
1) Coherence 
The second test in the verification of the belief in 
God as a valid belief is the logical test, the first aspect 
·of which is coherence. Now, there can be no coherence apart 
from the conformity of the mind with the object of knowledge.4 
1. Winde1band, Art.(l913), 201~see 
. Boutroux, Art.(l908), 187,188. 
2, DeBurgh, Art.(l926), 108-109. 
3. Sinclair, OS, 53-54; 
see Ward, EP, 365. 
4. See Maritain, IP, 180. 
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There must be a 11 coherent agreement of experience 1il7i th reality. n 1 
That there is such a relation or correspondence between thought 
and reality has been shown.2 One may well ask with Johnson: 
Is it not strange that the synthetic philos-
opher who rejected the false separation of ra-
tionalism and empiricism, ~1ho insisted that 
thought without experience is blind, should hold 
tenaciously to the artificial separation of ap-
pearance from reality? ••• Reality may be distin-
guished within experience as well as beyond ex-
perience •••• The data of experience become the 
evidence for infenence that what is beyond our 
fragmentary ob_eervation is coherent l'd th the 
samples kno1-m.J 
Nor can there be coherence without consistency: 11 No evi-
dence, public or private, can support a contradiction as such. 114 
But coherence goes:,~beyond conformity and consistency: 
It lies ••• in system, and.above all in that 
perfect type of system in whioh each component 
implies and is implied by eaoh other •••• To know 
the truth about anything is, so far, to appre-
hend it in a system of relatione that makes it 
intelligible~ and this is what we mean by under-
standing it.::; 
This is not a declaration that complete understanding 
of an object is requisite to a certainty of its existence or 
to a partial knowledge of it: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
If the universe is a system of relations, 
we cannot know all about a specific thing un-
til we know all its possible relations •••. To 
say that the universe 1A a. system of relations 
which we cannot altogether know until we kngw 
all is not to say that we can know nothing. 
The synoptic view taken in this dissertation of the 
Johnson, Art.(1941), 377. 4. Hartshorne, Art.(l948), 
Vide supr~, 237-254. 36. 
Johnson, Art.(l941), 378- 5. Blanshard, NT, I, 78. 
379. 6. Flewelling, RF, 36. 
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theoretical, moral, ex.p~riental and pragmatical elements in 
reference to.religious reality has been a coherent view. A 
broad view of experience has·oompr.ehended all the relevant 
facts; and there has been an 11 intel:'-relation of the elements 
Qf experience as a whole. Ill In a synoptic vi elf, Dr·. ·Brightman 
summarizes the ohief evidences of G&d as~ the rationality of 
the universe, the emergence of novelties, the nature of per-
sonality, reli~ious experience, an4 systematic coherence. 
The last Brightman considers the Judge of the others: 
The best r.eason tor beli.ef in God is that 
acceptance of the proposition that he eXists 
and manifests himself in the ongoing of exper-
ience leads to the most connected ~nd coherent 
view of our experience as a whole. 
Viewing modern theistic arguments as inductive, Johnson 
sees in them when taken together 11 a search :for meaning in facts, 11 
an interpretation of larger significance than now appears, and 
a judgment of what in the light of the examined evidence is 
probably true of what lies beyond. 113 But what lay "beyond" 
for all the traditional arguments drew near in the experiential 
argument, for the continuity sought be~ween knower and Known 
has been found, with the result·. that as part of a coherent 
whole, the traditional arguments have taken on new signifioanoe.4 
For, "a belief is rendered true ••• by its aooord with Aotuallty 
or Real~ty. 11 5 Where 11 sttbjectivaoert1tude is objectively 
1. Muirhead, Art.(l928) 1 18-19; v.ide supra, 195-404. 
2. Brightman, PG. 161-162; 
see RV, 33. 
3. Johllson, Art.(l941} 377 .. 
4. See Muirhead, Art.(i928), 
20. 
5. Tennant, PT, I, 329. 
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determined," certainty "can, nay must, be predicated," for 
"oonvincedness here is literally being overwhelmed or forcea.••l 
In the application of the pragmatic test the power of 
the mystical experience to integrate life and beliefs has been 
seen; this is a drive in the direction of coherence. Personal 
experience has been apprehended as completely as possible, and 
then grasped synoptically as a system of totality; in "this 
process of verification, 11 reason and experience have been 
joined not as 0 two separate powers," but reason as a 11 function 
of experience" and experienoe as 11 a movement toward. rational 
totality. 112 In the pragmatic view the idea of God is seen as 
a symbol of 11 unity and harmony between existence and val.ue"~: 
Thus while specific religious experiences 
cannot be used alone as evidence • ._ they may 
when taken in connection with the total world 
view derived from a coherent interpretation 
of all. experience be regarded as 'strong em-
pirical confirmation of the belief in God. 1 4 
Thus, 11 any religious belief or attitude must in the 
long run be tested by its fidelity to human experience in 
general. 11 5 A mysticism for which men are hungry, 11 a sane and 
heartfel.t one, contact with spiritual realities," one that 
emanates from J esu~ and centers in him, 11 and that, consequently, 
11 has power to rejuvenate our age, 11 meets the test of ooherenoe.6 
It is of great importance that mysticism 11 persistently 
1. Tennant, PT I, 291 .. 
2. Brightman, Art.(1937)~ 
1.?.? .. 
:3. Brightman, Art.(l937)1, 
148 .. 
4. Martin, EPR 35; see 
Brightman4 PG, 160-161; FG, 9~11 ; PR, 436-437. 
5. Moore, TRE, 187 .. 
6. Buckham, MML, 71. 
endeavors to express and interpret the experience in rational 
and moral terms ."1 
Theology must relate 11 reli~ious intuitions to the rest 
.. . 
of experience so as to achieve a "dynamically integrated reli-
gious experience .n2 The 'tfriter agrees with Brown that as there 
is for science reliable knowledge within limits so certain that 
events can be predicted, so there is ~a trustworthy knowledge of 
God 11 made possible by man's 11 capacity to act upon his ideals. 11 3 
The predication of certainty to theology is unwavering and quite 
general today. 4 For a.s revelation is a real presenta.t.ion of God 
to the soul of man, and as faith is not mere assent to truth, 
but an adjustment of the whole life to God, one may reach not 
only overwhelming subjective certainty but also a degree of 
~ logical certainty.J That is, belief in God may become a co-
herent belief when it is a synthesis of rationalism, empiricism, 
intuitionism, pragmatism, and authoritarianism~ 
fhe importance of authority in this regard can not be 
minimized. One of .the four assemblages of events held by 
Russell is.the one that depends on the testimony .of others.6 
It is from this source that most beliefs are first acquired; 
11 11e accept on trust nine-tenths of what "t!fe hold to be true, 11 
being disposed to believe "0-1hat we hear unless lfe have 11 some 
positive reason for doubting the honesty or competence" of 
1. Buckham, MML, 118. 
2. Aubrey, PTT, 201; see 
Lyman~ MTR, 203; Oman, 
NS, So. 
3. Brown, PC, 209. 
4. See Bosley, QRC, 28; 
vide supra, 273, 275, 
283. 5. See Duce, KGN, 551. 
6. See Benjamin, Art.(l941), 
569. 
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our informants.l Matthews sees the importance of this avenue 
of knowledge for the researcher in both the natural and spir= 
i tual realms: 
If he were confined to principles which are 
to ~m self-evident and experiences which he 
himself has had he could make no progress to-
wards a science of nature. In the same way, 
the solitary thinker seeking unaided for the 
Divine with the support only of his own spir-
itual experience and power of reflection will 
get but a short distance on the road and reach 
but a meagre conception of God.2 
In the light of the above, truth does, in a sense, con~ 
trary to Flewelling, need 0 the bolstering of authorityt" for 
while "it is never true on authority or by reason of authority" 
alone, the testimony of others to an experience is an indispen-
sable factor in coherence, in the whole truth, only a part of 
which the individual has when his 11 truth0 is not supported by 
the testimony of others; thus, 11 the individual believes that 
true which fit:s in with life" (with the life of others as well 
as his own), and which "works" in this complete sense .. 3 
Authority conserves the results of past experience; nwe 
may regard all human history as an experiment in applied reli-
gion. n4 To many the value of the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures 
lies in this conservation of the records of testimony to reli-
gious experienceS.: 
1. Montague'" WK, 39; vide 
supra, 46-47, 131-137. 
2. Matthews, GCE, 46; see 
Dodd, AB, 133, 136. 
3. Flewelling, RF, 32-33. 
4. Brolm, PO, 203; see 
199; vide supra, 292, 
• 299. 5. Bee Matthews~ GCE~ 114-
115; Dodd, Ati, 13~. 
I base my:faith in Christianity mainly on 
two things9 First, the testimony of the heart 
and eonscience (and may I not say, of the heart 
and eonseience of all right-minded people?) 
that in the New Testament are to be found • the 
l•7ords of eternal life 1 •· •• and my second ground 
is what I cfll mysticism or personal religious 
experience. · · · . 
Beeause the testimonies of the mystics and the ordinary 
believers of many faiths are so 11 clear and abundant," Brightman 
finds in them .additional confirmation of the existenee of God. 2 
It would be only a narrow authority ~nd a narrow reason 
that eould come into conflict. But a narrow authority (as for 
instance, when authority is unaccompanied by freedom) is not a 
real authority; it lives only in the environment of real free-
dom.3 Balfour has described the disastrous effects of the 
rej action o.f ·authority by any community, 4 and has shown that · 
to rely on authority may be. a scientific and reasonable act: 
. At everymoment of our lives, as individuals, 
as members of a family, of a party, of a nation, 
of a church, of a universal brotherhood, the si-
lent, continuous, unnoticed influence of Author-
ity moulds our feelings, our inspirations and, 
li'hat we are more immediately concerned ""ri th, our 
beliefs. It is from Authority that Reason it-
self dral'1S its most important premise·s.. It is 
in unloosing or directing the forces of Authority 
that its most imnortant conclusions find their 
principal funotion.5 
Crooks witnesses to the same point: 
It is significant that just in a time when 
the theoretical explanations of religion had 
made up their minds that reli:giaus oonvers'ion 
1. Inge, MR, 316. 
2. Brightman, PG, 160-161. 
3. See Rawlinson, AF, 17. 
4. See Balfour, FB, 203, 
228; vide supra'" 289.· 
5. Balfour, FB, 236; see 
238. 
was an emotional illusion, the psychologists 
came fOI"l-Tard with irrefutable proofs of the . 
reality and value of this exPerience. Thus 
science which has been.thought to bf the en-
emy of religion came to its rescue. 
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First-hand experience of God supported by the testimony 
of others to the experience is a solid basis upon which to 
build a valid belief in God. There is "a cloud of witnesses" 
to the reality andvalidity of belief in God--mystics, philos-
ophers, psychologists and theologians of various schools--
Protestant, Catholic, conservative, liberal, nee-orthodox, 
idealistic, realistic and pragmatic. To individual exPerience, 
thus, is added the testimony of corporate experience, making 
for coherence and giving a degree of logical certainty. The 
resulting theistic view is more coherent than that furnished 
by naturalism: 
The great body of our beliefs, scientific, 
ethical aesthetic, theological, form a more 
coherent and satisfactory whole if we consider 
them in a 2heistic setting than .... in a Natural-
istic 6ne. · . 
Would it not be asking too much to expect the belief in 
God's existence to approximate logical certainty in the minds 
. of all men? The foundation for it is lacking in the m:lnds of 
some through immediate experience of God~ Then, what is a 
coherent view for one man is not necessarily that for another. 
The difference is one of perspective. As Ramsdell has sh01·m, 
what one regards as reasonable depends upon what he thinks 
1. Crooks, Art. ( 1913) , 126 •. 2. Balfour, FB, 344; see 
330-331. 
important for understanding: 11His perspective is determined 
by what he evaluates as crucially significant. 11 l Inge notes 
the jealousy of religion, science and art towards one another 
as 11 each of them claims in a sense to cover the 1orhole field, 
that is, to interpret all experience from its own point of 
view.n2 And speaking of the characteristically modern apol-
ogist, Quick writes: 
Instead of exhibiting the explanatoriness of 
religious doctrine or belief, he seeks to estab-
lish the inexplicability and uniqueness of the 
religious experience. Its value, he will con-
tend, can only be known from withinby those who 
have already believed. The non-believer is bound 
to regard the claims of religion as dangerous 
nonsense. Thus the whole burden of proof ••• is 
shifted on to .the shoulders of the critic of re-
ligion, who must explain away an experience into 
which by3his. own confession he has not really entered. 
What Kant's ideas of the pure reason (including, of 
course, God) means to one depends upon his practical estimate 
of life and duty; value judgments differ.4 'The Christian 
apologist would be expected to have a different perspective 
than an atheist, just as the musician would be expected to 
differ in perspective from the deaf man. Naturally, all 
· existence appears in a different light to the one to whom 
God has revealed Himself: 
To the man who so sees God the problem of 
the world and self has been solved·; and his 
religious knowledge has a value greater far 
than all science and all philosophy.5 
1. Ramsdell, CP, 10. 
2. Inge, CW 227. 
3. Quick, GFC, 62. 
4. See Garvie, CMP, 275-
276. 
5. ~arvie, c~ 278. 
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Thus·, to unshakable· certitude is added the high degree 
of logical cert~inty that comes 'from taking the most:;cbherent 
view possible; of necessity, it is no claim to absolute logical 
certainty: 
If no argument which falls short of mathe-
matical or logical proof is accepted as con-
clusive, then it must be admitted tnat the 
truth of religious experience cannot be nroved 
absolutely. If this be true, the most that 
can be done with the facts of experience is to 
establish such an ove~~helming probability of 
their .validity as isi to the minds of most men, 
tantamount to logica certainty.l 
2) Logical necessity 
Logical necessity is an aspect of the logical test in 
the verification of belief in God. What is necessary to be-
lieve is reasonable to believe. 2 Belief in God is a neoe.ssary 
belief in that God seems to be a condition of all reasoning. 
His existence, while ultimately not an inference from any 
premise (i.e. to the one who has experienced.Him), makes pos-
ible all inferences.3 A modern follower of Plato has gone 
so far as to declare that man1 s intellect could not live un-
less the universe in which it finds i ts~lf 'tt1ere 11 as rational 
as it£Jelf, seeing that. reason could not live in a world where 
no reason is .. n4. If there is no Rationality at the heart of 
the universe, if there is no Logos, no Ultimate Explanation 
of all things, then human reason can have no real confidenQe 
in itself. As parallel lines may be said to meet in infinity, 
so may it be said that thought and thing, existence and value, 
1. Hughes, TE, 20. · 
2. Vide supra,_ 73. -76. 1 244-248, 2.:;>6-258 .. 
3. Vide supra, 29-30, 102. 
4. Tillett, PLG, 214. 
reason. and revelation may be ultimately joined. in an infinite 
Being. As belief in the uniformity of nature makes possible 
the work of the scientist, so belief in God makes possible the 
inferences of the religious'man.1 From the perspective of the 
one who has the certitude coming from having been in the· imme..:._. 
diate· presence of God, beli$f in God is also a logically neoes- ( 
sary belief; he cannot discover a more reasonable explanation 
of the world and history than that there is a universal Mind 
11 in which and for which all so-called material things ex1st.n2 
A place in the universe must be given to God 11 i1' human exper-
ience ••• continues to require" Him/' 
Then, 11 beliefs 't-thich are found to be practically neces-
sary for the efficiency:·· of. man 1 s moral and spiritual life must 
also be theoretically .... true. 11 4 Wieman, holding that the min-
imum meaning of God is Something of supreme value ("upon l>rhich 
human life is most dependent for its security, welfare and 
increasing abundance"), maintains that God, as thus necessary, 
must actually exist.5 
Theism seems to offer a better explanation of both moral 
and religious phenomena than (ioes atheism, naturalism or pan-
theism.6 Kant found that belief in a personal Summum Bonum is 
necessary to morality.? From the pragmatic point of view, 
Macintosh takes a similar position, which he describes: 
1 .. See Balfour~ FBA 303. 
2. Rashdall, P.tt, 1~; see 
Balfour, FB, 310; Dodd, 
AB, 133; vide supra, 41, " 
44, 48-51, 63. 
3. Boodin, Art.(l908), 234. 
'' 
4~ Vide. supra· 124-125. 
5. Wieman, RESM, 9; see 10. 
6. See Ramsdell, CP,.33; 
Quick' GFO, 58. 
?. Vide supra, 105-107, 
115-116. 
It consists in the postulate of the reality 
of God, on the groun~ that his existence, or 
belief in his existenoe, is morally necessary; 
not simply.~.to guarantee immortality and the 
adequate happiness of the virtuous in a future 
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life, but rather for rohe gaining of that ape- . 
oial experience of deliverance ••• of moral up-
lift through religious dependence ••• 1 salvation. 1 
It is thus the feeling that there ought to be a 
God, transpormed by the '~ill to believe' into 
the assertion that there must be and is a God.1 
This is of far greater value, as Macintosh realized, 
when accompanied by the disc~asure of God Himself to man. 
~ j 
This is Kantian in the sense 11 that the very possibility of a 
thing depends upon its being able to find a place in the tex-
ture of actual experience.n2 
III. An adequate certainty 
1. For the individual 
The certainty that is the product of logical certainty 
(the inadequate certainty resulting from the reception of th~ 
~r.aditional theistin arguments) and psychological certainty 
(the partial certitude resulting from assent to the moral ar-
gument), plus the overwhelming, unshakable certitude that 
gripe one who has had persona1 contact with God, and that is 
further the product of the correlation of these certainties 
in a synoptic view of experie.ce of whole reason, whole faith 
and whole experience (which together include intuition, author-
ity and race experience, the ~ion of rationalism and empir-
' icism, and the mystical apprehension of the whole), and in a 
1. Macintosh, TES, 94. 2. England, KOG, 194. 
•· 
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further verification by pragmatic and logical tests (by working 
and by being coherent and logically necessary)--this certainty 
is adequate for the individual. 
2. Fo-r a rational-empirical theology 
a. Definition 
The correlated certainty is adequate also tor a rational-
empirical theology, which is a theology of a true rationalism 
(a consideration of the whole of experience by the whole reason 
of a whole personality) and of true empiricism, i.e. one that 
includes faith and reason as parts of experience, and that is, 
in a sense, scientific in method$1 
b. Reasons for rejection of an empirical theology 
1) Self-refuting 
There are reasons for the rejection of an empirical 
theology that do not hold against a rational-empirical theology, 
the first of which is that the former is self-refuting2; tor 
the latter can consistently go beyond experience and formulate 
general propositions. The only alternattve is utter skeptis~. 
2) Narrowed experience 
Another cause for rejection of an empirical theology 
is its narrow view of experienceo In criticism of .Boodin, 
Brightman, Hocking, Macintosh and Wieman, Martin writes: 
All except Macintosh are professionally 
designated philosophers-rather than theolo-
gians and write in terms of 'philosophy of 
religion .. ' Yet there seems to be an open 
question as to'whether in their religious 
lo See Aubrey, PTT, 1S6o 2. See Russell, IMT, 207; 
Martin, EPR, 122. 
··~-·----------· _. __ :...=.__· --· ; ___ ---~-----· ----- --- ----. ~----·-··--------------··· 
'·!(.. 
. ; l ~ ~..,. 
philosophies, they are not act~ally assuming 
the validity of certain notions associated 
with specifically Christian faith and theol-
ogy •• 9$Thus there seems to be considerable 
indefiniteness on the part of our philosophers 
concerning the basic question whether their 
systems claim a universal validity which is 
reached independently of prior commitments to 
a particular faith or whether they are actual 
attempts to offer a philosophical defense of 
a particular faith which is taken to-be uni-
versally valid. Do these •natural theologies• 
presuppose or lead to a •revealed theology,' 
or are they offered as universal natural the-
ologies in terms of which1all 'revealed• the-ologies are to be judged? 
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Only on the assumptions (by critic or criticized) that 
experience excludes reason and revelation, that it is unscien-
tific for a scientist or anyone else to have any 0prior com-
m1tments11 when he begins an experiment, and that such commit-
ments are .made without reason acting upon prior experietlces, 
could a theology be declared unempirioal. 2 Martin himself 
declares that to take a broad view of experience is to be 
truly empirical. But concerning Hocking's emphasis upon a 
certain kind of mystical experience, Martin asks: 
Is the theory vindicated by the experience 
·or the experience by the theory? Are not ex-
perience and theory so intimately and subtly 
related as to render any defenBe of the one in 
terms of the other precarious?) . 
In turn it may be asked: Is it unscientific and unemp1r-
ioal for one to proceed by both deduction and induction, hy-
pothesis and verification? 
1. Martin, EPR, 123-124; 
see 122. 
Is it not the very breadth of the 
~. Vide supra1 199-203, 261-262 284-2ti9, 292-294. 
3. Martin, EPR, 114-115. 
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view of experience that necessitates this? Martin again seems 
to view experience narrowly in his criticism of Macintosh's 
emphasis on liberal Protestantism a;nd a certain type of conver-
sion experience: 
Suah specifically conditioned exoer1ences 
eannet in themselves substantiate or verify 
those theological doctrines whioh must be pre-
supposed before they may be held~l · . 
But how else could these "conversion" experiences be 
had apart from conditioning and presupposition? How could a 
scientist conduct an experiment on any other basis?2 !his 
implied criticism by Martin ignores the possibility that rea-
son and experience are behind the very laying down of the 
religious hypothesisa 
Tennant denies that religious experience is a 11 self-
sutf1cient and independent path-way to public philosophical. 
knowledge about God."3 Likewise, l3oodin seems to be opposed 
not so much.to a strict and correct empirical approach as to 
a wrong conception of empiricism, i.e. the view of James that 
"experience is self-sufficient, that our hypotheses lean on 
•experience,• but experience leans on nothing but itself,. 11 4 
Moore's qualified opposition to an empirical theology, ioe. 
if it has no appeal to experience in general, turns out to be 
no opposition to a true empirical theology.5 Because of this 
1. Martin, EPR, 116~ 
2. Vide supra, 258-259, 
284-289. 
3. Bertocci, EAG, 225; see 
Tennant, Philosophy of the 
Sciences~l68, 172-174. 
4. Boodin, ~u 4 15; see Art. (1908), 23 • 
5. See Moore, TRE, 187. 
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unnatural severance of rationalism and empiricism, Rashdall 1 s 
rationalistic method probably prevents his favoring an empir-
ical theology.l This is, at least in part, the position of 
Sheen, although he might be expected to give more favorable 
attention to experiences of the mystics (particularly the 
Catholic), believing as he does in revelation. 2 
On the other hand, Baillie, Macintosh, Wieman and True-
blood represent an empirical and inductive theology, with "a 
common appeal to religious experience, with or without depend-
ence on secondary authorities.n3 A broad view of experience 
in the union of rationalism and empiricism would be a denial 
of both the self-sufficiency of any one religious experience 
and the self-refuting character of such an empiricism~ 
3) Abbreviated ~ontent 
,•· 
Then empirical theology (in the narrow sense) is brought 
into disrepute through the apprehension that its underlying 
motive is to reduce beliefs or to minimize the!r importance. 
Hughes declares that the argument from Christian experience 
frequently leads to 11 a depreciation of the importance of the 
historic facts of. the Gospel," and warns that in the interests 
of Evangelical Christianity this peril should be avoided.4 
Sabatier, seeing the tendency to minify doctrine, has this to 
say: 
1. See Rashda11, PR, 106. 
2. Vide supra, 149-1504• see Meyer, PST 38-39, 1; 
Baillie, IR, 230-231. 
3. Duce, KGN, 555. 
4. Hughes, TE, 7. 
T.o say that t Ohristiani ty is .a life, there-
tore it is not a doctrine' is to reason very 
badly.. We should rather. ·say, 1 Christianity 1 s 
a life and therefore it engenders doctrine,' 
tor man cannot live his life without· thinking 
it. Whef the sap of pi~ty fRils, theology 
wi there .. .· . . ; , . ·. 
4) Non-intellectual 
3?5 
Another cause of the.disfavor of .empirical theolop;y is 
the view that it is- non-intellectual. This view is taken by 
Sheen, who contrasts the empirical substitute for intelligence 
with 11 the intellectual proofs, 11 Ftnd declares that "the intel-
lectual approach began with the world," in contrast to the non-
intellectual, 1-1hich "goes to God, not through the world., but 
through the ego. 112 Yes, the early Greek rationalistsbegan 
with the world--and ran into a dead end, reaching neither 
God nor the.world, and had to retrace their steps for a fresh 
start. Several times after suah a false start, philosophers 
had to go to the world via self~-in order to understand even 
the lforld 4 It is a question whether the traditional arguments 
should be called 11 intellectual11 or "speculative," and whether 
they lead to God or to the idea of God. Sheen declares: 
Between the apprehension of the external 
world and of God, there intervened necessa~ 
ily a logical process; the bridge between 
the two was built by t~e reas~ning mind .. 3 
But it was unbelief that dug the gulf between God and 
man; and it is faith, as has been shown, that leads the way 
1. Sabatier, OPR, 241; 
see 249; Moore, TRE, 
162. 
2. Sheen, GI, 31. 
3. Sheen, GI, 31 .. 
r -·T· ,...,~ .,... ·~. ~-
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back to God. This does not mean that there is no pmaoe for -
reason in the empirical approach; there is a mediated immedi-
acy in that approach. Of course, Sheen is correct that an 
extreme empiricism does not giv.e enough pla.oe to reason, but 
this does not hold of rational-empiricism. His assumption 
that persons are known by reason is to be questioned.. He 
quotes D1Aroy to the effect that the God reached by tradi-
tional proof's, or :from without, is a sterile God, out of 
relation to our lives. Sheen regards the· empirical mounting. 
to· God as a labor-saving device, i.e. 11 lfhy laboriously climb 
up Jacob 1 s ladder to heaven when we can bring heaven and its 
God down into our very hearts?ul- This was an unfortunate 
illustration for Sheen 1 a purpos-e, for Jacob was not repre-
sented as climbing the ladder; 'rather, th_!3 angela are repre-
sented as both ascending and des-eending.2 Naturally 8 the 
insistence" on immediacy leads 11 to a diminished interest 
' ' 
in the problem of the existence_ of God, 11 for now the interest 
is communion with God on the part of those to whom the exist-
ence of God is no longer a problem. In this sense, Sheen 
truly remarks: 11 0noe it is admitted that God is given immedi-
ately, the problem of God's existence ceases to be. 11 3 It is 
strange that in this whole discussion Sheen has not a word 
to say of the mystics; Garrigou-Lagrange and other ~atholic 
writers, however, are concerned with the task of reconciling 
l. Sheen, GI, 34; see 32. 
2. See Gen. 28:12. 
- -------------------------------·---~--..::..---~-;_ _ _____;:_ ~-:.- -----. -----=-=---
3. Sheen, GI, 34 .. 
. ·--- -------- --- . -- .C.C------~---- ~- . ---- -- ----------1 
377 
the divergent positions of the mystics and St. Thomaao His 
question, 11 If God is to be interpreted in terms of experience 
rather than in terms of knO't-tledge, how interpret experience? nl 
is a just criticism of those who do not relate their religious 
experience to the rest of life, but not of those who refleot 
on their experiences (experiences which being immediate, have 
implicit intellectual content upon which one can reflect). 
Garvie, writing of the differing emphases of Hegel, Kant and 
Schleiermacher, declares: 11 Within the Christian Chu11ch there 
are still those who lay stress exclusively on doctrine, 
practice or experience; their Christianity is pp,edominantly 
intellectual, ethical, or emotional. 11 2 All this shows the 
need for a rational-empirical theology. 
3. Essential elements 
a. Object of experience 
The first essential element of a rational-empirical 
theology, vie"toted as. scientific, is an object of experience .. 
Scientific method begins with the postulate that for every 
effect there is a cause, that for every impression received 
or response made there is a stimulus, that ideas have sources. 
11 There can be no true idea.apa:t>t from some relation to ulti-
mate reality. 11 3 The mind can no more cr.eate ideals M nihilo 
than it can create reality.4 For religious ideas and ideals 
there must be a Corresponding Reality. This religious Object 
·may be defined as 11 that Factor in human experience which 
1. Sheen, GI, 4lq 
2., Garvie, CMP, 113. 
3. Fe:t>r~, OF, 88. 
4. Vide supra, 287, 293. 
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produces, on occasion of man 1 s continued relation, a defintte 
lt ul • ,. • resu • The chief purpose of one of Wiemants books was 
11 to sho't'IT that religious experience is an experience of an ob-
ject ••• wh1ch is as truly external to the individual as is any 
tree or stone," i.e .. signifying something extending 11 beyond 
that space-time occupied by the individual. 112 Although held 
to be transcendent, this religious Object is known to be im-
manent, tor He comes within the range of man's experience. 
To this-Stimulus men respond oharacteristicly and uniformly 
with an "attitude of conscious dependence, awe, wonder11 and 
often with humility, 11 selt-surrender, trust and devotion ... 11 3 
This, together with the general agr·eement on the part of the 
experients on their certainty of the existence of this experi-
enced Object, indicates that God is a true Given, given to, 
but not created by, the experient, revealed bttt not 0 manag~ 
able, 11 i.ea not changed at will.4 To form a hypothesis about 
Godls existence and then to put it to the test is scientific, 
notwithstanding any differences between the religious Object 
and the objects of the natural sciences. 11 '1'he assumptions 
which .work are verified and accepted as true ... n5 In the words 
9f Hatth_ews~ 0 The modern scientific temper has no reason for 
~> 
objecting to a theology which starts from experience.n6 ·cer-
tainly, science would not be expected to object, if it is 
1. Y1de supra, 207, 286. 
2. Wieman, RESM, 5. 
3. Macintosh, PRK, 170. 
4. Vide supra, 141. 
5. Vide supra, 134. 
6. Matthews, GCE, 46. 
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true, as Wieman and Hoeking hold, that mystioa.l experience is 
the 11 parent of scientific endeavor • 11 1 Thomas H. Huxley was 
tar from objecting when he wrote: 
'If anyone is able to make good the asser-
tion that his theology rests upon valid evi-
dence and sound reasoning, then it appears 
to me that such theolofY must take its place 
as a part of sc1enceQ 1 
So it would appear that "inste!ld of being rationalized 
out of ex1stence 11 religion when systematized into a rational-
empirical theology is being "rationalized into a universally 
valid and finally satisfactory form'~; even before religion felt 
the impress of modern science, it was proceeding by the 11 trial 
and .error11 method..3 Of' course, it must be remembered that 
science itself can not state the ultimate nature of reality, 
and should not be allowed to prescribe the limits of knowledge 
to be attained by religious experiment; for knowledge received 
through the natural sciences is far from the whole of our 
~~owl~dge.4 But theology and philosophy can sa:t'ely go, as 
does science, from particular facts to general principles, 
without becoming subservient to science. For as Brightman in-
dicates, 11 method 11 means literally 11 a road after," or 11pursu1t. 11 
So ·11 scientific method is a pursuit of facts, laws and truths 
in special fields .. "-' Oalling science 11 nothing else than the 
refined process of knowing,~ Wieman places mysticism in the 
1. Martin, EPR, 99; see 
Wieman, RESM, 46 • 
2. Huxley, in Macintosh, 
TES, 2.5. 
3. Macintosh, TESl 5; see ix; 
vide supra, 29). 
4. See Ferre~ CF, 86-87; . 
Kuizenga, Art.(l948), ·558. 
5. Brightman, NV, 103. 
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process as supplying the datum for religious knowledge~l 
b. Perception of the object 
The second prequisite to a rat1onal•emp1rioal theology 
is perception of the religious Object. As already indicated, 
while God can not be 11 sensed, 11 He can be 11 perceived, n broadly 
speak1ngq 2 Macintosh uses 11 perception11 as affording data for 
theology, and as corresponding to the facts of revelation.3 
The term may be used for man's response to the stimuli emana-
ting from the religious Object,4 any awareness of God as the 
larger environment eurroufiding the human eoul,5 an apprehension, 
intuition, instinct, insight or vision corresponding to the 
~latonia vision. 6 Broadly viewed, it is an experience defined 
as the power of recognizing existence, an immediate experience 
in which there is implicit inference (as in the case of an old 
sailor 11 who knows implicitly when.a storm is approaohing," 
aware of some:thing 11 wi thout singling it out for full and spe-
oifio attention11 ),7 no sharp line be,ing discovered between 
feeling and thinking,8 a perception akin to the experiencing 
of love, beauty, music and sunsh1ne,9 and which results in 
acquaintance and a certitude which is more compelling than that 
due to the experiencing of things or of other minds.,lO 
1. Wieman, BESM, 23; see 4. Vide supra, 135, 150-15lo 
15-16; James VRE, 455; 5 .. Vide supra, 250, 253, 255o 
Baillie in Muirhead, 6. Vide supra, 260i 284, 292,301. 
OBP, 16, footnote .. 7. Blanshard, NT, ~ 90; vide 
2. Vide supra, 301; see supra, 249-252. 
Blanshard, NT, IE 53. 8. Vide supra, 253-260, 282, 
3. See Macintosh, T s, 307, 320. 323 .. 32, 103, 106 .. 9 .. Vide supra, 30Q-303, 
10. Vide supra, 280-287. 
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c. Experiment 
The third essential of a rational-empirical theology 
is experiment. Involved in this is the forming of a live and 
real hypothesis based upon religious experience,l the follow-
ing of conditions governing the experiment~ 2 observing of 
criteria for determining its success ,3 and verification·~4 · 
d. Reliance on testimony 
Olosely related to experiment is reliance on the testi-
mony of others who have worked in the field. From them the 
experimenter may get information for the hypothesis and for 
the conditions and criteria of the experiment. Reliance on 
testimony is scientific and reasonable • .5 "Experience, 11 how-
ever, has been used by some in such a narrow sense as to give 
the impression that religious empiricism has been freed 11 from 
all dependence upon divine revelation." 6 But it may be said 
that all knowledgeis through revelation.? And had God not 
ehosen to reveal Himself, man today would have no knowledge 
of Him. That He has actually disclosed Himself in general and 
special revelations through history is the witness of re1igion.8 
And philosophy has joined in this testimony.9 The third chaP-
ter of this dissertation has given much evidence to the effect 
that God has manifested Himself in special revelation, ioe. in 
1. Vide supra, 136, 140, 142-
148' 1.52-1.53 .. 
2. Vide supra, 168, 287-293. 
3. Vide supra, 287-290~ 299. 
4. Vide supra, 13.5, 1.5G-l.55, 
3.53-382. 
.5. Vide supra, 137, 
274, 289, 292. 
6. Mackintosh, TMT, 49. 
7. Griffiths, GIE, 293. 
8. Vide supra, 31, 119-
121, 144, 150. 
9. Vide supra, 294-295,308. 
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religious experience. Thus, to ignore the ter::Jtimonies found 
in the Christian Scriptures is an unscientific and narrow view 
of both experience and revelation~ And a theology founded upon 
experience narrowed down to exclude both reason and revelation 
is on a very narrow and insecure foundation. Moore has warned 
of the danger of transforming any religious system by making 
religious experience (evidently in the narrow sense) the es-
sence of ,vitalreligion.l This transformation would occur 
whether it were a reaction either against authoritarianism or 
against rational1sm2: 
It cannot be assumed that if a type of exper-
ience is separated from the beliefs 'toti th which 
it has been associated, it will have sufficient 
fixity of structure to maintain itself unchanged. 
Rather as doctrines weaken and beliefs change, 
experiences also tend to become vague and vari-
able. Those who have minimized the importance 
of theological beliefs in favor of specific ex-
periences hav~ in the long run tended to destroy 
both of them.-' 
Christian doctrine is more than the simple product of 
the Christian experience of one age; both :t.pe doctrine and the 
experience are based on a historic revelation.4 Modern science 
has no protest against dependence u"Oon testimony, oral or re-
corded; science gets p~rt ~i its data that way.5 The Reality 
found ~n individual experience is the Reality of race experience: 
Christianity finds the ideal which is also 
Reality in history. Its specific historic rev-
elation gives fullgr meaning to the general 
revelation of God~ · ' 
1. See Moore, TRE; 162 •. 
2. See Moore, TRE, 163. 
3. Moore, TRE, 162. 
4. Vide supra, 378; see 
Hughes, TE, 237-238; 
Garvie, CMP, 109, 332. 
5. See Matthews, GCE, 46; 
Relton, CPO 61-62. 
. . 6. Ferre, CF
6
, ~68; see Hughes, TE, 21~ 1- 2; Sabatier, 
UPR, 2;5, 240, 308-309. 
, 
Ferre adds that God may be seen in·a historical rev-
elation, as it 11 discloses what God. is and illumines the facts 
of history11 ; although it is a partial disclosure, it is a. 
true one.l Ferr~ observes that 11 radical 11 comes from the 
Latin radix meaning 11 root 11 ; thus radical Christianity is root 
Christianity: 11 Every great reform in Christianity has come 
from going back to the root. 112 . It has been noted that sane 
mystics have depended upon the Bible, and thus, upon their 
connection with the race.J And to ignore the Christian Scrip-
tures is to ignore the testimony of the greatest mystic of all, 
Jesus Chr1st.4 Our 11 concept of Deity is fashioned from the 
data of the religious experience~".) but no one has made a 
greater contribution to that concept than has Jesus Christ. 
The 11 formidable·consequences 11 of the attempt of modern 
theologians to draw a parallel between religious and scientif~c 
. II ·. 
experiment of which Hoffding complains 't<till not follow if the 
experiment is truly religious and. scientific, i.e. in the ac-
ceptance of relevant testimony from any·source, particularly 
the testimony of the great mystics and saints of all history.6 
11 The history of practical relig:ton may fairly be regarded as 
a prolonged empirical investigation."? It would be absurd, 
therefore, to attempt to construct a rational-empirical theol-
ogy on a basis that is too narrow to include any oral or 
1. Ferre, CF, 93. 
2 • Ferre, CF , 93 • 
3. Vide supra, 289-
292, 297-300. 
4. See Matthews, GCE, 
50-51. 
5. Matthews, GCE, 45. 
6. H8ffd1ng, TPR~ 103~ 
7. Macintosh, TE~, 5~ 
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recorded testimony to God's revelation of Himself or of Ris 
thought, particularly in religious experience "at its be:st~"l 
d. Analysis, interpretation and systematization 
Finally, there must be ~nalysis, interpretation and 
systematization of the results of experiment. Here ags.in, 
the experient can not ignore the results of experiments con-
ducted by others in the same field4 There is a body of knowl-
edge of God that .has been acquired gradually through the ages~ 
This data the modern experimenter must analyze, interpret and 
systematize, reducing to general truths and translating into 
scientific-theological terminology. In this, induction and 
deduction proceed together. 
It can be seen, thus, that to ignore the historical 
elements of Christianity is unreasonable and unscientific. 
They are empirical elements. Kant recognized historical 
faith, a faith based upon the Christian Scriptures.2 And for 
Hegel religious history was one of the three phases of the 
dialectic of religious truth. He taught that in genuine re-
ligion the 11 knowled.ge of particular facts in the history of 
religion is essentially a bridge leading •• ~to a direct per-
sonal a~1areness of the eternal truth of God. 113 History can 
not be driven out of religion any more than religion can be 
banished from history, for not only is man incurably religious, 
but God does not mock the instinctive craving for the divine 
1. Macintosh, TES, x; see 
Rawlinson, AF~ 10, 12-14. 
2. Vide supra, 1~1. 
3~ Schilling, ERE, 120-
121; see 120; Hegel, 
JUB, XIV, 174, 182. 
that He Himself has planted in the spirit of man. God has 
incarnated and reincarnated Himself in history.l History is 
His story. Revelations of God, general, special and supreme 
(Jesus Christ), take place in time; ~hristian faith and ex-
perience are historieal: 
The ~hristian revelation of God is not a 
system of truths which remain independent of 
the Person who enunciated them or th~ time 
in which they were first enunciatea.z 
As there is general agreement that 11 in some sense the 
New Testament is the fountain head of the Christian experience 
of God, 11 it can be reasonably concluded with Matthews that the 
New Testament is normative for all time, i.e. as the Labora-tory 
Manual for the Christian experiment;·and that, therefore, "we 
are not free to construct our concept of God in abstraction 
from h1story. 11 3 Here the Christian experimenter is no more 
original and-creative than the strictly scientific experimenter .. 
Here speculation oan not be substituted for the testimony of 
those who during the course of history have conducted experi-
ments in the sa~e field.4 One cannnot place a 11 ring-fenoe 11 
around himself and expect to find within it 11 adequate material 
for religious belief. 11 5 
Wieman sees the danger as ~ell as the absurdity of at-
tempting to divorce religion and history. He commends the 
work done by James and Hocking in the analysis of religious 
1. See Walsh, Art .. (1934) 1 .~ ·· 3-4; Macintosh, RR, 459. 
2. Matthews, GCE, 83. 
3. Matthews, GCE,. 44 .. 
4. See Matthews~ GCE, 48; 
Macintosh, TES, 5, 
5. Dodd, AR, 136. 
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experience and declares that science is needed to save religion 
from sentimentality and from bondage to ·tradition. But he is 
careful to add that religion, ho more than,science, can dis-
pense with the traditional! 
Faitho •• is a deep psytihologioal propulsion. 
As roots penetrate the earth and leaves turn to 
.the sun, eo this propulsion in man· seeks the 
reality l7hi.ch creates more abundant living •••• 
But when man meets God and God meets man, the 
way is opened not primarily by intellectual un-
derstanding. It is opened ·by aotual conditions 
that have been set up in the past and histori-
cally transmitted in the form.of a living oo~ 
munity in the manner called the Holy Spirit. 
If philosophy of religion degenerates into the 
endeavor to construct or find an idea of God ••• 
the resulting religion wil.l be s·o--aii'imic and 
weak that it will not have energy enough to 
breathe.1 
Whether there has been any deliberate attempt to out 
the life-lines of Ohristianity and to construct an entirely 
new (a so-called empirical) foundation is a auestion. There 
may have been s.n effort to break 1-1i th the past in the modern 
appeal to religious experience motivated by a desire to sim-
plify dogma and to minimize its impol"tanoe;. 2 But it is even 
more questionable whether any so-called empirical theologian 
has actually broken with history, tradition, revelation and 
other recorded testimonies to re1igious experience and helief. 
Speaking of the modern effort to build empirical religious 
philosophies or natural theologies, Martin declares that the 
11 divergent methodo-logical a~sumptione, ·interpretive schema 
and personal religious convictions implicit and explicit 11 
1. l1ieman, Art.(l9-44)} 57; 
see RESM, 48, 59, ol. 
2. See Moore, TRE, 162. 
are presuppositions rather than conclusions from experiment 
and that the reflections of the theologian upon general 
revelation are necessarily guided by his attitude towards 
certain central convictions or 11 special revelation11 which 
constitute the subject matter of a 1trevealed theology.ul 
4. The object of legitimate certainty 
Of what, then, may one be legitimately certain? He 
may be certain of both his theology and his experience of 
God if the theology is a rational-empirical theology. For 
on this basis a correlation has been effected between ce~ 
tainty and certitude. Individual experience of Goa has its 
roots, and thus, its very life, in historical soil. There 
is no reasonable divorcing of the individual and the his-
torical, theory and practice, arid experience and theologyZ; 
.The Christian life has two foci--the 
Gospel facts which reveal the grace of God 
and the inward experience of their redemp-
tive poweJ:>.. The task of theology is to ex-
plain and authenttcate the facts and inter-
pret the experience, and to set the two in 
their right relation to one another.J 
Sabatier joins the two foci mentioned by Hughes: 
11 Religion is simply the subjective revelation of God in man, 
and revelation is religion objective in Goa. 114 Christtan 
experience is conditioned by knowledge of., and faith in, 
Christ and His promisee, revealed in the Christian ScriP-
tures. Faithful following of the conditmons laid down there 
1 .. Martin, EPR, 122 .. 
2. See Hughes, TE, 237-
238. 
3. Hughes, ~E~ 64, 274. 
4. Satatier, uPR, 34. 
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for an experiment results inevitably in a demonstration .• 
There is action and reaction here; the relation between one's 
theology ~nd experience may be very intimate and vital. Con-
sequently, the certainty-~overwhelming certitude plus a high 
degree of logicaL certainty--concerning Christian experience 
naturally reacts .in favor of the theory or. the theology that 
made possible the demonstration. 
Oonsequen.tly, the correlation of certainty and certi-
tude by means of a.synoptic vi~T (including the various types 
of theistic arguments, experience, reason, faith, empiricism 
and rationalism) and verification of the religious hypothesis 
through its meeting of pragmatic and logical tests, furnish 
a certainty, that while not absolute, is adequate for the 
individual an~ tor a rational-empirical theologyo 
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ABSTRACT 
In the light of the thought of Immanuel Kant is there 
any justifiable certainty (particularly of God's existence)? 
This problem involves the su~ordinate problem: can logical cer-
tainty and psychological certainty (certitude) be correlated, 
i.e. is an empirical theology possible? Kant's treatment of 
the problem of God suggests three types of religious certainty 
or certainty-claims--theoretical, morB:l and experiential .. 
In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft,Kant exposed the weak-
nesses of the traditional theistic arguments as claims to 
logical or theoretical certaintyo Partly as a consequence, 
there is today a general dissatisfaction with the traditional 
theistic "proofs." As merely theoretical, they are abstract, 
the results of belief rather than·produoers .of it, having some 
value but producing no high degree of logical certaintyo 
In his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft _f;tnd_Kritik d·er 
. Urtheilskraft, Kant elaborated upon the idea advanced in the 
first Critique that what can not be demonstrated by the specu-
lative reason can be held as a reasonable belief by the prac-
tical reasono He viewed God as the Summum Bonum, Supreme 
Intelligence; who must exist if the happiness of the good is to 
be guaranteed, as. suoh a guarantee necessitates harmony petween. 
the moral and physical orders, a harmony only possible in their 
union under one Ruler. In aesthetic experience, also, Kant saw 
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an implication of God's existence, for he put the intuitive 
Judgments of the holy ana of a teleological universe upon the 
same plane as the immediate apprehensions of the beautiful and 
the sublime, all judgments of the practical reason. 
Th:e most serious dei'eot in Kant's moral "proof 11 is its 
narrow view of reason, faith and experience; this results in 
an arrested hypothesis, one out short in its approach toward 
a distinctive religious experienoeo For faith-may be viewed 
not only as pre-hypothetical and hypothetical, but also as 
post-hypothetical. This last faith is .the faith of the one 
who has conducted a successful religious experiment; he has 
a certitude that is not negated by make-b_elieve defini tiona 
(such as a definition of faith that would prevent a believer 
from being a knower), make•believe hypotheses (where the will-
to-believe degenerates into the- will-to-make-believe) , and 
make-believe moral arguments (which stand too near to hypoc-
risy, disillusionment and atheism). Granted that 11 he that 
cometh to God must believen _(the will-to-believe), yet judged 
by the testimony of countless numbers, liHe is a rewarder of 
. 
them that diligently seek Him." 
The chief value of Kant's moral argument is that it 
suggests a way of approach into the immediate presence of God--
the ~ay of faith. This faith may be ·described as active, 
necessary, primary, reasonable (although paradoxical) and 
emotionally-satisfying. 
The age-oJ.d appeal to distinctive religious experience 
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as a basis for certitude concerning God's existence has been 
stimulated by Wesley, Schleiermacher, James, and more recently, 
by the advance in science and by the revision of theistic argu-
ments along empirical llries. · 
Meanwhile, in dualistic empistemology there. is a bring-
ing of subject and object closer together in a "duality in the 
unity of experience." There is also a decline in the dogmatic 
and unqualified advocacy of. the doctrine ofp~obability .. Nega-
tively, this is apparent in the disagreement as to its nature, 
inconsistency in the denial of all.certainty, and the diminish-
ing vigor of assertions of the doctrine. Positively, the de-
cline is witnessed by the pressing of the following considera-
tions: the necessity of certitude for every-day life, non-infer-
ence as the essential nature of a datum, knowledge as a relation 
between two distinct terms in intimate union, some cognitive 
content in general awareness, dependence of probability upon 
certitude, and the denial of the merely hypothetical character 
of all empirical statements. In the light of all this, it seems 
unreasonable to deny the possibility of any: certainty •. 
It was Kant himself who laid a foundation for certitude 
concerning religious realities. For in Opus Postumum is found 
the concept of a personal God immediately revealed to the human 
soul. Such certitude is desirable in view of the alarming 'in-
crease in the number of those who are being treated by psychia-
trists and psychoanalysts, and the fact that it is impossible 
to live by uncertainties alone. The right of being psychologi-
cally certain is seen by the facts that desire for certitude 
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is an innate possession of the ra9e, that experience is gener-
ally reliable, and that there are some absolutes left in an age 
of uncertainty--such as absolute moral values and fixed business 
standards. 
Certitude regarCi,ing the existence of God is reasonable 
because unshakable oerti tude does not signify complete kno'tfl-
edge, certitude for self does not require proof for. others, and 
immediate experience of God is psychologically more compelling 
than the facts of science .and psychology (as an omnipresent 
Spirit can draw nearer the human spirit than can things or 
other human minds); this oertitude admit~ of psychological 
conditioning and is a human-divine interaction, an awareness, 
a mediated immediacy, a unique personal encounter (not pan-
theistic), and an incontrovertib-le fact., As the confrontatlon 
is an internal one, there is no fulcrum on which the 11 crow-bar" 
of denial can be rested in order to dislodge the mystic from 
hie position~ 
In immediate experience itself there seems to·be an 
intuitive grasp of 'tfholes. But when individual subjective 
experience becomes public experience and objective validity 
is given to the concept of God, an explicit step is taken 
toward the synoptic vietf requisite to the correlation of 
certitude and logical certainty. When, in addition,·part 
reason and part faith are made ~,.yhole, a still higher degree 
of logical certainty results •. This is intensified when ration-
alism and empiricism are joined. The connecting link in this 
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wedlock is mysticism.. Tl).e true mystic insists that his intui-
tions should be tested. Thus, the synoptic vision which appre-
hends reason, faith, and experience as wholes, which takes in 
ration~lism and empiricism, achieves the correlation of certi-
tude and logical certainty--the Wiesen of Kant. For with him, 
the culmination of.the steps of Meinung (theoretical opinion), 
Glauben (moral or practical belief), and Ueberzeugung (sub-
jective sufficiency of evidence for one's self) is Wiesen 
(''objective Gewissheito •• f£tr Jedermann 11 ). Applied to the 
knowledge of God, Wiesen is the inadequate logical certainty 
of theoretical theistic arguments, the partial certitude of 
Kant 1 s m~ral approach, plus the high degree of logical cer-
tainty acquired when individual experience is confirmed by 
race experience, when the correlation of certitude and logical 
certainty is perfected by authority--the living: or recorded 
testimonies of the multitudes who have experienced God. 
Belief in God can be verified. One personal contact 
with God is sufficient for permanent certitude of His existence, 
although not for full knowledge of His nature9 Consequently, 
certitude and tentativeness can exist side by side, making 
possible a revision of the religious hypothesis through the 
ages. In a sense, the direct experience of God is a self-
validating experience. For Bradley, Dewey, and Whitehead, 
i~ediate experience is the ultimate appeal. But to communi-
cate the experience, to make it others-convincing, the mystic 
has to supplement his certitude with logical certainty~ 
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Belief in God meets both the pragmatic and logical 
tests.· Mystioa.'11 experience often culminates in integrated 
thinking, dynamic living, higher moral and spiritual experi-
ence, and practical service. The synoptic vie1-r, taking in 
all the relevant facts--the theoretical, moral, experiential, 
and pragmatical aspects of religious Reality, has been a 
coherent view. ·Belief in God is a coherent belief when it 
is a synthesis of rationalism, empiricism, intuitionism, 
pragmatism and authoritarianism. And what is necessary to 
believe is reasonable to believe. Without the assurance 
. . . 
that Rationality is at the heart of the universe, human rea-
son is without real confidence in itself. As parallel lines 
may be· said to meet in infinity, so may it be said that 
thought and thing, existence and value, reason and revelation 
ultimately join in an .infinite Being.. Thus the unwavering and 
quite general prediction of certainty to theology today is not 
without warrant. It is a certainty which, while not absolute, 
is adequate for the individual and for a rational-empirical 
theology, a theology whose essential elements are: an object 
of experience, "perception11 ot·the object, experiment, reliance 
on testimony, and analysis, interpretation and systematization 
of the results of the experiment. 
The chief oonolusions reached are as follows: 1) There 
seems to be no reason for the denial of certainty of any kind. 
and of any degree .. 2) On purelytheoretioal grounds, there is 
no high degree of certainty in religious matters. 3) Certitude 
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of the existence of God is both desirable and reasonable. 
4). Practical certainty (certitude) of His existence is possible 
on the basis of the 11 moral 11 argument.. .5) There is a higher de-
gree of certitude in the experiential approach to God. 6) The 
synoptic view, comprising theoretical, moral, experiential and 
pragmatical aspects of religious Reality, is a coherent view. 
7) The certainty resulting from the correlation of certainty 
and certitude in this view, while not absolute, is adequate 
for the individual and for a rational-empirical theology. 
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